Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuremberg, October 1946 - April, 1949

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VOLUME XIII

“THE MINISTRIES CASE"

Given By

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Digitized by the Internet Archive
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TRIALS

OF

WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE

NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER

CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10

NUERNBERG

OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949

VOLUME XIII

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1952

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price 33.50 (Buckram)

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CONTENTS

“The Ministries Case”

[Introductory material and basic directives under which trials were conducted together with
Chapters I through VI of Case 11 are contained in volume XII. Chapters XIII through
XIX and Appendices A and B are contained in volume XIV. The index appears in
Appendix A.]

Page

VII. Murder and Ill-Treatment of Belligerents and Prisoners of

War — Count Three. 1

A. Introduction 1

B. The Sagan Murders 2

1. Affidavits of Defense Affiants Westhoff and Albrecht 2

2. Contemporaneous Documents 5

3. Testimony of Defendants Ritter and Steengracht von

Moyland and Affidavit of Defense Affiant Krafft 17

C. The Mesny Murder 32

1. Contemporaneous Documents 32

2. Affidavit of Prosecution Affiant Wagner and Testi-

mony of Prosecution Witnesses Wagner and Meurer. 47

3. Testimony of Defendant Berger 57

VIII. Atrocities and Offenses Committed against German Nationals on
Political, Racial and Religious Grounds from 1933 to 1939 —

Count Four. 76

A. Introduction 76

B. Defense Motion To Dismiss Count Four of the Indictment. 76

C. Oral Argument of the Defense on the Defense Motion to

Dismiss Count Four. 78

D. Oral Argument of the Prosecution on the Defense Motion

to Dismiss Count Four. 82

E. Concluding Oral Argument of the Defense on the Defense

Motion to Dismiss Count Four. 108

F. Order of the Tribunal Dismissing Count Four, and Tri-

bunal Memorandum Attached Thereto. 112

IX. Atrocities and Offenses Committed against Civilian Populations

— Count Five. 118

A. Introduction 118

B. Treatment of Nationals of Various Countries: Racial

Policy, “The Final Solution of the Jewish Question” 119

1. Contemporaneous Documents 119

2. Affidavits of Defense Affiants Donandt, Schroeder, and

Sonnleithner, and Testimony of Defense Witness
Schlabrendorff. 383

3. Testimony of the Defendants Schwerin von Krosigk,

Lammers, von Weizsaecker, Berger, and Veesen-
mayer. 403

C. Special Kommando Dirlewanger and Related Matters 508

1. Contemporaneous Documents 508

2. Testimony of Defendant Berger 534

D. Operation Zeppelin 551

1. Affidavit and Testimony of Prosecution Witness

Smolen. 551

iii

Page

2. Contemporaneous Documents 557

3. Testimony of Defendant Schellenberg 573

E. The German Resettlement Trustee Company — the “DUT” 597

1. Contemporaneous Documents 597

2. Testimony of Prosecution Witness Metzger 624

3. Affidavit of Defense Affiant Kleinschmidt 628

4. Testimony of Defendant Keppler 631

X. Plunder and Spoliation — Count Six 645

A. Introduction 645

B. Czechoslovakia 646

1. Contemporaneous Documents 646

2. Testimony of the Defendants Kehrl and Rasche 677

C. Poland 718

1. Contemporaneous Documents 718

2. Two Defense Affidavits and Testimony of the Defend-

ant Koerner. 742

D. Western Europe 751

1. Contemporaneous Documents 751

2. Testimony of Defendant Koerner 836

E. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 845

1. Contemporaneous Documents 845

2. Testimony of Defendant Koerner 901

F. Contemporaneous German Report on “Financial Contribu-

tions” of Occupied Areas to 31 March 1944. 911

G. Testimony of Defendant Schwerin von Krosigk on Various

Aspects of the Spoliation Charges. 925

XI. Slave Labor — Count Seven 942

A. Introduction 942

B. Contemporaneous Documents 943

C. Testimony of Defendants Koerner, Lammers, Kehrl,

Pleiger, and Berger. 1090

1. Koerner 1090

2. Lammers 1110

3. Kehrl 1118

4. Pleiger 1136

5. Berger 1155

XII. Membership in Criminal Organizations — Count Eight 1159

A. Introduction 1159

B. Contemporaneous Documents 1160

C. Testimony of Defendants Kehrl and Bohle 1189

1. Kehrl 1189

2. Bohle 1196

iv

VII. MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF BELLIGERENTS
AND PRISONERS OF WAR— COUNT THREE

A. Introduction

Eight of the defendants were charged under count three of
the indictment, “War Crimes: Murder and Ill-Treatment of Bel-
ligerents and Prisoners of War” (pars. 27 and 28). Five different
types of criminal activity were specified in the charges of this
count — (1) the murder of captured Allied flyers; (2) the murder
of members of Allied commando units; (3) the shooting of es-
caped Allied prisoners of war upon recapture — the so-called Sa-
gan murders; (4) the murder of the French General Mesny;
and (5) forced marches of Allied prisoners of war.

During the trial the prosecution withdrew its charges under
this count against defendant von Erdmannsdorff. In its judgment,
the Tribunal found three of the defendants — Dietrich, von Weiz-
saecker, and Woermann — not guilty on any of these charges.
The Tribunal found four of the defendants guilty as follows:
Lammers and Ritter under the charges concerning captured
Allied flyers; Ritter and Steengracht von Moyland as to the
Sagan murders; and Berger in connection with the murder of
General Mesny (sec. XV, vol. XIV). Upon a defense motion al-
leging errors of fact and law in the Tribunal’s judgment, the
Tribunal vacated its conviction of defendant Steengracht von
Moyland under this count (sec. XVIII D 2, vol. XIV).

In this section materials have been collected concerning two of
the five types of alleged criminal activity — the Sagan murders
(sec. B) and the case of General Mesny (sec. C). Materials con-
cerning the treatment of captured Allied flyers and Allied com-
mandos are included in the volumes of this series dealing with
the High Command case (vols. X-XI), and material concerning
the treatment of captured Allied flyers is also contained in the
volume devoted to the Justice case (vol. III). Evidence on the
treatment of belligerents and prisoners of war is also reproduced
below in section IX (Atrocities) and section XI (Slave Labor).

1

B. The Sagan Murders

I. AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE AFFIANTS
WESTHOFF AND ALBRECHT

TRANSLATION OF RITTER DOCUMENT 22
RITTER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 22

AFFIDAVIT OF ADOLF WESTHOFF, 31 MAY 1948, CONCERNING THE
SHOOTING OF RECAPTURED BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR FROM
THE SAGAN CAMP, AND RELATED MATTERS 1

I, Adolf Westhoff, at present at Nuernberg, having been in-
formed that I make myself liable to punishment if I make a
false affidavit, declare under oath that the following statement
is true and was made in order to be submitted as evidence before
the Military Tribunal IV at Nuernberg.

From February 1943 until the end of the war I was active in
Prisoner-of-War Affairs [Department] of the Armed Forces High
Command and later as Chief and Inspector until the end of the
war. My last rank was that of a brigadier general.

I know of the escape of the British prisoners of war from
Stalag Luft III in Sagan on 25 March 1944, during the time of
my former activity. Some of the recaptured PW’s were shot by
the police on Hitler’s orders already a few days after their
escape. 2 Field Marshal Keitel had issued strict orders according
to which it was prohibited to inform either in writing or by word
of mouth any of the other civilian or military offices, especially
the Foreign Office, of this incident. We were at that time un-
able to get any information at all from the Gestapo about these
matters, especially concerning the number of men who had been
shot and/or any details about it.

It was due to my cooperation that the British senior prisoner
of Camp Sagan was sent to England as an exchange PW. Shortly
afterwards Foreign Minister Eden informed the House of this
incident, his declaration being obviously based on information
which he had received from this senior prisoner of the PW
camp. The Foreign Office was then given by the OKW the in-
formation we ourselves possessed. If they ever had any infor-
mation from the Gestapo and whether it was correct is more

1 Westhoff also testified as a prosecution witness. His complete testimony is recorded in
the mimeographed transcript, 9 March 1948, pages 2923-2936.

a The Sagan shootings are discussed in the judgment of the IMT under the heading "Murder
and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War.” See Trial of the Major War Criminals, Vol. I, pp. 228-
232, Nuernberg, 1947. The IMT stated, among other things, that "In March 1944, 50 officers
of the British Royal Air Force, who escaped from the camp at Sag-an where they were confined
as prisoners, were shot on recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler.”

2

than I can say. I happen to remember, however, that Hitler’s
answer, when it was finally published, was drafted by himself.

The escape from camp Sagan took place at a time when mass
escapes of PW’s were quite frequent. The number of PW’s who
escaped in 1943 amounted to — as I remember — something like 43
thousand. As established by the Wehrmacht, the greater part of
them were organized mass escapes. There existed regular escape
committees in the British PW camps which organized the escape
attempts, drafted the plans which provided the PW’s with money,
maps, and all other escape material. It must be supposed that
the PW’s communicated with the foreign countries via the for-
eign civilian workers. There were also repeatedly found home-
made radio sets in the camp.

After Eden’s statement in the House of Commons I did not
learn that any recaptured PW’s had been shot. Document NG-
2318, Prosecution Exhibit 1284 1 was submitted to me. This was
a “warning to all PW’s to refrain from all further attempts at
escape.” I came across such drafts occasionally also at that time.
However, this matter was not handled in my office. I never
saw such a warning later on when I made my inspection tours
of the PW camps in which there were also British PW’s.

My answer to the question of what my interpretation of this
“warning” had been at that time, is that I saw in it merely a
measure which aimed at preventing further escapes and at mak-
ing impossible plant espionage and sabotage.

Nuernberg, 31 May 1948 [Signed] Westhoff

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT RITTER 21
RITTER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 21

AFFIDAVIT OF DR. ERICH ALBRECHT, CHIEF OF THE LEGAL DIVISION
OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, 31 MAY 1948, CONCERNING
THE SHOOTING OF FIFTY OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH AIR FORCE
AND DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT THERETO 2

I, Dr. Erich Albrecht, formerly Ministerial Dirigent in the
Foreign Office, have been duly warned that I make myself liable
to punishment if I make a false affidavit. As evidence for the
Military Tribunal IV in Nuernberg, I declare the following under
oath in accordance with the truth :

1 Reproduced later in this section. The portion of the document in question was a proposed
“warning” to be posted in prisoner-of-war camps which was transmitted by defendant Ritter
to Albrecht, Chief of the Foreign Office Legal Division, on 5 August 1944.

2 Albrecht also testified as a defense witness. His testimony is recorded in the mimeo-
graphed transcript, 4, 15-16 March and 28 October 1948; pages 2666-2686, 3260-3339, and
26673-26678.

3

In the case of the shooting of fifty officers of the British Air
Force who had escaped from Camp Sagan, the Swiss Legation
handed the Foreign Office a complaint from the British Govern-
ment at the end of April 1944. The note was submitted to the
Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs and I was told that I would
have to wait for directives from the Minister for handling the
matter.

At the middle of May, I was in Barcelona in order to direct
the German side of an exchange of seriously wounded and seri-
ously ill prisoners of war agreed upon with the British and
American Governments, as well as of medical personnel and
civilians. On the occasion of this exchange, the British officer
who had been senior prisoner in Sagan was exchanged. A few
days after my return from Barcelona, around 25 May, a younger
official from Ribbentrop’s circle of influence informed me by
telephone of the latter’s directive to come to Salzburg to work
out a note in reply to the British complaint. Here I learned
that Ribbentrop had requested the Reich Security Main Office
to send two officials to Salzburg with the necessary documents
regarding the incidents, and the OKW to send an officer of the
Prisoner-of-War Department; however, they had not yet arrived.

Soon after my arrival, a discussion of the case took place in
Ribbentrop’s presence, in which Ritter and I took part. At the
conclusion of the discussion, Ribbentrop authorized us to prepare
the draft of a reply note to the Swiss Legation on the basis of the
material which had been made available by the Reich Security
Main Office and to submit it to him for approval.

A few days later, two officials of the Reich Criminal Police
Office in Salzburg appeared and submitted photostatic copies of
teletype messages or written reports in which the heads of a
number of State Police Directorate offices in various parts of
Germany reported about the shooting of individuals or of entire
groups of prisoners of war escaped from Sagan. In the reports
the statement was always made, either that the escapees had been
shot in resisting recapture or in renewed attempts to escape after
recapture. All the material created the impression of having
been invented. When confronted with this, the officials of the
Reich Criminal Police Office did not actually admit it in so many
words, but did not dispute it seriously. After conferring with
Ritter, I nevertheless prepared the draft of a reply note on the
basis of this material, which Ritter submitted to the Minister
with the urgent advice from both of us not to let such a reply
be sent off. As Ritter told me, Ribbentrop came over to our
point of view and retained the sole right to issue directives for
the further handling of the matter.

4

In June I again took a business trip abroad, from which I
returned on 21 June. It is possible that on the next day, 22
June, I was questioned as to the stage of handling of the Sagan
affair with reference to a statement of Eden in the directors'
conference; I cannot remember, at any rate. The information
which I gave then must have corresponded with my present de-
scription, since I had heard nothing in the meantime regarding
any further development. At any rate, it is impossible that I
made the statement that the British would be sent a report that
the escaped officers had to be shot, since they did not comply
with the orders when they were captured; as mentioned above,
Ribbentrop had already decided at our suggestion that a reply
note should not be issued on the basis of the invented material
of the Gestapo.

I consider the memorandum of Thadden under section 1 of his
account of 22 June 1944 — Document NG 3496, Prosecution Ex-
hibit 1283 — to be an erroneous summary of what I was able to
answer at that time to the question about the stage of handling. 1
Nuernberg, 31 May 1948.

[Signed] Dr. Erich Albrecht
The above signature of Dr. Erich Albrecht was performed
before me, Dr. Erich Schmidt-Leichner, defense counsel at the
Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, and is hereby certified and at-
tested by me.

Nuernberg, 31 May 1948

[Signed] Dr. Erich Schmidt-Leichner

2. CONTEMPORANEOUS DOCUMENTS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2318 2
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1284

MEMORANDUM OF VOGEL, 25 MAY 1944, CONCERNING TELEPHONE
CONVERSATIONS ON THE SHOOTING OF BRITISH PRISONERS OF
WAR WITH SENIOR LEGATION COUNSELLOR SETHE OF THE
FOREIGN OFFICE

Copy File OKW

Memorandum

Today I telephoned Senior Legation Councillor Sethe and
pointed out to him that the memorandum of 20 May regarding

1 Eberhard von Thadden testified as a prosecution witness in this case. His memorandum
of 22 June 1944 to the Chief of Division Inland II of the Foreign Office is reproduced below
in this section. Von Thadden’s complete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed tran-
script, 3 March 1948, pages 2638-2664.

2 Other parts of this exhibit are reproduced below in this section according to their dates.

5

the British officers who escaped from a prisoner-of-war camp
contained under B, a sentence to the effect that “a provisional
communication on the subject of mass escape and shootings re-
sulting therefrom had been sent by the High Command of the
Armed Forces to the Foreign Office on 29 April 1944.” I re-
quested Senior Legation Councillor Sethe to let me have a copy
of this communication. Senior Legation Councillor Sethe said in
reply that the communication in question had never reached the
Foreign Office.

Upon instructions from Ambassador Ritter I telephoned Senior
Legation Councillor Sethe once more and told him that this would
have to be made clear to the High Command of the Armed Forces.
Senior Legation Councillor Sethe also said he had made a copy
of the communication of 29 April for himself at the High Com-
mand of the Armed Forces in Torgau. He said he would send
this to us together with a copy of his correction to the High
Command of the Armed Forces with the next courier.

Salzburg, 25 May 1944

[Signed] VOGEL

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-3901
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1282

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT RITTER, 5 JUNE 1944, CONCERNING
HIS DISCUSSION WITH FIELD MARSHAL KEITEL ON THE DRAFT
OF A NOTE TO THE SWISS LEGATION ON THE SAGAN MAHER
AND THE TRANSFER IN CHAINS BETWEEN CAMPS OF CERTAIN
BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR

Copy [Durchdruck]

Ambassador Ritter

No. 359 [Handwritten] OKW

1. On 4 June Field Marshal Keitel informed me that he agreed
to the draft of the note to the Swiss Legation regarding British
prisoners of war. He asked why we wanted to inform the pro-
tecting power of the funeral beforehand. This had not been
requested in the Swiss note. I replied that on a previous occa-
sion Switzerland had requested this and that the commander of
Sagan, Colonel Braune, had agreed to it. Keitel then also agreed.

[Marginal note] To be submitted: State Secretary, Minister Albrecht.
[Initial] A [Albrecht] 5 June.

2. On this occasion Field Marshal Keitel informed me of the
following :

A few days ago the British officers’ camp near Moravska Os-
trava had to be vacated and transferred to Brunswick, since the

6

camp in Moravska Ostrava is needed for other purposes. The
prisoners of war were transported from the station in Moravska
Ostrava to the station in Brunswick in chains. The reason for
this was that prior to the transport it had already been discovered
that the officers intended to make use of the opportunity afforded
by this train journey and escape. This intention had also been
expressed in letters which had been found. Several officers had
already hidden themselves in the Moravska Ostrava camp days
before, so that they would be left behind.

He intended to inform the Foreign Office of this, in case com-
plaints were lodged with regard to the chaining.

Salzburg, 5 June 1944

Signed : Ritter

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5844
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-372

NOTE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE SWISS LEGATION,
6 JUNE 1944, CONCERNING MEASURES TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO
THE SAGAN MATTER, AND NOTE OF THE SWISS GOVERNMENT
TRANSMITTING THIS NOTE TO THE BRITISH LEGATION IN BERN

Copy 1

Foreign Office

The Foreign Office is pleased to communicate the following to
the Swiss Legation, Division of Foreign Interests, 2 in answer
to the note of 26 May 1944 — No. 743 — relating to the escape of
British officers from Stalag Luft 3 :

A preliminary note was submitted to the Swiss Legation already
on 17 April, that is shortly after the escape which took place
on 25 March.

According to the investigations made meanwhile, it is certain
that 19 out of the 80 prisoners of war who escaped at that time
were taken back to the camp. While the hunt still continues at
time of writing and the investigations have not been concluded
as yet, there are preliminary reports on hand saying that 37
prisoners of war of British nationality were shot when they,

1 This document contained a certificate of the Acting British Consul at Bern, dated 10
August 1948, attaching true and faithful copies of the German notes of 6 June and 21 July
1944, together with copies of the transmittal notes of the Swiss Government to the British
Legation in Bern, The parts of the document concerned with the German note of 21 July
1944 are reproduced later in this section. The two German notes were in the German lan-
guage and the two transmittal notes were in the French language.

2 The German word “Schutzmachtabteilung” was frequently translated Protecting Power
Division or Protective Division. Since the Swiss used the French words “Division des
Interets Strangers,” the translations herein have been conformed throughout to “Division of
Foreign Interests.”

7

brought to bay by the pursuing detachment, offered resistance
or attempted a new escape after their recapture. Additional
preliminary reports are on hand showing that 13 other prisoners
of war of non-British nationality were shot after having escaped
from the same camp.

The Foreign Office reserves the right to make a definite detailed
statement after the conclusion of the investigation and as soon as
the details will be known. As regards the British inquiry for
the circumstance of the incident, the following can be said al-
ready :

Mass escapes of prisoners of war of different nationalities oc-
curred in March from the prisoner-of-war camps scattered all
over Germany. Several thousands of prisoners of war escaped
during the month of March. These mass escapes, prepared sys-
tematically and with General-Staff-like measures [generalstabs-
maessig] partly in connection with foreign countries, pursued po-
litical and military aims. They were an attack on the public
security of Germany and were at the same time intended to para-
lyze the agencies of administration and police. In order to nip
in the bud such rebellious ventures, especially severe orders were
issued to the pursuit detachments detailed for the recapture of the
fugitives — also for the protection of the pursuing detachments
themselves. Accordingly, the pursuit detachments, within the
compass of such a large scale pursuit action, have to launch a
relentless pursuit of escaped prisoners of war who disregard a
challenge while in flight or offer resistance or attempt to reescape
after having been recaptured, and to make use of their arms
until the fugitive is deprived of any possibility of resistance or
further flight. Save some few hundreds who could not be dis-
covered as yet, the prisoners of war escaped in the month of
March have been recaptured and taken back to the camps. Arms
had to be used against some prisoners of war. These include
the 50 prisoners of war of Stalag Luft 3.

When dealing with such mass escapes and on account of the
large scale pursuit actions throughout Germany necessitated
thereby, any exact clarification of individual cases is difficult and
takes time, the more so as the escaped prisoners of war have no
identification papers or other personal documents on them, refuse
to state their identities, or are in the possession of faked identity
papers. This is the explanation of the fact that exact data can-
not be gotten and reported to the protecting power with the usual
expeditiousness. At the time of writing, the large scale pursuit
action has not been concluded. As soon as this is the case, definite
information will be forwarded to the Swiss Legation.

8

In compliance with a desire of the British camp spokesman of
Stalag Luft 3, 29 urns containing the ashes of 29 shot prisoners
of war have been brought to Stalag Luft 3 so far. As regards
the time of the interment in the cemetery of Stalag Luft 3, the
protecting power will be advised in advance.

Berlin, 6 June 1944
(stamp)

D.C. 102-J/Ro Federal Political Department

Division of Foreign Interests

Subsequent to our note No. 28681, dated 9 June, the Federal
Political Department, Division of Foreign Interests, is pleased
to forward to H.M. Legation a note here inclosed which Baron
von Steengracht, State Secretary in the German Foreign Office,
handed over to the Swiss Minister in Germany in regard to the
death of 50 officers of the Royal Air Force who had escaped from
Stalag Luft 3 in Sagan.

In addition to the forwarding of this note, M. Feldscher states
that M. Gabriel Naville again has gone to the Stalag Luft 3 for
the 4th and 5th of June and will submit a special report on his
visit.

Bern, 12 June 1944
Enclosure :

Copy of a note (1) to The Legation of His Britannic Majesty,
Bern

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-3496
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1283

MEMORANDUM FROM VON THADDEN TO THE CHIEF OF DIVISION
INLAND II OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 22 JUNE 1944, CONCERNING
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SAGAN MATTER AND OTHER
MATTERS DISCUSSED AT A CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF THE
FOREIGN OFFICE

Legation Counsellor First Class von Thadden

The following points were brought up in today’s conference of
directors.

1. According to a statement made by Eden in the House of
Commons it is expected that a decision [Stellungnahme] will be
made with regard to the shooting of British prisoners of war
who escaped from German prison camps. With regard to this,
Herr Albrecht declared that the British had been informed via
Switzerland that several British and other escaped officers had

9

to be shot in the course of search activities because they refused
to submit to orders when captured. Nineteen other officers, who
did not offer resistance, were taken back to the camp without
further ceremony. Further details on the 50 cases of shootings
will be submitted to the British.

2. The Consulate in Monaco sent a wire concerning the French
national, Broussard. It was requested that Inland II check with
the Security Service as to what is known about this man. During
further discussions on this matter it was decided by the State
Secretary [defendant Steengracht von Moyland] that the Po-
litical Division inform Minister Abetz of the Monaco report and
instruct him to discuss this matter with Oberg, with the partici-
pation of Inland II.

3. The fact was brought out, as evidence against Turkey, that
Eden was able to state in the House of Commons that chrome,
on which an embargo had been placed for Germany, would now
be exported to England.

4. Under State Secretary Hencke mentioned a particularly in-
teresting report from Lisbon on the effectiveness of German
secret weapons, which however was not distributed. I succeeded
in securing one copy for the information of the Group Chief,
which is attached to this letter.

5. Although it was not mentioned at the conference of direc-
tors, I nevertheless managed by accident to receive information
that according to a wire from Stockholm a Swedish airline com-
pany was instructed to reserve a special plane for four Finnish
delegates to Moscow. In his wire Thomsen requested not to
disclose this information to the Finns in order to preserve the
source of information.

Berlin, 22 June 1944

Herewith submitted to Group Chief InlaTid II for information.

[Initials] v. Th. [von Thadden]

22 June

To the files

[initials] V Th [von Thadden]

10

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2318
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT I284 1

MEMORANDUM OF BRENNER 2 , 17 JULY 1944, SUBMITTED TO DE-
FENDANT RITTER, CONCERNING DECISIONS OF HITLER AND
VON RIBBENTROP ON THE HANDLING OF THE SAGAN AFFAIR

Copy-

Office of Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
Subject: Stalag Luft 3
Submitted to Ambassador Ritter

Minister von Sonnleithner 3 stated on 15 July, regarding the
memorandum to the Fuehrer dated 13 July, the following:

“The Fuehrer agrees to the note to the Swiss Legation re-
garding the escape of prisoners of war from Stalag Luft 3 and
has furthermore approved the drawing up of a warning and
publication of our note to the Swiss Legation.

“The Fuehrer was of the opinion that the warning also
should be made public and was in agreement with the forward-
ing of this warning to the Swiss Legation.”

End of message from Minister von Sonnleithner.

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs has accordingly decreed
the following:

1. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests Ambassa-
dor Ritter to pass on to the Swiss envoy our second reply to the
Swiss Legation regarding the escape of prisoners of war from
Stalag Luft 3.

2. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs requests Minister
Schmidt (Press), with regard to the publication of this note, to
submit an appropriate draft to the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs. In the press announcement the contents should also be
briefly mentioned.

3. Furthermore the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs re-
quests Ambassador Ritter to cooperate with the OKW when com-
posing the warning which is to be posted in the prisoner-of-war
camps, and to submit it to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
for approval.

In addition to the suggestion in the Fuehrer’s memorandum of
13 July — paragraph 2 — the warning could perhaps also state

1 Other parts of this exhibit are reproduced above and below in this section according to
their dates.

- Legation Secretary Brenner was an official in the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister.

3 Franz von Sonnleithner was an official in the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister, 1939-45.
He appeared as a defense affiant and witness. His complete testimony is recorded in the
mimeographed transcript, 26 August 1948, pages 18474-18499.

11

that in Germany there are certain “death zones” where very spe-
cial secret weapons are tested; any person found inside any of
these death zones will be shot at sight regardless of whether or
not he saw anything of the secret activities. As there are numer-
ous such zones in Germany, escaping prisoners of war would
expose themselves — as well as to the danger of being mistaken for
spies, saboteurs or enemy agents — to the danger of unwittingly
entering one of these zones and being shot.

“Westphalia,” 17 July 1944

Signed : BRENNER

Copy to Legationsrat Raykowski on account of paragraph 2.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5844
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-372

NOTE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE SWISS LEGATION,
21 JULY 1944, DECLINING TO MAKE FURTHER COMMUNICATION
WITH RESPECT TO THE SAGAN MATTER, AND NOTE OF THE SWISS
GOVERNMENT TRANSMITTING THIS NOTE TO THE BRITISH LEGA-
TION IN BERN*

Foreign Office Berlin W 8

R 10 880 Wilhelmstrasse 74-76

' Note Verbale

The Foreign Office has honor in acknowledging to the Swiss
Legation, Division of Foreign Interests, the receipt of the note
dated 26 June — No. 983 — concerning the escape of prisoners of
war from Stalag Luft 3.

On 23 June, the British Foreign Secretary, without awaiting
the result of the German investigations, made a declaration in
this respect which the Government of the Reich most emphati-
cally rejects. The Foreign Secretary of a country which started
the bomb war against the civilian population, and which mur-
dered tens of thousands of German women and children by
terror attacks on places of residence, hospitals, and cultural
institutions; which, in an officially printed “manual on modern
irregular warfare” for “His Majesty's Service” literally orders
its soldiers to use the methods of gangsters, as for instance to
gouge out the eyes of defenseless enemies lying on the ground
or to crush their heads with stones, must be, denied the moral
right to make a stand in this matter at all or to raise com-
plaints against others.

* The German note of 6 June 1944 is reproduced earlier in this section under the same
document and exhibit number.

12

In consideration of this unprecedented attitude of the British
Foreign Secretary, the Government of the Reich declines to
make further communications in this matter.

Berlin, 21 July 1944

To the Swiss Division of Foreign Interests in Berlin

Federal Political Department
D.C. 102 — CA/Ro Division of Foreign Interests

Subsequent to our note D.C. 102 — J/Ro of 12 June (29012)
relating to the death of 50 officers who escaped from Stalag
Luft 3, the Federal Political Department, Division of Foreign
Interests is pleased to forward to H.M. Legation the copy of a
note R 10830 which was addressed to the Special Division of
the Swiss Legation in Berlin by the German Foreign Office on
21 July 1944.

Bern, 25 July 1944
Enclosure :

Copy of a note (3) to The Legation of His Britannic Majesty,
Bern

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2318
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1284*

MEMORANDUM FROM DEFENDANT RITTER TO ALBRECHT, 5 AUGUST
1944, TRANSMITTING AND COMMENTING UPON A DRAFT OF A
"WARNING" TO BE POSTED IN PRISONER-OF-WAR CAMPS

Ambassador Ritter
No. 609

To Minister Albrecht

The enclosed version of the “warning” has now been approved
by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and the OKW. The
Armed Forces Operations Staff is now passing the warning to
the Propaganda Section of the OKW for translation. When
the translation is completed, copies of the warning will be given
to the Prisoners-of-War Section of the OKW for distribution
to the camps.

The Foreign Office has not yet communicated this warning
to the Swiss Government. The time of this communication must
coincide with the time of the posting of the warning in the
camps. I request you to contact the Prisoners-of-War Section of

* Other documents of this exhibit appear above and below in this section according to their
dates.

953402—52 2

IS

the OKW with regard to this time and recommend that the
wording of a note to the Swiss Government be submitted to the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs for approval a few days in
advance, so that the note is dispatched as soon as possible after
the warning has been posted in the camps.

Westphalia, 5 August 1945

Signed : Ritter

[In Ritter’s handwriting]

Megerle has received a copy simultaneously.

[Initial] R [Ritter]

[Enclosure]

Distributed by Major Kipp on 4 August 1944

L.

To all Prisoners of War

Escape from prison is no longer a game! Germany has al-
ways adhered to the Hague Land Warfare Convention and has
punished recaptured prisoners of war only by disciplinary meas-
ures. Germany will adhere to the tenets of international law in
the future as well. England, however, has carried the war be-
yond the honest fighting of the front-line soldiers into the oc-
cupied territories and even up to the borders of the Reich
itself by using commando, terror, and sabotage units. In an
English official secret instruction booklet, “Handbook of Modern
Irregular Warfare,” which was captured by us, the following
paragraphs occur:

“The times in which we fought according to the rules of
competitive sports are over. Now every soldier has to be a
gangster at the same time, and must, if required, use gang-
ster methods.

“The sphere of operations should always include the enemy
country, every occupied country, and, under certain circum-
stances, such neutral countries as he can use as sources of
supply.”

Thus England has begun gangster warfare! Germany will
protect her own territory, and especially her war industry and
her supply installations for the fighting front. For this purpose
restricted zones, so-called “death zones,” have been created in
which every nonauthorized person will be shot at sight. Escaped
prisoners of war, who unwittingly happen to come upon such
death zones, will lose their lives. Thus, they are in constant
danger of being taken for enemy agents or terror troops. We
therefore issue strict warning against further attempts at escape !

14

The escape from prisoner-of-war camps today is a damned
dangerous undertaking. The chances of remaining alive while
making your escape have been reduced to almost nothing. All
police and guard details have received strict orders to use their
guns against any alien who exhibits suspicious behavior.

Thus, escape from prison is no longer a game!

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2318
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1284

EXTRACTS FROM A MEMORANDUM OF MINISTER WINDECKER ON
A CONFERENCE OF 21 NOVEMBER 1944, AND MEMORANDUM OF
DEFENDANT RITTER TO WINDECKER, 8 DECEMBER 1944, RETURNING
WINDECKER'S MEMORANDUM AND CRITICIZING MENTION THERE-
IN OF THE SAGAN SHOOTINGS ON THE GROUND THAT THE
DOCUMENT WAS NOT CLASSIFIED AS TOP SECRET

I. Extracts from the memorandum of Minister Windecker on the first con-
ference of the Prisoner-of-War Service of the Foreign Office held on
21 November 1944

Prisoner-of-War Service
G.d.K. No. 515/44

Highly confidential

Memorandum* on the Conference of the Prisoner-of-War
Service on 21 November 1944, 1100 hours, at the Conference
Room 109a, Wilhelmstrasse 76

Before the conference began, Minister Windecker stated that
the first conference of the Prisoner-of-War Service had only
inter office importance, while other offices dealing with prisoner-
of-war matters outside of the [Foreign] Office would also be
invited to the following conferences. Minister Schmidt said that
he had called this conference because the Reich Foreign Min-
ister was especially interested in prisoner-of-war matters. For
this reason the direction of all these matters is being consoli-
dated within the Prisoner-of-War Service with Minister Win-
decker as Secretary General. The political indoctrination of
prisoners of war, he continued, has furthermore become of prime
importance inasmuch as the general treatment of PW’s, after
the evacuation of extensive territory, constituted the one ele-
ment from which the office could still reap political and propa-

* The distribution list attached to this document, which is not reproduced here, shows that
41 copies of this memorandum were circulated to various persons in the Foreign Office, and
among others to defendants Steengracht von Moyland and Ritter. A letter by Ritter concerning
this memorandum is reproduced just below.

15

gandistic advantages. Since 1940, the Foreign Office worked with
excellent results in the field of prisoner-of-war treatment. This
work necessitated close cooperation with the military authorities
which, as a whole, was a fruitful undertaking, but also led to
various tensions during the actual working process. In order
to smooth over similar difficulties which might occur eventually,
Minister Windecker has now been appointed to take charge
of all questions relating to prisoners of war. It follows from
this that all departments of the Foreign Office dealing with
these matters would now have to work in close contact with
Minister Windecker.

*******

After that Geheimrat Reinhardt who, as Minister Windecker
expressed it, is “at the front” of the Prisoner-of-War Service,
gave a survey of his activities. Upon suggestion of Geheimrat
Hesse, he began his work with prisoners in August 1943 starting
with the British sector. At first it was necessary to emphasize
repeatedly the necessity and importance of treating the prisoners
well, if only for the reason that complaints to the protecting
power would have no foundation. It was also necessary to over-
come a certain resistance on the part of the military authorities.
The labor offices were convinced of the fact that the prisoners
would do more and better work if they were treated well. He
further said that the difficulties to be overcome in the care of
the prisoners were great, since the camps and labor commands
were often situated far away from any railroad connection points.
The personnel was not always of the best caliber and it was
difficult to influence them en masse. In many respects, Amer-
icans were to be treated differently from the British. They did
not adjust themselves as easily to living in camps. On the other
hand, it was easier to start a conversation with them once they
had overcome the fear of their own counterintelligence. Escapes
from the camps, so greatly feared by the military because they
result in court martials, should often not be taken too seriously
because they were partly made only in order to carry out a
regulation which provided that there would be no promotion later
on if not even an attempt at escape had been made. Therefore,
such occurrences as in camp Sagan, in which 50 officers were
shot after having made an attempt to escape, are extremely re-
grettable. Through such happenings, he said, months of propa-
ganda work are reduced to nothing. For the same reason
also disciplinary camps cannot be considered as appropriate.

*******

16

End of the conference, 1230 hours.

Enclosed list of those present. 1

Signed : Windecker

2. Memorandum of defendant Ritter to Minister Windecker, 8 December
1944, returning a copy of the memorandum of the conference of the
Prisoner-of-War Service and commenting upon the mention in the memo-
randum of the Sagan Affair

Copy

Ambassador Ritter
No. 1034

To Minister Dr. Windecker

I am sending back to you the memorandum about the con-
ference of the Prisoner-of-War Service No. 515.

The memorandum is very interesting. Since, however, the
matters concerning prisoners of war are no longer under the
supervision of the OKW but under the SS, I have no active in-
terest in this matter. I therefore request that I be taken off the
distribution list in the future and that you cease to invite a
representative of my office to the conferences.

The sentence on page 8, “Therefore, such occurrences as in
camp Sagan, in which 50 officers were shot after having made
an attempt to escape, are extremely regrettable,” should not
have been written into a document which is not being treated
as Top Secret matter. 2 3 * *
Berlin, 8 December 1944

Signed : Ritter

[Illegible handwriting]

3. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS RITTER AND STEENGRACHT
VON MOYLAND AND AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE AFFIANT
KRAFFT

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT RITTER 8

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Dr. Schmidt-Leichner (counsel for defendant Ritter) : Wit-
ness, please give us your personal data.

Defendant Ritter: Karl Ritter, born 6 June 1883, at Doer-
flass. My education was the usual one — public school, high
school, university. I studied law, history and geology. My first

1 This list, not reproduced here, shows 35 persons as having been present at this conference.
None of the defendants were present.

2 Windecker’s memorandum was marked “Highly confidential.”

3 Complete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 12-16 July 1948; p«ge«

11743-11897, 11907-12000, 12168-12270, and 12447-12524.

17

state examination I took in 1905. Since at that time I did not
know what career to choose, I first of all worked for several
years at the Cologne Newspaper, Koelnische Zeitung, in the
Economic Department. Eventually I decided to enter the Colonial
Service, and in 1909 I passed my second state examination, and
until 1914 I worked in the Colonial Service. The first part of
my service I served at the Reich Colonial Office in Berlin but
the greater part of my career was spent in West Africa.

It so happened that by chance I was home on leave after a
severe case of malaria when the war broke out in 1914, and until
the middle of 1915 I was at the front lines as a volunteer. Be-
cause of my tropical illness I was declared unfit for further
active service.

In 1915 I entered the Reich office for Interior, Berlin, and
when economic matters were separated from the old Reich Min-
istry of interior and a new Reich Economics Office was set up
in 1917, I stayed at the new Reich Economics Office until 1919.

In 1919 I transferred to the Reich Finance Ministry. In these
three Ministries I only worked on economic affairs. At the
Ministry of the Interior I was concerned with food and raw
materials. In the Reich Economic Office I was concerned with
currency and credits, bank policy, and the same subjects still
remained under my jurisdiction in the Reich Ministry of Finance.
When the reparations became a matter of interest, I became
special Referent on the Question of reparations in the Ministry
of Finance.

Until 1922 I stayed at the Ministry of Finance when I entered
the Foreign Office. I did so for the following reason. The
problems connected with the reparations were, first of all, con-
sidered as a purely financial matter by the Reich government in
Berlin. Therefore, the Finance Ministry was the one to deal i
with all reparation questions. However, when it became evident
that the problem of reparations was the nucleus of the foreign
policy, and remained such until 1932, the Foreign Office had j
the desire as early as 1921 that I should be transferred to the !
Foreign Office, and so requested such transfer.

* * * * * * *

Q. The period of time from when the war broke out on 1
September 1939 until the time when you took over the position
as liaison man for Ribbentrop in 1940 I can skip, because there
have been no charges raised against you for that period; there-
fore, we don't have to go into the functions and missions you j
performed during that period. Before going into your activity
as liaison man between Ribbentrop and Keitel, from which the
prosecution has derived certain charges against you, I want first l

18

to have you describe this position and your jurisdiction in this
position. When were you given this assignment?

A. In October 1940. As far as I remember, that is. I had
thought that it was only in the spring of 1941, but with the
assistance of the documents I have convinced myself that this
was an error and that I took over in 1940.

* He sH * Hs * *

Q. I now turn to document book 40. That is the so-called
Sagan case. Mr. Ritter, the prosecution maintains that concern-
ing the escape of British officers from the Sagan camp, the For-
eign Office was fully informed and prepared the diplomatic con-
ciliatory notes to Switzerland as the protecting power, and you
in particular are charged with having, as it says, permitted
this policy of shooting escaped prisoners when recaptured. You
are supposed to have issued a warning. We know that this
escape of British prisoners took place on 25 March 1944, and
the shooting only 1 or 2 days later. I would like to ask you
first of all, when and how did you hear anything of this Sagan
case at the time?

A. Ribbentrop asked me on the telephone one day whether I
knew the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden’s statement
made in the House of Commons concerning the shooting of es-
caped British officers. The date of this inquiry I cannot give
from my own memory. The documents which have now been
submitted make it possible for me to reconstruct that the date
must have been on or about 25 May 1944. My memory does not
coincide with this reconstruction. I would have assumed that
it was about the middle of June. I told Ribbentrop that I did
not know this statement. Thereupon Ribbentrop read it to me
over the telephone and told me, “Ask Keitel urgently what he
knows about it.”

Q. Did you have the impression that Ribbentrop himself was
not yet informed about the question?

A. Yes. I did have that impression on the telephone because
if he had known more he presumably would have told me. I had
the same impression later when I briefly discussed it again with
him. I called up Keitel and noticed from Keitel’s very first words
that quite in contrast to his usual eloquence, Keitel was remark-
ably brief. He knew the Eden statement, and I had the im-
pression that he was prepared for a telephone call from the
Foreign Office. He just told me briefly, “Prisoners of war are
subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command only for as
long as they are in prisoner-of-war camps. When they have es-
caped, the Armed Forces High Command is not concerned with
their recapture. That is a matter for the Security Service, and

19

its various subsections of police, traffic police, railway police,
etc.” As this brief information did not satisfy me, I asked him
repeatedly what he knew, whether he didn't know anything else,
but he just repeated these few sentences two or three times.
It was obvious to me that Keitel knew more but didn’t want
to say more. I called up Ribbentrop again and told him that
and Ribbentrop said “Then it’s settled as far as you’re concerned.
If that is a Security Service and police matter, then I will ask
Wagner” — that was his liaison man with Himmler — “to ask
Himmler about it.” That settled the matter for me for the time
being. I am convinced that it would have been settled for me
finally if, because of my readiness to help as a colleague and
because of my conscientiousness — you can call it stupidity, if you
like — I had not voluntarily later on intervened again in the mat-
ter.

Q. May it please the Tribunal, with reference to Keitel’s reply
which the witness just mentioned, I would like to refer to Ritter
Exhibit 20, document book 2, page 15. 1 That is an affidavit by
the former Lieutenant Colonel Krafft, an officer in the Prisoner-
of-War Division of the OKW. Krafft says, and I quote, “In our
division it was generally known that Keitel had strictly forbidden
that the Foreign Office was to be informed about the instructions
issued to the police and their consequences.”

Mr. Ritter, after the British Foreign Minister had made a
public statement in the House of Commons, then presumably
a note from the protecting power must have come in before that?

A. That’s possible, but on the other hand it may not be so. 2
I would like to say here that I do not believe that I will succeed
in clearing up the whole connection and the chronological se-
quence on all these events because I’m not acquainted with them
myself. The documents of the prosecution are so full of gaps
that even on the basis of the documents I cannot reconstruct the
actual sequence of events. After all, I didn’t handle the matter,
as later documents show. The head of the Legal Division, Al-
brecht, was ad hoe on this occasion called twice to Salzburg.
He handled the matter. I was only consulted sporadically later
on, and I was therefore not acquainted with the chronological
sequence myself. I must limit myself to testifying about the
few things I know about the case itself.

1 Reproduced at the end of this section.

2 The Foreign Office rendered several notes to the Swiss Legation, Division of Foreign
Interests. The Foreign Office note of 6 June 1944 is reproduced earlier in this section as a
part of Document NG-5844, Prosecution Exhibit C-372. This note states further that "A pre-
liminary note was submitted to the Swiss Legation already on 17 April, i.e., shortly after the
escape which took place on 25 March.” This document was put in evidence as a prosecution
rebuttal document.

20

Q. May it please the Tribunal, I would like to refer to the
affidavit of Mr. Albrecht with reference to this question. That
is Ritter Defense Exhibit 21* in my book 2, page 19. How did
matters develop, Mr. Ritter? You have just mentioned Mr. Al-
brecht.

A. Well, as far as I'm concerned, nothing happened for the
time being. I only remember that one day Mr. Albrecht ar-
rived in Salzburg. He was head of the Legal Division, and in
answer to my question as to what he was doing in Salzburg he
said that Ribbentrop had called him to Salzburg with reference
to this case in order to handle it. A note from Switzerland as
protecting power had come in, quoting an inquiry about the in-
cident. Albrecht was living in the same hotel as myself. We
ate our meals together and went for walks together, so it hap-
pened quite naturally that he told me about the development of
the case as two colleagues who knew each other well will talk
about their business affairs. During these conversations, as a
precaution, alerted as a result of other incidents, I always at-
tached importance to making it clear to Albrecht: “Albrecht, it's
your affair. I have nothing to do with it but I am pleased to
listen to what you want to tell me." Soon, two Security Service
officials arrived from Berlin. They brought a number of tele-
grams from various parts of the Reich containing reports about
the shooting of escaped prisoners of war, sent by the local police
to a central agency in Berlin, I presume to the Reich Security
Main Office or some other Berlin central agency. These tele-
grams indicated that at a number of places in Germany the
prisoners of war had been shot, either while escaping or after
their recapture when trying to escape once again. When Albrecht
told me about these telegrams I said “Do let me see them," and
at first sight I said : “Albrecht, that's a swindle." I tumbled to it
because although these 12 to 15 telegrams outwardly, as far as
the outer form went, were very carefully imitated to look like
genuine telegrams, and all the outward formalities were ac-
curately reproduced ; the contents of the telegrams were so child-
ishly simple; they all sounded so alike for all these 12 or 15
cases that to a halfway intelligent reader it was obvious that
12 to 15 agencies could not send in telegrams so identical in text.
Concerning the further course of events my memory does not
quite correspond to Albrecht's in his affidavit. I don't mean to
say that I am in any way doubting Albrecht's testimony. I
would like to say that, because for decades I have been taking
quinine, I suffer from peculiar lapses of memory and, therefore,
myself mistrust my own memory to a very large extent. As far
—

* Reproduced earlier in this section.

21

as I remember, Albrecht had already made a first attempt, on
the basis of these telegrams, to dictate a reply and this he
showed me. I said to Albrecht: “You’re not going to be taken in
by these forgeries, are you?” Or perhaps I said: “We” — we
being the Foreign Office — “We can’t take these as basis for a
reply. You must tell Ribbentrop quite openly that that’s a
swindle and suggest that the Foreign Office get proper informa-
tion from the RSHA, or whatever the proper agency is, which
privately tells the Foreign Office all about it. Only then can
we make up our minds how to treat the case for outward con-
sumption.” Albrecht immediately accepted the advice and I
gave him a second piece of advice. He was not just to tell
Ribbentrop about this verbally, but to take a draft along, pre-
pared on the basis of these forged telegrams, and show it to him
while reporting verbally so that Ribbentrop, on the basis of
such a document, could see for himself that it was impossible
like that. I made this proposal because of my own experience
with Ribbentrop, that is, the experience that the easiest and
quickest way to get him to make up his mind was to submit
something to him in writing. Without anything in writing, it
usually turned out to be an unbounded and endless conversation.

Albrecht followed this advice too, and that is where my mem-
ory again differs from that of Albrecht. As far as I remember,
I said, “Go to Ribbentrop with this note and talk to him about
it,” and for that reason I even offered to accompany him, al-
though it was absolutely clear between us that he was the re-
sponsible person. I offered to do it out of sheer kindness. Al-
brecht was a first-class lawyer when sitting at the desk, and I
had a great deal of respect for him but he did not have the neces-
sary force or eloquence to persuade other people or to contradict
them decisively, and I wanted to help him. That is what I
mentioned at the beginning when I said that I got into this thing
on my own account because of wanting to help a colleague after
being excluded completely before.

Albrecht’s version is different. In his affidavit he is of the
opinion that no oral report was made to Ribbentrop but that a
written report in which both of us told Ribbentrop, on the basis
of these obviously forged telegrams from the Security Service,
that we tried to draft a note but found it impossible to send off
this draft. It was all a swindle and we suggested that he author-
ize the Foreign Office to ask the Reich Security Main Office, or
whatever was the competent agency, to ask for actual facts of
the case. Ribbentrop approved that and the RSHA was asked,
through channels unknown to me — I suspect Albrecht did it
either verbally or in writing — they were told, “It’s a swindle.

We want the true facts.” As far as I remember, Albrecht sat
around Salzburg for weeks without doing anything and waited
for this statement of facts. He made repeated attempts to go
back to Berlin because his sense of duty did not allow him just
to accept the fact of sitting idly around Salzburg. I told him
a thousand times, “Albrecht, stay here. If you ask Ribbentrop
for permission to go back I will ask Ribbentrop not to let you
go, because if you go then I will get stuck with the thing. You
are the person responsible, not me, quite apart from the fact
that I don’t know anything about international law.”

Q. So the outcome was that Ribbentrop allowed himself to be
convinced and did not send off a note?

A. Correct.

Q. I’d just like to clear up some small formality, Mr. Ritter.
You mentioned these telegrams and mentioned the SD. I pre-
sume that you don’t meant it in the technical sense. I suppose
it’s possible that it was the Reich Criminal Police Office?

A. Even now I haven’t the faintest idea what the Reich Se-
; curity Main Office is, and that name you mentioned just now I
hear for the first time. I have no idea what the distinction is
between the Security Service or Criminal Police. I just mean
this whole set-up of police.

Q. Was there not a representative of the OKW, Lieutenant
Colonel Krafft, in Salzburg at that time, whose affidavit I have
referred to?

A. Yes. I had quite forgotten about Krafft’s visit but after
reading Krafft’s affidavit I remembered about it again, although
not in great detail. At about that time, Admiral Buerkner called
• me up, the Chief of the Foreign Division [of Intelligence Depart-
ft ment] of the OKW, and told me there that Lieutenant Colonel
1 Krafft would visit me, without saying what he was coming to see
l S me about. I asked Buerkner, “What is he coming about?” But he
el gave me to understand that he couldn’t discuss it on the tele-
phone. When Krafft came to see me in my hotel room and told
h e me what it was all about, I called in Albrecht. According to
my somewhat vague memory, Krafft, however, could not give
lSlS us any concrete new facts. Except that, 2 or 3 months earlier,
ice 'l a perfectly horrible act had taken place, in the course of which
oft 46 — no t 50 — 46 British officers had been shot. That was nothing
new to me at that moment in so far as from the forged police
'i 01 telegrams I had gathered the same thing. But as for how and
s 0 , when and at whose orders that was done, Krafft, as far as I could
;kei remember, couldn’t tell us anything either.
id 11

****** *

23

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT
STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND * 1

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Dr. Haensel (counsel for defendant Steengracht von Moy-
land) : Witness, please give us your full name.

Defendant Steengracht von Moyland : Dr. Adolf von Steen-
gracht.

Q. And where do you live?

A. In Nuernberg.

Q. And where is your residence?

A. In Moyland.

* * * * * * *

Q. And now, up to the time when you were appointed State
Secretary 2 , did you remain technical chief of field headquarters
and deputy chief of the adjutant’s office?

A. Yes. I remained in that same capacity up to the time when
I was appointed to the position of State Secretary.

Q. And were you expected to do things or carry out duties in
that capacity which were against your conscience?

A. No. I was not expected to fulfill any such duties. I was
only in charge of purely technical affairs and in charge of a
purely technical staff, and it was my endeavor to carry out my
technical duties properly, as well as I could. In other respects,
there were many things that I did hear of that did suit me and
I also heard of many things that did not suit me. Whatever
did not seem to me to be right — and of course, only within the
close circle of my activity — I frankly and honestly notified Rib-
bentrop of it accordingly and I drew his attention to these things
whenever I thought that a stop had to be put to some measure
or other. And above all, I made it my duty to see to it that
many people who were there whose lives were very hard indeed
— I saw to it that these people found help and subsidy and that
the manners observed by us remained on a decent level and that
there was a sense of fellowship between us.

4c 4: 4c 4! 4c 4c *

Q. Mr. von Steengracht, why did you become State Secretary?
We had mentioned Ribbentrop’s suggestion.

1

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1 The complete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 23-25, 28-30 June,

1 July 1948; pages 9751-9793, 9861-9962, 10060-10103, 10134-10163, 10184-10395, 10472-10524,
10552-10581, and 10618-10675.

a Steengracht’s detailed testimony concerning his activities in the Foreign Office before he
became State Secretary in 1943 has been omitted. Steengracht testified that he had been
agricultural attach^ and later a member of the Protocol Division at the German Embassy in
London; that about October 1938 he was recalled to Berlin and assigned to the Protocol Divi-
sion there; that after the war began he was put in charge of the management of the train
which was von Ribbentrop’s "field headquarters.”

sast]

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24

A. Ribbentrop, as 1 said, thought that I was the man who
would be ready mainly to fight out his competency quarrels for
him and he also thought that I was not ambitious to cross his
path with Hitler in any way, that is, try to gain Hitler's sym-
pathy for myself. On the other hand, he knew that I was in-
dependent and that neither the Party, nor the SS, nor any other
organization, could offer me any advantages. So he considered
me to be a man who, so far as one could be free at all in the
Third Reich, had preserved his freedom.

*******

Q. When did you enter office?

A. I took office only about 5 weeks later, on 5 May 1943.

Q. What was the cause of this delay? The appointment was
for 30 March, wasn’t it, and you started work on 5 May 1943?

A. The long interval is first explained by the fact that Mr.
von Weizsaecker had been State Secretary for a long time* and
was liquidating his affairs in Berlin, and I had to turn over my
technical operations to other people and had to arrange other
matters so that these 5 weeks passed by.

Q. What special instructions did Ribbentrop give you when
you left the field headquarters?

A. When I left the field headquarters, Ribbentrop told me what
my assignments would be. In the course of that talk we had had
that time in the train, between Breslau and Salzburg, he had
already told me, as a matter of principle that he wanted to con-
^ i sider whether, after what had just taken place, after I had quite
1 clearly told him that in many things I would under no circum-
16 stances execute his orders, that he must think things over and
^ that he would either appoint me to become State Secretary or
S s that I would be shot. When I was ordered to Berlin I demanded
re once again to receive clear instructions what I was supposed to
^ do and what he imagined my sphere of tasks to be. He said,
^ “Your sphere of tasks includes three points: You must handle
^ routine contacts with diplomats in Berlin; you must maintain
w discipline in the Foreign Office; and you must protect the com-
petencies of the Foreign Office toward all agencies, with ruthless

( energy.” These were the definitely prescribed assignments he
gave me. I told him that I presumed that in political respects,
too, I would have a voice. Ribbentrop declined that absolutely,

I saying that that had been the old battle with Mr. von Weiz-
saecker — he had always tried to interfere in politics ; but politics
was exclusively the concern of Hitler and himself (Ribbentrop).
!ore JJ The Foreign Office and myself were just to carry out the orders
is we received. That was my sphere of tasks.
ol #

, e trji® * Defendant von Weizsaecker was State Secretary from the spring of 19S8 until he was suc-
ceeded by defendant Steengracht von Moyland.

25

Dr. Haensel: I would like to refer to my document book 7,
Documents 119 and 120, and to Document 118 1 in the same book.

Q. Did you have any time to get used to the routine of your
office?

A. No. You must consider that it was the end of the fourth
year of war. At that time conditions were very hectic. It was
impossible then anymore to make any long term dispositions ar-
rangements. So, on 4 May, in the evening, I arrived in Berlin.
On 5 May I went to Mr. von Weizsaecker and he handed over to
me the office in a quite short informal discussion, without my
having been shown or told anything. He opened the safe, gave me
the keys of the safe, which contained an old secret document,
quite without interest, and the whole safe contained 59 marks.
For the rest, he asked me especially to see to our relations with
the Papal Nuncio, not to let our contacts with Canaris break
off, and to look after the old officials as well as possible. That
is all that Mr. von Weizsaecker told me. I received no further
instructions or introduction.

Q. At that time did he also tell you about the basic principles
of his resistance work and introduce you into this, more or less
as his successor?

A. No, he did not.

Q. Did you now sit down at your diplomatic desk and read
the most important documents?

A. No. I had no time for that. I sent for the departmental
chiefs and asked them to inform me about the current affairs and
1 started my routine work.

*******

Q. Now we come to document book 40 which concerns the
shooting of the Sagan airmen. Please look at Document NG-
3901, Prosecution Exhibit 1282, 1 2 at the beginning, at page 2 in
your book. Did you see the document at the time? Exhibit 1282,
in document book 40.

A. Again, there is no initial on it.

Q. But it says so in the index. 3

A. But in the document it doesn’t say “submitted” but “to
be submitted.” Whether it really was submitted is not shown.

1 Documents Steengracht 119 and 120, Steengracht Defense Exhibits 119 and 120, were both
affidavits of Andor Hencke, a Ministerial Director and Under State Secretary in the Foreign
Office during the period when Steengracht was State Secretary. Document Steengracht 118,
Steengracht Defense Exhibit 118, is an affidavit of Hans Schroeder, chief of the Personnel
Division of the Foreign Office. These affidavits are not reproduced herein.

2 Reproduced earlier in this section.

3 Reference is made to the index to prosecution document book 40 where this document is
described as a memorandum of defendant Ritter “submitted to Steengracht and Albrecht.”
This description is erroneous in the sense that the copy of the document submitted in evidence
does not show that the original or any copy of the document was actually submitted to
Steengracht.

26

This document — and I am speaking from a purely technical point
of view — again shows that it was not submitted to me, because
otherwise not only Mr. Albrecht would have initialed it but my
initial would have to be on it too because this is obviously the
original document. 1

Q. Do you remember the case apart from the document?

A. The whole Sagan affair lay many months back; I did not
know anything about the actual events. Many months later we,
or at least I, heard of it through a statement by Mr. Eden in
the House of Commons. That was the first kndwledge I had of
the whole affair.

Q. Well, now, on page 2 there is mention of a draft of a note
to Switzerland. Did you make this?

A. No.

Q. Did you have any reason to doubt the accuracy of the re-
ports — or to check up on them — which were made by the OKW
and the Gestapo in this affair?

A. Of course, we could only send a note after we had inquired
from the home agencies, in this case the OKW or the Gestapo,
and obtained information from them as to what was actually at
the bottom of it all. First of all, the draft of the note was
based on this information. It says at the end, figure 1 —

Q. Where are you quoting from?

A. Exhibit 1283. 2

Q. Oh, I see, so you have got to 1283 now. I was still at
1282. However, what do you want to say about 1283?

A. It says —

Q. Excuse me for insisting, but where is this?

A. Exhibit 1283.

Q. Document book, page, and number, please?

A. Figure 1, page 1, of the original.

Q. What did you want to say?

A. I wanted to say that it states here how the note would
have looked to start with. It would have reproduced the infor-
mation given by the Foreign Office. Then it states that further
details about the 50 shootings would be sent to the British, and
I add now, depending upon the information we got from the home
agencies.

Q. So you were entirely dependent upon the information of

1 This is erroneous. The document submitted in evidence was a photostat of a copy marked
“Durchdruck” (copy) at the top. Furthermore the copy ends with “gez. Ritter” (signed
Ritter) in typewriting and bears no handwritten signature or initial of Ritter. This copy,
however, does bear the handwritten letters “OKW” (High Command of the Armed Forces)
and the handwritten initial of Albrecht, followed by a handwritten date ”5/6” for 5 June.

2 Document NG-3496, a memorandum of von Thadden, dated 22 June 1944, to the chief of
Division Inland II of the Foreign Office. This document is reproduced earlier in this section.

27

these agencies. Now, do you remember that after the German
collapse the murderers of the Stalag airmen were tried?

A. Yes, in Hamburg.

Q. Was anything said there about these reports?

A. They said there that the Chief of the Gestapo had given
them special instructions to forge false reports for the Foreign
Office.

DR. Kempner: I object to this question. How can this wit
ness testify as to what happened after the war in some war
crimes trials near Hamburg?

Defendant Steengracht : I have two newspaper excerpts here
from which I collected my wisdom.

Dr. Kempner: That is exactly what I mean.

Judge Powers, Presiding: I think we had better stick to what
the witness knows from personal contacts.

Dr. Haensel : I beg your pardon. I am certain that the prose
cution would not dream of doubting the correctness of newspape
reports. Was the note to Switzerland, which is mentioned ii
Exhibit 1282, sent out at all?

A. This note was certainly not sent. 1

(Recess)

Dr. Haensel: We had stopped with a discussion of Prosecu-
tion Exhibit 1283. That concerns itself with a director’s con-
ference. Do you have any clear recollection of this discussion?

A. I do not have a clear recollection of this conference of
directors.

Q. Then, I would suggest that we do not go into this subject
and the statements made by Albrecht at this meeting, but that
we resort to the best evidence and let Albrecht clear it up.

A. The whole thing was handled by Ribbentrop at the field
headquarters.

Q. Not by you?

A. No, not by me. As Albrecht said from the witness stand,
this became a “Chefsache.” 2

Q. Let’s go on to Document NG-2318, Prosecution Exhibit
1284, 3 to page 3 of the document, page 8 of the document book.
Does this document show that you had nothing further to do
with the matter?

*At the time of this testimony, 29 June 1948, the Foreign Office note of 6 June 1944 to the
Swiss Government had not yet been introduced in evidence. This note is a part of Document
NG-5844, Prosecution Exhibit C-372, reproduced earlier in this section.

2 “Chefsache,” literally “matter for chiefs,” means that the matter was to be handled secretly
by a limited group.

* This exhibit consists of numerous separate but related documents, five of which are repro-
duced earlier in this section.

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28

A. Yes. The form shows that I had no connection with it. It
was a Chefsache which was handled at field headquarters.

Q. If you will look at page 12 in document book 40, that is
pages 7, 8, and 9 of the original, page 12 in your document book.
This is still Prosecution Exhibit 1284. There you are in the
distribution list. Did you receive this document at the time?

A. Do you mean this matter for propaganda concerning PWs?

Q. Document book 40, Prosecution Exhibit 1284. It begins,
“To all PWs. Escape from captivity is no longer a sport.”

A. No, I did not see that document at the time. On page 8
of the original, one should make a dash across the page. The
distribution list does not belong to the rest of it. It belongs to
the next matter. That is misleading here in the German text at
any rate.*

Q. At any rate you did not receive this document?

, A. No.

*

i Q. And the distribution list?

A. It does not belong to it.

Q. So there is no conclusion to be drawn from that?

A. No.

Q. We can now leave document book 40. We come to docu-
ment book 41.

A. Only something further about this last exhibit on prisoners-
of-war matters.

Q. What else do you have on your mind?

A. We have not yet dealt with the minutes of the meeting
of the Prisoner-of-War Service?

Q. Did you have anything to do with the Prisoner-of-War
Service?

A. I did have something to do with the Prisoner-of-War Serv-
ice, and I am proud of it because that was to a large extent my
own invention, and the subjects which are brought up here show
that we endeavored only to treat the people well.

Q. Before we go into this document perhaps I might point
out that on page 17 of the document, page 22 in your book:
“Therefore, such occurrences as in camp Sagan, in which 50
officers were shot after having made an attempt to escape, are
extremely regrettable.”

* The defendant refers to the fact that the distribution list to Minister Windecker’s memo-
randum on the conference of 21 November 1944 was on a separate sheet preceding the memo-
randum itself — and that this distribution sheet followed the last page of the proposed notice
to prisoners of war, a notice which was attached to defendant Hitter’s memorandum of
5 August 1944 to Albrecht. This was made clear by the prosecution’s index to the various
items contained in Document NG-2318. With respect to Windecker’s memorandum, this index
states: “According to the attendance list (page 15 of the English translation, page 10 of the

original), Ritter was represented by Minister Frohwein of his staff. According to the dis-
tribution list (p. 6 of the English translation, p. 1 of the original), these minutes were to be
sent to Steengracht and Ritter.”

953402—52 3

29

Judge Powers, Presiding: Are you still talking about the last
exhibit in document book 40?

Dr. Haensel: I am speaking about Prosecution Exhibit 1284,
page 17 of the document. That is in book 40. It says there,
as I just quoted, that these incidents were regrettable. Does
this show that the spirit motivating these things was quite
different?

A. Yes. We all regretted this extremely and it was a terrible
crime.

* * * * * *

TRANSLATION OF RITTER DOCUMENT 20
RITTER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 20

AFFIDAVIT OF THEODOR KRAFFT, 16 MARCH 1948,
CONCERNING THE SAGAN SHOOTINGS 1

I, Theodor Krafft, residing in Arnsberg, Westphalia, have been
duly warned that I make myself liable to punishment by making
a false affidavit. I swear under oath that the following, to be
submitted in evidence to Military Tribunal IV in Nuernberg, is
true.

From autumn 1941 until the end of the war, I belonged to the
Prisoner-of-War Affairs Department of the Armed Forces High
Command as group leader, and from 1 October 1944 as division
chief. In March 1944 I was Group Leader I in the general divi-
sion under Colonel von Westhoff 2 as division head, and the former
General von Graevenitz as Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs. My
military rank at that time was that of a lieutenant colonel.

A short time after the escape of the British Air Force officers
from camp Sagan — which was probably about 25 March 1944 —
Westhoff informed me upon returning from a conference with
Keitel, that by order of Hitler the police had received orders to
use their weapons ruthlessly when the escaped officers were cap-
tured. Westhoff s objection was rejected by Keitel with the re-
mark that this order was already being carried out and any ob-
jection was useless.

It was a matter of general knowledge in our division that
Keitel had strictly forbidden that the Foreign Office be informed

1 Krafft also executed an affidavit which was submitted in evidence by the prosecution as
Document NO-3878, Prosecution Exhibit 1246, in connection with the Mesny murder. This
affidavit and Krafft's testimony concerning it and related matters are not reproduced herein.
Krafft’s testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 16 March 1948, pages 3246-
3256.

2 An affidavit of Westhoff, Ritter Document 22, Ritter Defense Exhibit 22, is reproduced at
the beginning of this section.

30

about the directive issued to the police and its consequences, al-
though Colonel Westhoff had stressed the necessity of informing
the Foreign Office.

We did not know in our office how the police had carried out
Hitler’s order in capturing the escaped air force officers. We
merely received the report via teletype message that the British
prisoners of war, designated by name, had been shot in flight by
the police and/or for resisting capture. Several teletype mes-
sages concerning this came in, which contained groups of names
in each case.

At about the beginning or the middle of May 1944, Privy Coun-
cillor Sethe from the Legal Division of the Foreign Office — a
subordinate of Albrecht — appeared at our office in Torgau, ob-
viously there (because of rumors about the incident which had
cropped up in the meantime) in order to gather particulars about
it. In view of the earlier strict order of Keitel not to divulge
anything of the matter to the Foreign Office, Colonel Westhoff
telephoned Keitel in my presence, in order to ascertain to what
extent he could give Privy Councillor Sethe information. Keitel
decided that Privy Councillor Sethe should receive information
with regard to all the incidents known to the office. This is what
happened, and one should observe that the details of the execution
of the order were not yet known to us, either, even at this time.

In the week before Whitsuntide 1944, Keitel’s order came into
the office (Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs) by telephone that
the specialist informed as to the Sagan incident should go to
Salzburg immediately in order to be at the disposal of the repre-
sentative of the Foreign Office there, for possible further in-
quiries. On the basis of this order, I departed for Salzburg, after
we had previously authorized the commander of camp Sagan,
Colonel Braune, to come to Salzburg as well, in order to be able
to give information on local questions if the occasion should
arise. We then had a discussion in the hotel in which Ritter and
Albrecht were staying. I had the teletype message with me, by
which we had been informed by the police about the incident.
The gentlemen of the Foreign Office also had lists of names,
from which I assume that they were police reports, similar to the
ones we had received. A comparison of our lists showed that
the names agreed. In comparing the names, it became evident
that there were also a few names among them which seemed to
indicate Polish or Czech origin, so that a doubt was created in
the Foreign Office as to whether the bearers of these names had
actually been British prisoners of war. I could subsequently
explain that these were obviously Polish and Czech citizens, who,
however, were in the service of the British Air Force. No note

31

of any sort was discussed or drafted in my presence. Although
my activity was limited to clearing up the doubt mentioned, I
nevertheless had the definite impression from our discussion that
Albrecht as well as Ritter was outraged about the incident. Am-
bassador Ritter expressed among other things his displeasure that
the Foreign Office had not been informed about this incident at
the proper time. We did not know the exact details of the execu-
tion of Hitler’s order even at the time of this discussion, for
we were merely referred to the police reports.

Nuernberg, 16 March 1948

[Signed] Theodor Krafft

C. The Mesny Murder
I. CONTEMPORANEOUS DOCUMENTS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-076
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1241

TELETYPE FROM HIMMLER TO NUMEROUS GOVERNMENT AND
PARTY OFFICES, 28 SEPTEMBER 1944, CONCERNING TRANSFER OF
CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR TO COMMANDER OF REPLACE-
MENT ARMY, TRANSFER BY HIMMLER OF AFFAIRS CONCERNING
PRISONERS OF WAR TO DEFENDANT BERGER, AND RELATED
MATTERS

Reich Security Main Office
Teletype Office

Received

Time Day Month Year

Space for

Forwarded

Time Day Month Year

by through

Receiver

to through

FS.— No. 190331

Stamp
Telegram —
Radiogram — Tele-
type — Telephone

[All entries in the above table illegible]
KR SHDS NO 998 28/9 1400#—

Top Secret —

To SRFS TM 12 : To SS Lieutenant General Pohl

To Race and Settlement Main Office

To SS Economic and Administrative Main Office

32

To Personal Staff — RF SS Berlin
To SS — Personnel Main Office
To SS General Heiszmeyer Bureau

To Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism —

Staff Headquarters

To Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germanism —

Main office for Repatriation of Ethnic Germans
To Reich Physician SS — and Police
To Chief of Communications

To Institute of Statistics and Research of Reichleader SS
To Mechanical Control Institute for the Maximum Utilization of

Manpower [Maschinelles Zentralinstitut fuer die Optimale

Menschen Erfassung und Auswertung]

1. The Fuehrer has, under 25 September 1944, ordered as fol-
lows:

“The custody of all prisoners of war and internees as well as
the prisoner-of-war camps and installations with guard units are
turned over to the commander of the Replacement Army 1 as of
1 October 1944. For all questions in connection with the carrying
out of the treaty of 1929, 2 as well as for all the matters of the
protective power and the societies for aid and all affairs concern-
ing the German prisoners of war in enemy hands, the competence
rests as before with the High Command of the Armed Forces.
The details of the transfer and of the limitation of the mutual
tasks are regulated by the Chief of the High Command of the
Armed Forces in direct agreement with the commander of the
Replacement Army and the component parts of the armed forces.”

2. In my capacity as commander of the Replacement Army, I
transfer all affairs concerning prisoners of war to the SS Lieu-
tenant General and General of the Waffen SS, Chief of Staff of
the Volkssturm, 3 Gottlob Berger. 4

3. The generals in charge of prisoners of war in the separate
military districts are subject to orders from the Higher SS
Leaders from 1 October onward.

4. The question (subj. 3.) will be discussed by SS Lieutenant
General Berger with the deputy commander of the Replacement
Army, SS Lieutenant General Juettner, the question of the labor
allocation of the prisoners of war with the SS Lieutenant General
Pohl, the reinforcement of the security of the camps with the
Chief of Security Police, SS Lieutenant General Dr. Kalten-
brunner.

1 Himmler at this time was commander of the Replacement Army.

3 Reference is made to the Geneva Prisoners-of-War Convention of 1929.

3 People’s Militia assembled during the latter stages of the war, resembling somewhat the
wartime State Guard in the United States.

* Other contemporaneous documents concerning positions held and functions performed by
defendant Berger are reproduced below in section IX.

33

5. Details of the transfer will be discussed by SS Lieutenant
General Berger with Lieutenant General (Infantry) Reinecke.

6. All camps and labor detachments have to be at once ex-
amined with regard to security and prevention of any subversive
attempts, and all appropriate measures have to be taken. In this
connection I order at once that all the food tins being received
in parcels by the prisoners of war have to be cut open on their
arrival, as they very often contain messages or tools, and have
to be handed out to the prisoner of war cut open and cut through
in the middle. In cases of food tins saved by the prisoners of war
this measure has to be carried out additionally.

Heil Hitler!

Signed: H. Himmler

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-037
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1249

EXTRACTS OF 13 DOCUMENTS FROM FILES OF THE GERMAN FOR-
EIGN OFFICE, 16 NOVEMBER 1944 TO 18 JANUARY 1945, CON-
CERNING THE MESNY MATTER

I. Memorandum from Defendant Ritter to Horst Wagner, 16 November
1944, transmitting von Ribbentrop's instructions on the Brodowski Matter

Top Secret

Ambassador Ritter
No. 999

To Senior Legation Counsellor Wagner 1

To avoid uncertainty, I once more wish to state in writing
that the Reich Foreign Minister instructed me on Saturday, 11
November, to pass on to you the charge of insuring that nothing
should happen in the Br. [Brodowski] matter 2 before the Reich
Leader SS or the SD has agreed with you about the modalities
and possible later manner of reporting. 3 I was able to pass on
this instruction to you on Sunday, 12 November, at 1730 hours.

1 Horst Wagner was the chief of Department Inland II of the Foreign Office. He testified
that “Inland II was a technical liaison department to maintain liaison between the Foreign
Office and the agencies of the Reich Leader SS, with the Reich Minister of the Interior, and
similar agencies.” See the extracts from Wagner’s testimony reproduced later in this section.

* Reference is to Major General Friedrich von Brodowski, a German military commander in
France, who was killed by French resistance forces in November 1944. To avenge his death,
Hitler ordered the reprisal killing of a French general of equivalent rank.

3 Concerning von Ribbentrop’s connection to the killing of General Mesny, the IMT stated
in its judgment: “In December 1944 von Ribbentrop was informed of the plans to murder

one of the French generals held as a prisoner of war and directed his subordinates to see
that the details were worked out in such a way as to prevent its detection by the protecting
powers.” General Mesny was shot on 19 January 1945.

34

The instructions are therefore addressed to you and not to me.

I have merely been instructed by the Reich Foreign Minister to
pass the instructions on to you. The Reich Foreign Minister also
told me to see that the instructions be duly carried out.

Berlin, 16 November 1944

[Signed] Ritter

[Handwritten] Kaltenbrunner, Thadden beginning 17 November.

2. Undated and unsigned file note of von Thadden, official of Department

Inland II, concerning developments in the Brodowski Matter on 13 and

14 November 1944

Legation Counsellor First Class von Thadden, Inland II

With reference to the affair of Major General von Podowski
[Brodowski] Senior Legation Counsellor Wagner instructed me
on the morning of 13 November to arrange for a meeting on
that very day between him, Ambassador Ritter, and SS Lieuten-
ant General Kaltenbrunner.

Kaltenb runner’s adjutant’s offices gave the telephone informa-
tion that a meeting on that date was out of the question, in fact
not possible before Tuesday, 1600 hours.

Ambassador Ritter declared that Mr. Wagner would have to
decide personally whether or not this date would still be ac-
ceptable. On the afternoon of 13 November, Senior Legation
Counsellor Wagner pronounced the date to be acceptable since
he had already informed Kaltenbrunner of our request.

On 14 November early in the morning, I checked the hour of
the meeting, 1600 hours, with Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant’s office.
I was thereupon told that it would have to be 1630 hours but
that they believed the conference was now superfluous since the
Fuehrer’s order concerning reprisals had in the meantime been
annulled.

I immediately informed Ambassador Ritter who declared —

a. that the Fuehrer’s decree could not possibly have been re-
pealed, since General Jodi had stated this to him on the telephone
only last night at 12 o’clock.

b. he, being senior in rank, did not mean to go to Kalten-
brunner. In the interest of the Foreign Office, Kaltenbrunner
should come to him.

I informed Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant’s office without delay that
the communication concerning the repeal of the Fuehrer’s decree
could not be correct. Having made inquiries, SS Major Malz
stated that the Fuehrer’s order had not been submitted to Kalten-
brunner but to the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs, SS Lieuten-
ant General Berger. SS Lieutenant General Berger was ill and

35

his personal adviser, SS Colonel Klump, in answer to my tele-
phone inquiry replied that only Colonel Meurer 1 knew about the
order. He would see to it that the latter rang me up at once.

After waiting in vain for the call, I myself rang up Colonel
Meurer, who told me that the order, strangely enough, had not
been sent to the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs [defendant
Berger] but to SS Lieutenant General Juettner. 2 The latter had
asked the Chief of Prisoners-of-War Affairs to hold in readiness,
for eventual measures of reprisals, a French general whose name
he mentioned. Subsequently SS Lieutenant General Juettner had
yesterday informed his office that the anticipated conference in
this matter had now become superfluous, the Fuehrer having re-
pealed his order. So far he had not heard of a new order. He
therefore considered the incident closed.

On 14 November, 1610 hours, I passed on this information to
Ambassador Ritter who asked to be connected by telephone with
SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner. This request was directed
to the SS Lieutenant General’s adjutant’s office, which imme-
diately agreed to comply with it.

3. File Note of Wagner, 18 November 1944, Submitted to von Ribbentrop
through defendants Ritter and Steengracht von Moyland, concerning
developments in the Brodowski Matter, noting that "the approximate
date was provisionally set for 27-30 November", and transmitting
enclosure

Group Inland II [Illegible Initials crossed out]

Notes for Verbal Report

I. Immediately upon receipt of the Reich Foreign Minister’s
directive in the case Brodowski, I contacted SS Lieutenant Gen-
eral Kaltenbrunner and asked him to do nothing without the
approval of the Foreign Office. SS Lieutenant General Kalten-
brunner, on 12 November still unaware of a pertinent Fuehrer
order, agreed.

II. It was found that, in transmitting the order, a number of
points had been confused, which made it only today possible to
establish who had actually been assigned to execute the order.

1. Field Marshal Keitel gave instructions to SS Lieutenant
General Juettner without General Jodi’s knowledge.

2. The adjutant of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff issued a directive without General Jodi’s knowledge.

1 Fritz Meurer was chief of staff to defendant Berger. Extracts from Meurer’s testimony
are reproduced below in this section.

• SS Lieutenant General Hans Juettner, General of the Waffen SS, was permanent deputy
to Himmler in Himmler’s capacity as commander of the Replacement Army.

36

3. SS Major General Fegelein’s deputy had promised Ambas-
sador Hewel and General Jodi to send a telegram. For reasons
unknown it was never sent.

Inland II spent 3 days in inquiries to find out from Juettner,
Kaltenbrunner, and Berger who was assigned for this task.

On 17 November, SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner noti-
fied me that he had just received the order, and requested me to
come for a discussion, having also been instructed to contact the
Foreign Office before taking action.

III. SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner informed me this
morning that he had to leave immediately, and requested me to
discuss the matter with SS Senior Colonel Panzinger* [the fol-
lowing words are crossed out in the original: ‘fin the presence
of SS Major General Mueller”] as he was the one who had been
assigned for the task. The discussion took place today.

IV. In pursuance of this conference, at which modalities, press
announcements, and possible later investigation by the protecting
power were discussed, SS Senior Colonel Panzinger will submit
to us the proposal of the SD for comment. Reich Leader SS
has ordered that no decision be made without the approval of
the Foreign Office. To allow for technical preparations, the ap-
proximate date was provisionally set for 27-30 November. Rough
outlines of the project are attached hereto [handwritten:] The
final SD proposal will follow without delay.

Berlin, 18 November 1944

[Signed] Wagner

Through Ambassador Ritter
and the State Secretary,

[Initial] R [Ritter] 18/11
[Initials] St [Steengracht] 18/11
Submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister

[Stamp]

Has been submitted to Reich Foreign Minister
[Handwritten] The Reich Foreign Minister has personally read
these notes. 19 November 1944.

[Initial] Sch [Schmidt]

Enclosure :

a. Modalities — 75 French generals are interned in Koenigstein
camp. As can be seen from the dossiers, it has for a long time

* SS Oberfuehrer (Senior Colonel) Friedrich Panzinger at this time was Chief of Office V
(Reich Criminal Police) in the Reich Security Main Office.

37

been intended to transfer these French generals, as Koenigstein
is required for other purposes. So far this plan has not been
carried out.

This transfer will now commence by a first batch of 5 or 6 French
generals, each in a separate automobile, being taken to another
destination. There will be a driver and a German one-man escort
in each automobile. The cars will display Wehrmacht insignia.
The two Germans in each car will wear Wehrmacht uniform.
They will all be handpicked persons. During the trip, General
de Boisse’s car will have a breakdown, in order to separate it from
the others. This will provide an opportunity of having the gen-
eral killed by a shot aimed at his back, “while attempting to
escape.” The time proposed is dawn or dusk. There must be
no local inhabitants in the vicinity. To play safe, in case there
is an investigation, it is planned to burn the body and to take
the urn to the cemetery of Koenigstein fortress. It would have
to be decided whether or not the urn should be interred with
military honors. A proper medical report, death certificate, and
certificate of cremation must be obtained. A sketch of the scene
of the incident and a detailed report will be prepared. There are
no great objections against dispensing with cremation, but the
question will be once more looked into in an internal SD dis-
cussion.

b. Press announcements — It will always seem suspicious that
the fact of a French officer’s attempted escape is given any press
publicity at all. On the other hand, this step assures that the
news of this measure, which is meant to be a reprisal also reaches
the public. The text of the press announcement will be prepared
after the question of modalities has been decided. Moreover,
another check will be taken of the French general’s traits of
character. But otherwise the text of the communique will follow
closely that of the Reuter message.

c. Investigation by the protecting power — The choice of partici-
pants and the preparation of all documentary evidence will as-
sure that in the event of an investigation being demanded by the
protecting power, such documents as are needed to bring about
a dismissal of the case can be produced.

Berlin, November 1944

[Initial] W [Wagner]

38

4. Note by Legation Counsellor Bobrick to Wagner, 20 November 1944,
concerning a report from Dr. Wehrhahn of the Legal Division of the
Foreign Office on the proprieties surrounding the burial of a general

Inland II B

Legation Counsellor Dr. Bobrik

[Handwritten] please discuss

Dr. Wehrhahn (of Legal Division) informs me that, as a pris-
oner of war, a general is buried with military honors regardless
of whether he is a French, British, or American prisoner of war.
The fact that we have an armistice with France does not alter
this. As an attempt to escape is not dishonorable, it would make
no difference if the general were shot while attempting to escape.

This has no bearing on the question of admitting a priest.
Prisoners of war are on principle entitled to the free practice
of their religion.

SS Senior Colonel Panzinger was informed by telephone.
Submitted to Group Leader Inland II.

[Initial] W [Wagner]
[Handwritten] to be filed, 30 November

Berlin, 20 November 1944
[Signed] Bobrik

5. Note from Bobrick to Wagner, 28 November 1944, submitted to de-
fendant Ritter on I December 1944, concerning developments in the
preparations

Inland II B [Handwritten] please discuss

Legation Counsellor Dr. Bobrick

1. SS Senior Colonel Panzinger reports that various changes
have been made in the preparations for the matter discussed but
that he has, nevertheless, spoken with Colonel Meurer once more
in order to clarify the position definitively. He has promised us
a plan for the elaboration of the project by the middle or end
of this week.

Submitted to Group Leader Inland II

[Initial] W [Wagner]

28 November

Berlin, 28 November 1944

39

2. Submitted to Ambassador Ritter for information — 1 Decem-
ber 1944.

[Initial] R [Ritter]

1 December
[Initial] B [Bobrik]

28 November

6. Note from Bobrik to Wagner, 6 December 1944, submitted to defendant
Ritter on 7 December 1944, concerning further developments in the
matter of the "Special Affair"

Inland II B [Handwritten] Concern Special Affair

Official in charge: Legation Counsellor Dr. Bobrik

SS Senior Colonel Panzinger reports that in the presence of
those concerned with the matter, he had another detailed con-
ference with Colonel Meurer the day before yesterday concerning
renewed modifications chiefly in connection with the car question.
He hopes to draft his final report before the end of the week.

He has informed the Reich Leader SS by way of his adjutant’s
office of the need for another modification of the plans.
Herewith submitted to Group Leader Inland II.

[Initial] W [Wagner]
Berlin, 6 December 1944

Submitted to: [Signed] Bobrik

1. Ambassador Ritter, for information.

7 December 1944
[Initial] R [Ritter]

2. Herr Bobrik for further action.

[Initial] B [Bobrik]
[Initial] W [Wagner]

7 December

7. Report of 13 December 1944, signed by von Thadden for submission to
von Ribbentrop through defendants Ritter and von Steengracht, con-
cerning two alternate plans for killing the French general

Group Inland II Personal

Subject: French general Strictly confidential

[Handwritten marginal note] Through Lieutenant Colonel Senior Govern-
ment Counsellor Dr. Schulze, 855456.

SS Senior Colonel Panzinger stated for our information that
the preparations in' respect to the French general had reached

40

the stage where a report concerning the proposed procedure
would be submitted to the Reich Leader SS within the next few
days.

The French general will be transferred, together with four
other younger generals, from the Fortress Koenigstein to a new
PW camp. The transfer will be carried out in three automobiles,
two of the younger ranking generals entering each of the first two
cars, while the senior ranking general in question will ride alone
in the last car in order to give him the special attention due to
his rank. The cars will be driven by SS personnel in Wehrmacht
uniform. The automobiles will bear Wehrmacht insignia.

The order will be carried out during the drive, by either of the
following methods:

1. By shooting during escape — on the way, the car will stop
at a suitable spot while the other two cars will continue their
journey. The general will be killed while trying to escape, “by
well-aimed bullets from behind.” Examination of the body, also
an eventual later post-mortem, will confirm that the general was
fatally hit while attempting to escape.

2. Through poisoning by carbon monoxide gas — A specially
built car which has already been constructed, is required for this
purpose. The general will sit alone in the back seat. The doors
will be locked in order to prevent him from jumping out during
the drive. The windows, on account of the cold winter weather,
will be closed. The window between the back and the front seat,
where the driver and the attendant will sit, will be closed. Pos-
sible air holes will be specially sealed. Odorless carbon-monoxide
gas will be introduced during the drive into the inner compart-
ment through a special apparatus to be controlled from the front
seat. A few breaths will suffice to ensure death. The gas being
odorless, there is no reason for the general to become suspicious
at the decisive moment and break the windows in order to let
in fresh air. Cause of death will be recognizable beyond question
by the color of the skin as a typical characteristic. It will be
established that, through leakages from the exhaust pipe, gases
from the engine entered the interior of the car, thus imperceptibly
leading to his death.

After the report to the Reich Leader SS has been dispatched, a
carbon copy of it is to be placed at the disposal of the Foreign
Office herewith by way of Ambassador Ritter to the State Secre-
tary for presentation to the Reich Foreign Minister.

Berlin 13 December 1944

Signed: [crossed out] Wagner
[Signed] VON Thadden

[Illegible handwriting]

[Initial] B [Bobrik] 13 December

41

8. Note from Bobrik to von Ribbentrop's office, 18 December 1944, con-
cerning developments on the subject "French General" and noting that
the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs had signed a report to be submitted
to Himmler

Inland II B Personal

Subject: French general Strictly confidential

The Fuehrer order explicitly allows for various methods of
execution, as has just been confirmed to me by the official in
charge, Senior Government Counsellor Dr. Schulze. The only
thing that has been fixed, is the subsequent press announcement.

The report to be submitted to the Reich Leader SS has been
signed by the chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs and is at present
before SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner for his cosignature.
It will then go to the Reich Leader SS. Inland II will receive
a copy for the information of the Reich Foreign Minister.

The assurance is given that the Reich Leader's decision will
not be carried out before the Reich Foreign Minister has been
consulted.

Through Group Leader Inland II submitted to Legation Coun-
sellor Brenner of the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister.
Berlin, 18 December 1944

Signed : Bobrik

[Initial] B [Bobrik]

[Handwritten] To be filed ' 18 December

9. Letter from Kaltenbrunner to Himmler, 30 December 1944, concerning
discussions of Kaltenbrunner, defendant Berger, and the Foreign Office
concerning proposals for killing a French general

Copy

Berlin SW 11, 30 December 1944
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Telephone 12 00 40
The Chief of Security Police and SD
VCB No. 831/44 top secret

Please quote above reference in your reply. [Stamp] Express
letter — Secret Reich Matter.

To Reich Leader SS, Field Headquarters

Referring to PS Field HQ Staff Gmund No. 460 and PS inter-
mediate report of 4 December 1944.

42

Reich Leader !

The discussions about the matter in question with the Chief of
Prisoner-of-War Affairs and the Foreign Office have taken place
as ordered and have led to the following proposals :

1. In the course of a transfer of five persons in three cars with
army identification, the escape incident will occur when the last
car has a flat tire, or

2. Carbon monoxide is released by the driver into the closed
interior of the car. The apparatus can be installed by the simplest
means and can be removed again immediately. After considerable
difficulties a suitable vehicle has now become available.

3. Other possibilities, such as poisoning by food or drink have
been considered but have been discarded again as too unsafe.

Provisions have been made for proper attention to subsequent
routine matters, such as report, obduction, death certificate, and
burial.

Convoy leader and drivers are to be supplied by the Reich Se-
curity Main Office and will appear in army uniform and with
pay books delivered to them.

Concerning the notice for the press, contact has been estab-
lished with Privy Councillor Wagner of the Foreign Office. Wag-
ner reports that the Reich Foreign Minister would like to discuss
the matter with the Reich Leader.

In the opinion of the Reich Foreign Minister, this action must
be coordinated in every respect.

In the meantime, it has been learned that the name of the
man in question has been mentioned in the course of various long
distance calls between Fuehrer headquarters and the Chief of
Prisoner-of-War Affairs, therefore the Chief of Prisoner-of-War
Affairs now proposes the use of another man with the same quali-
fications. I agree with this and propose that the choice be left
to the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs.

Expecting your instructions, Heil Hitler !

Your obedient servant,

Signed : Dr. Kaltenbrunner

10. Note by Wagner, 4 January 1945, submitted to von Ribbentrop through
defendant Ritter, transmitting a copy of Kaltenbrunner's letter of 30
December 1 944 to Himmler

Subject: French general Personal

Strictly confidential

SS Senior Colonel Panzinger has submitted attached copy of
SS Lieutenant General Dr. Kaltenbrunner’s report for the Reich
Leader SS, dated 30 December 1944,* with the request to submit
it to the Reich Foreign Minister.

* Kaltenbrunner’s letter is reproduced immediately above.

43

Assurance has again been given that the Reich Foreign Min-
ister will be informed of the reply of the Reich Leader SS prior
to execution of the plan.

Signed : Wagner

Herewith (channeled through Ambassador Ritter for his in-
formation upon [his] return)

[Crossed out] to State Secretary

[Handwritten] to Minister Schmidt personally for submission
to the Reich Foreign Minister

Has been submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

[Initial] SCH [SCHMIDT]

Berlin, 4 January 1945

[Initial] B [Bobrik]

1 1. Note from Schmidt of von Ribbentrop's Office to Wagner, 6 January
1945, concerning von Ribbentrop's Views on Further Handling of the
Matter after Consideration of Kaltenbrunner's Letter of 30 December
1944

Office of the Reich Foreign Minister Personal , strictly

confidential!

In confirmation of the verbal notification, the Reich Foreign
Minister asks to discuss the subject matter of the express letter
of the Chief of Security Police and Security Service, dated 30
December 1944 — VGB No. 831/44 top secret — with Minister Al-
brecht so as to find out ' precisely what rights the protecting
power would have in this matter, and to be able to adjust the
plan accordingly.

The Reich Foreign Minister thinks that the announcement of
the incident to be published in the press should as far as possible
be phrased in the same way as the notice of the occurrence which
provoked the above mentioned plan, so that the responsible per-
sons on the other side may thereby clearly recognize the answer
to their own move.

Herewith submitted to
Senior Legation Counsellor Wagner

[Initial] W [Wagner]

Berlin, 6 January 1945

[Signed] Schmidt

44

12. Note by Bobrik to Legation Counsellor Krieger, 12 January 1945, con-
cerning the Legal Rights of the Protecting Power in connection with
the Plan to kill a French general

Personal

Strictly confidential

Legation Counsellor Dr. Krieger — Legal Division, Section XV

Hildebrandstr. 5

With reference to telephone conversation —

A French prisoner-of-war general is going to die an unnatural
death by being shot while escaping or by poisoning. Provisions
have been made for proper attention to subsequent routine mat-
ters, such as report, post-mortem examination, death certificate,
and burial.

The Reich Foreign Minister’s instruction states that “the mat-
ter is to be discussed with Minister Albrecht in order to determine
exactly what legal rights the protecting power could claim in this
matter, and to coordinate the plan accordingly.”

I should be grateful therefore, if after discussing the matter
with Minister Albrecht, you would draw up the desired informa-
tion to be submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

In my opinion allowance would, among other things, have to
be made for possible legal rights of General Bridoux’s Commis-
sion,* for those of the International Red Cross and other authori-
ties ; as for example, that of exhumation, post-mortem examination
by a court pathologist, etc., also a notice to the Armed Forces
Information Office, a report to Bridoux, filling up of question-
naires for the International Red Cross Committee in connection
with the forwarding of possible personal effects and the like.
Berlin, 12 January 1945

[Signed] Bobrik

13. Answer of Krieger, 18 January 1945, to Bobrik's Note of 12 January 1945
Memorandum
Personal

Strictly confidential
To Legation Counsellor Bobrik, Inland II

In the event of a PW’s death, we, as the detaining power, are,
according to the Prisoner-of-War Convention of 27 July 1929,
under the following obligations:

* Reference is to the French Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.

953402—62 4

45

Every case of death must be reported to the Armed Forces In-
formation Office which, in its turn, passes on this report, inclusive
of enrollment number, personal data, day of death, and place of
burial to the Central Information Office of the International Red
Cross in Geneva for notification to the country of origin. The
cause of death — without detailed account — will be mentioned only
if disclosed on the death certificate.

The Armed Forces Information Service is further under the
obligation of collecting all articles of personal use (valuables,
letters, paybooks, identification, and so on) belonging to deceased
prisoners of war and of dispatching them to the country of origin.

On the other hand, unless there has been an additional, definite
arrangement to this effect as, for instance, in the case of the
Anglo-German convention, we are under no obligation to bring
to the knowledge of the protecting power cases of violent or
unnatural death.

In view of the fact that the country of origin is naturally in-
terested in detailed information in cases of unnatural or violent
death, especially where the supposition of an infringement of the
agreement seems justifiable, it has become a mutual practice to
notify the protecting power of all such cases with the additional
result of a relevant investigation by the Foreign Office. In this
connection a decisive role has been played by the fact that, on
account of its conventional right of correspondence and verbal
intercourse with the prisoners of war, the protecting power is in
a position to collect information of this kind elsewhere, subse-
quently demanding an explanation in the case of a violation of
the agreement.

In any case the protecting power, in the absence of witnesses or
detailed data in particular, will have to content itself with the
result of the official investigation as submitted by the Foreign
Office and it is, moreover, not entitled to demands such as ex-
humation, subsequent post-mortems by government pathologists,
etc.

With reference to French prisoners of war, following this pro-
cedure, notice is sent to General Bridoux’s French section for
Prisoner-of-War Affairs. On the other hand the de Gaulle gov-
ernment receives notifications of death only in the already men-
tioned routine manner through the Armed Forces Information
Office or the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva.
The de Gaulle government, not being in the charge of a protecting
power, can direct inquiries only through the International Red
Cross, and we are under no obligation to answer them.

Berlin, 18 January 1945

[Signed] Krieger

46

2. AFFIDAVIT OF PROSECUTION AFFIANT WAGNER AND
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES WAGNER
AND MEURER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-3658
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1250

AFFIDAVIT OF HORST WAGNER, CHIEF OF DIVISION INLAND II OF
THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, 26 NOVEMBER 1947*

I, Horst Wagner, Senior Legation Counsellor, retired, herewith
declare the following under oath:

I was born in Poznan on 17 May 1906. After attending the
Realgymnasium in Steglitz, the University in Berlin (the College
for Political Science and the College for Physical Training), I
worked in the German press and in 1936 entered the England
Section of Ribbentrop’s office to entertain foreign guests of honor.
In 1938 I became scientific co worker in the Protocol Division of
the Foreign Office, later on received a commission and in 1943
took over direction of Inland II; in this position I was appointed
Senior Legation Counsellor.

On 12 November 1944 at 1730 hours, Ambassador Ritter called
me into his office and informed me of the following: A German
general of the Wehrmacht, named Brodowski, had been murdered
by French resistance forces. Following this the Fuehrer had
decreed corresponding countermeasures and the Foreign Office
was ordered to assert its opinion based on the point of view
of international law. I was to arrange immediately for a dis-
cussion between SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner and our-
selves, concerning the form the plan was to take and concerning
later speech directives, and to ensure that the order would not
be carried out until then. Furthermore he informed me that he
would exercise full supervision in the matter, that the affair
would have to be kept strictly secret, and that references may
be forwarded only in sealed envelopes when submitting the matter.

Akin to the character of Ambassador Ritter, the discussion
was very brief. Since it was impossible for me on Sunday to
contact Kaltenbrunner, I asked Legation Counsellor von Thadden
to arrange for a meeting between myself, Ambassador Ritter and
SS Lieutenant General Kaltenbrunner. This was done on 13 and
14 November. This discussion however did not take place since
Ambassador Ritter was of the opinion that Lieutenant General
Kaltenbrunner, as the person lower in rank, would have to call
on him. After SS Lieutenant General Berger, the Chief of Pris-

* Extracts from the testimony of Wagner concerning this affidavit are reproduced imme-
diately below.

47

oner-of-War Affairs, was dealing with the execution of the plan
and after Colonel Meurer on 14 November expressed the opinion
that the Fuehrer decree had been rescinded, I sent Thadden to
Ritter so as to inform him about closer details, who then ordered
that Kaltenbrunner be contacted.

On 16 November I was called by Mr. Ritter who reproached
me for not having done anything in the matter yet. He told me
again that he had been ordered by the Reich Foreign Minister
to see to it that the order was carried out properly. Thereupon
he sent me a written confirmation of our discussion. On the
following day I was again called to Ambassador Ritter, who now
told me that his discussion with Kaltenbrunner would not take
place. At the same time Ambassador Ritter explained in detail
the incident in France, the decree issued by the Fuehrer, and the
order to the Foreign Office to examine the matter from the point
of view of international law. Now I was to receive an official
of the Security Service; this official was to inform me of the
measures planned and he was to discuss with me the speech
directives and points on international law.

On 18 November I was informed by Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant
that SS Senior Colonel Panzinger would be sent for a discussion.
During the discussion Panzinger outlined the intended measures
by the SD and I put them down verbatim ; then the press release
and points of international law were discussed. I could not un-
derstand the purpose of a press release, since it seemed illogical
to camouflage the whole affair on the one hand and to publicize
it on the other as a means of intimidation. In addition the SD
set the date for the period 27-30 November. As ordered, I then
made certain that nothing would happen in the matter until ap-
proval of the Reich Foreign Minister had been obtained.

Immediately after the discussion I drew up a memorandum
which was sent sealed to Ambassador Ritter and State Secretary
Steengracht for initialing and then submitted by me to Minister
Schmidt for the Foreign Minister in a sealed envelope. In doing
so I gave special instructions. All information which then reached
us in the matter was immediately forwarded to Ambassador Rit-
ter and the more important points of the matter to the Foreign
Minister via State Secretary Steengracht.

On 13 December a discussion took place between Thadden and
Panzinger in which the latter stated that preparations concerning
the French generals had been concluded and that a report on the
intentions of the SD would be submitted. This report was for-
warded to Ambassador Ritter and State Secretary Steengracht
via myself for the purpose of submitting it to the Foreign Min-
ister.

48

On 4 January Kaltenbrunner’s report to Himmler was sent to
me by Panzinger and submitted to the Foreign Minister via Am-
bassador Ritter and Minister Schmidt. In order to close the
affair I was asked by Minister Schmidt upon instruction of the
Foreign Minister to discuss with Minister Albrecht what rights
the protecting power would have in the matter. Simultaneously
the Minister’s instruction concerning a press release was given.
As already mentioned, it was to be attempted to intimidate the
enemy.

Since, as far as I recall, and for reasons which I do not remem-
ber at present, a discussion between myself and Albrecht never
took place. Bobrik, in order to obtain the approval of the Min-
ister as ordered, asked Dr. Krieger of the Legal Division for an
opinion concerning the rights of the foreign protecting power.

I cannot say for the moment when I learned that the special
order had been carried out. It is certain that I knew nothing
of it until 19 January. Only the Legal Division could inform
the protecting power of this incident.

I had always hoped that the Minister would prevent the carry-
ing out of this murder plan. Since I have been disappointed in
my justified assumption I must characterize this incident as a
crime under international law.

These statements are true and were made without any coercion.
I have sworn to them, read, and signed them.

Nuernberg, 26 November 1947

[Signed] Horst Wagner
Senior Legation Counsellor, retired

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
HORST WAGNER*

DIRECT EXAMINATION

M. Charles Gerthoffer (official representative of the Repub-
lic of France, for the prosecution) : Witness, would you specify
what was your official position in November 1944?

Judge Powers, Presiding: First let’s get his full name in the
record.

M. Gerthoffer: Will you give the Tribunal your full name?

Witness Wagner: Horst Wagner.

Q. What is your age?

A. 41. f * ;

Q. What is your profession?

A. I was an official of the Foreign Office.

Q. What was your rank in the Foreign Office?

* The complete testimony of Horst Wagner is recorded in the mimeographed transcript,
3 March 1948, pages 2585-2637.

A. I was, at the end, Senior Legation Councillor.

Q. What functions did you hold in November 1944, Witness?

A. In November 1944, I was the head of the Division Inland
II in the Foreign Office.

Q. Will you specify with a little bit more clarity what your
actual functions were, I mean what kind of work you did?

A. Inland II was a technical liaison department to maintain
liaison between the Foreign Office and the agencies of the Reich
Leader SS, with the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and similar
agencies.

Dr. Schmidt-Leichner (counsel for defendant Ritter) : Your
Honor, I am a little muddled. I thought the Court had decided
that the witness was to be called for cross-examination. I don't
know how deep counsel for the prosecution wants to go, but I
thought the right to cross-examine lay in the hands of the defense.

Judge Powers, Presiding: This witness’ affidavit has just been
offered?

Dr. Schmidt-Leichner: Yes, and accepted.

Judge Powers, Presiding: Does the prosecution desire to offer
anything further.

M. GerthoffeR: My opponent can be quite calm about the
matter. All I am going to do is to ask the witness whether he
wants to maintain his affidavit.

Judge Powers, Presiding: Very well. Proceed with dispatch.

M. Gerthoffer: Witness, on 26 November 1947 you were in-
terrogated under oath and you signed an affidavit [Document
NG-3658, Prosecution Exhibit 1250.*] Do you maintain that
affidavit in its entirety?

Witness Wagner: Yes.

M. Gerthoffer: No further questions, Your Honor. Your
witness.

Judge Powers, Presiding: Cross-examine.

CROSS-EX AMIN A TION

***** * *

Dr. Froeschmann (counsel for defendant Berger) : Witness,
I have only one brief question. In answer to the question of
counsel for defendant Schellenberg, you stated that the report you
mentioned in your affidavit was expected by Kriminalrat Pan-
zinger?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it then correct that Kriminalrat Panzinger was entrusted
with the execution of the plan to murder General Mesny?

* Reproduced immediately above.

50

A. Panzinger was the only person to inform us, as an office,
of the various stages of this plan.

Q. May I ask you to look at your affidavit, page 44 of the
German, 31 of the English, the last four lines on page 44 of the
last paragraph, but one on page 31. Do you have that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I would like to know how do you come to claim that
the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs Berger dealt with the exe-
cution of the plan?

A. I can’t remember at the moment. I assume that this comes
from some document or is taken out of some context, the ex-
pression “dealt with.”

Q. Were these words which the prosecution more or less put
in your mouth on the basis of the documents?

A. I think it is possible that it is connected with some docu-
ment.

Q. Witness, at the moment of this alleged knowledge, you had
only known about this affair for a very few days or only a very
few hours, that is correct, isn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you know that Keitel at that time had given an order
concerning a French general first of all to a certain Juettner,
who came then to the Inspectorate of Prisoner-of-War matters?

A. I recall having heard something of the kind, but I cannot
say for certain what is correct, because I only know that at
that time nobody knew who actually gave the order. Up to the
time of the capitulation, I never found out for certain who
actually passed on Hitler’s order.

Q. But today your explanation, as you formulated it in this
affidavit, is one you cannot maintain, that the Chief of Prisoner-
of-War Affairs dealt with the execution of the plan, is that
correct?

A. No.

Dr. Froeschmann: Thank you very much.

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
FRITZ MEURER*

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Mr. Petersen: Witness, what is your full name?

A. Fritz Meurer.

Q. When and where were you born?

A. On 30 November 1896, in Lahr in Baden.

* The complete testimony of Fritz Meurer is recorded in the mimeographed transcript 24 and
25 February and 9 March 1948; pages 2385-2354, 2363-2389, and 2905-2923.

51

Q. Will you please provide the Court with a short synopsis
of your career up to the time when you first became affiliated with
the prisoner-of-war administration? Would you make that pretty
short, please?

A. I went to a secondary school and then I went to high school,
where I matriculated. Then I worked for 2 years, which work
was interrupted by the First World War. After 1919 I studied
for five terms at a technical college and became an engineer. Be-
tween 1922 and 1925, I worked as engineer. Between 1925 and
1933, I worked as a civilian employee with the Army District in
Stuttgart. Between 1933 and 1935, I was with the Training De-
partment, and in 1935, I joined the Wehrmacht as an active offi-
cer. My military career in the First World War I terminated
as a first lieutenant of the reserve and after 1935, when I rejoined
the Wehrmacht, until 1938, I worked with the Army Replace-
ment Command at Stuttgart. Between 1939 and 1940, I was
with the Army Replacement Inspector at Karlsbad, and between
1940 and 1943, I worked with the Deputy General Command of
Nuernberg, after which I was transferred into the Prisoner-of-
War Affairs in September 1943.

Q. When did you become affiliated with the Office of the Chief
of Prisoner-of-War Affairs?

A. In September 1943, in order to become acquainted with my
work, I was assigned to the commanding general in charge of
prisoners of war in the Ukraine. In 1944 I was sent to a tran-
sient camp in the East, where I remained until 1 October 1944,
after which date I worked with the Chief of Prisoner-of-War
Affairs in Berlin.

* * * * * * *

CROSS-EXAMINATION

* * * * * * *

Dr. Froeschmann (counsel for defendant Berger) : Now Wit-
ness, the prosecution yesterday mentioned the case of General
Mesny as part of their interrogation. You have already in broad
outlines described the Mesny affair. I would like to take out a
few brief points from there and would like to ask you if it is
correct to say that the order concerning the earmarking of a
French general in November 1944 was originally addressed to
the Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army who was
Himmler, and the execution order was addressed to the RSHA,
whereas your agency was merely informed of the matter?

Witness Meurer : I would like to clear up that first there was
a preparatory order.

52

Q. Excuse me, Witness. All I want to know is this — I don’t
want to waste the Court’s time — would you very concisely tell
me whether that order about the earmarking of a French gen-
eral was addressed originally to the Commander in Chief of the
Replacement Army?

A. The order in writing was addressed to the RSHA and it
was addressed to the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs and the
Foreign Office for informative purposes. The preparatory order
was originally addressed to Himmler as the Commander in Chief
of the Replacement Army. Whether or not the order in writing
was also sent to the Commander in Chief of the Replacement
Army, I don’t know.

Q. Well, Witness, in a most credible manner you described
the affair to us yesterday, and you also described that a list of
the French generals was available at the time, which Keitel had
gotten hold of through the Inspector of Prisoner-of-War Affairs, a
list which was headed by the name de Boisse, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And then you described that 2 months later upon the inter-
vention or the suggestion of the intelligence officer, three officers
were chosen from that list — you yourself quite openly admitted
that you did that yourself — and it was on that occasion that
Mesny’s name headed the list, is that correct?

A. Well, whether he headed those three names or not I no
longer know.

Q. But anyway his name was included on the second list.
Then you said that Berger, both in the case of the first and the
last order, could not be reached; in some instances he was in-
formed by word of mouth, is that correct?

A. No. The first order — we must differentiate between four
teletype letters — the first communication to Keitel to the effect
that we were suggesting to change the name, I know —

Q. Did you —

Judge Maguire : Just a moment, let the witness answer. Then
you may inquire again. Proceed.

Dr. Froeschmann: Please go ahead, Witness.

Witness Meurer: What happened was this. We first drew
Keitel’s attention to the fact that secrecy had been endangered
and therefore sent him a teletype letter. Berger knew about
this eventually because I discussed it with him. The teletype
letter itself was sent out by me on the same day bearing the
following signature: “Signed Berger, corrections certified by
Meurer.” Keitel’s reply for which we were waiting could only
consist of either he himself deciding on the name, as he did in
the case of de Boisse, or that he would ignore our suggestion

and decline to have the name changed. What actually hap-
pened was that Keitel's reply came with roughly the following
wording: “Approve suggestion. According to the conditions put
by me, one name is to be selected. The name is to be reported."
That approximately was what the teletype letter said but Keitel
had transferred the selection of the name to us. When this tele-
type letter came in, I made a marginal note on it for Berger,
suggesting to select not one but three names, and I put that
teletype letter into his mail which was sent him on that day
because I could not report to him myself. When on the following
day I got the teletype letter back, nothing to the contrary was to
be seen on it and I, therefore, assumed that Berger approved
the suggestion. He had in the meanwhile been away on an
official trip and I also was about to go on a short official trip
and wanted to settle the whole affair before I left. I therefore,
always assuming that Berger agreed to the whole thing as he
had not said anything to the contrary, sent a teletype letter to
Keitel mentioning the three names, two of which came from the
list supplied by the Inspector of Prisoner-of-War Affairs. The
third name I had to pick from the list giving the names of the
French generals about to be transferred. The whole list by the
Inspector of Prisoner-of-War Affairs consisted of only three
names, that is, the list which was supplied to me. As de Boisse
was out of the question, there remained only two, and I added
the third name myself. The teletype letter gave the names of
those three generals — I don't know in which order. It also
mentioned their ages and their exact rank. I again sent off that
teletype letter with the signature “Signed Berger, certified by
Meurer," and Keitel's reply was worded, “Please replace de Boisse
with the name of Mesny. Signed, Keitel." When Berger re-
turned from his duty trip, I informed him of the changes that
meanwhile occurred, and he approved my measures because, after
all, there were no other possibilities left to me. However, I
found out at that moment that he had never seen the second tele-
type letter from Keitel, although it had been part of his incoming
mail, together with my marginal note, and he told me that he
had never read it.

Q. Witness, have you finished your explanation?

A. Yes.

Q. What I am interested in now is how you and Berger reacted
to the order which came in, in November 1944 and particularly
I am interested in Berger's reaction. Let me ask you this. Is
it correct to say that after the first orders came in Berger said
quite generally that all this was out of the question ; he wouldn't
do a thing like that?

54

A. Yes. Well, when the written order came in, he at once
and spontaneously declared that he would not have carried out an
order of that sort. He also stated that he would immediately
contact Himmler on this matter and, if necessary, would contact
the Fuehrer himself.

Q. Do you know that in actual fact defendant Berger got as
far as Hitler himself, asked to be allowed to report to the Fuehrer,
but was not admitted?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you also know that Berger, having not been admitted to
Hitler’s presence, then turned to Himmler and went to see him
together with you, which I think must have been around 10
December 1944, in order to persuade Himmler into taking back
that order?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you please describe that conversation to us?

A. The first arrangement made with Himmler about a confer-
ence dates back to the last days of October. It was scheduled
originally for 6 December. However, it did not take place on that
day. There was some delay until 12 December and it was on
that day that Himmler was reached. A conference took place
in the neighborhood of Ulm at a railroad station. Himmler said
he was ready to use his influence for the order to be rescinded.
At the same time Berger had to use a lot of persuasion on that
occasion.

Q. To make this quite clear, you were not present during that
conversation, were you?

A. No.

Q. But is it correct to say that immediately after the conference
Berger told you about the contents of his conversation with
Himmler?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Berger highly excited when he came back from
Himmler?

A. Yes.

Q. And did he say to you on that occasion : “Very well, I hope
that Himmler will intervene and the whole thing will die?” Is
that roughly what he said?

A. Yes.

Q. Was this conversation between Berger and Himmler of 10
December followed by any actual events between then and the
end of December?

A. No. Nothing happened at all. Neither the OKW, the
RSHA, nor the Foreign Office gave us any information or in-
structions. We already believed by the end of December that
the order had been quietly rescinded.

55

Q. Was it then your assumption that the whole thing was over
and done with?

A. Yes, more or less.

Q. Was the matter revived at the end of December by the
intervention of the intelligence officer?

A. No. I forgot to mention that before. The intervention
by the intelligence officer took place very much earlier, before the
end of December or the beginning of January. As I remember
now very well, this must have occurred in the first half of De-
cember, and that action was quite independent of anything else
that was taking place.

Q. Is it correct to say that Berger, when inquiries were made
at the beginning of January about the execution of the order,
made another attempt to reach Himmler or Hitler?

A. Yes.

Q. What do you know about that?

A. When Berger returned from leave at the beginning of
January, he was still very optimistic. As I mentioned before,
we all thought that the whole matter would die out. Yet he was
still very optimistic. It was around 8, 9, or 10 January that he
called me in to see him in a highly excitable manner, and to
my surprise, he once again interrogated me about these ques-
tions. He wanted to know whether the preparations made orig-
inally for the transportation of those officers to another camp had
been made, and I deduced from the way he questioned me that
somehow or other something new had occurred in the affair in an
unpleasant sense of the word.

Q. Is it correct to say that Berger, toward the end of 1944
and the beginning of 1945, was frequently absent from his office
because he had once been buried alive during an air raid in the
beginning of November?

A. Yes.

Q. Well now, Witness, we have discussed the whole Mesny
affair. There is one final point — what was the cause of the
whole business? How did it come about that Hitler decided to
order this frightful event?

A. The reason was that a German general named Brodowski
had been shot in France.

Q. Who was Brodowski?

A. Brodowski was the Military Commander in eastern France,
as far as I know.

Q. And what had happened, as far as you know? What did
you hear from the order itself?

A. From the orders which I mentioned before, the orders in
writing I mean, no details were given at all. All that was said was

56

that the German General Brodowski had been shot in France
by the resistance movement. By making inquiries from the
Fuehrer’s headquarters Berger found out that this was a murder,
or shooting, of a general in a most atrocious manner.

Q. Was that German general a prisoner of war?

A. Yes. He had been captured but had been surrendered to
the resistance movement.

Q. He had become a French prisoner of war and the agency
concerned handed him over to the Maquis, did they?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it correct to say that this general, according to your
information, was beaten, tied to a motor car, killed that way, and
then taken to Marseilles?

A. Yes. That is what we were told.

Q. And that fact was embellished in the newspapers by the
version: “German general shot while trying to escape”?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it true to say that because of this brief report:
“German general shot while trying to escape,” Hitler said, “All
right, let me try and shoot a general while trying to escape,”
because he was convinced that the general had been murdered.

A. That is what we were told, yes.

* * * * * * *

3. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT BERGER
EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT BERGER*
DIRECT EXAMINATION

Dr. Froeschmann (counsel for defendant Berger) : Witness,
your full name, please, as well as the place and date of your
birth?

A. My name is Gottlob Christian Berger. I was born on 16
July 1896, in Gerstetten, Wuerttemberg.

Q. Will you now give us a brief description of your life, in
so far as it is of relevance to your case?

A. In view of the fact that my detailed personal file is avail-
able, I shall confine myself to the most important parts. My
father was a carpenter; he had his own sawmill and a farm
estate. There were eight children altogether, and we were sub-
ject to strong discipline on the part of our parents. I attended

* Complete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 20, 21, 24-28 May;
1, 2, June; 27 October 1948; pages 5976-6009, 6056-6204, 6307-6345, 6403-6495, 6519-6570,
6581—6616, 6641—6738, 6831—62924, 7062—7126, and 26595—26611. Further extracts from the
testimony of defendant Berger are reproduced below in sections IX B 3, IX C 2, and XI C 6.

57

elementary school in Gerstetten and then went to a boarding
school for one year. Then I went to the training seminary in
Moedlingen. In 1914 I passed my first state examination. Then
I graduated and volunteered on 6 August 1914, joining the army
on that day. [I went through the war from the very start to
the very end.] Very soon I was made an officer. I was wounded
on four occasions. I was decorated for courage shown before the
enemy. I passed a preliminary examination for the general staff
in the military school in Raedel in 1916. I then went into active
service and was commander for one year, that is, the commander
of a Sturm battalion, assigned for duty on the Western Front.
At the end I was adjutant of a Wuerttemberg Sturm regiment.
When the Wehrmacht was activated, in 1935, I became a captain
and was taken over in that capacity. I then became a captain in
a cavalry regiment, in 1938 a major, and in 1939, lieutenant
colonel of the reserve. When the First World War was over, I
finished my training from 1919 to 1921, passed the officially pre-
scribed examinations, and I was then trained in the physical
training school in Spandau and obtained the qualification to be
an academic physical instructor. I was then instructor at vari-
ous schools, in seminaries, and various schools of training in
Wuerttemberg. From 1929 on I was headmaster of the school.
In 1933 I became Stadtschulrat.* After that, in 1935, I took
over the physical training branch in the Wuerttemberg Ministry
of Education and Training and I became Chief of the State
Physical Training Center of Wuerttemberg. I was married on
23 April 1921, and we had four children. My daughter was killed
due to the effects of an assassination attempt actually directed
against her husband in Rumania in 1942. My oldest son was
killed in action as commander of the 1st Company, 1st Regiment
of the SS Leibstandarte Division when he with his company de-
fended themselves against a tank attack near Kharkov on 11
February 1943.

[In the next ensuing testimony, defendant Berger discusses in considerable
detail the numerous positions he occupied and functions he performed between
the end of World War I and October 1944, including his role as Chief of the
SS Main Office, a leader in the Waffen SS, and German commander in Slo-
vakia in September 1944. Since this testimony covers a period and events
not directly related to the killing of General Mesny, it has been reserved for
a later section where it is more pertinent. (See extracts from the testimony
of defendant Berger reproduced below in section “IX. Atrocities and Offenses
Committed against Civilian Populations.”)]

On 1 October 1944, at the order of Hitler, I took over a part of
the Prisoner-of-War Affairs, and I was in charge of that up to
the end of the war. In the same manner at the time, I was
assigned the education and training of the Volksturm in con-
nection with the Party Chancellery.

* Title of a superintendent of schools in a city.

58

*******

Q. Witness, is it correct to say that on 1 October 1944, the
custody of prisoners of war was transferred to Himmler, and
that Prisoner-of-War Affairs were transferred to you and Pohl
by Himmler? 1

A. Yes, that is correct. The order is correct.

Q. Therefore, you as well as Pohl were assigned to prisoner
of war work?

A. In the order it says specifically that in addition to myself,
Pohl and Kaltenbrunner were to be assigned to the handling of
prisoner-of-war affairs. Kaltenbrunner, more or less, was to be
responsible for security detention; Pohl was to take over the
labor allocation.

Q. Did such an understanding of Himmler’s contradict or vio-
late the Geneva Convention, in your opinion?

A. The question of transferring prisoner-of-war matters, on
the part of Himmler, had already been discussed in May. The pre-
requisites and conditions were quite different then from those
that actually prevailed in September. From the very first day on
I was opposed, in every way, against such a division of work,
and on the occasion of the first conference I held with Colonel
Meurer, 2 3 my chief of staff, I expressed this vehemently and
clearly.

Q. Is it correct to say, Witness, that first of all during the first
few months, say in August and September, Hitler or Himmler
told you that the entire prisoner-of-war matter was to be taken
over by you?

A. In May of 1944, Himmler mentioned that I was to take
over all of the prisoner-of-war affairs. In September, and this
was the night 18-19 September, after having seen Hitler 12 years
before I again saw him, close, and I was able to talk to him.
He, Hitler, spoke of the transfer of the entire Prisoner-of-War
Affairs, without any limitations or restrictions, and the same was
true in the night 29-30 September 1944.

Q. Witness, did you gladly entertain the thought that you were
now to become Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs, or did you, much
rather, express negative considerations to Himmler or Hitler?

A. I said to Hitler that I had no ambitions to become a cus-
todian of prisoners because I was not a policeman by nature.
However, if this task were to be taken over by me on a broad
basis, then I would be glad to have that office transferred to me.
Hitler did not react to that, and I took that to be a tacit consent.

1 See Himmler’s teletype of 28 September 1944, concerning prisoners of war, reproduced

above in section VII C 1 as Document NO-076, Prosecution Exhibit 1241.

3 Extracts from Meurer’s testimony are reproduced earlier in this section.

59

He gave the reasons briefly why it was now planned to make a
change in the handling of prisoner-of-war matters.

Q. What were those reasons?

A. At that time he mentioned four reasons to me — (1) The
case of Sagan,* (2) the matter of the broadcasting station in
the American prisoner-of-war camp Fuerstenberg ; (3) the re-
volt in Warsaw, and (4) the Allied plan concerning the landings
of airborne troops and parachutists in the vicinity of prisoner-
of-war camps.

Q. Witness, I do not wish to enter into any detailed discussions
of these incidents but maybe you would be good enough to be
very brief in telling us what the case of Sagan and what the
broadcasting station of Fuerstenberg were.

A. The case of Sagan was the escape of 72 British Air Force
officers, approximately 50 of whom were shot after they were
returned to the camp — upon Hitler’s command and in violation
of all provisions and laws in effect up to then.

Q. What happened in the case of Fuerstenberg?

A. In Fuerstenberg a radio station was discovered — a strong
radio receiving equipment and a strong powerful short wave
transmission set.

Q. Furthermore, is it right to say that in the case of the
Warsaw revolt, files were found which divulged a plan developed
in a Bavarian mountain locality, likewise with the objective of
revolts on the part of the prisoners of war?

A. Yes. That is right. It was the plan of the camp Murnau,
in Upper Bavaria.

Q. In listing these reasons to you, did Hitler say that the
present administration of prisoner-of-war affairs no longer had
his confidence and that he therefore proposed to charge you
with the job?

A. Yes. That is what happened. He said that all the people
were lying to him and betraying him and that this Sagan affair
would not have happened if the commander there had acted and
undertaken suitable measures, in accordance with his duties.

Q. All right, Witness. In this trial several witnesses have
already been heard, prosecution as well as defense witnesses, re-
garding prisoner-of-war affairs. I wish to avoid all repetition
and will confine myself to asking you whether this or the other
statement given by the witness is right or not. First of all, let
me verify the following: Is it right to say that up to 1 October
1944, the prisoner-of-war affairs were subordinated to the General
Armed Forces Office?

A. Yes. That is correct.

* See section B 1 above.
60

Q. Is it right to say that the chief of this office was General
Reinecke? 1

A. That is correct.

Q. And is it, furthermore, right to say that in addition to
other officials handling this business, General Westhoff, 2 who
testified here, was also in charge?

A. First of all General Graevenitz and then General Westhoff.

Q. I now ask you, to whom was the General Armed Forces
Office subordinated?

A. The General Armed Forces Office was subordinated to Field
Marshal Keitel.

Q. In what capacity?

A. As Chief of OKW.

*******

Q. Witness, which of the types of camps listed by you were
subordinated to you?

A. I was in charge of all permanent prisoner-of-war camps
in the German Reich Area, including the occupied areas in Poland,
Warthegau and Weichselgau, respectively.

Q. Were you not in charge of any of the remaining camps since,
from what you have just told us, they would belong to your
sphere of jurisdiction?

A. Not subordinated to me were all prisoner-of-war camps in
the operational area of the Commander in Chief West; as well as
from the middle or end of November 1944 on, no longer subor-
dinated to me were the prisoner-of-war camps in north and
central Norway, because, in the meantime, this area had become
operational area. On the whole, in cases where the front re-
ceded and headquarters came to be included in the operational
area, what happened was that the commander in chief, that is,
the commander of the army group, was also responsible and in
charge of the prisoner-of-war camps in the area, so they were
eliminated from my command or charge.

Q. Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said that orig-
inally the entire prisoner-of-war matters were to be assigned to
you?

A. Yes. That is correct.

Q. But from what you have told us just now, substantial parts
of the camps were taken out of your sphere of jurisdiction. I

1 General Hermann Reinecke was a defendant in the High Command Case ( Vols. X-XI, this
series). Reinecke was Chief of the General Armed Forces Office of the High Command of the
Armed Forces (the “Allgemeines Wehrmachtsamt.'’ ordinarily abbreviated to “AWA”) .

* General Adolf Westhoff testified as a prosecution witness. His testimony is recorded in
the mimeographed transcript, 9 March 1948, pages 2923-2936. An affidavit he executed for
the defense concerning the Sagan matter, Ritter Document 22. Ritter Defense Exhibit 22, is
reproduced above at the beginning of this section.

Xi.

953402—52 5

61

now want to ask yon, were there any, so to say, organizational
portions of prisoner-of-war affairs which were not assigned to
you?

A. The most substantial portion, that is the part which I was
most anxious to receive — I ought to say would have been most
anxious to receive — liaison with the protecting power, that is
the international liaison, was taken away from me pursuant to a
special agreement concluded between Himmler and Keitel ac-
cording to which this department continued to be handled by the
AWA under the name of Inspectorate of Prisoner-of-War Af-
fairs. It was the duty of this division, in conjunction with the
Foreign Office, to maintain liaison with the protecting power
and with the International Red Cross.

*******

Q. Witness, the entire prisoner-of-war affairs as such was
something that you were alien to — you were not an expert in
that field. Did you ask that the entire staff which had been
handling prisoner-of-war matters up until then be made available
to you for your new agency?

A. Not only was I absolutely ignorant and a nonexpert in these
matters but I was ignorant in every respect. This entire set of
directives was entirely remote from my previous work. For that
reason, in favor of smooth continuation of work, I asked that
the entire staff, particularly of the organizational division in a
closed unit and without exception, be assigned to the newly to-
be-established staff of the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs.

Q. Witness, of course in Germany as well as with the protecting
powers, it was a sensational incident that now, all of a sudden,
prisoner-of-war affairs were placed into the hands of an SS
leader. In taking over prisoner-of-war affairs, did you very soon
absorb other SS members into the organization of Prisoner-of-
War Affairs?

A. When Himmler took over the Prisoner-of-War Affairs, from
what I was told by an acquaintance of the Swiss Legation, a tre-
mendous stir and sensation was caused throughout the world. I
have to be quite honest. Up to that time I had not been listening
to enemy broadcasting stations, and I really got quite scared
when I heard of the propaganda, and when I heard what was
being said outside the frontiers concerning the SS in general and
in particular of the Reich Leader SS himself what was thought of
him and what was said of him. For that reason I arranged for
some special measures to go into effect from the very start. First
of all, the agency of the Office of Chief of Prisoner-of-War Af-
fairs was removed from my main office geographically — it was in
Berlin, kilometers distant — in spite of the fact that I knew

62

that this would incur considerable obstacles in the management of
the business; second, there was nobody, no SS member, that I
took over into this staff of Prisoner-of-War Affairs, nor did I
assign any such man into such staff. From the start I wanted
to break all propaganda that might arise from such an act, or—
let me put it better — I wished to break enemy propaganda.
Actually I can say that at that time I was not even affected per-
sonally by enemy propaganda, but when Himmler took over these
matters, the prisoners of war, particularly in the officers’ camps,
were greatly stirred and excited, and I wanted to counteract this.

Q. Witness, you just now mentioned briefly your relations with
the protecting power. This is of a certain importance in the
Mesny affair. Please describe, in a few words, your collaboration
with the protecting power.

A. Legally speaking, I had no right at all to get in touch with
the protecting power directly. The official channel lay through
the Inspector for Prisoner-of-War Affairs, AWA, Keitel, Foreign
Office. In a discussion with Steengracht, we agreed that he
should give me direct contact by way of Legation Counsellor Dr.
Reichel, so that many things could be discussed directly between
us. This started with the matter of the Red Cross food parcels
in December, and from January onward there was no restriction
on this means of communication. This was partly due to the
fact that the Inspector for Prisoner-of-War Affairs was in Torgau
— that is, not in Berlin. Representatives of the protecting power,
however, remained in Berlin up until the time the Russians
marched in.

Q. Witness, I now come to the Mesny case. Do you know
what the various witnesses have testified to here about this
case? The indictment charges you with having participated in
the plans for the murder of this French general, and that these
plans were made between November 1944 and January 1945.
Were you concerned in the making of any such plans, or were you
informed through any conversations with the agencies planning
them?

A. No. Once again I would like to point out to the Tribunal
that I take over responsibility for my agency as Chief of Prisoner-
of-War Affairs and it is not a matter of my wishing to push off
any personal guilt in the coming questions.

Q. You used the word “guilt” just now. Surely you mean
responsibility?

A. Responsibility, yes, of course.

Q. The prosecution claims that you took part in discussions be-
tween the Foreign Office and your office, such as Chief of Pris-
oner-of-War Affairs and other agencies. Did you yourself take
part in any such discussion?

63

A. No.

Q. Did you send any member of your staff to attend such a
discussion ?

A. No. This was impossible because at the first discussion
of this question —

Q. I will come to that in a moment. Now, I would like you to
answer very briefly, because that is the best way of getting on.
The prosecution further claims that General Mesny had been
selected at your personal suggestion. Is that correct?

A. No.

Q. The prosecution further says that under your personal super-
vision and with your personal approval, subordinates of your
office worked together with the Gestapo in order to put this
murder plan into effect. Is that correct?

A. No. Neither supervision nor approval.

Q. Now I come to the actual description of the incident.
When did you hear for the first time of a Hitler order concern-
ing this matter.

A. It must have been about 10 November.

Q. Who told you about this order?

A. My chief of staff, Colonel Meurer. It wasn't quite clear;
it was a little confused. He mentioned a number of telephone
conversations.

Q. Witness, how did you react to this first report?

A. I can remember quite clearly that I told Meurer. “If Field
Marshal Keitel wants to shoot off his imprisoned generals, let him
do it alone, without us.'”

Q. That must have been about the middle of November?

A. No, it wasn’t the middle, it must have been during the first
10 days.

Q. What happened in the 2 weeks which followed?

A. In the 2 weeks which followed, as the documents show, I
was not in the office. At about that time I was buried under-
ground in debris as a result of bombings and I suffered concus-
sion. The next day I collapsed in the office and I was away from
Berlin for 2 weeks, at least up to 28 November.

Q. During these 2 weeks, did discussions take place with the
Gestapo, ordered by Keitel?

A. At least one discussion took place.

Q. Who told you that?

A. Meurer.

Q. At that time did Meurer tell you what his standpoint had
been at this discussion?

A. Yes.

64

Q. Did you not tell Meurer at that time that he should not
have taken part in such a discussion at all during your absence?

A. I asked him how it was that he went to the Gestapo at all,
and he told me he had had orders from above. You must not
forget that about that time Colonel Meurer was nothing more
than a colonel, and therefore lived in fear of his military su-
periors and did not dare in any way to try to oppose the orders
of a field marshal and chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

Q. When did you return to your office?

A. Toward the end of November.

Q. When you returned to your office, when you heard of the
discussion, did you tell Meurer that he was not allowed to do
anything else in this matter and that you would handle it your-
self? Or what did you say?

A. I told him that he was not to do anything, that I would
first of all talk to Kaltenbrunner. Between the first and the
fourth of December — it may even have been the day before, but
certainly within these limits — I tried to reach Kaltenbrunner
both by telephone and personally, but I did not succeed. It was
very important to me, because after returning from my sick
leave Dr. Brandt ordered me to go to Himmler as soon as possible
to be examined by Dr. Kersten, his personal physician. The
request again reached me on 1 December, and I left at noon on
4 December.

Q. Where did you go?

A. To Trieberg, in the Black Forest. Himmler was there at
the time, as Commander in Chief Upper Rhine.

Q. Do you know for certain on what day that was?

A. Definitely on 4 December, because on this day I experienced
at very close quarters the air raid on the old city of Heilbronn
where within 1 hour something like 10,000 people died. I myself
had a whole family of cousins there who w6re all killed. I had
wanted to spend the night with them. That is why I know for
certain it was 4 December.

Q. Could you see Himmler as soon as you arrived in Trieberg?

A. I tried it, but it didn't work. He put me off. He said first
of all that he had ordered me to come there for a treatment by
his miracle physician.

Q. How long was it until you could really talk to Himmler?

A. I saw him twice in the evenings, at dinner time, but then
all that took place was talk of unimportant things. But about
the Mesny case I could not talk to him until 12 December 1944
in his special train at the railroad station of Kaufbeuren, near
Ulm.

Q. What took place at this discussion?

A. I could not even make my report. When I was about to
start to talk about important matters — I was not going to start
on the Mesny case until the end — Himmler attacked me with
bitter reproaches. He read me a letter from Fegelein.

Q. Who was he?

A. Fegelein was his liaison man and liaison man of the Waf-
fen SS to Hitler himself.

Q. Do you remember the date of the letter?

A. 6 December. In this letter Fegelein said that Keitel had
told him that he knew for certain that I was the man who would
prevent the reprisal measure against Mesny. After all, he
[Keitel] was in the final analysis Chief of Prisoner-of-War Af-
fairs and Himmler was subordinate to him, just as I was. Liter-
ally, he said that of course if it had been a general of the Waffen
SS who had been murdered by the French, then the reprisal
would have been carried out long since.

Q. Did Himmler take the standpoint that he too was of the
opinion that you sabotaged the Fuehrer order?

A. Yes. Certainly he knew it.

Q. And did he tell you that, through your measures in prisoner-
of-war affairs, the security of the Reich was being endangered?

A. Yes. I have to answer this question in two respects. On
the one hand it was quite agreeable to Himmler if I did some-
thing special for prisoners of war because then he could tell the
representatives of the protecting power, especially in the case
of Switzerland, that it was he, the Reich Leader SS, had done it.
On the other hand, he lived in terrible fear of Adolf Hitler and
that he would hear something about it. Just at this time Himm-
ler noticed what we had told him a year before, that he had
been written off as far as Hitler was concerned, that he no
longer had anything to say, and that his transfer to the Upper
Rhine Front had only been a tactical measure in order to get
him away. I have to mention this in order to show the source
of Himmler’s tremendous excitement.

Q. Did this conversation with Himmler come to a peaceful
conclusion, or was there an explosion?

A. First of all I answered him quite quietly — there were two
other reproaches he made to me which did not concern prisoner-
of-war affairs — and I tried to explain things to him calmly.
But he was in such a state that he told me that all his work was
being turned into an illusion by me because of my stubbornness
and he took his cap, his bag, and went. He had already left in
his car before I had left his special compartment.

66

Q. So what happened, Witness? Was it impossible to carry
out your intention of talking quietly and objectively about this
Fuehrer order with regard to Mesny, in view of Himmler’s rage?

A. I could hardly say a word about Mesny — he did all the
talking.

Q. Very well. Did you return to Berlin?

A. I returned to Berlin immediately. Dr. Kersten and his
secretary went with me.

Q. When did you arrive in Berlin?

A. On 13 December.

Q. What did you do there as the outcome of this talk?

A. I could do no more since as I said, he shut me up and left
the train; I handed in my resignation in very definite terms.

Q. Did you get an answer to your resignation?

A. An SS leader took the resignation to Trieberg so that after-
wards Himmler could not say he had not received it. I even
obtained a receipt that he had obtained this personally written
letter. First I received no answer at all. On about 18 December
he called me up, quite peaceably, and said he had thought it
over, perhaps I was right after all, and he would talk to the
Fuehrer personally about the Mesny case, because his command
on the Upper Rhine Front would end on 1 January at the latest.

Q. So, Witness, in spite of Himmler’s excitement during the
first discussion at Trieberg, he gathered from your objections that
you were absolutely in disagreement with this Fuehrer order?

A. I gave detailed reasons in my resignation — one whole page,
with four points — and the main point I quoted was that as Chief
of the SS Main Office, I could not be responsible for this to my
men of the SS to take up any such a matter, even if it were
justified.

Q. Slowly, slowly. In this telephone conversation did Himmler
tell you whether he would let you know?

A. He told me that he was writing me a Christmas letter at
that very moment and that I would hear the rest later and that
I would be very pleased.

Q. Did you get this Christmas letter?

A. Yes. The Christmas letter reached me on the afternoon of
21 December, in the Poznan area. It was already there when
I got there in the evening for my Christmas leave.

Q. What did this Christmas letter say?

A. Oh, no, I was wrong, it was 22 December — it was 22 De-
cember when I arrived, I beg your pardon. In addition to the
usual wishes and greetings, he told me that it would probably be
the biggest pleasure he could give me to tell me that he had
talked to Kaltenbrunner and that the Mesny matter would be

67

delayed and not carried out. Here I would like to add one thing.
This Christmas letter was in my possession up to May 1945, in
my personal files. In Augsburg they took it from me, together
with other important papers, and now they are indicting me
on that very charge. Of the total files concerning prisoner-of-
war matters, too, not one single document of mine was burned
but much rather, in February or March, they were all taken in
one unit to the camp of Landeck, in the Tyrol. It was not my
fault that the files were not turned over. I was not at all anxious
to prevent the handing over of the files in a proper manner.
For this reason, as early as 5 May I got in touch with the United
States Divisional Commander, General Federing [sic], in order
to get this matter cleared up. Therefore, the files must be in
existence.

Q. Do you mean to imply, Witness, that if these documents
were submitted it would be shown what measures of a good nature
you took on behalf of prisoners of war — what correspondence you
had with the Red Cross and so on? Do you wish to imply that
your chances of defense may have been rendered more difficult
in an unpardonable manner?

A. If these prisoner-of-war files were available, I think an
indictment under count three, slave labor and prisoner-of-war
matters, would hardly ever have taken place.

Q. Very well. Let’s come back to the Christmas letter. What
did you do next after you had been told that Himmler himself
would intervene with Hitler, and that Kaltenbrunner would see
to it that the Fuehrer order was not carried out?

A. On 2 January I came back from my Christmas leave. Be-
fore diving into the documents which had accumulated, Meurer
arrived to report to me about a number of important things.
Unless I am very much mistaken it was in particular a matter
of a number of court cases, confirmations of sentences in the case
of excesses carried out by guards, excessive use of arms, imper-
missible use of arms, and in two cases ill treatment of prisoners
of war. After Meurer had reported I, of my own accord
pointing to my brief case where I had Himmler’s letter, said in
my way, “Well, Fritz [Meurer], Mesny, hm, [matter] closed
[aus],” or “de Boisse, French General, [matter] closed.” He
said he had heard nothing more about it. Thereupon I said more
or less “You won’t hear any more about it either.”

Q. Witness, I don’t know whether I managed to elicit just
now the fact that in his Christmas letter Himmler told you that
he wanted to take up the matter of the French general and sub-
mit it to Hitler personally.

A. Yes. He mentioned that.

68

Q. Go on please.

A. Well, nothing happened for a few days, at least not con-
cerning prisoner-of-war matters. Between the seventh and the
ninth — I can't give you the definite date as such great confusion
reigned at that time — I was called up by Fegelein.

Q. He called whom?

A. Me. The headquarters at that time, of Fegelein at any rate,
were still in East Prussia. Fegelein, making himself important
as always, said, “The Fuehrer is furious. The Fuehrer is deeply
embittered.” In this tone of voice. That left us pretty cold.

Q. Why was the Fuehrer embittered?

A. Because the reprisal had not been carried out yet in spite
of his order and because it took more than 3 months to carry out
his orders.

Q. Did he also mention that Hitler had said that he was deter-
mined to make an example of you?

A.* Yes, Fegelein did say that.

Q. Did he add anything else?

A. He said he had managed to cope with obstinate generals
and he would manage to cope with obstinate SS generals too.

Q. Did he mention the Brodowski case in Besangon?

A. More than that. First of all he read me a report and that
was not Fegelein's imagination. He wasn't clever enough for
that — to make out such a stylistic report and just shake it out
of his sleeve, just like that. This report was signed “G-51” —
“G” as in George, 51. This said that General Mesny had been
taken prisoner in the proper manner and was being transported
by French soldiers, when he was surrounded in Besangon by an
excited mass of people. That the French soldiers who accom-
panied him had then disappeared and that Mesny —

Q. Witness, you must mean Brodowski.

A. Well, what did I say?

Q. Mesny.

A. I'm sorry. May it please the Tribunal, I have been wounded
seven times and buried alive twice, so these things can happen
to me. I’m sorry.

Judge Christianson, Presiding: The correction is noted.

Defendant Berger : Of course it’s Brodowski. Before the out-
break of the war he was commander of a cavalry regiment in
Gotha. The excited population had beaten down Brodowski. Then
they chained him to a car by his ankles. They beat him down
first and then tied him to a car with a rope or something — I
don’t know exactly. First of all he had been forced to run be-
hind the car and then the car accelerated its speed and he had
been thrown off his feet and dragged into a barracks. Now I

69

don’t know exactly whether it was a barracks or a fort — it may
have been either.

Dr. Froeschmann: Witness, may I interrupt you here. In
document book 42, on page 9, Exhibit 1247, Document NO. 3979,*
there is an affidavit of yours, and this says under number 3, and
I quote, “Upon inquiry I found out that a German general had
been taken prisoner in France and on the way from Belfort to a
fort had been surrendered to the Maquis by the guards.”

A. That was a mistake on my part. It should have been
Besangon.

Q. Thank you. Please continue. So you are just describing
the murder of the general.

A. Yes. He had arrived there a bundle of blood, and I think
it said scraps of material, and then he was shot. But that was
not the worst. Fegelein read me further reports about at least
eight staff officers, lieutenant colonels and colonels who had been
taken prisoner and then had been shot. Of all those names which
were new to me I can only remember the one whom I did know.
That was the colonel of the Luftwaffe, Alpers. In peacetime he
had been State Secretary in the Reich Ministry [Reich Office]
for Forestry. He [Fegelein] said that in the British or Amer-
ican papers the news of his [Alpers] capture had been printed,
and that a picture of the capture had also been printed. From
the time of his capture nothing had been heard of Alpers. In-
quiries via the International Red Cross had had no result. Adolf
Hitler was particularly excited about this.

Q. Did you stand up for your standpoint toward Fegelein?

A. I told him what I told Himmler. I think I used the same
words.

Q. Did you tell Fegelein that Himmler had told you that he
would report to the Fuehrer personally?

A. I told him that I was very surprised because the Reich
Leader SS had told me verbally and in writing that he would
intervene in this matter by reporting personally to Adolf Hitler.
Fegelein, I remember, made a very deprecatory remark — “Oh,
Reich Leader SS — he talks as much as the day is long.”

Q. Could you follow the development of the case on the spot?

A. No. But I called up Colonel Meurer immediately, and pre-
sumably in a very excited voice said that in the case of the French
general, Keitel was making new efforts, and that he would try
to bring the matter to a finish ; that I must go away at all costs,
and I asked him to look out very keenly and let me know.

Q. Why did you have to go away?

A. I had to take over the arms for the entire German Volks-

* Not reproduced herein.

70

1

sturm which were stored in Thuringia — I had to take them over.
In armament questions, a Hitler order had instructed me to get
in touch directly with Gauleiter Sauckel 1 in Weimar and to dis-
cuss further supplies of arms with him, and furthermore to dis-
cuss the manufacture of a special rifle for the Volkssturm. These
rifle models I was to inspect myself and then submit them to him.

Q. Were your days in Thuringia filled out by this work so that
you could not get in touch with Berlin, or what?

A. To get in touch with Berlin or any outside place at this
time was incredibly difficult. It’s hardly a secret today that from
January onward, in fact from Christmas onward, our communi-
cations were badly interfered with. Moreover I wasn’t sitting
at one definite place. I was in Zuhl, Ohrdruff, Eisenach, Eisen-
stein, and in more towns where small arms were being produced
as a result of the evacuation. At any rate it was only about the
twentieth — no, it must have been even a few days later, I got in
touch with Berlin.

(Adjournment for the day)

Q. Witness, yesterday afternoon we were dealing with the
Mesny case. First of all, I would like to remind you that you are
still under oath. You mentioned that at the beginning of January
you went to Thuringia and a number of other places in order to
obtain arms for the Volkssturm, and that as a result you were
not in touch with Berlin. Had any other special events taken
place which interfered with your communication with Berlin?

A. Yesterday I referred to the gradual destruction of German
communications as a result of the air raids. At that time, as a
result of the bright days, enemy airmen flew right as far as the
Dresden area and watched it day and night. And it was very
difficult, even by car, to reach some places ; so, on the average one
had to take cover every 50 or 80 km, or take the consequences.
That is why everything was delayed. Then, I not only had to
take over the arms, but more especially to have them transported
away as quickly as possible to the areas where they were needed.
Although since November 1944 it was known that the Russians
were preparing their offensive with German support and under
the leadership of German General Staff officers 2 in the Baranov
area, the supreme leadership would not believe that this could
be true.

Q. Witness, will you only quite briefly tell us whether it is
correct that as a result of the Russian break-through you got in
touch with Berlin? That’s all we need here.

1 Sauckel, Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation also was Gauleiter of Thuringia.

2 Apparently the witness is referring to German officers who, as prisoners of war of the
Russians, participated in the so-called “Free Germany Movement.”

71

A. The Russian break-through was a few days later. That's
right. There were already indications of it at that time, and I
was dealing with home guard matters outside Berlin.

Q. When did you learn that the reprisal against the French
general had been carried out?

A. I can’t remember the day, but it must have been about 25
January. At any rate, it was about the time when I was search-
ing for and again found my wife and children, who had gotten
mixed up with the retreat and got lost, and that must have been
about 25 or 26 January. Colonel Meurer reported it to me. At
first I was not informed that we had actually played a part and
said to him: “So, he did have him killed.” By “he” I meant
Keitel.

Q. Did Meurer tell you then that a counterintelligence officer
of the agency had also gone?

A. Only then he told me that the counterintelligence officer of
the agency — we had only one — had been on the trip.

Q. What was your reaction?

A. I can’t say because otherwise it would mean my incriminat-
ing members of my agency.

Q. But I would like to know whether you had expected the
news or whether you were startled.

A. I think that I would be able to prove to the Tribunal that
I was not pleased but that I was deeply startled and taken back.

Q. Now, Witness, we have dealt with the general course of
affairs. Now, I must come to the chapter concerning the name
and the person of General Mesny. Witness, the witness Meurer
has already confirmed that at Keitel’s demand he sent three names
of French generals off by radio, without informing you. Is that
correct?

A. Yes, that’s correct; and, as far as I remember — but my
memory is full of gaps — that must have been at the end of No-
vember or at the beginning of December — or earlier.

Q. Did you yourself, at that time, select the name of de Boisse?

A. I did not select any name. And I would like to say the
following: When Meurer told me about it at that time I was so
sure of being successful that I would manage to put a stop to this
nonsensical reprisal, that I thought, “It doesn’t matter at all
whether it’s one name or another.” On the contrary, teletypes
of this kind would only delay the affair further.

Q. Did you send any teletype in this matter, or did you order
or approve the sending of any teletype?

A. No.

Q. You will remember that Meurer had first given the name
of de Boisse. Do you know how the changing of the name came

72

about? And, Witness, I want you to give us now only the posi-
tive facts you know from that time and not things that you have
learned later from the documents in the case.

A. I can only remember the following: That Meurer told me,
“A lot of telephoning has been going on here. For reasons of
secrecy we must change the name and name another general.”
I don't know any more than that.

Q. When that changing of names took place did you also hope
and expect that it would mean a further delay and a gradual
tapering off into nothingness?

A. Yes. I have already said that.

Q. Now, Witness, General Mesny was taken from the Koenig-
stein officers' camp later on. To whom was this officers’ camp
subordinate?

A. I have already stated that Himmler had ordered me not to
take any interest at all in the Koenigstein officers' camp up to
31 December 1944, and he also refused me permission to go there
with the French Minister [of Interior] Darnand. According to
this order, these reservations would be dropped after the first
of January 1945. j JJ

Q. Do you know why Hitler may have put this camp under
Keitel?

A. Yes. Because of the escape of the French General Giraud,
who in spite of having given his word of honor and so having
received special consideration, escaped.

Q. I think you made a mistake, didn't you? I think his name
was not "Giraud” but “Gerard.” 1

A. Well, I don't want to quarrel with you.

Q. Now, would you please look at book 42? I want to submit
to you a document which the prosecution has submitted in re-
buttal of your testimony here. On page 35 of this document book
you will find Exhibit 1249, Document NG-037. 2 This document
shows that the report to be submitted to the Fuehrer is initialed
by the Chief of Prisoner-of-War Affairs, and this document came
from the Foreign Office. What do you know about that?

A. I don’t know how the person making the report can say here
that I initialed it; I can quite definitely assure you that I neither
saw such a report, nor initialed it, nor was I told about it.

Q. Then, how is it that no report was made to you in this im-
portant affair? Were you not in the office as a result of being
sick?

A. No. I was quite definitely in my office on the date of this
report, 16 November 1944.

1 Reference is to General Henri Giraud.
3 Reproduced earlier in this section.

73

Q. But maybe this report of 16 November 1944 which refers to
the other report, might have been made earlier or later.

A. There was also an earlier report from the Foreign Office.

I wrote down the exhibit number but I can’t find it now. This
shows quite clearly that between 10 November and the end of
November, as a result of sickness, I was not in my office.

Q. Will you continue?

A. I have finished.

Q. Oh! Then, on page 6 of the document book 42, paragraph

II of Document NO-3878, Prosecution Exhibit 1246* —

A. Yes.

Q. There you will find a note which, according to what Krafft
says in his affidavit here, was sent by your agency to Krafft’s
agency after the shooting of the French general. What can you
say about that?

A. I myself did not sign such a report. I would most certainly
be able to remember it. I think I can say for certain, too, that
after a verbal report of my chief of staff, I heard no more about
the Mesny case. But it is, of course, possible — even probable —
that a member of the Office of the Chief of Prisoner-of-War
Affairs, at the request of the Inspector for Prisoner-of-War
Affairs, might have made a report of this kind, in accordance
with mutual agreement.

Q. Witness, of course, it matters a great deal to me to have
this matter absolutely cleared up. What happened if, for ex-
ample, a prisoner-of-war officer in a prisoner-of-war camp under
your supervision died? Did these cases have to be reported to the
protecting power?

A. Yes. It was all laid down in detail, and it always worked
smoothly. Reports from the PW camps would arrive with an
accurate description of how and from what causes the PW had
died, whether he was an officer or an enlisted man, with a medi-
cal report attached both by a physician of the nationality con-
cerned and by an official German physician. These reports would
go via the commander of Prisoner-of-War Affairs in the military

* Affidavit of Theodor Krafft, dated 6 June 1947, not reproduced herein. Krafft was a
lieutenant colonel in the Prisoner-of-War Affairs Department of the High Command of the
Armed Forces. The paragraph of his affidavit here in question states: “11. After the shoot-
ing of the French General Mesny in January 1945, a report on the shooting — by the Chief
of Prisoners-of-War Affairs — came to my office. This communication consisted of the copy
of a report by the officer wl*o accompanied the transport of General Mesny, and of a short
cover letter from the office of the Chief of Prisoners-of-War Affairs. Its contents was approxi-
mately that a breakdown had occurred during the trip from officers’ camp Koenigstein to
officers’ camp Colditz. While the driver and the man in charge of the transport were repair-
ing the car, French General Mesny attempted to escape and was shot. The General was taken
to a hospital in Dresden, where his death was diagnosed. The report by the Chief of Prisoners-
of-War Affairs was submitted to Counterintelligence, Foreign Branch.” Another affidavit of
Krafft, Ritter Document 20, Ritter Defense Exhibit 20, concerning the Sagan shootings, is
reproduced above in this section.

74

district to the Inspector for Prisoner-of-War Affairs, from there
to the Foreign Office, and from the Foreign Office to the pro-
tecting power.

Q. When Krafft mentions a report which reached him in some
way or other, would it have been possible, for example, for an
official or expert from your agency to have made out such a report,
intended for the protecting power, and sent it to the inspector’s
office?

A. Yes, certainly.

Q. Now, Witness, on the basis of the entire description of the
affair, as you remembered it, and as you have come to know it
from the documents, didn’t you gain the impression that the
order to carry out the reprisal was carried out only as a result
of a second order of Hitler’s immediately before the shooting of
the general?

A. Undoubtedly if Hitler intervened actively a second time or
ordered it, when people like Fegelein and Keitel quite openly re-
ferred to it, even without its actually having happened — of course,
we could not tell that from down below, but I can assure you
for certain that this matter would have come to nothing if Field
Marshal Keitel hadn’t pressed it.

Q. Witness, I’ve talked now in great detail about these things
during the last days and months. Until now you have tried to
serve only the truth. I ask you : Do you feel, in any way, guilty
before your conscience of having participated, in any way in, or
protected the shooting of General Mesny?

A. No. I myself did what I could in this matter. I had no
other means than delay; I had no other means than urging
Himmler to do something, and I did that. The affair was carried
out at a time when I was not present.

75

VIII. ATROCITIES AND OFFENSES COMMITTED
AGAINST GERMAN NATIONALS ON POLITI-
CAL, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS GROUNDS
FROM 1933 TO 1939— COUNT FOUR

A. Introduction

The charges under count four are contained in paragraphs 30-
37 of the indictment (sec. I, vol. XII). The Tribunal, upon a
defense motion, dismissed this count of the indictment during
the prosecution's case in chief. Accordingly, the current section
is devoted to the argumentation and ruling on this count, and
no evidence bearing on these charges is reproduced in this sec-
tion. The defense motion to quash count four and to reject the
submission of evidence in support thereof was filed on 26 Febru-
ary 1948, about half way through the prosecution's case in chief
(sec. B, below). This motion alleged that the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction to try the crimes charged in count four. Since the
questions raised by the motion involved one whole count and most
of the defendants, the matter was set down for oral argument
before the Tribunal on 2 March 1948. Dr. Kubuschok, who often
acted as general spokesman for defense counsel, opened the oral
argument (sec. C, below). General Taylor replied for the prose-
cution (sec. D, below) and Dr. Kubuschok concluded the oral
argument (sec. E, below). The Tribunal dismissed count four
of the indictment by an order of 26 March 1948, which order
incorporated a memorandum giving the Tribunal's reasons for
the dismissal (sec. F, below).

B. Defense Motion to Dismiss Count Four
of the Indictment

Dr. Kubuschok,

Spokesman of the defense

In Case XI Nuernberg, 26 February 1948

To the Judges of Tribunal IV via the Secretary General

In the name of those defense counsel whose clients are charged
with count four, I repeat the motion already made orally in the
trial —

To quash count four of the indictment and in connection there-
with to reject the submission of evidence and interrogation of
witnesses in support of this count of the indictment.
Substantiation:

With count four of the indictment, the prosecution raises
charges for crimes against humanity committed during the period

76

of January 1933 — September 1939. A trial and presentation of
facts within the frame of these accusations is not permissible.

These facts are not included in the terms of Control Council
Law No. 10 1 which has to be the basis for finding the verdict.
This can be seen from the following:

According to the preamble of Control Council Law No. 10, the
latter has been issued —

“ * * * in order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow
Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of
8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto * *

The close connection of the Charter with Law No. 10 is hereby
clarified. If the terms of the Charter are to be “carried into
effect” by Control Council Law No. 10, the Charter is decisive for
the interpretation and at least for the definition in Law No.*
10. This is underlined also by the fact that the Moscow Declara-
tion and the London Agreement are inseparable constituent parts
of Law No. 10 — as its Article I explicitly states — as well as of
the Charter. The Charter formulated for the first time the
criminal concept of crimes against humanity. The concept which
in itself comprehends far-reaching facts had to be limited because
of the international character of the prosecution supported there-
by. In temporal respect it is rather comprehensive since it in-
cludes crimes against the civil population prior to and during
the war ; with regard to the substance, however, it is limited since
only such crimes are subject to prosecution which have been com-
mitted in execution of or in connection with a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal according to the Charter. This
limitation provides the definition of the crime against humanity
which is subject to criminal prosecution and therewith also the
limitation of a tribunal's competency for trial.

The meaning of this limitation becomes clear by the wording
of Article 6(c) of the Charter. All crimes committed before the
war can be charged as crimes against humanity only if these
crimes are connected with a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal according to the meaning of the Charter, that is, with a
crime against peace or a war crime. The verdict of the IMT
also decided to this effect in stating (p. 16501 of the German
text) that crimes against humanity are substantiated only if the
act has been committed in execution of a war of aggression or
in connection with another crime within the meaning of the
Charter. 2

1 Control Council Law No. 10, and all other basic agreements or enactments mentioned in
this motion, are reproduced in the early part of Volume XII, this series.

2 Trial of the Major War Criminals, op. cit.. Volume I, pages 254 and 255.

953402 — 52— 6

According to the preamble and Article I of Law No. 10, the
latter’s penalties could not deviate from this delimitation of the
concept of the crime against humanity within the meaning of the
Charter, nor from the limitation of the thereby sustained limi-
tation of the competence to prosecute such acts. They actually
do not deviate. If the facts listed under Article II of Law No.
10 do not show the same formulation as in the Charter, it is
because for the first time definitions have been made which, at
the time Law No. 10 was issued, were already and had to be
definite concepts if Law No. 10 was destined to carry the Charter
into effect. If the prosecution is of the opinion that the lack of
a provision analogous to the Charter’s provisions that the crimes
against humanity should be in connection with another crime of
the Charter might not be unintentional, the correctness of this
view can be doubted. Wrong, however, is the conclusion that the
lack of this provision could result in an extension of the frame
set in the Charter for the prosecution of crimes against hu-
manity. Considering the close connection between the Charter
and Law No. 10, such an extension should have been established
expressi verbis , if such an extension of a Charter would have been
possible at all in the carrying-out law.

Law No. 10 did no longer need the basic definition of crime
against humanity which was for the first time necessary in the
Charter. Contrary to the Charter, Article II (paragraph c) of
Law No. 10 did not need to state explicitly that acts which had
been committed prior to or during the war would be included in-
sofar as they were committed in connection with another crime
of the Charter. Law No. 10 did not need to mention the temporal
extension to acts prior to the war nor the limiting connection
with crimes against peace and war crimes. The definition existed
already and therewith its frame and delimitation. This was in-
serted in the Moscow Declaration and the London Agreement by
which it had been made clear that only war criminals were to
be tried by this special criminal law.

[Signed] Dr. Kubuschok

C. Oral Argument of the Defense on the Defense
Motion to Dismiss Count Four 1

Presiding Judge Christianson: We have for consideration
this afternoon a motion to quash count four of the indictment.
Are the moving parties of the defense ready to present their
argument? Who is to present it for the defense? Dr. Kubuschok?

Dr. Kubuschok : In a short written motion, 2 I stated my basis

1 Recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 2 March 1949, pages 2523-2529.

2 Reproduced above in this section.

78

fol* filing that motion. According to the text of the law, I am
of the opinion that the legal question involved is relatively simple.
As a matter of course, on the other hand, legal objections may be
raised.

Q. Just a moment, Dr. Kubuschok. Are you speaking for all
the defendants?

A. Yes.

Q. And all the defendants who are charged in count four are
represented in this motion?

A. Yes.

Presiding Judge Christianson: I just wanted that for the
record. Excuse me for interrupting you. Go ahead, Dr. Kubu-
schok.

Dr. Kubuschok: The legal objections which might be raised
against our motion are manifold. I do not know which of these
the prosecution will be willing to take up. Of course it would
mean a loss of time if in theory I were to enter into all possible
objections in advance, that is anticipating them before they are
made. For that reason, therefore, the most economic — that is,
time-saving measure for me is to proceed to the prosecution for
its answer to my written motion, raise its objection, and thus
give me an opportunity in my reply to confine myself to those
points raised by the prosecution in opposing my motion.

Q. Well, of course that is a little bit irregular, I think, Dr.
Kubuschok. You’d better say all you want to say now in behalf
of your motion. Then we will hear the prosecution, or those,
opposing the motion. We are inclined to give you some time for
reply argument. If you wish to waive your preliminary argu-
ment and let it stand on the basis of the argument you put in
your motion, very well. We will then hear the prosecution, and
then we will give you an opportunity to reply, but it will be in
the nature of a reply. Do you wish to proceed in that manner?

A. I first of all refer to my written motion and to the justifi-
cation outlined in that motion. In supplement thereto, I wish
to say that any provision of law must have limitation in time.
In the case of a normal law, this is very simple. As far as time
is concerned, it goes into effect on the day of its enactment or
it goes into effect at a later day regulated in the law itself and
established therein.

As far as Control Council Law No. 10 is concerned, this law
does not say anything about restrictions of time within which
it is to apply. Therefore, all we can utilize are such portions
enabling us to interpret confinement and restrictions of time
which are based in the law itself — in the text of the law — and
the preamble to Allied Control Council Law No. 10 shows us

79

the way very clearly. In that preamble, there is reference made
to the Moscow Declaration and to the London Agreement and
to the Charter of the IMT, which are made the guiding prin-
ciples for the interpretation of Allied Control Council Law No.
10. It is specifically stated there that Control Council Law No.
10 has for its purpose to implement and give effect to the terms
of the Moscow Declaration, the London Agreement, and the
Charter. Furthermore, in order to make this even more clear,
the Control Law No. 10 says, further down, that these three
declarations are made integral parts of Law No. 10.

Now, if Control Council Law No. 10 does not contain any
restrictions as to the time in which it is to be valid or to gain
effectiveness, then all that we can do is to interpret such limi-
tations of time from such clarifications or explanations as the
law itself may give. Because if we refer to the Moscow Declara-
tion, the London Agreement, and the Charter respectively, we
will find our guiding principles, to determine such limitation on
time. The Moscow Declaration as well as the London Agreement
clearly show the purpose of this newly established judicial pro-
cedure. They show clearly that the purpose is to have crimes
of war indicted and prosecuted and to have war criminals held
responsible. As far as the Charter is concerned, it clearly con-
fines and restricts these purposes. It had to make such restric-
tions and demarcations in order to show clearly that also crimes
committed prior to the Polish War are considered as war crimes
and their perpetrators are to be considered as war criminals only
if the deeds perpetrated prior to the Polish campaign have a
direct connection with the two war crimes specified in the Charter
itself — these being crimes against peace and war crimes.

In this connection, crimes against humanity perpetrated prior
to the Polish campaign are classified as war crimes and their
perpetrators fall into the category of war criminals. This shows
the clear demarcation established in the Charter and this was
a demarcation which was absolutely imperative so that the Char-
ter or any subsequent law enacted pursuant to the Charter be
safeguarded from the reproach that it be a law which was in
violation of the basic principle, “nulla poena sine crimine, nulla
poena sine lege”

For the purpose of argumentation, I do not have to deal with
matters referring to whether the Charter was successful in estab-
lishing the demarcation outlined by me. In any case, it would
not have been successful if crimes against humanity perpetrated
between 1933 and 1939 were to be included which do not have
any connection whatsoever with war crimes as such, crimes
which therefore are not in violation of any law, be it either

80

codified law or customary law, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the
provisions of international law, codified as well as customary law.

This is the argumentation which the prosecution held in the
proceedings before the IMT in order to counteract the contention
to the effect that the Charter was not in violation of the principle,
nulla poena, sine lege. As far as crimes against humanity are
concerned, the argumentation raised by the prosecution in the
trial before the IMT cannot be applied in any way whatsoever.
Very probably the prosecution's argument will be that the text
of the respective provisions of Law No. 10, as well as the Charter
of the IMT, are different in nature, that there are differences
between the two, and very probably it will raise in the way of
argument that, as far as the technical aspects of law are con-
cerned, it would be entirely incomprehensible if, in defining the
concept of law, according to Law No. 10, another concept or
definition would be utilized in answer to which I wish to say
Law No. 10 could not possibly be more extensive than it is or
more comprehensive than it is for the reason of nulla poena,
sine lege .

Furthermore, it could not be more extensive for reason of the
limitation which it sets in its own preamble in its close connec-
tion with the Charter. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the
different wording of Law No. 10 does not prove by any means
whatsoever that there is no demarcation or limitation in time
whatsoever established here. I don't know what the prosecution
is going to argue on that subject. I don't know whether the
prosecution is going to say: “The limitation of 1933 up to May
1945 is made by me,'' and I don't know whether this may even
be right, whether it is not possible that the law might permit
retroaction to the time prior or subsequent. In any case, to justify
the limitation in time which it believes applies from 1933 to
May 1945. Over and over again reference must be made to the
Moscow Declaration and to the London Agreement and to the
Charter, by the prosecution. They have no means but to refer
to these three instruments, all three of which are quite specific
and clear in their wording that independent crimes, as far as the
time from 1933 to 1939 is concerned, may not be arraigned or
indicted before this Tribunal.

The prosecution will probably ascertain the wording of Control
Council Law No. 10 intentionally refrains from stating that
deeds must be connected with the two crimes established in this
Charter. The prosecution will say that this was omitted inten-
tionally, and for that reason the prosecution will draw the con-
clusion that even such crimes may be adjudged which have no
connection whatsoever with those two crimes established in the

81

Charter, but I have just the same right to assert here for my
part that the same provision of law has omitted something else
in addition compared to the wording of the Charter, namely, has
omitted the provision that crimes committed prior and during the
war are not mentioned.

Now, if the one thing was omitted intentionally, surely the
other thing was omitted, too, namely, the extension in time.
Therefore, the prosecution cannot make use of the omission of the
one demarcation for making an extensive conclusion. On the
other hand, whereas the other provision can be omitted, likewise
this is used in the prosecution’s own favor and, on the contrary,
even says that although specifically omitted, time limitations
should be interpreted extensively.

This can’t be done. On the one hand, you cannot act in one
way and then argue in another sense on the other hand.

In my opinion, over and over again, in interpreting this law
we come back to the preamble, the initial point which clearly
specifies the aim of the law, and this aim will do away with all
lack of clarity which may be contained in the wording of the law
itself and which will prove as a guiding principle to this Tribunal
in adjudging in this case.

Last of all, I wish to say if in actual fact there should be any
doubts and there should be justification for doubts, and even if
the question could not be clearly answered by the law itself, even
so, in any case the Tribunal could not judge under doubtful
competency but for the sake of law could only assert its com-
petency within such limits as clearly specified and proved by the
law. This applies to any case, but most certainly and much more
so it must apply to a law which is new, which establishes new
crimes and which becomes retroactive to periods which, in date
of time, are before the actual enactment of law — that is, the law
has retroactive character.

D. Oral Argument of the Prosecution on the Defense
Motion to Dismiss Count Four*

Presiding Judge Christianson: I take it the prosecution
wishes to be heard in opposition to the motion. General Taylor.

Brigadier General Taylor: If Your Honors please. Dr.
Kubuschok’s argument throughout, has, I think, mentioned a
great many of the points which have been made with reference
to this general question but, with the Court’s permission, I would
like to cover the whole thing rather fully, and answer some argu-
ments which he has not mentioned this time but which have ap-
peared in other documents by the defense.

* Recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 2 March 1948, pages 2529-2563.

82

Dr. Kubuschok’s motion raises questions which, we submit, have
not been squarely decided by the IMT or by any of the decisions
so far rendered here under Law No. 10, but the principles that
relate to the question posed by the motion were discussed at some
length in two prior decisions, by Tribunal III in Case 3 — that is.
the Justice case 1 — and by Tribunal IV in Case 5, the Flick case. 2

The issues raised by this motion we believe have fundamental
importance in the field of international law and, in fact, I do not
believe that any question which is likely to confront these Tri-
bunals is of greater importance.

In approaching this question we would like to make two pre-
liminary observations. We just stated our belief that the de-
cisions in the Justice and Flick cases are not on all fours with
the question here today, but both of those decisions did deal with
closely related questions and, while there is no square conflict
between these decisions in their end result, we think there is
apparent difference in the rationale of the opinions. Likewise,
while the IMT did not pass on this direct question, there are very
various statements in the IMT opinion which are of related in-
terest, so at the outset we think it important to state that in our
view the conclusion reached, and the statements made, by these
other Tribunals are certainly entitled to great weight, but are not
binding on this Tribunal.

Under Control Council Law No. 10 and Ordinance No. 7, cer-
tain determinations by the IMT are made binding, but decisions
on general abstract questions of law are not. As for the other
military tribunals sitting here at Nuernberg, they are of coordi-
nate jurisdiction, and binding decisions can only be made by joint
sessions of all the tribunals under Article V paragraph ( b ) of
the Ordinance and, so far as I am aware, no joint session relating
to this question has been held. We agree with the statement of
Tribunal IV in the Flick case that these other judgments are
advisory only. The views expressed in the Flick case and the
Justice case are entitled to the greatest respect, but this Tribunal
has the authority — and we think the duty — to make its own inde-
pendent determination of the issues raised by this motion.

Our second preliminary point is that the defense has chosen to
raise this question by a motion to dismiss or quash count four
and, therefore, a decision on the motion must be based on the
assumption that all the facts that we allege in count four are
true. Therefore, we must keep in mind the charges set forth
in count four; and, as appears from paragraph 30 of the in-
dictment, thirteen of the defendants are charged under count four

1 United States vs. Josef Altstoetter. et al., volume III, this series.

2 United States vs. Friedrich Flick, et al., volume VI, this series.

83

with crimes which include murder, enslavement, imprisonment
and other ill treatment of persons, and the plunder and looting
of property. The victims of these crimes, as appears from para-
graph 31 to 36 of the indictment, were German nationals, in-
cluding numerous political opponents of the Nazi regime, trade
union leaders, clergymen and Christian leaders among the laity
and, under paragraphs 31-36, German nationals of Jewish ex-
traction. Dr. Kubuschok’s argument is that this Tribunal has
no jurisdiction to hear and determine these charges of murder,
enslavement, and other atrocious crimes because they occurred
prior to September 1939.

Now, it is particularly important to bear in mind the nature
of these charges because, as will readily appear, they are funda-
mentally very different from the charges we put into count three
of the indictment in the Flick case, the dismissal of which, by
Tribunal IV, is strongly relied on by Dr. Kubuschok. In count
three of the Flick case the only charge was that the defendants
benefited from what is called the “Aryanization” program and,
as the Court stated in that case — I quote:

“There is no contention that the defendants in any way par-
ticipated in the Nazi persecution of Jews other than in taking
advantage of the so-called Aryanization program by seeking
and using state economic pressure to obtain from the owners,
not all of whom were Jewish, the four properties in question.”*

And bearing in mind this striking difference — that is the end
of the quotation — and bearing in mind this striking difference
between the allegations of count three in the Flick case on the
one hand and count four in this case on the other hand, we
think it is clear that the dismissal of count three in the Flick
case does not lend much support to the motion to dismiss count
four of this case.

Now, I turn to the juridical background of Control Council
Law No. 10 which we believe bears on the matters here and
which Dr. Kubuschok has mentioned. The general nature of the
law which is applied by the Nuernberg Tribunal under Law No.
10 has been described and analyzed in several of the judgments
which have been rendered here and we don’t need to make any
lengthy analysis now. It was pointed out in the Justice case
that within Germany, Control Council Law No. 10 is substantive
legislation and is binding on this Tribunal and other tribunals
which have been established to enforce its provisions; but the
criminal character of the acts with which these defendants are
charged does not derive solely from the language of Control

* United States va. Friedrich Flick, et al., judgment, mimeographed transcript page 11008 ,

84

Council Law No. 10 any more than the criminal character of
murder in domestic penal law derives solely from the local statutes
defining murder and prescribing the punishment for its varying
degrees.

The acts which we have charged as criminal in this indictment
were criminal under international penal law long before the
adoption of the London Charter and the enactment of [Control
Council] Law No. 10. Neither the Charter nor Law No. 10 in
our view, creates “new” crimes; Article II of Law No. 10, states
that certain acts are “recognized” as crimes. International law
does not spring from legislation on the whole; it is a “customary”
or “common” law which develops from “usages established among
civilized peoples” and, as these develop, these usages and customs
become the basis and reason for acts and conduct, and from
time to time they appear in international agreements, treaties,
and declarations. The London Charter and Law No. 10 are im-
portant items in this stream of acts and declarations through
which international law develops, but they are not retroactive.

Law No. 10, therefore, is not a source of international law in
a strict legislative sense at all, although it is a prime example
of the method by which international law, like the common law,
develops. Law No. 10 and Ordinance No. 7 do confer on this
and the other Nuernberg Tribunals jurisdiction to apply and en-
force international penal law within Germany and within the
limits set forth in Law No. 10. In short, Law No. 10, together
with Ordinance No. 7, provides both the jurisdictional basis and
the procedural mechanisms which enable this Tribunal to func-
tion as a court and to apply and enforce international law.

But Law No. 10 is not mere procedure. It is the fountain of
jurisdiction and the charter of this Tribunal. This Tribunal and
other tribunals have no general power to enforce all international
law. They are only empowered to enforce that portion of inter-
national law which, we might say, is caught up and declared in
and recognized by Law No. 10; therefore, the Tribunal has no
power to set aside and disregard any provisions of Law No. 10.
Where questions of interpretation arise, the Tribunal may, in-
deed, look behind the language of Law No. 10 to the general body
of common law principles of international law of which the en-
actment is declaratory. But it can look behind the language only
to interpret, and not to expand the scope of the enactment or to
nullify its provisions. Just as the IMT was bound by the defini-
tions in the London Charter, so, we submit, this Tribunal is
bound by the definition of Law No. 10. As Tribunal III declared
in the Justice case, I quote briefly:

SS

“It can scarcely be argued that a court, which owes its
existence and jurisdiction solely to the provisions of a given
statute could assume to exercise that jurisdiction and then, in
the exercise thereof, declare invalid the act to which it owes
its existence. Except as an aid to construction, we cannot and
need not go behind the statute.”*

There is a third aspect of Law No. 10 which is of importance,
and which it appears is in strong contrast to the London Charter.
The London Charter is an international agreement, signed by four
powers, and adhered to by numerous others. It is in no sense a
statute. Under Article 7 of the London Agreement, it can be
terminated by one month’s notice on the part of any signatory.
Its geographical effect is not limited to Germany; it applies to all
war criminals of the European Axis, not only to Germans. In
sharp contrast, Law No. 10 is an enactment of the Control Coun-
cil, which is a body now exercising supreme legislative authority
in Germany. It can only be repealed or amended by the same
principles as all other legislative enactments of the Control Coun-
cil. It applies only within Germany. It is, in short, an occupa-
tional enactment for Germany.

And so it appears that Law No. 10 is not a mere declaration
of international law. It is also a legislative enactment for the
governance of an administration of justice in Germany by the
supreme legislative body. Its purpose is not only to give effect
to the London Agreement but also, as it expressly states in the
enacting clause, and I quote: “to establish a uniform legal basis
in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other simi-
lar offenders.” Very clearly, Law No. 10 is not concerned solely
with crimes by Germans against the nationals in other countries.
On the contrary, it is directly concerned with crimes committed
by Germans against Germans. Thus, Article III of Law No. 10,
which authorizes the establishment of tribunals to try persons
charged with crimes, expressly states that the tribunal, and I
quote: “may, in the case of crimes committed by persons of Ger-
man citizenship, against other persons of German citizenship * * *
be a German court, if authorized by the occupying authorities.”
Therefore, if a German court, authorized to enforce Law No.
10, is required to take jurisdiction over crimes by Germans against
Germans, it is clear that this Tribunal, in enforcing the same
statute, has the same jurisdictional basis and it must take cog-
nizance of these crimes in cases which fall within the definitions
of the statutes. So, I think, it is clear that the juridical prin-
ciples beneath Control Council Law No. 10, are not limited to

* United States vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al., Volume III, this series, page 965,

86

the principles of international penal law. Law No. 10 also in-
vokes and is based upon universal accepted principles of domestic
penal law, which may legitimately be applied by the occupying
power in governing occupied territories. One of the purposes of
occupation is stated to be “the eventual reconstruction of German
political life on a democratic basis,” and the abolition of the racial
discrimination of the Third Reich. Because of the stultifying of
the judicial tradition under the Third Reich, because Nazi preju-
dices may not be completely dead, or for any other sufficient
reason, the occupying authorities may legitimately entrust to oc-
cupation courts the task of punishing crimes committed against
Jews or other groups which the Nazi regime treated as special
enemies. As was stated in the Justice case, I quote:

“They [the occupying powers] have justly and legally assumed
the broader task in Germany which they have solemnly defined and
declared, to wit: the task of reorganizing the German Govern-
ment and economy and of punishing persons who, prior to the
occupation, were guilty of crimes against humanity committed
against their own nationals.”* Now, to apply these principles to
the interpretation of Law No. 10, we must know, in the first
instance, that Law No. 10 is not based solely on principles of
international penal law. And, in looking behind the language of
Law No. 10, in order to solve questions of construction, this Tri-
bunal should not look only at the underlying principles of inter-
national penal law, but also at such accepted principles of domes-
tic penal law as Law No. 10 was obviously designed to embody
and apply in certain situations as defined therein.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that while this Tribunal
does not enforce only international law, this Tribunal is bound
by international law in every move it makes. The Tribunal is
bound by international law, not only when it is enforcing inter-
national penal law but when it is enforcing domestic penal law,
for this Court is not a German court. It is a Court constituted
under international authority. It is sitting in a foreign country
and it is meting out justice to citizens of a foreign country; and
therefore it must not invoke any jurisdiction or employ any pro-
cedures beyond what is permissible under international law under
these circumstances.

In taking pains to stay within those limits of what is permitted
under international law, I believe the Tribunal need not decide
in vacuo whether the occupation of Germany is now a “belligerent
occupation” within the meaning of the Hague Conventions, or
whether there has been a “subjugation,” or what the technical
status is. Two of the judges in the Justice case held that, because

* Ibid;, p. 964.

87

of the complete disintegration of the German central government
and the fact that there is no longer a German Army in the field,
there is no belligerent occupation and the Hague Conventions do
not apply. The third judge thought that he did not have to de-
cide that point in order to decide the case. And we think the
point need not be decided here because, in any event, the Hague
Conventions are not a complete statement of the principles of
international law, as the Convention itself acknowledges in the
preamble. Whether or not the Hague Conventions are in force
in Germany today, the occupying powers obviously must respect
the general principles of law and of humane behavior recognized
and acknowledged by all civilized nations. And it follows that
this Tribunal must apply and enforce the law only within the
limits which these principles permit, and must accord the de-
fendants a fair trial.

Certain consequences with respect to the construction of Law
No. 10 follow from what I have just said. The juridical char-
acter and the several purposes which the law was intended to
achieve must not be lost sight of, and it should not be construed
so as to obstruct or nullify those purposes. But, on the other
hand, the whole purpose of Law No. 10 would be frustrated if it
were to be construed in a manner unfair to the defendants who
are prosecuted under its provisions; and, therefore, the language
of Law No. 10 must not be stretched beyond its normal intend-
ment, and, in any case of real doubt, the language should be con-
strued in favor of the defendants. Likewise, while the technical
American constitutional prohibition against ex post facto law is
not applicable here as such, the generally accepted principles that
underlie that prohibition should be recognized. In this connection,
we respectfully invite the Tribunal's attention to the draft report
of the second session of the United Nations' Commission on
Human Rights, held at Geneva in December 1947. At this session
there was submitted a draft of an international covenant on
human rights which contains what I believe to be an excellent
statement of the principle nullum crimen sine lege, which Dr.
Kubuschok referred to, and which we think defines its proper
scope in an international penal proceeding such as this one. The
draft has defined that principle in this manner: First, no person
shall be held guilty of any offense on account of any act or
omission which did not constitute such an offense at the time it
was committed, nor shall he be liable to any greater punishment
than that prescribed for such offense by the law in force at the
time the offense was committed.

Second, nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and
punishment of any person for the commission of any act which,

88

at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the gen-
eral principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

In other words, as it was put in the judgment of the Justice
case, the rule against retroactive legislation should be regarded as
“a principle of justice and fair play,” and applied as such.

Now, with this background, I turn to the particular question
raised by the motion, in particular whether the definition of
crimes against humanity in Law No. 10 includes crimes com-
mitted prior to 1939. In approaching this question, it may assist
matters if we state at the outset our understanding of what the
IMT and Military Tribunals III and IV have previously decided
in this general field, and what effect we believe this Tribunal
should give to those judgments. So far as we know, those are the
only three cases that bear on this point in any significant fashion.

The IMT construed the definition of crimes against humanity in
Article 6 (c) of the London Charter as applying only to such
crimes as were committed in execution of or in connection with
war crimes or crimes against peace. This holding was based on
certain language in the definition of crimes against humanity con-
tained in the London Charter, which language is omitted from
the definition of crimes against humanity contained in Law No.
10. Not only for this reason, but also because Law No. 10 and
the London Charter are very different in their fundamental char-
acter and purposes, we believe that this holding of the IMT is
clearly inapplicable in cases brought under Law No. 10.

The IMT also decided, as a matter of fact but not of law, that
the prosecution in that case had not succeeded in establishing
that the crimes against humanity which were charged to have
been committed prior to 1939 were, in fact, committed in con-
nection with crimes against peace.

This ruling was clearly intended to apply only on the basis of
evidence presented before the IMT. It was, we submit, not in-
tended to bind other Tribunals rendering judgment on the basis
of other evidence, and therefore it follows that even if the IMT's
view that crimes against humanity must be connected with war
crimes and crimes against peace, be adopted, it is still open to
the prosecution to show that such a connection in fact exists, and
the prosecution has alleged in the indictment in this case that
such a connection does exist.

Paragraph 6 of count one of the indictment is in essence a
summary of count four, and furthermore, by paragraph 23 of the
indictment all of count four is incorporated by reference in count
one. The prosecution has therefore taken meticulous pains to
specify that the crimes against humanity charged in count four
were connected with the crimes against peace charged in count

89

one, and therefore, even under the IMT ruling which, we repeat,
we believe to be inapplicable here, count four is not subject to
dismissal.

Judge Maguire: General, where in count four do you allege
that the acts committed were in connection with or in pursuance
of the commission of a crime against peace?

General Taylor: Well, Your Honor, I believe it is not in
count four. I believe it is in count one, and I would submit that
that is sufficient because the indictment must be regarded as a
whole and paragraph 23 states that the allegations included in
counts three to seven inclusive were committed as an integral
part of the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars
of aggression and invasion. With all respect, I would not sup-
pose it governed whether that language appeared in count four
or count one. I should think that since it is in the indictment
that the allegation has been made in such connection as this is.

Judge Maguire: Well, is it the prosecution’s claim that any
count in the indictment is aided so far as that count is con-
cerned by allegations of fact or conclusions of law contained in
another count?

General Taylor: Well, Your Honor, I don’t know how I would
answer that as a general proposition, but it does seem to me the
indictment must be read as a whole and that if it appears to be
specifically stated that the allegations in count four are of a
certain character and have a certain connection, that the prose-
cution sufficiently alleged it. Again I would think the important
thing is whether the necessary language is in the indictment and
not whether we have put it in one count or the other.

Judge Powers : Well, General, in count one, if proved, it would
prove only the offense of aggressive warfare, wouldn’t it? I
don’t know whether you heard me or not.

General Taylor: Yes, I did, Your Honor. Count one, if all
the allegations were proved, would include the allegations in para-
graph 4 — in paragraph 6, which are in very summary form much
the same as count four, and if paragraph 23 is proved, it would
be proved that those things are in connection with aggressive war.

Judge Powers: It wouldn’t prove a crime against humanity?

General Taylor: It would, however, establish the necessary
connection, it seems to me, Your Honor, so that a crime against
humanity could be found. Now, passing from the IMT decision
to the Justice case, the indictment in that case did not charge
the defendants with committing crimes against humanity prior
to 1939, but the indictment did charge the defendants with com-
mitting crimes against humanity against other German nationals
after the outbreak of war. The Court cohvicted several of the

90

defendants of having committed such crimes against humanity
and in its judgment Tribunal III employed reasoning which, we
submit, is demonstrably valid and which clearly supports the
legal sufficiency of count four in the indictment in this case.

In the Flick case, the indictment charged the defendants with
the commission of crimes against humanity prior to 1939 in that
they participated in the Aryanization of industrial properties be-
longing to Jews. Tribunal IV dismissed the count on two quite
distinct grounds, one of which they referred to as the ground
utilized as having no jurisdiction but stating in conclusion, and
I quote: “Whether we hold that we have not jurisdiction or
whether we assume jurisdiction and hold that no crime against
humanity has been proved, the result so far as these defendants
are concerned is the same. * * * Accordingly count three is
dismissed.” 1

One of the grounds relied on by the Tribunal, the one expressly
relied on, was that the definition of crimes against humanity in
Law No. 10 does not include crimes committed prior to September
1939. With greatest respect to Tribunal IV, the prosecution sub-
mits that this conclusion is untenable. The other ground relied
on by Tribunal IV was that the definition of crimes against
humanity in Law No. 10 comprehended only atrocities, and I
quote, “Such as affect the life and liberties of oppressed peoples,” 2
and that it does not comprehend transactions relating to indus-
trial properties such as were charged in count three of the Flick
case. The prosecution believes that this is a very substantial
point and should be given full attention in the interpretation of
the law in the present case, and we will shortly state our views
with respect to this matter which we believe is the most im-
portant point raised by Dr. Kubuschok’s motion.

The definition of crimes against humanity contained in the
London Agreement, while it is similar in most respects to the
definition in Law No. 10, differs in several respects including,
as Dr. Kubuschok pointed out, that the language “before and
after the war” is omitted and also in that the following limiting
clause was omitted; reading, “in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

This clause doesn’t appear in the definition in Law No. 10. It
was this clause which was expressly relied on by the IMT in
holding that crimes against humanity as defined in the London
Charter did not, if we put it this way, stand on their own feet
but must have been committed in execution of or in connection
with crimes against peace or war crimes in order to come within

1 United States vs. Friedrich Flick, et al., judgment, mimeographed transcript page 11014 .

2 Ibid., page 11013.

91

the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This ruling of the IMT was
analyzed at some length in the prosecution’s opening statement
in the Flick case, and we don’t want to repeat now all that we
said then, but in summary we pointed out that the effect which
the IMT gave to the particular clause in question, is we believe,
hard to justify and that it is far more probable that the clause
was intended to make it clear that the definition was not meant
to embrace private or occasional crimes or local petty persecutions
but only such wholesale campaigns of eradication as are con-
demned by civilized usage as contrary to the law of nations.

We also pointed out that this portion of the IMT’s judgment
has been strongly criticized in writings, among others by Mr.
Henry L. Stimson, on the ground that it tends to make the
definition of crimes against humanity practically meaningless and
we drew attention to the subsequent comments of the French
member of the IMT which made it clear that, so far as he was
concerned, he personally disapproved of the concept of crimes
against humanity, and therefore refused to give this portion of
the London Charter any practical consequences. Those are his
own words, and indeed, that he emptied them of their substance,
again his own words. But these speculations about the London
Agreement and the IMT decision are, we submit, academic. The
indictment in this case is not brought under the London Agree-
ment, but under Law No. 10. The definition of crimes against
humanity in Law No. 10 is not identical with that in the London
Charter, and one of the differences is that the words which I
quoted before, which provided the sole basis for the limiting
ruling made by the IMT, do not appear in Law No. 10 and with
respect to this circumstance, Tribunal IV in its judgment in
the Flick case stated: “It is argued that the omission of this
phrase from Control Council Law No. 10 evidences an intent to
broaden the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to include such crimes.
We find no support for the argument in the express language
of Law No. 10. To reach the desired conclusion its advocates
must resolve ambiguity by a process of statutory construction.
Jurisdiction is not to be presumed. A court should not reach out
for power beyond the clearly defined bounds of its chartering
legislation.”*

Now, this statement of general principles of statutory construc-
tion is, we submit, irreproachable, but it is one thing to resolve
ambiguities in favor of the accused, and quite another to create
ambiguities where none in fact exist, and with all respect we
believe that is what had been done in that case. For example, a
statute which defines and punishes the crime of murder is not

* Ibid., page 11009.

92

ambiguous if it fails to specify expressly that its prohibition
extends to murder accomplished by poison or murder committed
in the month of June 1952. Murder accomplished by poison or
committed at a specific time are clearly within the definition of
the general prohibition and no express language is needed. The
application of these principles to the question at issue, we think,
is clear. Since Law No. 10 is a declaration of pre-existing law,
it must operate retrospectively. There is nothing in the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity to suggest that its retrospective
operation is effective only as far back as September 1939. We
submit there is no ambiguity. The proponents of the view that
its retrospective operation is limited to the period of the war
can point to no express language in support of such a view.
They are relegated to a process of statutory construction which
we submit is demonstrably invalid. Indeed, the very fact that
this clause appeared in the definition of the London Charter, but
not in the definition of Law No. 10, we think serves only to em-
phasize the clear and unambiguous meaning of Law No. 10.
The London Agreement and Law No. 10 are very different kinds
of legal instruments, and Law No. 10 is not an amendment of
the London Charter; but the London Charter was in the hand
of those who promulgated Law No. 10, as the preamble and
Article I of Law No. 10 make abundantly clear, and it is a well
recognized principle of construction that changes in language are
presumed to be meaningful rather than meaningless.

As Tribunal III stated in its judgment in the Justice case, and

I quote:* “The evidence to be later reviewed establishes that
certain inhumane acts charged in count three of the indictment
were committed in execution of, and in connection with, aggressive
war and were therefore crimes against humanity even under the
provisions of the IMT Charter, but it must be noted that Control
Council Law No. 10 differs materially from the Charter. The
latter defines crimes against humanity as inhumane acts and so
forth, committed, ‘in execution of, or in connection with, any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal/ whereas in Control
Council Law No. 10 the words last quoted are deliberately omitted
from the definition.”

Finally, if anything more is needed, and in this I am directing
my remarks to Dr. Kubuschok’s observation about the omission
of the words “before and during the war,” the question we think
is set at rest by the express language of paragraph 5 of Article

II of Law No. 10 which states that: “In any trial or prosecution
for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not be entitled
to the benefits of any statute of limitation in respect of the period

* United States vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al.. Volume III, this series, page 974.

953402—52 7

93

from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945, nor shall any immunity,
pardon, or amnesty granted under the Nazi regime be admitted
as a bar to trial or punishment.” This provision we think makes
it clear by express language that Law No. 10 operates retro-
spectively back to 30 January 1933 which was the day of Hitler's
appointment as Chancellor, and we think it perfectly clear that a
primary purpose of this paragraph was to furnish a basis for
the prosecution of crimes against humanity committed after Hit-
ler’s appointment as Chancellor, but prior to the outbreak of war
because, so far as crimes against peace are concerned there were,
so far as we know, no German municipal statutes recognizing or
punishing crimes against peace to which statutes of limitation
might have applied, nor were there any Nazi amnesties or par-
dons with respect thereto, and as to war crimes, this provision
can only be effective as far back as 1939 or at the most, 1938,
because the laws of war cannot have come into play at the very
earliest before the annexation of Austria in 1938, and it follows
that the quoted paragraph has substantive effect between 1933
and 1938 only with respect to crimes against humanity, and it
is a cardinal principle that statutes are to be construed so as to
give effect to their provisions, not to nullify them.

In summary, we take the position that crimes against humanity
are one of the three independent categories of crimes defined in
Law No. 10 and are punishable by Tribunals established under
Law No. 10 if committed at any time after 30 January 1933.
There is, we submit, no ambiguity, and this conclusion is required
by the express language of Law No. 10. And, indeed, no other
conclusion is possible in the light of the general character and
purposes of Law No. 10. To repeat once more, the IMT was
enforcing an international agreement, terminable on one month’s
notice by any one of the signatories thereto for the punishment
of European Axis war criminals, but this Tribunal is enforcing
an enactment in the nature of a statute by the Allied Control
Council. This enactment expressly states that it is concerned
with crimes committed by Germans against other Germans, and
is part of the occupational machinery having for its purpose the
“eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic
basis.” Law No. 10 expressly states that its purpose is “to
establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution
of war criminals and other similar offenders.” We must not
overlook the fact that in at least one of the other zones of occu-
pation — the French zone — German courts have been authorized
to enforce Law No. 10 with respect to crimes committed against
persons of German citizenship or nationality. Such authority
might in the future be delegated to German courts in the Amer-

94

ican zone. We think it would be little short of catastrophic if
these German tribunals were to be confronted with the ruling that
Law No. 10 does not apply to murders and other crimes against
humanity committed under Hitler between 1933 and 1939. The
punishment of such crimes is a primary purpose of Law No. 10
and a vital step in the reconstruction of a democratic Germany.

Now to meet all this Dr. Kubuschok has suggested — and there
is a suggestion, if not an express statement, in the judgment in
the Flick case — that this question should be decided on the basis
of the language of the London Charter and not of Law No. 10.
In one of the other cases now pending before these Tribunals —
the Farben case — the defense counsel have openly taken the posi-
tion that Law No. 10 must be regarded as a nullity except to
the extent to which it embodies the provisions of the London
Charter. Several arguments have been made in support of this
proposition which, we submit, is entirely without foundation.

Now it is true, of course, as Tribunal IV pointed out in the
Flick case, that Article I of Law No. 10 states that the Moscow
Declaration and the London Agreement “are made integral parts
of this law.” The reasons for this are clear enough. The Mos-
cow Declaration was a statement of international policy with
respect to war crimes and other atrocities by the powers to which
Germany surrendered. The London Agreement contains various
provisions essential to the implementation of Law No. 10. One
of the important purposes of Law No. 10, for instance, is the
trial and punishment of persons convicted of membership in or-
ganizations declared criminal by the IMT under the provisions
of the London Charter, and in this respect Law No. 10 serves
to implement Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the London Charter.

But it by no means follows from all this that Law No. 10 is a
nullity insofar as it expands, contracts, alters, or otherwise de-
parts from the London Charter. The Moscow Declaration is also
“made an integral part of Law No. 10,” but certainly no one
could argue that Law No. 10 cannot legitimately go beyond the
Moscow Declaration, and there is no better reason for taking
such a position with respect to the London Agreement. The Lon-
don Agreement may, to be sure, be looked to as an aid to the
construction and interpretation of Law No. 10, but there is no
warrant for declaring that the language of the London Agreement
should prevail over or nullify express language in Law No. 10,
which is the jurisdictional charter and basis of this Tribunal.
And, indeed, to give the London Charter such over-riding effect
would be in direct contravention of the London Agreement itself,
which provides in Article 6, and I quote:

95

“Nothing in this agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction
or the powers of any national or occupation court established
or to be established in any Allied territory or in Germany for
the trial of war criminals.”

Now from time to time it is suggested in these proceedings that
for some reason Law No. 10 is not of equal dignity with the Lon-
don Agreement. It seems to me that rather the contrary is the
case. We have pointed out that the London Agreement is ter-
minable upon one month’s notice by any of the four signatories.
Law No. 10, on the other hand, is in the nature of a legislative
act. It was enacted by the same four powers who enacted the
London Agreement. In Law No. 10 these four powers acted in
a legislative fashion through their representatives, constituting
the Allied Control Council, who are authorized to carry out the
occupation of Germany. The Allied Control Council is the very
body which was authorized to review the sentences imposed by
the IMT under the London Agreement, and we call attention also
to Article I of the London Agreement which provided that the
IMT should be set up in consultation with the Control Council.
We can see absolutely no basis for the suggestion that as an
international juridical instrument Law No. 10 is not of equal or
greater dignity than the London Agreement.

Now, finally, in support of their position that Law No. 10
must be construed within the limits of the exact language of the
London Charter, defense counsel in the Farben Case,* and Dr.
Kubuschok, a few moments ago, have also argued that a con-
trary result would violate the principle that there can be no
punishment of crime without preexisting law. So I will now
advert briefly to that question in order to show that no problem
of “ex post facto law” arises under the definition of crimes
against humanity in Law No. 10 properly construed.

Judge Maguire: Before you proceed to that portion of your
argument, General, could you cite to us the document or order
whereby the Control Council was constituted and what powers
were conferred upon it by its originating document?

General Taylor: Well, Your Honor, I am afraid I can’t do
that extemporaneously. I can provide it immediately after the
conclusion of the argument.

Judge Maguire: If you would be so good as to do that, we
would appreciate it.

General Taylor: Yes, indeed.

So I turn to the concept of crimes against humanity as a con-
cept of international penal law. It needs no elaborate research to

* United States rs. Carl Krauch, et al., case 6, Volumes VII and VIII, this series.

96

ascertain that international penal law has long recognized the
international character of certain types of atrocities and offenses
shocking to the moral sense of all civilized nations. As of schol-
arly interest we are handing up to the Court a description of
an international trial held in 1474 at Breisach on the Upper Rhine,
only a few hundred kilometers from Nuernberg. The defendant
in that case, Sir Peter of Hagenbach, was accused of murders
and other outrages committed in his capacity as Governor of
Breisach under the authority of Duke Charles of Burgundy,
known to history as Charles the Bold. After the death of Charles
the Bold, Sir Peter was tried on 4 May 1474 in the market
place of Breisach. The acts of which he was accused were not
committed during actual hostilities or in time of war and, there-
fore, under our modern terminology would be akin more to
crimes against humanity than to war crimes. The judges were
delegated by various cities and towns in the Holy Roman Empire
and by several Swiss towns. The Public Prosecutor, Henry
Iselin of Basel, Switzerland, accused Sir Peter of having com-
mitted deeds which outraged all notions of humanity and justice
and constituted crimes under natural law; in the words of the
prosecutor, the accused had “trampled underfoot the laws of God
and men.” Sir Peter of Hagenbach relied on the defense of
superior orders, claiming that he had done only what the Duke
of Burgundy ordered him to do. His advocate also contested the
jurisdiction of the tribunal. After deliberation, the judges deter-
mined that they had jurisdiction, overruled the plea of superior
orders, found Hagenbach guilty. The sentence was thereafter
carried out by the marshal of the tribunal.

The doctrine that certain types of atrocities have international
legal significance developed even more rapidly during the 19th
Century and the early part of the 20th Century. As Tribunal IV
stated in its judgment in the Justice case, I quote:

“ * * * it can no longer be said that violations of the laws
and customs of war are the only offenses recognized by com-
mon international law. The force of circumstance, the grim
fact of world-wide interdependence, and the moral pressure of
public opinion have resulted in international recognition that
certain crimes against humanity committed by Nazi authority
against German nationals constituted violations not alone of
statute but also of common international law.”*

There is no need at this time to reexamine and restate all of the
precedents in treaties, declarations, and learned treatises, which
established beyond question that massacres and other categories

* United Statea vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al.. Volume III, page 979.

97

of atrocities on racial and religious grounds are and have been
for many years recognized as criminal under international penal
law. The legal history of crimes against humanity was traced by
Tribunal III in its opinion. The declarations of high govern-
mental officials and legal experts of many countries — England,
France, Russia, the United States and Germany — are cited there-
in. As was stated by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British Chief
Prosecutor, before the IMT:

“The right of humanitarian intervention on behalf of the
rights of man, trampled upon by a State in a manner shocking
to the sense of mankind, has long been considered to form part
of the recognized law of nations. Here, too, the Charter merely
develops a preexisting principle/’ 1

Many years earlier in 1878 the famous German-law professor,
Bluntschli, wrote:

“States are allowed to interfere in the name of international
law if ‘humanity rights’ are violated to the detriment of any
single race.” 2

And, finally, one of the purposes of American intervention in
Cuba in 1898 was, as President McKinley stated in his special
message to Congress:

“In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the bar-
barities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now exist-
ing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either un-
able or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say
this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and
therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it
is right at our door.” 3

There can be no doubt, in summary, that murderous persecu-
tions and massacres of civilian population groups were clearly
recognized as contrary to the law of nations and, as crimes, came
under international penal law, long before the First World War.
And, giving full scope to the principle against ex post facto
punishment as a principle of justice and fair play, there can
be no objection to the punishment of such crimes in this case.
But, before passing to other questions, it should be pointed out
that, under modern conditions, international penal law should not
be enforced by unilateral armed intervention of the types I have
just cited, as was the only method for its enforcement until
recent years. Indeed, lacking some vehicle for true collective

1 Trial of the Major War Criminals, op. cit.. Volume III, page 92.

2 J. C. Bluntschli, Professor of Law, Heidelberg University, in “Das Moderne Voelkerrecht
der Civilisierton Staaten,” (3d ed.) page 270 (1878).

3 President’s Special Message of 11 April 1898. Hyde, op. cit.. Volume I, page 259.

98

action, interventions were probably the only possible sanction of
that time, but they are outmoded and cannot be resorted to in
these times either safely or effectively.

But the fact that a particular method of enforcing law has
become outmoded does not mean that what was previously , a
recognized crime at international law is such no longer. Inter-
national law is going through a transition which municipal crim-
inal law passed through centuries ago. International society has
now reached the point where the enforcement of international
criminal law must be by true collective action through an agent,
whether the United Nations, a World Court, or what you will,
truly representative of all civilized nations, and this Tribunal is
such an agent. It renders judgment under a statute enacted by
the four great powers in charge of the occupation of Germany,
and although constituted by the American occupation authorities,
it is in substance an international tribunal. Therefore, we think
there is no basis for the fear which was expressed by the dis-
tinguished French member of the IMT, and referred to in the
Flick judgment, that the doctrine of crimes against humanity
“offers a pretext to intervention by a State in the internal affairs
of weaker States ”. 1 As was pointed out in the Justice judgment,
I quote:

“ * * * it is important to distinguish between the rules of
common international law which are of universal and superior
authority on the one hand, and the provisions for enforcement of
those rules which are by no means universal on the other .” 2

Tribunal III went on to state and I quote again:

“ * * * enforcement of international law has been traditionally
subject to practical limitations. Within the territorial boundaries
of a State having a recognized, functioning government presently
in the exercise of sovereign power throughout its territory, a
violator of the rules of international law could be punished only
by the authority of the officials of that State. The law is uni-
versal, but such a State reserves unto itself the exclusive power
within its boundaries to apply or withhold sanctions. Thus, not-
withstanding the paramount authority of the substantive rules of
common international law, the doctrines of national sovereignty
have been preserved through the control of enforcement ma-
chinery. * * * Violators of international law could, no doubt, be
tried and punished by the State of which they were nationals,
by the offended State if it can secure jurisdiction of the person,
or by an international tribunal if of competent authorized juris-
diction. * * * In Germany an international body (to wit, the

1 United States vs. Friedrich Flick, et al„ case 5, judgment, mimeographed transcript
page 11011.

2 United States vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al. f case 3, Volume III, this series, page 969.

99

Control Council) has assumed and exercised the power to estab-
lish judicial machinery for the punishment of those who have
violated the rules of the common international law, a power which
no international authority without consent could assume or exer-
cise within a State having a national government presently in
the exercise of its sovereign powers.”*

I come now to what I believe to be the most substantial ques-
tion raised by Dr. Kubuschok’s motion. We stated at the outset
that, in any case of real doubt, the language of Law No. 10
should be construed in favor of the defendants. We likewise
stated that the rule against retroactive legislation should be re-
garded as a principle of “justice and fair play,” and applied as
such. The prosecution does not suggest that these principles
should be accorded only lip service. On the contrary, they have
a very real application in construing the definition of crimes
against humanity in Law No. 10. But neither justice nor law
suggests that these principles will be served by the artificial fixing
of a date, unwarranted by anything in the language of Law No.
10, prior to which the law would not be applied. The principles
of strict construction and against retroactive legislation should
be applied, not to words and phrases which are not found in the
statute, but to words and phrases which are present and which
must be interpreted and construed. And, obviously, there are
some important problems of construction. Certain of the words
used in the definition — such as murder, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, and rape — have acquired over the course of years
a well defined legal meaning. But obviously not every murder
or rape is a crime against humanity within the definition. Like-
wise, the definition includes such phrases as “atrocities and of-
fenses,” “other inhumane acts,” and “persecutions.” These words
do not have so well developed a meaning as expressions such as
“murder” and “rape.” In construing these expressions, the Court
must apply a strict interpretation favorable to the defendants,
and avoid violation of the principle against retroactive legislation.

In dismissing count three in the Flick case, Tribunal IV de-
clared that seizures of industrial property pursuant to the “Ary-
anization” program charged in that count did not constitute
crimes against humanity as defined in Law No. 10. The prosecu-
tion suggests that this portion of the Flick judgment dismissing
count three is, in numerous places, as sound as the portion de-
clining to take jurisdiction over crimes charged to have been
committed prior to 1939 is unsound. In holding that the alleged
seizures of industrial properties did not constitute crimes against
humanity, Tribunal IV stated, and I quote:

* Ibid., pages 970 and 971.

100

“The law existing when the defendants acted is controlling.
To the extent that Law No. 10 declares or codifies that law,
and no further, is this Tribunal willing to go. Under the basic
law of many states the taking of property by the sovereign,
without just compensation, is forbidden, but usually it is not
considered a crime. A sale compelled by pressure or duress
may be questioned in a court of equity, but, so far as we are
informed, such use of pressure, even on racial or religious
grounds, has never been thought to be a crime against hu-
manity. A distinction could be made between industrial prop-
erty and the dwellings, household furnishings and food sup-
plies of a persecuted people. In this case, however, we are
only concerned with industrial property, a large portion of
which (ore and coal mines) constitutes natural resources in
which the State has a peculiar interest.

*******
“Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis the catch-all words
‘other persecutions’ must be deemed to include only such as
affect the life and liberty of the oppressed peoples. * * * It may
be added that the presence in this section of the words ‘against
any civilian population,’ recently led Tribunal III to ‘hold that
crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law
No. 10 must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of
atrocity or persecution whether committed by private indi-
viduals or by governmental authority.’ United States vs. Alt-
stoetter et al., decided 4 December 1947 : ‘The transactions be-
fore us, if otherwise within the contemplation of Law No. 10 as
crimes against humanity, would be excluded by this holding’.”*

I discuss now the ex post facto principle in the construction
of Law No. 10.

Carrying out the general principles announced in the Flick
judgment, the prosecution believes that, in construing the defini-
tion of crimes against humanity in Law No. 10, the rule against
retroactive legislation requires that the acts charged as crimes
must fulfill one of two requirements,* as a matter of fact, it is
hard to imagine any act which fulfills one of these requirements
which would not also fulfill the other. Either the act charged
must be of the type which has long been recognized as a crime
at international law, or it must be an act such as murder or rape
or other well-known crime under the domestic penal law of Ger-
many and other civilized nations. Within the field of interna-
tional penal law, we do not believe that localized outbursts of
race hatred or petty discriminations have ever been regarded as

* United States vs. Friedrich Flick, et al., judgment, mimeographed transcript pages 11010,
11013.

101

having international penal significance. At the opposite end of
the scale are wholesale, nationwide campaigns to make life in-
tolerable for, to expel, to degrade, to enslave, or to exterminate
large groups of the civilian population. This type of atrocious
persecution has long been recognized as criminal at international
law, and the punishment of such crimes in this case does not
violate the principle against retroactive legislation. Nor is that
principle violated by the punishment in this case of well recog-
nized crimes such as murder, enslavement, and rape, which have
long been crimes under the domestic penal law of Germany and
other civilized nations. As Tribunal III stated in the Justice
judgment, I quote:

“It is true that this Tribunal can try no defendant merely
because of a violation of the German penal code, but it is
equally true that the rule against retrospective legislation, as
a rule of justice and fair play, should be no defense if the act
which he committed in violation of Control Council Law No.
10 was also known to him to be a punishable crime under his
own domestic law.” 1

The principle against retroactive legislation is, of course, not
the only limitation on the definition of crimes against humanity in
Law No. 10. It would not violate that principle for a man to be
tried before this Tribunal for an ordinary murder, but clearly
Law No. 10 is not intended to cover ordinary murders. As the
prosecution declared in its opening statement in the Flick case,
“Private and occasional murders and sex offenses, such as un-
fortunately occur even in the most orderly and democratic na-
tions, are not within its intendment.” 2 Or, as was more authori-
tatively declared in the Justice judgment:

“As we construe it, that section provides for punishment
of crimes committed against German nationals only where
there is proof of conscious participation in systematic, govern-
ment-organized or approved procedures, amounting to atrocities
and offenses of the kind specified in the act and committed
against populations or amounting to persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds.” 3

Now, if we apply the foregoing principles to the charges set
forth in count four of the indictment, it will clearly be seen that
these charges fall well within the definition of crimes against
humanity in Law No. 10, strictly construed and giving full scope

1 United States vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al., case 3, Volume III, page 977.

2 United States vs. Friedrich Flick, et al., case 5, opening statement by prosecution, tran-
script page 106.

3 United States vs. Josef Altstoetter, et al., case 3, Volume III, page 982.

102

to the principle against retroactive legislation. Of the thirteen
defendants charged under count four, one only — the defendant
Rasche — was not a governmental official. Under paragraph 36
of count four and under count five, Rasche is charged with the
same general type of a crime as was the basis for the conviction
of Flick and Steinbrinck on count four in the Flick case. The
other twelve defendants charged are all leading governmental
officials. They were the framers and signers of decrees, the ex-
ecutives, the propagandists and political leaders who conceived
and put into execution the systematic criminal program charged
in count four. Unlike count three of the Flick case, which charged
the defendants there only with participation as private individuals
in four particular episodes involving the “Aryanization” of in-
dustrial property, the charges in count four of this case include
atrocious crimes and offenses such as murder, imprisonment,
deportation, and plunder. The charges, therefore, fall well out-
side of the limiting principles applied by Tribunal IV in the
Flick case, and well within the declaration setting forth the
principle of strict construction in the opinion in the Justice case,
where it was held:

“ * * * that crimes against humanity as defined in Control
Council Law No. 10 must be strictly construed to exclude iso-
lated cases of atrocity or persecution whether committed by
private individuals or by a governmental authority.”*

Now, among the allegations in count four there are various acts
charged which, standing by themselves, might fall short of the
requirements which we have hereinbefore stated. Thus, for ex-
ample, under paragraphs 34 and 35 of the indictment, relating
to persecution of Jews, the acts charged do include murder, im-
prisonment, and other mistreatment, but they also include eco-
nomic boycotts, the deprivation of various of their civil rights,
and a general program for their economic impoverishment. As
to such allegations, the prosecution must show that these acts
form part of a general pattern or program, in which the defend-
ants participated, amounting to a systematic program for the
persecution of Jews or other groups of the civilian population of
sufficient scale and violence to fall within the clear intendment
of Law No. 10. Thus, in the Justice case, the defendant Rothen-
berger was charged with participating in the enactment of legis-
lation which deprived Jewish paupers of the aid of the courts.
With respect to this charge, Tribunal III stated:

“It is true that the denial to Jews of the right to proceed
in civil litigation without advancement of costs appears to be

♦Ibid.

103

a small matter compared to the extermination of Jews by the
millions under other procedures. It is nevertheless a part of
the government-organized plan for the persecution of the Jews,
not only by murder and imprisonment, but by depriving them
of the means of livelihood and of equal rights in the courts of
law.” 1

Earlier in the judgment in the Justice case, Tribunal III made
a more general pronouncement of the test to be applied in deter-
mining the legality or illegality of conduct charged as crimes
against humanity under Law No. 10:

“The overt acts of the several defendants must be seen and
understood as deliberate contributions toward the effectuation
of the policy of the Party and State. The discriminatory laws
themselves formed the subject matter of war crimes and crimes
against humanity with which the defendants are charged. The
material facts which must be proved in any case are: (1) the
fact of the great pattern or plan of racial persecution and ex-
termination; and (2) specific conduct of the individual de-
fendant in furtherance of the plan. This is but an application
of general concepts of criminal law. The person who persuades
another to commit murder, the person who furnishes the lethal
weapon for the purpose of its commission, and the person who
pulls the trigger are all principals or accessories to the crime. 2

“We turn to the national pattern or plan for racial extermina-
tion.

“Fundamentally, the program was one for the actual ex-
termination of Jews and Poles, either by means of killing or
by confinement in concentration camps, which merely made
death slower and more painful. But lesser forms of racial per-
secution were universally practiced by governmental authority
and constituted an integral part in the general policy of the
Reich. We have already noted the decree by which Jews were
excluded from the legal profession. Intermarriage between
Jews and persons of German blood was prohibited. Sexual
intercourse between Jews and German nationals was punished
with extreme severity by the courts. By other decrees Jews
were almost completely expelled from public service, from edu-
cational institutions, and from many business enterprises.
Upon the death of a Jew, his property was confiscated.

“The pattern and plan of racial persecution has been made
clear. General knowledge of the broad outlines thereof, in
all its immensity, has been brought home to the defendants.

1 Ibid., page 1114.

* Ibid., page 1063.

104

The remaining question is whether or not the evidence proves
beyond a reasonable doubt in the case of the individual defendants
that they each consciously participated in the plan or took a
consenting part therein.”

Count four states a valid charge under Control Council Law
No. 10. I honestly submit, on behalf of all we have said, that
the motion to dismiss count four must fail. By its express
terms, Law No. 10 covers acts committed on or after 30 January
1933. Under the laws referring to the statute of limitations,
and granting every benefit to the defendants from the rules
against retroactive legislation and favoring strict construction of
the criminal statutes, nevertheless it is clear that count four
states a valid charge under the definition of crimes against
humanity in Law No. 10. With respect to certain particular
allegations against individual defendants, the prosecution may
or may not be able to show that such acts were part of an over-all
governmental system and program for the degradation and ex-
termination of groups of the civilian population. If the prosecu-
tion fails to establish such a connection beyond a reasonable
doubt, the charge will not be proved, but these matters can only
be decided on the evidence, not on the basis of a motion.

We point out once again, parenthetically, the point which has
already been adverted to and discussed between the bench and the
podium — that count four, we believe, is not subject to a motion
to dismiss even if weighed under the London Agreement and
the IMT decision. The IMT did not hold that no crimes against
humanity prior to 1939 are cognizable under the London Agree-
ment. It held only on the basis of the evidence offered in that
case that “the Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declara-
tion that the acts before 1939 were crimes against humanity
within the meaning of the Charter.” This language is very
guarded and cautious, and obviously was worded so as not to
constitute a determination with respect to any particular crimes
or to govern other proceedings in which other evidence is offered.

Finally, and chiefly for logical symmetry, we must make one
further point. Even if we assume that no crimes against hu-
manity prior to 1939 are judicially cognizable here, the evidence
which has been assembled under count four should be received
because it is relevant to the other counts of the indictment —
chiefly, but not only, to count five.

Thus, in the Justice case where, in contrast to this case, the
indictment did not charge the commission of any overt criminal
acts prior to September 1939, the Tribunal nevertheless received
evidence dating back to 1933, stating:

105

“The conduct of the defendants must be seen in a context of
preparation for aggressive war, and must be interpreted as
within the framework of the criminal law and judicial system
of the Third Reich. We shall, therefore, next consider the
legal and judicial process by which the entire judicial system
was transformed into a tool for the propagation of the National
Socialist ideology, the extermination of opposition thereto, and
the advancement of plans for aggressive war and world con-
quest. Though the overt acts with which defendants are
charged occurred after September 1939, the evidence now to
be considered will make clear the conditions under which the
defendants acted and will show knowledge, intent, and motive
on their part, for in the period of preparation some of the
defendants played a leading part in molding the judicial system
which they later employed.” 1

Precisely the same situation confronts us in this case. The
charges in count four of the indictment are part of a chain of
evidence related, roughly chronologically, in counts four and five
of the indictment. The acts charged in count four are, in the
words of Tribunal III, relevant to show “knowledge, intent, and
motive,” and to “make clear the conditions under which the
defendants acted.” Exactly the same thing was done in the IMT
case. Although no defendant was convicted and no accused or-
ganization was declared criminal on the basis of crimes against
humanity committed prior to 1939, the evidence covering the
prewar period was considered, at countless places in the IMT
judgment, to assist in determining knowledge and motive. The
same is true of the Flick case. Thus, Flick and Steinbrinck were
convicted under count four of the indictment only on the basis of
their acts after 1939, but the Court did carefully examine the
evidence relating to their conduct between 1933 and 1939 in order
to determine their motives and the extent of their guilty knowl-
edge. We invite the Tribunal’s attention, for instance, to the
discussion of Flick’s visit to the Dachau concentration camp under
Himmler’s auspices in 1936, discussed in the judgment in the
Flick case. 2

Your Honors, the various points in the statement we have
made, references to judgments, documents, or other authorities,
with your permission we will hand up the entire instrument —
in order to save time — with those references so that the Court
will have them on the record, and defense counsel will have them
in German.

1 Ibid., page 988.

2 United States vs. Friedrich Flick, et al.. Case 5, judgment, transcript page 11017.

106

Judge Maguire: Whether we will have time to discuss this
particular matter before recess, I do not know, but I would like
to hear you — either now or after recess — on a question that
has given me some difficulty, namely, the preamble to Control
Council Law No. 10, which recites that, “in order to give effect
to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and
the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter issued
pursuant thereto, and in order to establish a uniform legal basis
* * * the Control Council enacts as follows” :

Now, if in those documents recited, and particularly in the
Charter, there is a limitation upon the period of time which can
be charged — or which constitute a crime if done within that
period or before that period — then how can Control Council Law
No. 10, if it is to give effect to that limitation, be held to destroy
it?

General Taylor: May I answer that now, Your Honor?

Judge Maguire: Yes, if the film will give time.

General Taylor: I have two comments, Your Honor. First,
I believe that there is no limitation of time in the London Charter
with respect to crimes against humanity.

Judge Maguire: You are correct on that.

General Taylor: It is not a limit of time at all.

Judge Maguire: It is the objective connection with the pur-
suance of it —

General Taylor: Well, second, as I pointed out, Law No. 10
is a different kind of juridical instrument from the London Char-
ter, and it seems to me most natural that Law No. 10 has ob-
jectives which the Charter did not comprehend. In this preamble,
it is not stated that the only purpose is to give effect to the Lon-
don Agreement or Moscow Declaration, but that is one of two
purposes stated. Finally, I would have supposed that a preamble,
while useful in order to get the general background to aid in
the construction of a statute, would give way to the precise lan-
guage of the substantive provisions.

Judge Maguire: I get your position on that. The next ques-
tion is this. If the Charter or those agreements contained limi-
tations, as was held in the IMT case, and they are made an
integral part of the law, of Control Council Law No. 10, and
you then have therefore a conflict between one part of the law
and a second part of the law — one part being the limitation of
scope and purpose found in the Charter and the other what you
claim to be an enlargement of jurisdiction, found in the subse-
quent definitions in Article 2 — how do you reconcile that kind of
a situation?

General Taylor: Your Honors, I should think that the refer-

107

ences in Article 1 to the Moscow Declaration and the London
Agreement are inserted to make it clear that those documents
may and should be looked to in order to illuminate and carry out
the purposes of Law No. 10, but I should hardly think that they
are inserted there for the purpose of nullifying express provisions
contained later in the statute.

E. Concluding Oral Argument of the Defense on the
Defense Motion to Dismiss Count Four*

Presiding Judge Christianson: Dr. Kubuschok, you wish to
be heard in reply? If so, you may proceed.

Dr. Kubuschok: General Taylor took up many important and
interesting judicial problems and gave some profound explanation
on some of them; however, I believe that, pursuant to these
general considerations which, it is true, will one day play some
part in this trial, but which very often have no direct connection
with the motion tendered here, we should not be tempted to go
into detail in answer to these explanations.

I think I can confine myself to answering those parts of the
prosecutor’s statements which are in direct connection with our
motion.

First of all, in procedural respect, General Taylor mentioned
that under certain conditions it is necessary to serve a plenary
decision to solve a problem raised, and he bases himself for this
on Ordinance No. 11. In answer to this I would like to say
that Ordinance 11 is not mandatory law, but only furnishes the
possibility to have such questions brought before a plenary body
for decision. Apart from that, the course that matters have
taken as well as the motion that I tendered to this Tribunal,
the Tribunal’s decision to have the matter decided by itself, as
well as the prosecution’s answer, show clearly that all partici-
pants are of the opinion that this question is to be decided now
and before this Tribunal here.

Moreover, there would be no substantive legal principle in
existence which would authorize the decision to be made by a
plenary body, because as a matter of fact, my motion does not
deviate from any announcement or decisions passed to date by
any of the other Tribunals.

There are three judgments which were quoted by General Tay-
lor. First of all the judgment in the Milch trial [sic]. From
his further statements I was unable to gather to which specific
points of the Milch judgment he was referring to base his own
opinions on. From what I know of the Milch judgment, I be-

* Recorded in the mimeographed transcript (2 Mar. 1948), pages 2664-2570.

108

lieve that I have to answer it absolutely in the negative that any
action which is prior in date to the Polish campaign could be
charged against Milch under criminal law.

The second judgment, to which reference was made, is that in
the case of the Flick trial. The judgment itself is so unambigu-
ous, so very clear, that surely it is not necessary for me to go
into details here* The judgment says specifically, and with great
clarity, that any actions which date prior to 1939 and which have
no connections with the two major types of crimes, cannot be
charged or tried. It is my opinion that the Chief Prosecutor
emphasized, and unjustly so, the type of criminal offense which
was under indictment in this specific case. The type of the of-
fense or crime has nothing whatsoever to do with the judgment
of the Tribunal which tried the case. In its judgment, the
Tribunal took up questions of a general nature and, in order
to support its own verdict, it went into profound details con-
cerning the judicial basis, and it did not confine itself exclusively
to the one crime which was the subject matter of the judgment;
but beyond this, it dealt with the general judicial question which
is also the subject matter of my motion.

There is one further judgment, namely that in the Justice trial,
to which General Taylor made reference. And first of all I have
to clarify that the prosecution in that trial did not specially in-
dict any crimes or actions whatsoever prior to 1939, with the
result that the judgment of Tribunal III did not have to pass any
judgment on such questions. The judgment, however, does handle
in detail the question as to whether crimes against humanity
may be tried and may be judged, which were perpetrated against
Germans exclusively. This question was answered in the affirma-
tive and did not represent a complicated judicial problem in view
of the charter of the IMT, which was also used for the limitation
and interpretation of Control Council Law No. 10.

Tribunal III without any further reasons, so to say “en pas-
sant ” makes reference to the fact that the legislator in enacting
the Control Council Law No. 10 deliberately omitted the clause
according to which a connection between the deed and the other
two major crimes would be a prerequisite, however, the judgment
in the Justice case fails to give specific reasons as to what they
mean and what judicial conclusions the Tribunal drew there-
from. It wasn’t necessary to give such reasons or conclusions
because, as already stated by me, the Tribunal, in judging, did
not judge on any deeds which represented crimes of their own,
perpetrated within the period of time within 1933 and 1939.

I, myself, am also of the opinion that the legislator, in enacting
Law No. 10, is most deliberate in omitting this clause as well

953402—62 8

109

as any further limitations in time, as contained in the Charter,
namely the limitation to offenses and crimes committed prior to
the war and after the war. It was proposed not to apply this
limitation in time in any case, because the Charter itself discloses
the limitation in time and it was not desired to repeat the pro-
visions of the London Agreement in the Charter. I therefore
believe that the prejudicial aspects, described up to now, will not
result in any divergent comments or decisions to be taken in
answer to my motion but that, rather in the sense of the IMT
judgment and in accordance with judgments passed up to now
by the Military Tribunals, this Tribunal will decide on my mo-
tion too. The prosecutor submits, in the way of argument, that
actions committed after 1 January 1983 are to be included under
the penal provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 because
Article II, paragraph 5, contains the provision that pardons and
amnesties which date to the time between 80 January 1933 and
1 July 1945 may not be given consideration. I am unable to con-
cur with this trend of argumentation. There is no doubt that
even, according to Control Law No. 10, actions and deeds com-
mitted prior to 1933 are subject to punishment.

May I remind you of crimes against peace. In some manner it
had to be established that those pardons and amnesties, which
were passed in a time causing the legislator of Control Council
Law No. 10 to have certain misgivings, may not be used and
applied as justification of judgment to be passed. In any case
the mere mention of this limitation of time which has specific
reference to the exclusion of consideration to be given to am-
nesties, does not permit us to conclude that Allied Control Council
Law No. 10 may be absolutely and extensively applied under all
circumstances. The prosecutor has stated that Control Council
Law No. 10 is a law ; whereas the London Agreement is an agree-
ment, as the title implies, subject to renouncement. Therefore
we have to emphasize and place particular weight on Control
Council Law No. 10. This might be right if the London Agree-
ment and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 were presented to
us as having no connection with each other. If, however, in
Control Council Law No. 10, the London Agreement and particu-
larly the Charter is made an integral part of the law itself, then
it is a matter of course that for the interpretation of Law No.
10, the London Agreement and the Charter must receive con-
sideration. In conclusion, General Taylor referred to the fact
that it is necessary to extend the limitation in time because the
crimes under consideration are crimes the judgment on which will
serve to bring about the establishment of a democratic Germany.
I have to oppose this by saying that there are many aims which

110

cannot simply be implemented and carried out by any law, what-
ever it may be. As a matter of fact in Germany this aim, too,
is being pursued, although it is true by other means, by the aims
and achievements of the Control Council and other agencies.
Daily we experience those crimes which were emphasized by
General Taylor, murder and all major crimes which were com-
mitted in that time, being judged by German courts who are
imposing grave punishment. Furthermore, we see that an at-
tempt has been made to bring about a democratic Germany by
having general political offenses and crimes brought within the
scope of the De-nazification Law with the approval and under
authority of the Control Council, and we see punishments being
imposed which are to serve this aim of bringing about a demo-
cratic Germany. Therefore, there is no reason whatsoever to
carry out an implementation and achieve this aim by extending
this law in a manner not justified by the language of the law nor
by the history of its origin and enactment.

General Taylor referred to the fact that count one surely con-
tains everything which was indicted under count four, too. I
don’t quite follow that trend of thought. This will be made most
clear to us if we remember that only a portion of the defendants
is indicted under count one, whereas there are defendants in-
dicted under count four on the other hand who are not indicted
under count one. This fact alone proves that the prosecution did
not propose to create any such connection between the two counts
and was unable to create any such connection between the counts
for the sake of having crimes tried which apply particularly to
the period of time, 1933 to 1939, and are made the subject matter
of count four of the indictment.

It may be that some crimes may be classified as crimes against
humanity which could also be given another designation or char-
acter. If the prosecution proposes to do that, then let it go ahead,
and in the case of each individual defendant, let it specifically
state as to why this specific incident has causality or is supposed
to have causality with another count of the indictment.

The prosecution has given a very wide scope to the term of
crimes against humanity, such a wide scope which might possibly
be authorized by the language of Control Council Law No. 10
unless no limitation were possible within the provisions of the
Charter. May I refer you to the language “Persecution for po-
litical, racial, or religious reasons”? If this concept were not
restricted in some manner or other, then no tribunal would be
able to construct the motive and intent of the legislator from the
wording of the law itself. What does persecution mean? You
may only know that from an explanation given, and the explana-

111

tion is to be found in connection with the other two major crimes
established by the Charter. Just to cite one example, among
other things, the prosecution made reference to the Civil Service
Law, constructing this as a measure for political or racial perse-
cution. Now, are we really to assume that the discharge from
service, and let us say, as an example, that a Communist public
servant is discharged, is such a discharge really to represent a
crime which can be considered as atrocious under the laws and
ideology of all nations and considered atrocious particularly by
each one of the signatory powers? And thus, in dealing with
this problem, particularly in the year of 1948, we can find no
limitation for what all nations and all signatory powers consider
as a crime subject and worthy of punishment, namely, the crime
of persecution. And that is why the law did give us this limi-
tation.

F. Order of the Tribunal Dismissing Count Four, and
Tribunal Memorandum Attached Thereto

ORDER

, The defendants charged in count four of the indictment in this
case having made a motion that said count four be dismissed,
and the Tribunal having heard the arguments of counsel, and
having considered the briefs filed in support of such motion and
in opposition thereto, now therefore,

IT IS ORDERED THAT SAID COUNT FOUR BE AND THE
SAME IS HEREBY DISMISSED.

Memorandum hereto attached is made a part of this order.

Nuernberg, Germany
26 March 1948

[Signed] William G. Christianson
William G. Christianson
Presiding Judge
Tribunal IV

MEMORANDUM

The defendants charged in count four of the indictment have
filed a motion which challenges the sufficiency of the facts stated
in that count to constitute a crime over which this Tribunal has
jurisdiction. Said count charges that defendants named therein
committed crimes against humanity, as defined in Article II of
Control Council Law No. 10, in that they committed, or par-
ticipated in the commission of, atrocities and offenses against
German nationals, including murder, extermination, ill treatment,

112

enslavement, imprisonment, plundering and looting of property,
and other persecutions and inhumane acts, committed on political,
racial, and religious grounds.

This count does not, however, allege that these acts were com-
mitted in execution of or in connection with crimes against peace
or war crimes.

The question squarely presented by this motion, therefore,
is whether such acts as charged in said count four as having
been committed by the defendants against nationals of their own
country, in peacetime and not connected with or related to wars
or invasions involving other nations, constitute a crime which
comes within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. The answer to
this question involves construction of Control Council Law No.
10, under the provisions of which law this Tribunal was set
up and its jurisdiction fixed.

Chapter II of the Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal, pursuant to which such Tribunal functioned, set forth
the acts which constituted the crimes coming within the juris-
diction of the International Military Tribunal, and involving
individual responsibility. Paragraph (c) of Article 6 of said
Chapter II of the Charter provided :

“CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, exter-
mination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during
the war ; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the.
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”

In considering the scope of the foregoing provision, the In-
ternational Military Tribunal, in its judgment, stated with refer-
ence to atrocities against German nationals:

“To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on
before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of,
or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting
and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been
satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or
in connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore
cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939
were crimes against humanity within the meaning of the
Charter * * * ”*

The definition of crimes against humanity in Control Council
Law No. 10, [Article II, paragraph 1 (c)] which authorizes

* Trials of the Major War Criminals, op. cit., Volume I, page 254.

113

the creation of this and similar Tribunals and fixes their juris-
diction, is —

“(c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, in-
cluding but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in vio-
lation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.”

The prosecution contends that this definition of crimes against
humanity is properly susceptible of a broader construction than
the definition of such crimes in the Charter which controlled
the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal, and that
by reason of such possible broader construction, this Tribunal
can properly take cognizance of the charges in count four. This
contention is based upon the fact that the definition in Control
Council Law No. 10 does not contain that certain qualifying
phrase which is contained in the Charter definition, which phrase,
immediately following the listing of the offenses constituting
crimes against humanity, is as follows, “in execution of, or in
connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tri-
bunal.”

This position, in our view, is not tenable, and cannot justify
an extension of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal beyond the
sphere to which the International Military Tribunal properly
limited itself. It should be here observed that the preamble to
the Charter, under which the International Military Tribunal
functioned, stated that the Charter was providing “for the estab-
lishment of an International Military Tribunal for the just and
prompt trial of major war criminals.” We next observe that
Control Council Law No. 10 states in its preamble that it was
enacted :

“ * * * to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration
of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8 August
1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to
establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution
of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those
dealt with by the International Military Tribunal * *

Such Control Council Law No. 10 states in Article I thereof
that:

“The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 ‘Concerning
Responsibility of Hitlerites for Committed Atrocities’ and the
London Agreement of 8 August 1945 ‘Concerning Prosecution

114

and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European

Axis’ are made integral parts of this Law.”

Thus it appears that both the Charter and Control Council
Law No. 10 indicate by express language that the International
Military Tribunal and the Tribunals established under authority
of Control Council Law No. 10 were created to try war criminals.
It is true that in Control Council Law No. 10 the preamble indi-
cates that provision is being made for the “prosecution of war
criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with
by the International Military Tribunal * * The general

qualifying phrase, “and similar offenders,” as contained in Con-
trol Council Law No. 10 does not however warrant an extension
of jurisdiction to the lengths contended for by the prosecution.
It must be remembered that we are here concerned with the
construction of an enactment involving criminal responsibility.
We must therefore adhere to the rule of strict construction. This
Tribunal is not one of general jurisdiction. It was created for
the purpose of trying those accused of specific crimes. In con-
sidering the construction to be given the provisions of Control
Council Law No. 10, here under consideration, it should be noted
in the definition of crimes in paragraph 1, Article II of Control
Council Law No. 10, that they are not limited to time or space.
In construing this particular paragraph, we cannot therefore limit
our consideration to the language of that section alone, as by so
doing we would be according to this and similar tribunals juris-
diction over crimes of the character described, whenever and
wherever committed. Such a sweeping grant of jurisdiction can-
not be presumed. The provisions which declare the purpose of
the law and the documents which are by reference incorporated
into the law, clearly negative such sweeping jurisdiction.

In the opinion of the majority of this Tribunal, there is a
further and even more persuasive consideration bearing on the
question of interpretation. It is to be observed that neither the
London Charter nor Control Council Law No. 10 (if we consider
them separately) attempts by their terms to create new crimes.
They clearly proceed upon the assumption that certain acts were
criminal under existing international law at the time of their
enactment. They describe the acts constituting the crimes and
set up machinery for trial of those who were charged with com-
mission of the crimes defined. We call attention to a statement
by Lord Chief Justice Wright in an article in volume 62 of the
Law Quarterly Review, January 1946, which was prior to the
judgment of the International Military Tribunal. In discussing
the establishment and jurisdiction of the International Military
Tribunal, he stated:

115

“The Tribunal so established is described in the Agreement
as an International Military Tribunal. Such an International
Tribunal is intended to act under international law. It is
clearly to be a judicial tribunal constituted to apply and en-
force the appropriate rules of international law. I understand
the Agreement to import that the three classes of persons
which it specifies are war criminals, that the acts mentioned
in classes (a), ( b ), and (c) are crimes for which there is
properly individual responsibility; that they are not crimes
because of the agreement of the four Governments, but that
the Governments have scheduled them as coming under the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal because they are already crimes
by existing law . On any other assumption the court would

not be a court of law but a manifestation of power . The prin-
ciples which are declared in the Agreement are not laid down
as an arbitrary direction to the court but are intended to de-
fine and do, in my opinion, accurately define what is the exist-
ing international law on these matters” [Emphasis supplied.]

Subsequently, the International Military Tribunal, in its judg-
ment, in the course of discussing the construction to be given
the Charter, stated:

(< The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the
part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal
as will be shown, it is the expression of international law
existing at the time of its creation” [Emphasis supplied.]

The foregoing statements of Lord Wright and the International
Military Tribunal, made with respect to the jurisdiction of the
International Military Tribunal, clearly apply with equal per-
suasiveness to the question of this Tribunal's jurisdiction under
Control Council Law No. 10.

To hold otherwise would be to disregard the well-established
principle of justice that no act is to be declared a crime which
was not a crime under law existing at the time when the act
was committed.

In holding that the crimes here defined as crimes against hu-
manity and as perpetrated against German nationals were not,
when committed, crimes against international law, there being
no claim that such crimes were perpetrated in connection with
crimes against peace or war crimes, we are not losing sight of
the fact that the charges in count four accuse defendants of
having been part of and responsible for the perpetration against
humanity of the most extensive programs of cruelty and perse-
cution ever recorded in the annals of mankind. Such charges, if
true, indicate such crimes against humanity were characterized

116

by brutal and savage suppression of what we know as human
rights, among them the right of free speech, a free press, free-
dom of religion, and freedom of assembly. It is argued with
great force that a general suppression of such human rights is
of concern to civilization, for science and industry have shrunk
the world into an interdependent neighborhood. It has been very
properly pointed out that the foreign policy of any despot is one
which is inherently a constant risk to the peace and security of
other nations.

There can be no question but that the relationship between
human rights and a just and lasting peace is very close and
interlocking. Any nation which, by its laws and policies, cuts its
people off from the influence of foreign and world opinion, sys-
tematically persecutes helpless peoples, and punishes as traitors
those of its people who voice objection to its domestic policies,
and who may insist that the nation must hold to its international
obligations, is a menace to peace everywhere. In other words, if
a nation’s domestic policy is characterized by aggression at home,
its foreign policy will probably also be characterized by aggres-
sion.

The foregoing arguments and observations do not, however,
establish that crimes against humanity perpetrated by a govern-
ment against its own nationals, are of themselves crimes against
international law. Such arguments and observations rather serve
to emphasize the urgent need of comprehensive legislation by
the family of nations, with respect to individual human rights.
Such steps as have been taken in this direction since the late war
may need to be further advanced and implemented. This, how-
ever, involves functions beyond the province of this Tribunal.

117

IX. ATROCITIES AND OFFENSES COMMITTED
AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS — COUNT
FIVE

A. Introduction

Count five of the indictment (sec. I, Vol. XII), charged 19 of
the defendants with the commission of war crimes and crimes
against humanity for criminal participation in various atrocities
and offenses against civilian populations. The specifications of
these charges encompassed a great variety of alleged criminal
activities — the destruction of nations and. ethnic groups ; the per-
secution and extermination of persons considered to be political
and racial undesirables by Nazi doctrines; the “Germanization”
of areas occupied by military force; the illegal recruitment of
persons from the occupied countries for SS and other police
units; and other related activities. The Tribunal in its judgment
(sec. XV, Vol. XIV) found the following 14 defendants guilty
under this count: Berger, Darre, Dietrich, Kehrl, Keppler, Lam-
mers, Puhl, Schellenberg, Schwerin von Krosigk, Steengracht von
Moyland, Stuckart, Veesenmayer, von Weizsaecker, and Woer-
mann. The Tribunal found five defendants not guilty under
these charges — Bohle, von Erdmannsdorff, Meissner, Rasche, and
Ritter.

The discussion of these charges in the Tribunal’s judgment
runs to over 300 mimeographed pages and numerous documents
are quoted at length in the judgment. Furthermore, most of the
charges deal with issues which in one way or another came up
in most of the Nuernberg trials. Accordingly, because of space
limitations, only a relatively small part of the evidence concerning
the charges of count five has been reproduced in this section.

The evidence reproduced in this section has been grouped into
four sections. The first section, “B. Treatment of Nationals of
Various Countries, Racial Policy, ‘The Final Solution of the
Jewish Question’,” deals with some of the general aspects of
Nazi doctrine and practice. No affidavits of prosecution affiants
and no testimony by prosecution witnesses have been included in
this section. The next section, “C. Special Kommando Dirle-
wanger and Related Matters,” deals more specifically with the
activities of a particular organization assigned to various spe-
cial tasks in occupied eastern Europe. In this section contem-
poraneous documents (C 1) are followed by testimony of de-
fendant Berger (C 2). Section “D. Operation Zeppelin” is con-
cerned with the recruitment of Russian prisoners of war for
intelligence and other purposes, and with the killing of some of

118

the persons thus recruited. Testimony of one prosecution wit-
ness (D 1) is followed by contemporaneous documents (D 2)
and testimony of defendant Schellenberg (D 3). The last section,
“E. The German Resettlement Trustee Company — the ‘DUT’,”
deals with a particular aspect of Germanization and involves the
resettlement of people and the treatment of the property of vari-
ous groups of persons affected. Here the contemporaneous docu-
ments (El) are followed by the testimony of a prosecution wit-
ness (E 2), the affidavit of a defense affiant (E 3), and testi-
mony of defendant Keppler (E 4).

Much of the evidence reproduced in the various parts of this
section overlaps with evidence reproduced in sections dealing
mainly with other counts. This is particularly true with respect
to the next two following sections : “X. Plunder and Spoliation —
Count Six” and “XI. Slave Labor — Count Seven.” Sections IX,
X, and XI all concern counts involving charges of both war
crimes and crimes against humanity.

Extensive argumentation concerning count five appears in sec-
tions “V. Opening Statements” (Vol. XII) and “XIII. Closing
Statements” (Vol. XIV).

B. Treatment of Nationals of Various Countries: Racial
Policy, "The Final Solution of the Jewish Question"

I. CONTEMPORANEOUS DOCUMENTS

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I8I6-PS*
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1441

EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GOERING CONFERENCE ON
THE JEWISH QUESTION, 12 NOVEMBER 1938, ATTENDED BY DE-
FENDANTS SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, WOERMANN, STUCKART,
AND KEHRL, AMONG OTHERS

Stenographic report on a part of the conference on the Jewish
question under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Goering at
the Reich Air Ministry on 12 November 1938 — 11 o'clock

Goering : Gentlemen ! Today’s meeting is of a decisive nature.
I have received a letter written on the Fuehrer’s orders by the
Chief of Staff of the Fuehrer’s deputy, Bormann, requesting that
the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and
solved one way or another. And yesterday once again did the
Fuehrer request by phone for me to take coordinated action in
the matter.

* Document 1816-PS was introduced in the IMT trial as Exhibit USA-261 and the German
text appears in Trial of the Major War Criminals, volume XXVIII, pages 499-540.

119

Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the
economic angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a
number of legal measures shall have to be taken which fall into
the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of the Min-
ister of the Interior; and certain propaganda measures shall be
taken care of by the office of the Minister for Propaganda. The
Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economics shall take
care of problems falling into their respective fields.

The meeting in which we first talked about this question and
came to the decision to Aryanize German economy, to take the
Jew out of it, and put him into the debit ledger [in das Schuld-
buch hineinzubringen und auf die Rente zu setzen] was one in
which, unfortunately, we only made pretty plans which were
executed very slowly. We then had a demonstration, right here
in Berlin; we told the people that something decisive would be
done, but again nothing happened. We have had this affair in
Paris now,* more demonstrations followed, and this time some-
thing decisive must be done!

Because, Gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations!
They don't harm the Jew, but me, who is the last authority for
coordinating the German Economy.

If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into
the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which
the Jew does not even have; and furthermore consumer goods,
goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future,
demonstrations which are necessary occur, then I pray that they
be directed in such a manner as not to hurt us.

Because it's insane, to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse
and then have a German insurance company make good the loss,
and the goods which I need desperately, whole bales of clothing
and what not, are being burned; and I miss them everywhere.
* * * * * * *

I should not want to leave any doubt, Gentlemen, about the
following : we have not come together today merely to talk again
about what should be done but to make decisions [es fallen jetzt
Entscheidungen] , and I implore the competent agencies to take
the necessary measures blow by blow for the Aryanization of the
economy and to submit them to me as far as it is necessary.

* * * * * *

Now, the foreign Jews. There we'll have to make distinctions
between the Jews who have always been foreigners — and who

* Reference is made to the assassination of German Legation Counsellor Ernst vom Rath in
Paris. Vom Rath was shot by a Polish- Jewish youth on 7 November and died on 9 November
1938.

120

shall have to be treated according to the laws we arranged with
their respective countries. But regarding those Jews who were
Germans, have always lived in Germany, and have acquired for-
eign citizenship during the last year only because they wanted
to play safe. I ask you not to give them consideration. We’ll
finish with these. Or have you any misgivings? We shall try
to induce them through slight and then through stronger pres-
sure and through clever maneuvering — to let themselves be pushed
out voluntarily.

Woermann: I’d like the Foreign Office to be included in in-
dividual cases, since it is very difficult to decide this in a general
manner.

Goering: We cannot consult you in every case. But on the
whole we will of course.

Woermann : In any case, I’d like to make known the claim of
the Foreign Office to participate. One never knows what steps
may be made.

Goering: Only for important matters! In any case, I do not
want to give special consideration to this category. For, I have
learned only now to what extent that has been done, particularly
in Austria and Czechoslovakia. If somebody was a Czech in the
Sudetenland, 1 we do not have to consider that at all, and the
Foreign Office does not have to be consulted because one can
claim that he now belongs to us. In Austria and also in the
Sudetenland, very many become all of a sudden Englishmen, or
Americans, or what not, and generally we cannot consider this a
great deal.

*******

Goebbels: Number two — in almost all German cities syna-
gogues are burned. New, various possibilities exist to utilize the
space where the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build
parks in their place, others want to put up new buildings.

Goering: How many synagogues were actually burned?

Heydrich : 2 Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by
fire, 76 synagogues demolished, and 7,500 stores ruined in the
Reich.

Goering: What do you mean “destroyed by fire”?

Heydrich : Partly they are burned down and partly gutted.

1 The Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia had been annexed by Germany a few weeks earlier
as a result of the Munich Agreement. See volume XII section VI D.

2 Concerning the role of Heydrich in the events discussed at this meeting of 12 November
1938, the judgment of the IMT states: “In the early morning of 10 November 1938, Heydrich
sent a telegram to all offices of the Gestapo and SD giving instructions for the organization
of the pogroms of that date and instructing them to arrest as many Jews as the prisons could
hold ‘especially rich ones,’ but to be careful that those arrested were healthy and not too old.
By 11 November 1938, 20,000 Jews had been arrested and many were sent to concentration
camps.” See Trial of the Major War Criminals, op. cit., volume I, page 265.

121

Goebbels: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dis-
solve the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be
razed by the Jews. The Jews must pay for it. Here in Berlin,
the Jews are ready to do that. The synagogues which burned
in Berlin are being leveled by the Jews themselves. We shall
build parking lots in their places or new buildings. That ought
to be the criterion for the whole country; the Jews shall have
to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall have to
provide the German people with cleared free space.

* * * * * * *

Goering: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of
goods were taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would
that also be thievery?

Hilgard : 1 I don’t think so.

Goering: Could that be termed as “Riot”?

Hilgard: That is just the question which we are unable to
decide at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a
dwelling or a container of any kind is forced and something is
taken away?

Goering: That is a case of “Riot.”

Hilgard: Riot does not mean much since we have very little
insurance against damage caused by riots, these were discarded
by us long ago.

Goering: But this here is “Rioting.” That is the legal term.
There was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But
a mob rushes in and knocks everything to pieces, or “Public
Disturbance.”

Hilgard : Public disturbance. It is no riot.

Goering: Are they insured against damages caused by public
disturbances?

Hilgard : No, no more. May I show this by an example. The
most remarkable of these cases is the case Margraf Under Den
Linden. The jewelry store of Margraf is insured with us through
a so-called combined policy. That covers practically any damage
that may occur. This damage was reported to us as amounting
to 1,700,000 because the store was completely stripped.

Goering: Daluege and Heydrich, you’ll have to get me this
jewelry through raids, launched on a tremendous scale!

Daluege : 2 The order has already been given. The people are
being controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were
arrested by yesterday afternoon.

1 Eduard Hilgard was head of the Reich Group Insurance. The minutes show that Hilgard
did not participate in the earlier part of the conference but participated only after the dis-
cussion turned to the question of the indemnification to be paid by insurance companies.

2 Chief of the Uniformed Police (Ordnungspolizei) .

122

Goering : These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody
comes to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them,
they'll be confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them
in all right.

Heydrich : Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in
more than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed; but we
have already several hundred people who were plundering, and
we are trying to get the loot back.

Goering: And the jewels?

Heydrich: That is very difficult to say. They were partly
thrown into the street and picked up there. Similar things hap-
pened with furriers, for example in Friedrichstrasse, district C.
There the crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks,
etc. It'll be very difficult to recover that. Even children have
filled their pockets just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler
Youth is not to be employed and to participate in such actions
without the Party’s consent. Such things are very easily de-
stroyed.

*******

Heydrich : The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is
to be paid, it will be confiscated. That way we'll have saved face.

Hilgard: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich
has just said. First of all, use of the mechanism of the insurance
company to check on the damage, to regulate it and even pay,
but give the insurance company the chance to —

Goering: One moment! You'll have to pay in any case because
it is the Germans who suffered the damage. But there will be a
lawful order forbidding you to make any direct payments to the
Jews. You shall also have to make payment for the damage the
Jews have suffered, but not to the Jews, but to the Minister of
Finance. (Hilgard: Aha!) What he does with the money is
his business.

*******

Heydrich : We estimate that the damage to property, to furni-
ture, and to consumer goods amounts to several hundred million ;
although that includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from
loss of taxes, sales taxes, taxes on property and on income. I
assume that the Minister for Finance too, has been informed on
all this.

Von Krosigk: I have no idea about the extent.

Heydrich : Seventy-five hundred destroyed stores in the Reich.

Daluege : One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of
the goods in the stores were not the property of the owner but
were kept on the books of other firms, which had delivered them.

123

Then there are the unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which
definitely are not all Jewish but Aryan, those goods that were
delivered on the basis of commission.

Hilgard: We'll have to pay for them, too.

Goering: I wish you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed
such values.

Heydrich: There were 35 killed.

Kehrl: I think we could do the following: Jews we don’t pay
anyhow, as for Aryans, payment shall have to be made; the in-
surance company may contact us through the “Reichsgruppe” and
we shall investigate each case. I am thinking of the small reci-
procity companies; it should be easy to find out whether they
are capable of paying or not. In their cases, the amounts in-
volved are not too large. We may find an arrangement for this
later on; I am thinking of one in which the insurance companies
arrange for compensation exclusively to Aryan, and once they
know the result of their inquiries, contact us. We shall then find
a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases
where it is absolutely necessary.

* * * * * * *

[Reich Group Leader Hilgard leaves the room]
*******

Heydrich: I’d like to say one more thing of primary im-
portance. In the decree we should not mention the confiscation.
We can do that easily.

Goering: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal pro-
cedure will have to be employed there. But that is not what
Mr. Woermann means, he is talking about these foreign Jews
who are not insured. As far as they are insured, they are cov-
ered. This concerns those who are not insured. That may be
the case here and there.

Woermann : We shall then have plenty of complaints.

Goering: I’d like to avoid paying too much attention to the
foreign Jews.

Woermann : But if Article 2 * contains that provision, Article

* The decree here discussed was signed by Goering, as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year
Plan, on the same day as this meeting, 12 November 1938. This decree appears in the
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 1581, and is entitled “Decree concerning the Restoration of
Street Appearances near Jewish Business Establishments” (Verordnung zur Wiederherstellung
des Strassenbildes bei juedischen Gewerbebetrieben) . The decree, in three sections, provides:
“1. All damages which through the indignation (Empoerung) of the people about the inciting
actions (Hetze) of international Jewry against National Socialist Germany, have been caused
to Jewish business establishments (Gewerbebetrieben) and abodes on 8, 9, and 10 November
1938, must be made to disappear by the Jewish owner or Jewish tradesman immediately.
2. (1) The expense for the repair shall be borne by the owner of the respective Jewish trade
enterprises and abodes. (2) Insurance claims of Jews of German nationality are confiscated
(beschlagnahmt) in favor of the Reich. 3. The Reich Minister of Economics is authorized to
issue implementing regulations, in agreement with the other Reich Ministers.”

124

1 may as well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice
covered it all very nicely.

Guertner:* Now, if I don’t misunderstand Mr. Woermann, he
is primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which
shall be valid generally, while only Jews who have German citizen-
ship are mentioned regarding the insurances. I’d like to know
whether there are any objections against compelling also the for-
eign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he shall
not be paid the money from the insurance.

Goering: He is quite able to do that.

Woermann: Even if he is not insured?

Guertner: Oh — !

Goering: There should hardly be such instances. Let’s take
a chance on it.

Stuckart : If he is not insured, he’ll have to have the damage
restored anyway. How can he then make claims against any-
body?

Goering: He cannot.

Woermann : He can file claims against the State.

Stuckart: According to which law? Damage caused by riots?
We won’t recognize riots.

Goering: Perfectly right.

Woermann : Generally speaking, may I say regarding foreign
Jews, the reservation that the contract is to be taken into con-
sideration was made only for the organization. That is valid for
all branches which we have discussed today, and also for the
expropriation.

Goering: Like the Fuehrer says, we’ll have to find a way to
talk this over with the countries which also do something against
their Jews. That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position
here and we have to stand him — that ought to cease. The Fueh-
rer was not very happy about the agreement that was made with
the Poles. He thinks we should take a few chances and just
tell the Poles; all right, we are not going to do that; let’s talk
over what we may be able to accomplish together ; you are doing
something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the
Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole!
I’d like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.

Woermann: It ought to be considered whether or not the
United States might take measures against German property.
This question cannot be handled equally for all countries. I have
to make a formal and general reservation.

Goering: I have always said and I’d like to repeat it that our
steamship companies and German companies in general should

* Reich Minister of Justice until 1941.

953402—52

125

finally catch on and liquidate their investments in the United
States, sell them, etc. That country of scoundrels does not do
business with us according to any legal rules. Once before they
stole everything from us, that is why I don’t understand how we
could do it again, just for some temporary profit. It is dangerous.
You can do it with an orderly country but not with one that
cares for rights [die Rechtsseite] as little as the United States.
The other day I had the American Ambassador with me, we
talked about the Zeppelin and I told him: “We don’t need any
helium, I fly without helium but the prerequisite will have to be
that this ship will be flying to civilized countries where the right
prevails. It goes without saying that one cannot fly to such
gangster states.” He had a rather silly look on his face. One
ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr. Woer-
mann, it ought to be considered.

Woermann : In other words, the Foreign Office is granted the
right to be consulted.

Goering: Granted, but I’d like to avoid mentioning the for-
eign Jews as long as we can help it. We’d rather have the For-
eign Office take part in those cases where that question becomes
acute, so that some compromise can be reached.

Woermann: Generally, and in particular cases.

* * * * * * *

Goering: One more question, gentlemen: What would you
think the situation would be if I’d announce today that Jewry
shall have to contribute this one billion 1 as a punishment?

Buerckel : 2 The Viennese would agree to this whole heartedly.

Goebbels: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull
out of this, and to put out something on the side.

Brinkmann : 3 They’d be subject to punishment.

von Krosigk : Mr. Fischboeck, one question, could this author-
ization be ordered without their closing out their securities?

Funk: They are all registered. They’ll also have to register
the money.

von Krosigk : But for the time being they may dispose of it.

Goering: It won’t help them to cash them all. They can’t
get rid of the money.

Funk : They’ll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their
stocks and bonds.

Fischboeck : There is a certain danger, but I don’t think it is
very great. But only then, when all the other measures shall
definitely be carried out during next week.

1 See Goering’s Decree of 12 November 1938, the same day as this conference, reproduced
immediately following.

2 Reich Commissioner in Austria.

3 Then State Secretary in the Ministry of Economics.

126

von Krosigk : They have to be taken during the next week at
the latest.

Goering: I would make that a condition.

FiSCHBOECK: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under
pressure this way.

Goering: I shall choose the wording this way; that German
Jewry shall, as punishment for their abominable crimes, etc.,
have to make a contribution of one billion. That’ll work. The
pigs won’t commit another murder so soon. Incidentally, I’d like
to say again that I would not like to be a Jew in Germany.

von Krosigk : Therefore, I’d like to emphasize what Mr. Hey-
drich has said in the beginning ; that we’ll have to try everything
possible, by way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into
foreign countries. The decisive factor is that we don’t want to
keep the whole society-proletariat [Gesellschaftsproletariat] here.
They’ll always be a terrific liability for us. (Frick: “And a dan-
ger!”) I don’t imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice.
The idea of the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore,
the goal must be, like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we
can!

Goering: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the
German Reich should come into conflict with foreign powers
[aussenpolitischen Konflikt] it goes without saying that we in
Germany should first of all let it come to a big showdown with
the Jews [eine grosse Abrechnung an den Juden zu vollziehen].
Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with these
foreign powers who have brought the Jewish question up, in
order to solve the Madagascar project. He explained it all to
me 9 November. There is no other way. He’ll tell the other
countries. “What are you always talking about the Jews for?
Take them!” Another proposal may be made. The Jews, gotten
rid of, may buy territory for their “co-religionists” in North
America, Canada, or elsewhere.

I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economics shall direct
the committee and he shall, in one form or another, take all
steps necessary within the next few days.

Blessing: I fear that during the next few days, beginning
Monday, the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for
hundreds of thousands, in order to provide themselves with
means. Since we hold the quotation [Kurs] of the internal loan
in order to sell more bonds, the Reich Treasury, Loan Committee,
or the Reich Minister for Finance should have to back this in-
ternal loan.

Goering: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the
market? (Remark: “Sell them”) To Whom? (Remark: On the

127

stock market. He orders a bank to do it.) Well, I’ll prohibit
selling internal loan bonds for 3 days.

Blessing: That could be done only through a decree.

Goering: I can’t see any advantage for the Jew. He won’t
know himself how, and he’ll have to pay. On the contrary, I
believe he won’t move.

Goebbels: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays
at home.

Goering: I don’t think it would be logical. Otherwise we’ll
have to do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is
that for the time being we have a quiet situation, but who can
guarantee that there won’t be new trouble by Saturday or Sun-
day. Once and for all I want to eliminate individual acts. The
Reich has taken the affair in its own hand. The Jew can only
sell, he can’t do a thing. He’ll have to pay. At this moment,
the individual Jew won’t think of throwing anything on the
market. There’ll be some chatter first, and then they will be-
gin to run to us. They’ll look for those great Aryans with
whom they think they may have some luck, the so-called various
mail-boxes of the Reich with whom they can lodge their protests.
These people will run my door in. All that takes some time, and
by then we’ll be ready.

Daluege: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?

Goering: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the police will
have to think over what measures will have to be taken. I thank
you.

(Conference closed at 2:40 p.m.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I4I2-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2102

GOERING DECREE, 12 NOVEMBER 1938, IMPOSING A FINE OF ONE

BILLION REICHSMARKS ON JEWS OF GERMAN NATIONALITY AND

AUTHORIZING THE DEFENDANT SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK TO

ISSUE EXECUTIVE ORDERS WITH RESPECT THERETO IN AGREEMENT

WITH THE REICH MINISTERS CONCERNED*

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1579

Decree concerning the Payment of a Fine [Suehneleistung] by
Jews of German Nationality, 12 November 1938.

The hostile attitude of Jewry toward the German people and
Reich, which does not even shrink from committing cowardly

* This decree was discussed at the Goering conference of 12 November 1938, the same date
as the date of this decree. Extracts from the minutes of this conference are reproduced
immediately above.

128

murder, makes a decisive defense and a harsh expiation [Suehne]
necessary. I order therefore by virtue of the decree concerning
the execution of the Four Year Plan of 18 October 1936 (RGB1.
I, p. 887) as follows:

Section 1

On the Jews of German nationality as a whole has been im-
posed the payment of a contribution [Kontribution] 1 of 1 billion
reichsmarks to the German Reich.

Section 2

Executive orders are to be issued by the Reich Minister of
Finance in agreement with the Reich Ministers concerned.
Berlin, 12 November 1938

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

Goering
Field Marshal

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-A 2
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1443

GOERING DIRECTIVE TO THE REICH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR,
24 JANUARY 1939, CONCERNING THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE
EMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM GERMANY AND THE APPOINTMENT
OF THE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY POLICE, HEYDRICH, AS CHIEF
OF THE REICH CENTRAL OFFICE FOR JEWISH EMIGRATION

Berlin, 24 January 1939
The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan
Field Marshal Goering
To the Reich Minister of the Interior
Berlin

The emigration from Germany of Jews is to be advanced by all
means.

A Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration [Reichszentrale
fuer die juedische Auswanderung] is established within the Reich
Ministry of the Interior from the representatives of the agencies
concerned. The Reich Central Office has the mission to uniformly
within the whole territory of the Reich —

1 The term “Kontribution” is generally used in wartime only.

2 Document NG-2586 is a compilation of numerous related contemporaneous documents per-
taining to the treatment of Jews, all found in the files of “Department Germany” of the
German Foreign Office. These documents are dated between January 1939 and February 1943.
Some were drawn up by officials of the Foreign Office. Others originated in other agencies
and found their way to the Foreign Office files during the development of Germany’s policy
concerning Jews. Because the individual documents in Document NG-2586 were so widely
separated in date, the prosecution offered various items of the compilation in evidence under
different exhibit numbers. Consequently, different parts of Document NG-2586 will be found
hereinafter with various exhibit numbers.

129

1. Take all measures for the preparation of an increased emi-
gration of the Jews, among other things to create a Jewish or-
ganization which is qualified to prepare all steps to make avail-
able and utilize the internal and foreign funds, and to determine,
in collaboration with the Reich Bureau for Emigrant Matters,
countries suitable for emigration.

2. Direct the emigration; and to favor among other things,
particularly, the emigration of the poorer Jews.

3. Expedite emigration in individual cases by central coor-
dinated processing of the necessary applications, State certificates
and vouchers needed by the individual emigrant and by the con-
trolling of the course of the emigration.

The Chief of the Security Police [Heydrich] is in charge of
the Reich Central Office. He appoints the manager and regulates
the management of the Reich Central Office.

I will be currently informed of the work of the Reich Central
Office. My decision must be requested before measures of funda-
mental importance are taken.

In addition to the other agencies concerned, Ambassador Eisen-
lohr as Delegate for Official International Negotiations and Min-
isterial Director Wohlthat as Delegate for the Negotiations on
the Rublee Plan,* are to be members of the executive committee.

Signed : Goering

* George Rublee was American representative, and later director, of the Intergovernmental
Committee, convened in 1938 and 1939 to discuss problems of Jewish emigration from the
Reich.

130

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2360-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3906

EXTRACTS FROM HITLER'S SPEECH BEFORE THE REICHSTAG, REPRO-
DUCED IN THE OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER OF THE NAZI PARTY OF 31
JANUARY 1939, CONCERNING THE FATE OF THE JEWISH RACE
IN EUROPE "IF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE JEWRY" PLUNGES
EUROPE INTO ANOTHER WORLD WAR

Voelkischer Beobachter, Berlin Edition, 31 January 1939

[Note. The first page of the newspaper contains a picture of Hitler ad-
dressing the Reichstag captioned “The Fuehrer on the occasion of his address
before the First Greater German Reichstag.” The picture shows that the
following defendants were present: Lammers, Meissner, Schwerin von

Krosigk, Woermann, and Dietrich.]

ADOLF HITLER’S FORCEFUL SPEECH BEFORE THE
GREATER GERMAN REICHSTAG

Prophetic Warning to World Jewry
Unequivocal Avowal of German-Italian Community of Fate
* * * * * * *

I believe that this problem will be solved — the sooner the
better — for Europe cannot rest again before the Jewish problem
has been eliminated.

*******

If international finance Jewry in and outside Europe should
succeed in plunging the peoples of Europe into another world
war, then the result will not be the bolshevization of the world
and a victory for world Jewry but the annihilation of the Jewish
race in Europe!*

*******

* This extract from the Voelkischer Beobachter was used during the cross-examination of
defendant Lammers on 23 September 1948. (See extracts from Lammers’ testimony repro-
duced below in this section.) Later the prosecution offered in evidence as part of the exhibit
another part of Document 2360-PS. an extract from a Hitler speech of 30 January 1942,
reported in the Voelkischer Beobachter of 1 February 1942: “I have already declared on

1 September 1939, in the German Reichstag, and I am careful not to make hasty predictions,
that this war will not turn out the way the Jews think it will, namely, that the European
Aryan peoples will be wiped out, but that the result of this war will be the annihilation
[Vernichtung] of Jewry.” This part of Document 2360-PS was not referred to in Lammers’
cross-examination and the Tribunal sustained a defense objection to it on 12 November 1948.

131

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NID-13853
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2104

SECOND EXECUTIVE ORDER CONCERNING THE FINE ON JEWS, 19
OCTOBER 1939, SIGNED BY DEFENDANT SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK,
AND INCREASING THE TAX ON JEWISH PROPERTY TO MEET THE
BILLION MARK FINE

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 2059

Second executive order concerning the payment of the fine by the
Jews, 19 October 1939

In accordance with section 2 of the decree concerning the pay-
ment of a fine by Jews, dated 12 November 1938 (Reichsgesetz-
blatt I, p. 1579, 1 the following order is published:

1. In order to raise the amount of one billion Reichsmarks, the
tax on Jewish property is to be increased 2 from 20 percent to
25 percent of the assets.

2. The difference of 5 percent becomes due on 15 November
1939.

3. Payment is to be made without a special demand notice.
Berlin, 19 October 1939

The Reich Minister for Finance

Count Schwerin von Krosigk:

1 Document 1412-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 2102, reproduced above.

2 The first executive order to the Goering Decree of 12 November 1938 was issued by defend-
ant Schwerin von Krosigk on 21 November 1938 (Doc. 1411-PS, Pros. Ex. 2103, not repro-
duced herein). It provided that Jews of German nationality, and stateless Jews whose total
assets exceeded 5,000 Reichsmarks, had to pay a fine of 20 percent of their property in four
equal installments.

132

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3363-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2501

CIRCULAR LETTER FROM HEYDRICH TO CHIEFS OF ALL EINSATZ-
GRUPPEN* WITH COPIES TO DEFENDANT STUCKART AND OTHERS,
21 SEPTEMBER 1939, CONCERNING THE JEWISH QUESTION IN
GERMAN OCCUPIED TERRITORY, SECRECY FOR THE "ENTIRE
PLANNED MEASURES," AND "FIRST PRELIMINARY MEASURE FOR
THE FINAL AIM"

Copy

The Chief of the Security Police Berlin, 21 September 1939
PI (II) -288/39 Secret

Express letter

To : The chiefs of all Einstatzgruppen of the Security Police

Subject: Jewish question in the occupied territory [Judenfrage
im besetzten Gebiet]

With reference to today’s conference in Berlin, I am once
more stressing that the entire planned measures (hence the final
aim) [die geplanten Gesamtmassnahmen (also das Endziel) ] are
to be kept strictly secret .

It has to be distinguished between —

(1) the final aim (which will take some time) and

(2) the sections of fulfillment of this final aim (which will
be achieved in short terms) .

The planned measures demand most thorough preparation in
technical as well as in economic respect.

It is self-evident that the imminent tasks cannot be outlined
in all detail from this office. The following instructions and
terms of reference are at the same time serving the purpose of
keeping the chiefs of the operational groups to practical con-
siderations.

I

The first preliminary measure for the final aim is the concen-
tration of the Jews from the country into the larger towns.
This has to be carried out with acceleration. It has to be dis-
tinguished —

(1) between the area of Danzig and West-Prussia, Poznan,

Eastern Upper Silesia, and

* The IMT, in its judgment, found that the “Einsatzgruppen” were involved, among other
things, “in the widespread murder and ill treatment of the civilian population of the occupied
territories.” See Trial of the Major War Criminals, volume I, page 270. One entire trial in
Nuernberg, the Einsatzgruppen case, was concerned with the activities of these special task
units. See Volume IV, this series.

133

(2) the remaining occupied territories.

As far as possible, the area as mentioned under number (1)
has to be cleared [freigemacht] of Jews, at least the aim has to
be to establish only a few concentration towns [Konzentrierungs-
staedte] .

In the areas as mentioned under number ( 2 ), as few concen-
tration points [Konzentrierungspunkte] as possible are to be es-
tablished [festzulegen] so that the measures to be taken later
will be carried out in an easier manner [erleichtert werden] . It
has to be observed that only such towns will be established as
concentration points, which either are railway centers or at least
are situated at railway lines.

In principle, Jewish communities of less than 500 heads are
to be dissolved, and to be transferred to the nearest concentra-
tion town.

This decree does not apply to the area of Einsatzgruppe I which
is situated east of Cracow, roughly circumscribed by Polanico,
Jaroslaw, the new line of demarcation, and the former Slovak-
Polish border. Within this area, only an approximate census of
the Jews has to be carried out. Furthermore, the Jewish Coun-
cils of Elders are to be established, as mentioned immediately
below.

II

Councils of Jewish Elders

(1) In each Jewish community, a Council of Jewish Elders
is to be set up which, as far as possible, is to be composed of the
remaining influential personalities and rabbis. The council is to
be composed of up to 24 male Jews (depending on the size of
the Jewish community).

The council is to be made, in the true sense of the word, fully
responsible for the exact and punctual [termingemaesse] execu-
tion of all directives which have been or which will be issued.

(2) In case of sabotage of such instructions, the councils are
to be warned of severest measures.

(3) The Jewish Councils are to take an improvised census of
the Jews of their area, possibly divided as to sex (age groups) —

(a) up to 16 years of age,

( b ) from 16 to 20 years of age,

(c) those above [20 years,] and also according to the principal
vocations, and they are to report the results in the shortest possi-
ble time.

(4) The Councils of Elders are to be made acquainted with
the time and date of the evacuation [Abzug] , the evacuation pos-

134

sibilities and finally the evacuation routes. They are, then, to
be made personally responsible for the evacuation of the Jews
from the country.

The reason to be given for the concentration of the Jews to
the cities is that Jews have most decisively participated in sniper
attacks and plundering.

(5) The Councils of Elders of the concentration centers are
to be made responsible for the proper housing of the Jews to
be brought in from the country. The concentration of Jews in
the cities for general reasons of security will probably bring
about orders to forbid Jews to enter certain wards of that city
altogether, and that in consideration of economic necessity they
cannot, for instance, leave the ghetto, they cannot go out after
a designated evening hour, etc.

(6) The Council of Elders is also to be made responsible for
the adequate feeding of the Jews on the transport to the cities.

No scruples are to be voiced, if the migrating Jews take with
them all their movable possessions, as far as that is technically
at all possible.

(7) Jews who do not comply with the order to move into
cities are to be given a short additional period of grace when
there is a good reason. They are to be warned of strictest
penalty if they should not comply by the appointed time.

Ill

All necessary measures, on principle, are always to be taken
up in closest agreement and collaboration with the German civil
administration and the competent local authorities.

In the execution of this plan, care must be taken that eco-
nomic security suffer no harm in the occupied zones.

(1) The needs of the army should particularly be kept in
mind, for example, it will not be possible to avoid leaving be-
hind here and there some Jews engaged in trade who absolutely
must be left behind for the maintenance of the troops, for lack
of any other way out.

In such cases, the immediate Aryanization of these enterprises
is to be planned for and the emigration of the Jews is to be
completed later, in agreement with the competent local German
administrative authorities.

(2) For the preservation of German economic interests in
the occupied territories, it is self-understood that Jewish war
and ordinary industries and factories, and those important to
the Four Year Plan, must be kept going for the time being.

.In these cases also, immediate Aryanization must be planned for
and the emigration of the Jews must be completed later.

135

(3) Finally, the food situation in the occupied territories must
be taken into consideration. For instance, as far as possible,
real estate of Jewish settlers should be provisionally entrusted to
the care of neighboring German or even Polish peasants to be
worked by them in order to insure harvesting of the crops still in
the fields, or cultivation.

In regard to this important question contact should be made
with the agricultural experts of the C.d.Z. [Chief of the Civil
Administration] .

(4) In all cases in which a conformity of interests of the
Security Police on the one hand, and the German civil admin-
istration on the other hand, can be reached, I am to be informed
of the individual measures in question as quickly as possible before
their execution, and my decision is to be awaited.

IV

The chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen are to report to me continu-
ously on the following matters:

(1) Numerical survey on the Jews present in their territories
(if possible according to the above-mentioned classification).

The number of Jews who are evacuated from the country and
those who are already in towns are to be listed separately.

(2) Names of towns which have been designated as concen-
tration points.

(3) The time set for the Jews to be evacuated to the towns.

(4) Survey of all Jewish war and ordinary industries and
factories or those important to the Four Year Plan in their ter-
ritory.

If possible, the following should be specified:

(a) Kind of factory (also statement on possible reconversion
of factory to really vital or war-important factories or those im-
portant to the Four Year Plan) ;

( b ) Which factories should be most urgently Aryanized (in
order to avoid loss) ; what kind of Aryanization is suggested?
Germans or Poles, (the decision depends on the importance of
the factory) ;

(c) Number of Jews working in these factories (include lead-
ing positions).

Will it be possible to keep the factory going after the Jews
have been removed or will German or Polish workers respectively
have to be assigned for that purpose? To what extent?

If Polish workers have to be used, care should be taken that
they are mainly taken from the former German provinces in
order to somewhat ease the problem there. These questions can

136

only be solved by incorporation and participation of the labor
offices which have been set up.

V

For the fulfillment of the goal set, I expect the full cooperation
of all forces of the Security Police and the Security Service
(Sicherheitsdienst) .

The chiefs of the neighboring Einsatzgruppen shall immedi-
ately establish contact with each other in order to be able to
cover completely the territories in question.

VI

The High Command of the Army; the Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan, (Attention: State Secretary Neumann); the
Reich Ministry of the Interior (Attention : State Secretary Stuck-
art) ; for Food, and for Economics (Attention : State Secretary
Landfried) ; as well as the chief of the Civil Administration of
the occupied territories have received copies of this decree.

Signed : Heydrich

Certified

Signed : SCHMIDT

Office Clerk

Certified true copy
Signed signature
Major (GSC)

137

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-1467
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1304

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN DEFENDANT LAMMERS AND
REICH LEADER SS HIMMLER, 29 SEPTEMBER AND 4 OCTOBER 1939,
CONCERNING THE DRAFT OF A HITLER DECREE "FOR THE
STRENGTHENING OF GERMANISM"

I. Letter of Lammers to Himmler, 29 September 1939

[Illegible initial]
Berlin W 8, 29 September 1939
Vosstr. 6

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Rk. 518 B g.

[stamp]

Secret

To the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Himmler
Dear Mr. Himmler:

With reference to our discussions in the Fuehrer headquarters
and in connection with my letter of 28 September of this year,
I take the liberty of sending you the enclosed draft of a Fuehrer
decree. Would you be good enough to comment on it?

[stamp]

Personal Staff of the
Reich Leader SS
1 October 1939
Journal No. AR/

To: RF 149

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly
K [Signed] Dr. Lammers

[Illegible initial]

Enclosures :

2. Text of draft decree, undated 1

DECREE OF THE FUEHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR
FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF GERMANISM [zur Festi-
gung deutschen Volkstums] 2

dated

The Poland established at Versailles has ceased to exist. The

1 The decree later adopted on 7 October 1939 is reproduced immediately below.

2 “Deutschen Volkstums” is not readily translated into English. Often it was also trans-
lated as “German folkdom.”

138

opportunity therefore arises for the greater German Reich to re-
ceive and settle in its area German men and women who had to
live abroad up to now and to eliminate those of foreign nationality
or race [Volksfremde auszuscheiden] . I commission the Reich
Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior to carry through this task according to the fol-
lowing directives:

/

The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior will be responsible for —

1. The return of people of German nationality and race living
abroad and entitled to return to the Reich permanently.

2. The elimination of the injurious influence of those parts
of the non-German population, which in their present position
would represent a danger to the Reich and the German racial
community — in the existing, and especially, also in the newly ac-
quired, Reich territory 1 ; in the Reich territory, and especially
also in those parts of the Occupied Eastern Territories, which are
to be incorporated into the Reich 2 .

3. The placing of agricultural settlers, also from the existing
Reich territory, in the newly acquired territories 1 ; Reich terri-
tory, in the parts of the Occupied Eastern Territories, which are
to be incorporated into the Reich 2 .

Reich Leader SS is authorized to take all the administrative
measures necessary for the performance of these duties. In par-
ticular, in order to accomplish the task set for him in paragraph I
section (2) he may assign the group of people in question to
certain areas and quarters.

II

In discharging his task, the Reich Leader SS will, if possible,
make use of the existing offices and establishments of the Reich,
the provinces and the communities, as well as other public bodies
and settlement agencies.

Negotiations with foreign government offices and authorities,
as well as with racial Germans who are still abroad, will take
place in agreement with the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs.

If, on the basis of legislation and administrative machinery, no
agreement can be reached on a particular measure between the
Reich Leader SS on the one hand, and the responsible Supreme
Reich Authority or the person entrusted with executive power
in the occupied territories on the other hand, my own decision

1 Wording if the decree is issued after the incorporation of the occupied territory.

2 Wording if the decree is issued before the incorporation of the occupied territory.

139

will be obtained through the Reich Minister and Chief of the
Reich Chancellery.

III

If landed property in the existing* Reich territory is needed
for the settlement of returning persons of German nationality
and race, the law of 29 March 1935 (Reich Law Gazette I, p.
467) concerning procurement of land for purposes of the armed
forces and the implementation directives for this law will be
applied to obtain the necessary land. The tasks of the Reich
Office for Procurement of Land will be taken over by the office
designated by the Reich Leader SS.

IV

The means necessary for carrying through these measures will
be made available to the Reich Leader SS by the Reich Minister
of Finance.

Berlin, this day

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

3. Letter from Himmler to Lammers, 4 October 1939

[stamp]

Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS
Administration of Central Files
File No: AR/35/1

4 October 1939

Journal No.: AR/149
RF/Pt.

To the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery Dr.
Lammers

Berlin W 8, Voss Str. 6.

Dear Mr. Lammers:

I am in receipt of your letter of 29 September 1939 with the
draft of the Fuehrer decree for the consolidation of German folk-
dom. I am in complete agreement with the decree and have no
amendments to suggest.

Heil Hitler!

Yours very truly

[Initials] HH [Heinrich Himmler]

4 October 1939 [Illegible initials]

* Wording if the decree is issued after the incorporation of the occupied territory.

140

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-3075
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1305

FUEHRER DECREE OF 7 OCTOBER 1939, SIGNED BY HITLER, GOERING,

DEFENDANT LAMMERS, AND KEITEL, CONCERNING RESETTLEMENT

OF GERMAN CITIZENS AND RACIAL GERMANS, ELIMINATION OF

THE HARMFUL INFLUENCE OF ALIEN PARTS OF POPULATIONS,

AND RELATED MATTERS

Fuehrer Decree, Orders from the Reich Commissioner

Fuehrer Decree

DECREE OF THE FUEHRER AND REICH CHANCELLOR
FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF GERMANISM

Dated 7 October 1939
(not yet published)

The consequences which Versailles had on Europe have been
removed. As a result, the greater German Reich is able to ac-
cept and settle within its space German people, who up to the
present had to live in foreign lands, and to arrange the settle-
ment of national groups within its spheres of interest in such
a way that better dividing lines between them are attained. I
commission the Reich Leader SS with the execution of this task
in accordance with the following instructions:

I

Pursuant to my directions the Reich Leader SS is called upon
to —

1. Bring back those German citizens and racial Germans abroad
who are eligible for permanent return into the Reich.

2. Eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of the
population as constitute a danger to the Reich and the German
community.

3. Create new German colonies by resettlement, and especially
by the resettlement of German citizens and racial Germans coming
back from abroad.

The Reich Leader SS is authorized to give such general orders
and to take such administrative measures as are necessary for
the execution of these duties.

To carry out the task allotted to him under paragraph I, point
2, the Reich Leader SS can assign certain dwelling areas to the
parts of the population in question.

II

In the occupied, formerly Polish territories, the Chief of Ad-
ministration Upper-East carries out the task allotted to the

953402—52 10

141

Reich Leader SS, according to the latter’s instructions. The
Chief of Administration Upper-East and subordinated chiefs of
administration for military districts are responsible for the exe-
cution. The measures they take must be in keeping with the
requirements of the military command.

Persons, insofar as they act on special orders for the purpose of
carrying out these tasks, do not come under the jurisdiction of
the Wehrmacht.

III

Insofar as the Reich Leader’s SS task concerns the creation of
a new German peasantry, the Reich Minister of Food and Agri-
culture will act for the Reich Leader SS and according to his
general instructions.

Otherwise the Reich Leader SS will use the services of Reich
county and local authorities and institutions as well as those of
other public corporations and already existing settlement organi-
zations for the execution of his task within the territory of the
German Reich.

In cases where agreement between the Reich Leader SS on the
one hand and the competent Supreme Reich Authority (in op-
erational theaters the Commander in Chief of the Army) on
the other hand, cannot be reached on measures which by reason
of legislation and administrative organization require such agree-
ment, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister
and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

IV

Negotiations with foreign governmental offices and authorities,
or with racial Germans while they are still abroad, have to be
carried on in agreement with the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs.

V

Insofar as land within the territory of the Reich is needed for
the settlement of returning German citizens or racial Germans,
its acquisition is governed by the law concerning the acquisition
of land for army purposes, dated 29 March 1935 (Reich Law
Gazette I, p. 467), and the regulatory statutes relating to this
law. The Reich Leader SS will determine which authority is to
take over the duties of the Reich Office for the Procurement of
Land.

VI

The Reich Minister of Finance will provide the Reich Leader
SS with the financial means necessary for putting the above
measures into operation.

142

Berlin, 7 October 1939 The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Signed : Adolf Hitler

The President of the Council of Ministers
for the Defense of the Reich
Signed: Goering, Field Marshal

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Signed: Dr. Lammers

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Signed : Keitel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4699
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1257

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THE REICH

PRESS CHIEF, 13 JANUARY 1940, GIVING INSTRUCTIONS CON-
CERNING THE USE OF "ANTI-SEMITIC THEMES," THE "JEWISH-

CAPITALIST THEME," AND RELATED MATTERS*

13 January 1940

Confidential Information [V.I.] No. 11/40

Secret

It is to be observed that, with few exceptions, the press has
not yet understood how to stress in their daily journalistic work
the propagandistic Parole of the New Year’s Message of the
Fuehrer, wherein he discussed the battle against the Jewish and
reactionary warmongers in the capitalist democracies. Anti-
Semitic themes are a part of the daily press material as clear
expositions of the social backwardness of the moneybag democra-
cies who wish to salvage their exploitation methods through this
war. In this connection many well-known circumstances (Lon-
don slums, etc.) may be treated in text and illustration. The
anti-Semitic theme, which has become timely in the case of Hore-
Belisha, should not be permitted to remain in the background.
The National Socialist Press Service [NSK] will provide current
material for both groups of thematic material.

The stressing of these clear propaganda lines must, however,
include appropriate copy, headlines, and commentaries with re-
spect to current new material.

Only by closest attention on the part of the editors in directing
the Jewish-capitalist theme will the necessary long-term propa-
gandistic effect be achieved.

* Defendant Dietrich’s functions as Reich Press Chief of the Nazi Party and as Press Chief
of the Reich government are the subject of two Hitler orders reproduced in Volume XII,
section VI C. The first is Hitler’s order of 28 February 1934, announcing the functions of
the “Reich Press Chief of the NSDAP,” Document NG-3081, Prosecution Exhibit 857; the
second is Hitler's order of 26 November 1937, appointing Dietrich "Press Chief of the Reich
government,” Document NG-3564, Prosecution Exhibit 864,

143

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4698
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1258

PRESS DIRECTIVE, 15 FEBRUARY 1940, CONFIRMING FOREIGN PRESS
REPORTS ON THE TRANSPORT OF 1,000 GERMAN JEWS TO
POLAND AND DIRECTING THAT THIS MATTER IS TO BE TREATED
CONFIDENTIALLY

Instructions from the Press Conference of 15 February 1940
Directive No. 3U7

The foreign press declares that 1,000 German Jews have been
transported to the Government General. The report is correct,
but it is to be treated as confidential.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2490
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1529

MEMORANDUM FROM DEFENDANT LAMMERS TO HIMMLER, 28
MARCH 1940, TRANSMITTING A REPORT SENT TO LAMMERS
ANONYMOUSLY, ENTITLED "DEPORTATION IS BEING CONTINUED
—THE DEATH MARCH FROM LUBLIN— DEATHS FROM FREEZING—
GOERING'S DECISION APPEALED TO"

Berlin, 28 March 1940
now at Berchtesgaden

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Rk. 4797 B

1. To the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior
Berlin SW 11, Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Written: Ko
Read: Le./Bru
Dispatched: 29/3 Ma

with 1 end.

Dear Mr. Himmler:

In accordance with the wish expressed in your letter of 14
January 1940 — 1 185/40 Ads. — I am pleased to send you here-
with a photostatic copy of a memorandum (Eingabe), “The De-
portation is Being Continued,” which was sent to me anony-
mously.*

[Handwritten] blue
Photostat of RK 4797 end.

Heil Hitler!

Very respectfully yours
(name of the Reich Minister

[Initial] L [Lammers]

* In addition to the photostat of the memorandum, Lammers’ note to Himmler enclosed a
photostat of an envelope stamped “Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, 16 March 1940” and addressed
“Personal. To Herrn Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, Berlin W. 35, Von der Heydstrasse 18.”

144

2. To the files

[Illegible initials] 20 March

Bt.

[Enclosure]

Deportation is Being Continued

The Death March from Lublin — Deaths from Freezing —
Goering’s Decision Appealed to

The following report is based on the findings of the mixed
Polish- Jewish Relief Committee in the Government General
which is cooperating with the American Quaker Organization
(The Society of Friends) as well as with delegates of the Red
Cross and the district authorities of the Governor General for
the Occupied Polish Territory.

[Handwritten] (1) Received anonymously (2) Herr Kritzinger [Illegible
initials] [Initial] L [Lammers].

The contents represent an urgent appeal to the conscience of
mankind and the sense of responsibility of the entire world.

Krakow, 14 March 1940

In spite of the objections of the Government General to a
hasty and unplanned continuation of the deportation of Jewish
German nationals to eastern Poland this is being continued at
the order of the Reich Leader SS.

On 12 March 1940, 160 more Jews were evacuated from Schnei-
demuehl in a freight car to the Lublin district. Additional
transports are reported in Lublin. The deported persons had
to leave their entire property behind. They were not allowed to
take even a suitcase with them. The women had to give up
their handbags before the trips. Some persons had their over-
coats taken away from them, these being men and women who
had tried to put on several coats or suits of underwear over
each other as a protection against the cold. They were not
allowed to take one cent in cash with them, not even the 20
zloty which those deported from Stettin were allowed. Nor were
they permitted to take food, beds, household articles (cooking
pots, etc.) with them. Upon their arrival in Lublin the de-
portees only had with them what they wore on their bodies.

The deportees are divided up among the villages of Piaski,
Glusk , and Belcyca at a distance of about 26-30 kilometers from
Lublin. The deportees from Stettin are also living there, as
many of them as are still alive.

Men, women, and children had to march from Lublin to these
villages on foot in a temperature of 22° [centigrade] below

145

zero, along country roads deeply covered with snow. Shocking
things occurred during this march. Of the approximately 1,200
persons deported from Stettin, 72 persons, including men and
women up to 86 years old, were left lying on the march, which
lasted more than 14 hours. The greater part of these people
froze to death. Among them was a mother who was carrying
her 3 year old child in her arms, tried to protect it from the cold
with her clothes and was left lying in this position after in-
human hardships. Furthermore, the body of a child about 5
years old was found in a half frozen condition. It carried a
cardboard sign around its neck with the name “Renate Alex-
ander from Hammerstein in Pomerania.” It appeared that this
child was deported with the others while visiting relatives in
Stettin, while its parents are still living in Germany. This
child had to have its hands and feet amputated in the Lublin
hospital. After the transport the corpses were collected on
sleds along the country road and brought to the Jewish ceme-
teries in Piaski and Lublin.

Upon their arrival in the three villages the deportees were
left to seek lodgings in the overcrowded houses and huts of the
local Jews. Since there were no additional quarters available
anywhere, the greater part of the deportees had to be lodged in
stables, sheds, etc.; and since, besides this, there is no food ex-
cept black bread, and the sanitary conditions are desperate,
numerous persons are dying every day, especially old people
and children. Up to 12 March the death rate among the Jews
deported from Stettin alone increased to a total of 230. The
Relief Committee is doing everything in its power. But it can-
not procure any quarters and can also improve the food situation
only to an insignificant degree. Medicine, ointment against chil-
blains, etc. are completely lacking. There is a lack of clothing,
underwear, in short, everything. In view of the almost indescrib-
able misery, some of the local Jews are on bad terms with the
ones deported from Germany which is primarily caused by the
diversity of languages and educational background. In addition
to this the deportees arrive completely without means, have no
cooking facilities, and in this way are slowly perishing. The
Government General for the Occupied Polish Territories (Dis-
trict Chief Governor Zoerner) has disclaimed any responsibility
for these occurrences and consequences resulting therefrom.
Field Marshal Goering has been informed of these, occurrences..

146

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1880
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1314

"REFLECTIONS ON THE TREATMENT OF PEOPLES OF ALIEN RACES
IN THE EAST" A SECRET MEMORANDUM HANDED TO HITLER BY
HIMMLER ON 25 MAY 1940*

[Handwritten] Dr. Gross of the Racial Policy Office has been
informed 28 November 40
Wolff

For the files
[stamp] Top Secret

Reflections on the Treatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East

Concerning the treatment of peoples of alien races in the East
we have to see to it that we acknowledge and cultivate as many
individual ethnic groups as possible, that is, outside of the Poles
and the Jews, also the Ukrainians, the White Russians, the
Gorals [Goralen] , the Lemcos [Lemken] and the Cashubos
[Kaschuben]. If other small and isolated national groups can
be found in other places, they should be treated the same way.

What I want to say is that we are not only most interested
in not unifying the population of the East, but, on the contrary,
in splitting them up into as many parts and fragments as pos-
sible.

But even within the ethnic groups themselves we have one in-
terest in leading these to unity and greatness, or perhaps arouse
in them gradually a national consciousness and national culture,
but we want to dissolve them into innumerable small fragments
and particles.

We naturally want to use the members of all these ethnic
groups, especially of the small ones, in positions of police offi-
cials and mayors. Only the mayors and local police authorities
will be allowed to head those ethnic groups. As far as the Gorals
are concerned the individual chieftains and elders of the tribes,
who live in continuous feud with each other anyhow, should fill
these positions. There must be no centralization toward the top,
because only by dissolving this whole conglomeration of peoples
of the Government General, amounting to 15 million, and of the
8 million of the eastern provinces, will it be possible for us to
carry out the racial sifting which must be the basis for our con-
siderations: namely selecting out of this conglomeration the ra-
cially valuable and bringing them to Germany and assimilating
them there.

* This memorandum is undated, but the time of Himmler's handing it to Hitler and others
is noted in the next document reproduced herein.

147

Within a very few years — I should think about 4 to 5 years —
the name of the Cashubes, for instance, must be unknown, be-
cause at that time there won’t be a Cashubian people any more
(this also goes especially for the West Prussians). I hope that
the concepts of Jews will be completely extinguished through
the possibility of a large emigration of all Jews to Africa or some
other colony. Within a somewhat longer period, it should also
be possible to make the ethnic concepts of Ukrainians, Gorals and
Lemcos disappear in our area. What has been said for those
fragments of peoples is also meant on a correspondingly larger
scale for the Poles.

A basic issue in the solution of all these problems is the ques-
tion of schooling and thus the question of sifting and selecting
the young. For the non-German population of the East there
must be no higher school than the four-grade elementary school.
The sole goal of this school is to be —

Simply arithmetic up to 500 at the most; writing of one’s
name; the doctrine that it is a divine law to obey the Germans
and to be honest, industrious, and good. I don’t think that
reading is necessary.

Apart from this school there are to be no schools at all in the
East. Parents, who from the beginning want to give their chil-
dren better schooling in the elementary school as well as later
on in a higher school, must take an application to the Higher
SS and Police Leaders. The first consideration in dealing with
this application will be whether the child is racially perfect and
conforming to our conditions. If we acknowledge such a child
to be as of our blood, the parents will be notified that the child
will be sent to a school in Germany and that it will permanently
remain in Germany.

Cruel and tragic as every individual case may be, this method
is still the mildest and best one if, out of inner conviction, one
rejects as unGerman and impossible the Bolshevist method of
physical extermination of a people.

The parents of such children of good blood will be given the
choice to either give away their child; they will then probably
produce no more children so that the danger of this subhuman
people of the East [Untermenschenvolk des Ostens] obtaining a
class of leaders which, since it would be equal to us, would also
be dangerous for us, will disappear — or else the parents pledge
themselves to go to Germany and to become loyal citizens there.
The love toward their child, whose future and education depends
on the loyalty of the parents, will be a strong weapon in dealing
with them.

Apart from examining the applications made by parents for

148

better schooling of their children, there will be an annual sifting
of all children of the Government General between the ages of
6 to 10 years in order to separate the racially valuable and non-
valuable ones. The ones considered racially valuable will be
treated in the same way as the children who are admitted on
the basis of the approved application of their parents.

I consider it as a matter of course from an emotional as well
as from a rational viewpoint that the moment children and
parents come to Germany they are not treated like lepers in the
schools and in everyday life, but, after having changed their
names, they should, in full confidence, be incorporated into the
German life, although attention and vigilance must be exercised
with regard to them. It must not happen that the children be
made to feel as outcasts, because, after all, we believe in this,
our own blood, which, through the errors of German history has
flowed into an alien nationality and we are convinced that our
ideology and our ideals will strike a chord of resonance in the
racially equal soul of these children. Here teachers and Hitler
Youth leaders especially must do an out-and-out job, and the
mistake that has been made in the past with the people from
Alsace Lorraine must never be repeated; namely, that on one
side one wants to win the people as Germans, and on the other
side one constantly hurts and repudiates their human value, their
pride and honor through distrust and insults. Insults like “Po-
lack” and “Ukrainian” or something like that must be made
impossible.

The children will have to be educated in an elementary school
and after those four grades it can be decided whether the chil-
dren should continue to go to the German grammar school or
should be transferred to a national political institution of edu-
cation.

The population of the Government General during the next 10
years, by necessity and after a consistent carrying out of these
measures, will be composed of the remaining inferior population
supplemented by the population of the eastern provinces deported
there, and of all those parts of the German Reich which have
the same racial and human qualities for instance, parts of the
Sorbs [Sorben] and Wends [Wenden].

This population will, as a people of laborers without leaders,
be at our disposal and will furnish Germany annually with
migrant workers and with workers for special tasks (roads,
quarries, buildings) : they themselves will have more to eat and
more to live on than under the Polish regime; and, though they
have no culture of their own, they will, under the strict, con-
sistent, and just leadership of the German people, be called

149

upon to help work on its everlasting cultural tasks and its build-
ings and perhaps, as far as the amount of heavy work is con-
cerned, will be the ones who make the realization of these tasks
possible.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1881
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1313

FILE NOTE OF HIMMLER, 28 MAY 1940, CONCERNING THE HAN-
DLING AND DISTRIBUTING OF HIS MEMORANDUM ON THE TREAT-
MENT OF ALIEN RACES IN THE EAST

The Reich Leader SS

Special Train, 28 May 1940
Top Secret

On Saturday, 25 May, I handed my memorandum on the treat-
ment of peoples of alien race in the East to the Fuehrer.* The
Fuehrer read the six pages and considered them very good and
correct. He directed, however, that only very few copies should
be issued; that there should be no large edition, and that the
report is to be treated with utmost secrecy. Minister Lammers
was likewise present. The Fuehrer wanted me to ask Governor
General Frank to come to Berlin in order to show him this report
and to tell him that the Fuehrer considered it to be correct.

I suggested to the Fuehrer that Minister Lammers, who had
received one copy from me, be ordered to present this report to
the four Gauleiters of the eastern Gaue: Koch, Forster, Greiser,
the Oberpraesident of Silesia, the Governor General Frank, as
well as to Reich Minister Darre, and to inform them that the
Fuehrer acknowledged and sanctioned this report as a directive.

Then a short file note should be made concerning the notifica-
tion of the persons named as to the contents of the report. The
Fuehrer agreed and gave the order to Minister Lammers.

Reich Leader Bormann received another copy for notification
of the deputy of the Fuehrer.

One copy was given to the chief of my office, SS Brigadier Gen-
eral Greifelt in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the
Strengthening of Germanism. I shall give him the order to in-
form in turn all Chiefs of the Main Offices as well as the first
five concerned Higher SS and Police Leaders East, North East,
Vistula, Warta, and South East and to have a report made on this
subject in the same manner. The notification to the Chiefs of the
Main Offices shall be effected by an SS Leader who will have to
wait until the chief concerned of the Main Office has read the

* Document NO-1880, Prosecution Exhibit 1314, reproduced immediately above,

150

report and has acknowledged it by his signature. At the same
time everyone has to confirm that he has been informed of the
fact that this is to be considered as a directive, but that it shall
never be laid down in an order of one of the Main Offices either
in form of a mere excerpt or from memory.

Moreover SS Brigadier General Greifelt is authorized to bring
the contents of the report to the attention of Mayor Winckler and
his own main collaborators; the latter he shall suggest to me.

Furthermore, I will personally give one copy to the Chief of
the Security Police with the order to notify his main coworkers
in the above described manner and without making any copies.

He has to suggest to me the circle of coworkers who are to be
informed of the report.

[Handwritten by Himmler]

The same applies to the Chief of the Race and Settlement Main
Office.

The Reich Leader SS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-1645
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1315

EXTRACT FROM ARTICLE IN THE NEWSPAPER "NS-LANDPOST," 7
JUNE 1940, CONCERNING THE TASK OF DEFENDANT DARRE IN
CONNECTION WITH AGRICULTURE IN POLAND, THE UTILIZATION
OF GERMANS OR RACIAL GERMANS FOR AGRICULTURAL MAN-
AGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS 1

“Agriculture in the New Eastern Territories. The Work of the
Ostdeutsche Landbewirtschaftungs G.m.b.H.,” by Dr. H.
Berger 2

The occupation of Poland in September 1939 confronted the
Reich Food Minister with a task, the magnitude and difficulty
of which was governed by the extent of the occupied area and
the speed of the military occupation. In the very shortest space
of time, immediately upon the heels of the invading army, har-
vesting, especially of all the root crops, had to be started; live-
stock which had been carried off or was found straying had to
be returned to the farms and the farms themselves set going
again so as to secure the harvest for 1940.

Immediately behind the advancing army, the entire occupied
area (including the present Government General) became dotted
with farmers from the Reich, at first widely distant. It was
their task to ensure continued cultivation by all available means.

1 The “NS” in the name of this newspaper stands for “National Socialist.”

2 Not defendant Berger.

151

More agricultural workers to run the derelict estates and farm-
steads were continually being applied for according to the re-
quirements. On the basis of applications and after examination
of the applicant’s particulars, these agricultural workers were
summoned to Berlin and sent on their journey to the areas re-
questing them. The area south of East Prussia was supplied by
the province of East Prussia in the same way as the area now
constituting the Danzig-West Prussia Gau was supplied by Dan-
zig, whereas the Warthegau, the district of Kattowitz, and the
area now constituting the Government General were directly sup-
plied by the Reich Food Ministry. A great number of farmers,
required for running the farms, were also taken from the army
and from among the racial Germans on the spot. Almost at
the same time, a great number of tractors, tractor implements,
steam plow units, threshing implements, steaming apparatus and
other appliances were shipped to the East for immediate use.

The speed of the supply columns and the eagerness to work
of thousands of German farmers, many of whom (among them
a considerable number of reliable lessees of government land)
had temporarily left their own or leased farms in the Reich,
were the main factors contributing to the success of the opera-
tion. Untrammeled by red tape, this tremendous task, unique
of its kind, was accomplished by eager cooperation and adapta-
tion to the new conditions as well as could at all be expected.

In appraising this achievement, one must not lose sight of the
fact that in the Incorporated Eastern Territories alone, nearly
5,000 large farms and hundreds of thousands of small Polish
farms had to be brought in. Their total area amounted to al-
most a fifth of the agricultural area of the old Reich (Germany
up to December 1937). In addition, the organization had to be
improvised to suit the necessities of the moment and had to
cope with the fact that agriculture had already been deprived
of many efficient farmers who were serving in the army.

At the time they were taken over, Polish agriculture as well
as the individual farms bore the marks of decades of Polish
agricultural policy. The use of fertilizers was unknown to many
farmers, cattle raising methods were generally inadequate, and
the herds were of poor quality. The buildings had been partly
destroyed by fire, and those available were in a poor state of
maintenance and were dilapidated. Modern machines were lack-
ing. On many large farms and nearly all the small Polish farms
conditions can still be found which we, with our well ordered
conditions, are unaccustomed to.

During the long winter which set in early, first of all the
estates were overhauled from a production point of view, and

152

lectures on the economic objectives were given to such managers
and administrators of small farms as had already been ap-
pointed. These objectives were to raise output, to increase root
crop and oil seeds cultivation, to intensify and improve livestock
keeping, to increase farm produced fodder, etc., also appropriate
plans for the cultivation of the land were worked out. The use
of commercial fertilizers has already considerably increased this
year. In order to raise crops and improve their quality, seeds
were made available. Livestock (horned cattle, pigs, and sheep)
was increased by additions from the old Reich. With the help
of bookkeeping centers, bookkeeping was introduced on the larger
farms.

Pursuant to the decree of 12 February 1940, all agricultural
and forestry undertakings and estates located in the Incorporated
Eastern Territories (not the Government General), which on 1
September 1939 were not owned by persons of German extrac-
tion, will be put under State management. For the purpose of
implementing State management, the Reich Minister for Food
and Agriculture has appointed the “East German Land Cultiva-
tion Company, Inc.” (Eastland) [Ostdeutsche Landbewirtschaft-
ungsgesellschaft m.b.H. (Ostland)] as Custodian General. The
lands formerly owned by the Polish State will be excluded and
will be managed by the administration of lands owned by the
State [Domaenenverwaltung] of the Reich Ministry of Food
and Agriculture. The economic tasks of the “land cultivation”
of the farms not owned by Germans as well as the whole ma-
chinery of management in the Incorporated Eastern Territories
have thus devolved on this corporation.

The late spring made it necessary first of all to employ all
available labor for tillage. The tractors loaned for use in the
fall of 1939 were purchased by the Ostland at the beginning of
April and used on a large scale. They were operated day and
night as far as possible so that spring tillage, despite the late
start, had made good progress by April.

The organization predominantly designed to deal provisionally
with purely agricultural assignments is now being consolidated
by the Ostland in administrative and credit matters. It must be
a further aim to exert a stronger influence on the management
of the smaller Polish farms than has hitherto been possible in
by far the largest part of the area.

The Central Office of the Ostland will be kept as small as pos-
sible — indoctrination in methods of production management and
the administrative work has been delegated to eight branches —
corresponding to the administrative areas * * *.

*******

153

[Typed file symbol]

O.L. 253 [Ostland 253]

6.9.40.-75 [6 September 1940 - 75]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-B
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1445

MEMORANDUM BY RADEMACHER, 3 JULY 1940, ENTITLED "THE

JEWISH QUESTION IN THE PEACE TREATY," NOTING THAT THE

DESIRABLE SOLUTION IS TO "GET ALL THE JEWS OUT OF EUROPE,"

PROPOSING THAT MADAGASCAR BECOME A GERMAN MANDATE

TO WHICH EUROPEAN JEWS BE SENT, AND RELATED MAHERS

The Jewish question in the peace treaty

The imminent victory gives Germany the possibility and, ac-
cording to my opinion, also the obligation to solve the Jewish
question in Europe [die Judenfrage in Europa]. The desirable
solution — Get all the Jews out of Europe. The task of the For-
eign Office in this respect is —

a . To lay the foundation for this demand in the peace treaty
and to carry the same demand into effect by individual negotia-
tions with the countries in Europe that are affected by the peace
treaty

b. To secure in the peace treaty the territory, necessary for the
settlement of the Jews and to establish the principle for the col-
laboration of the enemy countries on this problem

c. To determine the position in public law of the new overseas
territory for Jewish settlement

d . As preliminary work —

(1) Clarification of the wishes and plans of the Party, State,
and scientific bureaus interested and the coordination of these
plans with wishes of the Reich Foreign Minister. Part of this
is also

(2) The creation of a survey on factual basic dates which are
to be found at the individual bureaus (number of the Jews in
the individual countries), utilization of their property by an in-
ternational bank

(3) Negotiations with Italy, our friend

The Referat D III has already approached the Reich Foreign
Minister through Department Germany about initiating prelim-
inary work and was commissioned by him to start this prelim-
inary work immediately. Conferences with the bureau of the
Reich Leader SS, with the Ministry of the Interior, and with
some Party offices have already taken place. These offices ap-
proved of the following plan of office (Referat) D III.

154

Referat D III suggests the following for the solution of the
Jewish question: The peace treaty with France contains a clause
whereby France has to put the isle of Madagascar at our dis-
posal for the solution of the Jewish question, and its approximate
25,000 Frenchmen domiciled there are to be evacuated and com-
pensated. The island will be transferred to Germany as a man-
date. The bay of Diego-Suarez, important for reasons of naval
strategy, as well as the harbor of Antsirana become German
naval bases (there will perhaps also be the possibility for the
further extension of these naval bases to the harbors — open land-
ing places — Tamatave, Andevorante, Mananjary, etc., if the Navy
so desires). Apart from these naval bases merely parts of the
country which are suitable for establishing air bases are cut out
from the territory of the Jews. The part of the island that is
not required for military reasons is put under the administration
of a German Police Governor, who in turn is subordinated to the
administration of the Reich Leader SS. Otherwise the Jews will
get autonomy in the territory; their own mayors, their own police,
their own post and railway administration, etc. The Jews are
responsible as joint debtors for the value of the island. The
whole European property, owned by them so far, is transferred
for this purpose to an European bank which is to be founded.
As far as this property is not sufficient for the payment of the
real estate values which change into their hands and for the
purchase in Europe of goods, necessary for the reconstruction of
the island, they will receive at their disposal bank credits from
this source.

As Madagascar becomes only a mandate, the Jews settling
there do not acquire German citizenship. However, all Jews
who are deported to Madagascar are deprived of their citizen-
ship of the individual European countries, effective from the time
of deportation. Instead they become members of the Mandate
Madagascar. This regulation removes the chance that the Jews
establish a Vatican state of their own in Palestine and thus ex-
ploit for their own aims the symbolic value which Jerusalem has
for the Christian and Mohammedan world. Besides, the Jews
remain under German domination as a pawn for the future good
conduct of their racial comrades in America. The generosity
shown to the Jews by Germany in granting the cultural, economic,
administrative, and judicial autonomy, can be exploited from the
point of view of propaganda. It can be emphasized in this re-
spect that our German sense of responsibility toward the world
forbids to offer immediately the gift of an independent state to
a race which knew no national independence for thousands of

155

years; national independence must of necessity stand the trial
of history.

Berlin, 3 July 1940

[Signed] Rademacher

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4893
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1688

NINE ITEMS OF CORRESPONDENCE AND NOTES FROM GERMAN
FOREIGN OFFICE FILES, 20 AUGUST-23 DECEMBER 1940, CON-
CERNING ANTI-JEWISH MEASURES IN FRANCE

I. Coded Telegram from Ambassador Abetz in Paris to von Ribbentrop,
20 August 1940, Requesting Approval of Immediate Anti-Semitic Mea-
sures "which may serve as a basis for later expulsion of Jews from
unoccupied France also"

[Stamp] Foreign Office

[Handwritten] 42 Reich secret 158

[Stamp]

Foreign Office
Political II 3473. Secret
21 August 1940

Telegram (Secret Code V)

Paris, 20 August 1940

Arrived, 20 August 1940, 2010 hours

No. 413 of 20 August

Very urgent
For the Reich Minister

I request your approval for immediate measures of an anti-
Semitic nature [antisemitischer Sofortmassnahmen] which may
serve as a basis for later expulsion of Jews from unoccupied
France, also —

1. Ban on the reimmigration of Jews into occupied France
across the line of demarcation.

2. Compulsory registration of Jews residing in the occupied
territory.

3. Marking of Jewish stores in occupied France.

4. Appointment of trustees for Jewish stores, plants, store-
houses, and warehouses whose owners have fled.

These measures may be explained by reason of the fact that
they lie within the interest of security for the German occupying
forces, and are to be executed by French authorities.

Signed : Abetz

156

2. Letter from Luther to Himmler's Personal Staff Office, 10 September
1940, repeating request for opinion on measures suggested by Abetz

[Handwritten]

Re D III 159 Secret II
[Stamp] Secret

Berlin, 10 September 1940 (Loe)

(1) To the Reich Leader SS Personal Staff
Berlin SW 11

Prinz Albrechtstr. 8
[Illegible handwriting]

On 23 August 1940 — D III 42 Secret — I requested your opinion
as to the inquiry of Ambassador Abetz, in Paris, with respect to
anti-Semitic measures which may serve as a basis for the later
expulsion of Jews from unoccupied France.

(2) (Again submitted after two weeks)

Since I have not received an answer so far, and as this matter
is very urgent, I request your opinion anew.

The Reich Foreign Minister
By order:

Signed: Luther [Signed] Luther

9 September

[Initial] R 9 September

3. Answer from Heydrich to Luther, 20 September 1940, approving the
contemplated measures and requesting collaboration with security
police

The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police in the
Reich Ministry of the Interior

Berlin, SW 11, 20 September 1940
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Telephone: 12/00/40

[Stamp] Secret

S-IV D 6—776/40 Secret

[Stamp] Express letter

[Stamp]

Foreign Office
D III
159 Secret

Received 24 September 1940

To the Foreign Office
Attention : SA Colonel Minister Luther
or Deputy

953402—52 11

157

Berlin W 8

Wilhelmstr. 72-76

Subject: Measures against the Jews in occupied France.
Reference: Letter of 23 August 1940 — D III 42 Secret.

I have no objections to the execution of the measures against
the Jews planned by Ambassador Abetz for occupied France —

1. Ban on the reimmigration of Jews into occupied France
across the line of demarcation.

2. Compulsory registration of Jews residing in the occupied
territory.

3. Marking of Jewish stores in occupied France.

4. Appointment of trustees for Jewish stores, plants, store-
houses, and warehouses whose owners have fled.

I also agree that these measures should be carried out by French
authorities. I should like to say now, however, that in order to
assure a rigid execution of the measures mentioned under points
1 to 3, I consider it imperative to appoint a sufficient number of
trustees, as mentioned in point 4, who will be capable of repre-
senting the German interests, and that I consider it necessary
to utilize, on a large scale, the units of the Security Police sta-
tioned in occupied France because they in particular have mem-
bers who are well experienced in the Jewish sphere. The transfer
of the control of the activities from the French authorities to
the Security Police is particularly necessary in view of the fact
that the French police are charged with the carrying out of
these measures in any case, and that they are in close touch
with the commander of the Security Police.

Therefore, I should like to ask you to insure that the Security
Police is utilized accordingly and to inform me of the further
developments in this matter.

Signed : Heydrich

[Stamp]

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD
Certified.

[Signed] Dietrich

Clerk

4. Draft copy of letter from Luther to Abetz, 28 September 1940, suggesting
that contemplated measures be initially carried out by Vichy government
in order to render it responsible in case of failure

Draft copy (LOE)
Foreign Office
D III 159 Secret

158

28 September 1940

D.

Chief Foreign Organization
[Illegible initials]

Chief of the Foreign Organization

With respect to the telegraphic report No. 413 of 20 August
1940

[Stamp] Top Secret

Contents: Immediate measures against the Jews in occupied ter-
ritory.

It is impossible to judge here the expediency of the measure
against the Jews in occupied territory. However, one should con-
sider the possibility that the opposite of the desired effect may
be obtained if the necessary psychological preparation has not
taken place.

With respect to the appointment of trustees, it is to be em-
phasized that it must be on a general basis and that no differ-
entiation appears between Jewish and French enterprises.

It would be desirable that the intended measures are first
carried out by the Vichy government, so that the Vichy govern-
ment will sign as being responsible and will bear the responsi-
bility in the event of failure.

By order:

[Signed] Luther

1. To the Office of Ambassador Abetz, German Embassy, Paris

2 .

3. To the files
Z 289

5. Secret telegram from German Embassy in Paris to Foreign Office, 9
October 1940, referring to anti-Jewish regulations issued by the chief
of military administration in France and requesting immediate instruc-
tions concerning foreign Jews

Telegram (not coded)

Paris, 9 October 1940, 2140 hours
Arrived: 9 October 1940, 2210 hours

[Stamp]

Foreign Office
D III 71 Secret
Received: 10 October 1940

No. 820 of 9 October

To Dr. Schwarzmann, Office of the Minister

The Chief of the Military Administration in France issued a

159

regulation on 27 September with respect to measures against
Jews which, in Article 1, defines a Jew as a person who belongs
to the Jewish religion or who is the descendant of more than
two Jewish grandparents. Article 2: Reimmigration of Jews
who fled to occupied territory is prohibited. Article 3: Every
Jew is to report and register in the Jewish Register before 20
October. Article 4: Jewish enterprises are to be marked as
such before 31 October, but the administrative division of the
Chief of the Military Administration states that this refers to
all Jews in occupied territory, no matter of what nationality
they may be. The field offices have been directed, however, to
exempt American Jews from the application of this regulation.

With respect to Jewish enterprises, individual examinations
are to decide upon citizens of other countries from case to case.
A number of foreign missions have inquired how to proceed with
regard to Jews who are nationals of other countries.

I request immediate instructions from your office and directions
to be transmitted to the military administration, especially per-
taining to the treatment of foreign Jews who are employed in
the diplomatic or consular offices.

Signed : Schleier

19 copies, distributed as follows:
No. 1 Office of the R.A.M.

No. 2 R.A.M.

No. 3 SS
No. 4 AO
No. 5 D.A.L.

No. 6 Under State Sec.

Political Div. [Woermann]

No. 7 Under State Sec.

Legal Div.

No. 8 Chief, Personnel
No. 9 Political Div.

No. 10 L.W.

No. 11 Lg.W.

No. 12 Leg. Legal Div.

No. 13 Leg. Cultural Div.

No. 14 Dirigent
No. 15 Dirigent Press Div.
No. 16 Dirigent Germany Div.
No. 17 Dirigent Political Div.
No. 18 Hewel

No. 19 Regional Governments,
Political Div.

6. Memorandum from Rademacher to Juengling, 12 December 1940, re-
ferring to request concerning foreign Jewish diplomatic representatives
and noting defendant Weizsaecker's agreement with contemplated
measures

To Hofrat Juengling [Illegible initials] 13 December

Some time ago we inquired whether the anti- Jewish measures
in occupied France would also affect the foreign Jewish diplo-
matic representatives. Ambassador Abetz replied that if the
Jews belonged to the Diplomatic Corps — no; if they were em-
ployees of the representatives — yes. State Secretary Weiz-

160

aaecker, at the conference of directors, stated that he was in
agreement with this ruling, particularly since the diplomatic
representatives concerned are accredited to France and not to
the German Reich.

Mr. Kempe of the Protocol Division telephoned me recently
and asked me for information regarding these events, as the Pro-
tocol Division* had not been informed. I told him that details
would be sent to him. Today he reminded me. I am not certain
whom I charged with the enquiries into the matter, and would
therefore request you to take charge of it and inform the Pro-
tocol Division. If necessary I request a conference.
[Handwritten] The files are to be found under D III secret.
Berlin, 12 December 1940

[Handwritten] The files are enclosed.

D III 158 Secret, 159 Secret, 160 Secret

[Signed] Rademacher

[Handwritten]

Mr. E. B. Kempe (Protocol)

Submitted for confidential information (early return re-
quested).

[Handwritten] At D III filed, contents noted.

[Signed] Juengling

13 December 1940

Berlin. 18 December 1940
[Signed] Kempe
(Protocol Div.) J.J. 4238

7. Draft of teletype from Luther to German Embassy in Paris, 18 December
1940, requesting information on the ordinances of German military com-
manders in France and Belgium concerning Jews and information on the
application to American Jews of the ordinance in France

Teletype
Draft (Loe.)

Berlin, 18 December 1940, e.o. D III 6190
To the German Embassy, Paris

* Minister Smend (Protocol Division) was informed.

161

Ref.: Minister Luther

Legation Counsellor
Rademacher

Here Foreign Office
German Embassy
Paris —

Verbindedksm [sic]
Buvhier [sic] Paris

Here Germany Division —

I have just heard that a
teletype No. 130 from D
III dated 18 December
1940 did not arrive.

Yes, it was received here.
A note in my book says :
Please submit immediate-
ly to Legation Counsel-
lor Achenbach Good, 0.
K.

[Handwritten] J.J. 4236

Please advise whether the ordi-
nance of the Military Commander
there [in Paris] concerning compul-
sory registration of Jews, dated 27
September 1940, agrees in text with
the similar order of the Military
Commander, Belgium. If not, please
transmit by teletype text of Paris
order.

I request further information
whether excesses against Jewish busi-
nesses have taken place since the or-
dinance was issued. If so, by whom
and whether North American na-
tionals were affected. United States
has maintained in a note the “van-
dalism has been committed against
American Jews by persons wearing
armbands.” Your telegram No. 820
dated 9 August 1 reported that the
offices of the military commander had
been instructed not to apply the or-
dinance to American Jews. Have
these instructions been carried out
and are they still observed?

Immediate reply necessary in order
to reply to United States note.

Signed : Luther

[Signed] Luther 18 December

83-26 France

8. File note concerning von Ribbentrop's decisions on the American note
on treatment of Jews, 19 December 1940, and Rademacher's note of 21
December 1940 on action taken thereon

19 December 1940

The Reich Foreign Minister has made the following decision
with regard to the enclosed American note — No. 1675: 2

1. No reply is to be made to the note. If a reminder is re-
ceived from the American Embassy, an answer is to be made
referring them to the previous note which dealt basically with
the Jewish question and stating in addition that the measures
have been adopted in occupied French territory for reasons of
military security.

1 The telegram referred to was not a part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

2 This note was not a part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

162

2. The Reich Foreign Minister does not consider it correct
that, as stated in telegram No. 280, dated 9 October, from Paris,
the field headquarters have received instructions to exclude Amer-
ican Jews from the application of the ordinance. It would be
a mistake to reject the protests of friendly nations, such as
Spain and Hungary, and to show weakness, on the other hand,
toward America. He therefore considers it necessary to cancel
these instructions to the field headquarters.

[Handwritten] J. J. 4234

To be submitted to Germany Division (Rademacher), with ref-
erence to the telephonic discussion.

Berlin, 19 December 1940

[Illegible signature]

Ref. Ill (Legation Counsellor Rademacher)

Note . — On the instructions of Minister Luther, I have today again tele-
phoned the Embassy in Paris for a reply. I spoke to a lady in the Embassy,
as Ambassador Abetz and Legation Counsellor Achenbach were in confer-
ence. She promised to pass on my wishes to Legation Counsellor Achenbach
immediately after the conference.

Berlin, 21 December 1940

[Signed] Rademacher

J.J. 4285

9. Secret teletype from Luther to the German Embassy in Paris, 23 Decem-
ber 1940, transmitting order of foreign office to cancel exceptions for
American Jews

Berlin, 23 December 1940 (Loe)

1. To the German Embassy, Paris

to D III 176 Secret
(Secret Teletype)

Reference: Teletype message No. 255 dated 21 December 1940
and further to the decree — Teletype message dated
18 December 1940.

D III 6190— Teletype No. 130.

Ref. Minister Luther
Legation Counsellor
Rademacher

Before dispatch: Submitted to Under State Secretary Gaus with
the request for countersignature.

The Foreign Office does not consider it desirable to reject pro-
tests from friendly nations, such as Spain and Hungary, and
on the other hand to show weakness toward America. It re-

163

quests that the order to the field headquarters according to
which Jews of American nationality are to be excluded from
the order, be canceled.

I request that the Military Commander in France be asked
to adopt corresponding measures. Please inform me by wire
when this has been done.

By order:

[Signed] LUTHER

23 December
[Handwritten] J. J. 4232

2. To be resubmitted after 1 month.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4934
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1629

( Also STUCKART DOCUMENTS 631 AND 632,

STUCKART DEFENSE EXHIBITS 367 AND 368) 1

CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE FILES OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 29
AND 31 OCTOBER 1940, CONCERNING THE DEPORTATION OF
JEWS FROM BADEN AND THE PALATINATE TO UNOCCUPIED
FRANCE

I. Memorandum from Heydrich's office to the
Foreign Office, 29 October 1940

[Handwritten] Enclosure 2
Berlin SW 11, 29 October 1940
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Telephone No. 12 00 40
The Chief of the Security Police and of the SD
IV D 4 2602 /40

When replying please quote above file number
[Handwritten] Z D III 4761

To the Foreign Office attention SA Standartenfuehrer Minister

Luther

Berlin

The Fuehrer ordered the deportation of the Baden Jews via
Alsace, and of the Palatinate [Pfalz] 2 Jews via Lorraine. The
operation having been carried out to conclusion, I can now re-
port to you that railway transports left from Baden on 22 and

1 Most of the first memorandum reproduced here was also introduced as Stuckart Defense
Exhibit 867 and the text of the first two sentences of the second memorandum reproduced
here was also introduced as Stuckart Defense Exhibit 868.

a Reference is to that part of the Palatinate which at that time was a part of Bavaria. It
is located immediately east of the Saar.

164

23 October 1940, and 2 railway transports left the Palatinate on
22 October 1940, with 6,50b Jews, by prearranged agreement
with the local officers of the Wehrmacht, without previous noti-
fication of the French authorities. They were transferred into
unoccupied France via Chalon-sur-Saone.

The deportation of the Jews took place in all localities of
Baden and the Palatinate without friction and without incidents.

The operation itself was scarcely realized by the population.

The registration of the Jewish property values, as well as
their trustee administration and utilization will follow through
the competent Regierungspraesidenten [heads of regional admin-
istration] .

Jews living in a mixed marriage were exempted from the
transports.

[Illegible signature]

2. Memorandum from Luther of Department Germany,

31 October 1940

[Handwritten]

Filed on 25 Nov

To be resubmitted on 11 Feb [Stamp] SECRET
[Handwritten] to D III 157 secret
Memorandum

Subject: Evacuation of Jews from the Districts Saar-Palatinate
and Baden.

On 22 and 23 October 1940, upon order by the Fuehrer, all
Jews from the districts of the Saar-Palatinate and Baden have
been deported to unoccupied France in nine special trains. The
State Police Regional offices in Karlsruhe, Neustadt a.d.H. and
Saarbruecken had the order from the Reich Leader SS to pre-
pare and carry out this action in secret. In the morning of
22 October at 0600 hours the Jews were awakened; they had
the possibility of getting food supplies and of taking with them
50 kg. of luggage. In 9 special trains, of which 7 came from
the district of Baden and 2 from the Saar-Palatinate, the Jews
were deported via Alsace, resp. Lorraine. A total of 6,504 Jews
were comprised in this action. The action went off smoothly and
almost unnoticed by the public.

[Handwritten] I/V.A.A. Wako in the Embassy in Paris have instruction to
treat the matter in a dilatory manner.

[Initial] R

6 December

[Handwritten] [Initial] R

165

As SS Hauptsturmbannfuehrer Guenter of the Reich Security
Main Office told me, it was contemplated to inform the French
Government. But this was refrained from for unknown reasons.
All the trains went via Chalon s/Saone. The Armistice Com-
mission has requested instruction as to how to behave toward
the French who have demanded a clarification.

Herewith submitted to Minister Luther

[Signed] LUTHER
Berlin, 31 October 1940
Referat D III
[Handwritten] Klingenhoefer

[Handwritten]

To Bureau RAM, with request to ask for instruction by the
Reich Foreign Minister regarding the last paragraph

Immediately

[Signed] Luther 31 October

[Initials] Li 2 November

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1950-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1532

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT LAMMERS TO VON SCHIRACH, 3 DE-
CEMBER 1940, TRANSMITTING HITLER'S DECISION TO DEPORT THE
REMAINING 60,000 JEWS FROM VIENNA

Berlin, W 8 3 December 40
Voss Str. 6

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory
RK. 789 B secret

SECRET

[Stamp]

Received: 13 December 1940
la Pol VIII— 153/40g Big A
To the Reich Governor in Vienna
Gauleiter von Schirach, Vienna
Dear Mr. von Schirach:

As Reichsleiter Bormann informs me, the Fuehrer has decided
after receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60,000
Jews, still residing in the Reichsgau Vienna, will be deported
most rapidly, that is, still during the war, to the Government
General because of the housing shortage prevalent in Vienna.
I have informed the Governor General in Krakow as well as the

166

Reich Leader SS about this decision of Fuehrer, and I request
you also to take cognizance of it.

Heil Hitler!

Your obedient
[Signed] Dr. Lammers
[Handwritten] la Pol.

Copy given to pp and Hago and bn
[Illegible initial] 9 December

Copies :

1. to Dr. Dellbruegge

2. Reg. Praes. Jung
9 Dec 40/HK

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT N0-II23
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3902

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT LAMMERS TO BORMANN, 7 JUNE 1941,
STATING HITLER HAD REJECTED A PROPOSED DECREE ON STATE-
LESS JEWS AND ADDING AS "CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION"
HITLER’S REASON THAT "AFTER THE WAR THERE WOULD NOT
BE ANY JEWS LEFT IN GERMANY ANYHOW"* * * *

* ***** *

3. To the Chief of the Party Chancellery

Herr Reich Leader Martin Bormann, at present at Ober-
salzberg

Subject: Draft of an 11th decree to the Reich Citizenship Law
concerning the status of stateless Jews.

Dear Mr. Bormann:

The Reich Minister of the Interior has transmitted to me with
his communication of 8 April 1941 the draft of an 11th decree
to the Reich Citizenship Law and of an implementing ordinance
to it, and has asked me to obtain a decision in principle by the
Fuehrer in regard to the measures against the Jews outlined in
the drafts. I am informed by the Reich Minister of the In-
terior that the office of which you are in charge has cooperated
decisively in the drawing up of the plans.

[Typed marginal remark] Bf. Abschr. v. Ziff. 1.

I have reported both drafts to the Fuehrer. Please note the

* Document NG-1123 contained a number of memoranda and various correspondence con-

cerning the drafting of the 11th decree to the Reich Citizenship Law. The Reich Citizenship

Law was one of the original “Nuernberg Laws” of 15 September 1935. Subsequent measures
against Jews were often issued as implementing decrees “to the Reich Citizenship Law.” The

“Eleventh Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law,” dated 25 November 1941, is reproduced below

(Document NG-2499, Pros. Ex. 1536). At least from March 1941, the drafting of this 11th
decree had been discussed among leading Reich agencies. Further documents concerning this
decree are reproduced in the materials on the Justice case. Volume III, this series.

167

decision of the Fuehrer from the enclosed copy of my letter to
the Reich Minister of the Interior. For your own confidential
information I take the liberty of adding the following: The
reason why the Fuehrer rejected the legislation proposed by the
Reich Minister of the Interior was chiefly, that he is of the
opinion that after the war there would not be any Jews left
in Germany anyhow [“Sowieso” crossed out and “ohnedies” hand-
written above it] and that therefore it is not necessary to issue
now a regulation which would be difficult to enforce, which
would tie up personnel, and which would not bring about a
solution in principle.

Heil Hitler!

Respectfully yours
(Name of the Reich Minister)

[Initial] L [Lammers]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-1688
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 528

DECREE SIGNED BY HITLER, KEITEL, AND DEFENDANT LAMMERS, 17
JULY 1941, MAKING "POLICE SECURITY" IN THE NEWLY OCCU-
PIED EASTERN TERRITORIES A MATTER FOR REICH LEADER SS
HIMMLER

Fuehrer Decree Regarding Police Security Within the Newly
Occupied Eastern Territories, on 17 July 1941

I

The police security of the newly occupied Eastern Territories
is a matter for the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German
Police.

II

After introducing the civilian administration in these terri-
tories, the Reich Leader SS is authorized to give directions to
the Reich Commissioners within the sphere of his task desig-
nated under I. As far as these directions are of a general char-
acter or of real political importance, they will have to go through
the office of the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern Terri-
tories. However, not if a direct threatening danger is to be
averted.

III

In order to carry out this police security, every Reich Com-
missioner will be assisted by one Higher SS and Police officer,
who is directly and personally subordinate to the Reich Com-
missioner.

168

To the General Commissioners, Chief and Area Commissioners
SS and Police officers will be assigned, who are directly and
personally subordinate to them.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 17 July 1941

The Fuehrer
Signed : Adolf Hitler

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

Signed : Keitel

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Signed : Dr. Lammers

(L.S.)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-E
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1448

[Also STUCKART DOCUMENT 635
STUCKART DEFENSE EXHIBIT 371)

LETTER FROM GOERING TO HEYDRICH, 31 JULY 1941, COMMISSION-
ING HEYDRICH WITH THE ADDITIONAL TASK OF PREPARATIONS
"FOR A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH QUESTION IN THOSE
TERRITORIES WHICH ARE UNDER GERMAN INFLUENCE"

Berlin, 31 July 1941

The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich
Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

Chairman of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich
To the Chief of the Security Police and the SD
SS Major General Heydrich
Berlin

As supplement to the task which was entrusted to you in the
decree dated 24 January 1939,* namely to solve the Jewish ques-
tion by emigration and evacuation in a way which is the most
favorable in connection with the conditions prevailing at the
time, I herewith commission you to carry out all preparations
with regard to organizational, factual, and financial viewpoints
for a total solution of the Jewish question [fuer eine Gesamt-
loesung der Judenfrage] in those territories in Europe under
German influence.

If the competency of other central organizations is touched
in this connection, these organizations are to participate.

I further commission you to submit to me as soon as possible
a draft showing the organizational, factual, and financial meas-
ures already taken [organisatorischen, sachlichen, und materiel-

* Goering’s decree of 24 January 1939 is reproduced earlier in this section as Document
NG-2586-A, Prosecution Exhibit 1443.

169

len Vorausnahmen] for the execution of the intended final solu-
tion of the Jewish question [angestrebten Endloesung der Juden-
frage] .

Signed : Goering

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 492-A
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 448*

NOTE OF 16 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING VON RIBBENTROP’S DECI-
SION THAT "ALL COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE REICH LEADER
SS AND ALL AGENCIES OF SAME" BE FORWARDED FIRST TO
DEPARTMENT GERMANY II

e. o. D II 4515

Note

According to the Service Regulations of the Foreign Office,
the department D II of the Division Germany will have to deal
with all matters which relate to the Reich Leader SS and to all
offices of same.

Following a corresponding suggestion of Under State Secretary
Luther, the Foreign Minister has decided that all communica-
tions from the Reich Leader SS and from all agencies of same,
including all letters addressed to the person of Reich Foreign
Minister, must first be forwarded to the department D II Rau-
cherstrasse 27. Only matters of an urgent or personal nature
will be excepted. Should the respective matter come within the
field of another department of the Foreign Office, D II will see
to it that the respective letter reaches this department.

The agencies of the Reich Leader SS primarily include the
following :

The Chief of the Security Police and SD

The Chief of the Regular Police

The Secret State Police

The Personal Staff of the Reich Leader SS

The SS Main Office

The SS Main Office for Care and Welfare
The SS Main Office for Budget and Buildings of the Reich
Leader SS

The Administrative and Economic Main Office of the Reich
Leader SS
The SS Barrack

The Supply Office of the Waffen SS
The Waffen SS Headquarters

* This exhibit, as introduced in evidence by the defense, had two parts. The second part,
a draft of a letter by Luther bearing the date 8 December 1942, and pertaining to the same
general subject, is reproduced later in this section.

170

The SS Personnel Main Office.

The Reich Leader SS, Reich Commissioner for the Strength-
ening of German Folkdom.

The department D II requests that, in accordance with the
directives of the Reich Foreign Minister, all letters received in
the Foreign Office from the agencies of the Reich Leader SS will
first be forwarded to the department D II.

1. To be forwarded to the Main Office via Herr MED.
Berlin, 16 August 1941

[Signed] Picot

2. To be submitted also to the Office of the Reich Foreign
Minister.

[Illegible notes and initials]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 488
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 445

THREE MEMORANDUMS EXCHANGED BY DEFENDANT VON WEIZ-
SAECKER AND LUTHER, 15 SEPTEMBER TO 22 SEPTEMBER 1941,
CONCERNING FOREIGN OFFICE PARTICIPATION IN THE REGU-
LATION CONCERNING THE WEARING OF DISTINCTIVE INSIGNIA
BY JEWS

I. Memorandum of defendant von Weizsaecker to Luther,

15 September 1941

Berlin, 15 September 1941

I have been asked whether the police regulation concerning
the wearing of distinctive insignia by Jews (Reich Law Gazette
No. 100, p. 547)* was issued in conjunction with the Foreign
Office. I have replied that I do not know anything of the For-
eign Office having been consulted.

Herewith to —

Germany Division with request to ascertain whether the office

* Reference is made to the “Police regulation concerning markings for Jews," 1941 Reichs-
gesetzblatt, Part I, page 747, dated 1 September 1941, and signed by Heydrich on behalf of
the Reich Minister of the Interior. The first three of the six sections of this regulation pro-
vided: “1. (1) Jews (in the meaning of paragraph 5 of the First Decree to the Reich Citizen-
ship Law of 14 November 1935, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 1333) who have completed their sixth
year of age are forbidden to appear in public without a Jewish Star. (2) The Jewish Star
consists of a black-bordered six-cornered star of yellow fabric, the size of the palm of a hand,
with the black inscription ‘Jew.’ It shall be worn visibly, and firmly sewn, on the left breast
side of the apparel. 2. Jews are forbidden (a) to leave the area of the community where they
reside, without carrying with them a written permission from the local police authority;
(6) to wear decorations and other insignia. 3. Sections 1 and 2 do not apply (a) to a Jew
living in a mixed marriage provided there exist offspring from such marriage and that such
offspring are not deemed to be Jews, even if the marriage does not exist anymore or if the
only son has died in the present war; (b) to the Jewish wife in a childless mixed marriage
for the duration of such marriage.”

171

was actually concerned with this matter without previous report
having been made to me.

Signed : Weizsaecker

Copy to:

Under Secretary — Political Division
Legal Division [Initial] W [Woermann]

2. Memorandum from Luther to defendant von Weizsaecker, 19 September
1941, with handwritten notes by Weizsaecker requesting further informa-
tion

to D III 367 g

Under State Secretary Luther

Memorandum

[Handwritten] D III Party Member Rademacher

The question of introducing distinctive insignia for the Jews
in Germany was submitted to the Fuehrer by the Reich Minister
Goebbels on or about 20 August 1941. The Fuehrer has decided
that the Jews in Germany are to be marked.

SS Major General Heydrich has informed this office verbally.
The Reich Foreign Minister was informed. A conference of the
representatives of the various Ministries, concerning these mat-
ters took place on 29 August 1941 in the Reich Ministry of the
Interior..

[Handwritten] D. Through whom? Before? [Initial] W [Weizsaecker]
20 September.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary, Baron von Weiz-
saecker.

Berlin, 19 September 1941

[Signed] Luther

3. Memorandum from Luther to defendant von Weizsaecker, 22 September
1941, with handwritten note by von Weizsaecker requesting adherence
to official channels in future, and other measures

ad D III 367 secret

Under Secretary Luther

SECRET

Memorandum

Through the memorandum of 22 August 1941, copy of which
please find herewith, I informed the Reich Foreign Minister re-
garding the marking of the Jews in Germany. I submitted the
memorandum immediately because speedy action was required
in view of the fact that Dr. Goebbels has already mentioned the
subject to the Fuehrer, so as to keep the Reich Foreign Minister

172

up to date, should the Fuehrer wish to discuss the matter with
him.

The Reich Foreign Minister has made his decision as per copy-
attached herewith as enclosure 2. In the meantime, the Reich
Ministry of the Interior has summoned a conference at short
notice and issued the police regulation. As the decree was is-
sued speedily, I again immediately informed the Reich Foreign
Minister — having regard to his decision — through memorandum
of 11 September 1941 — copy of which is attached herewith. 1

Herewith resubmitted to State Secretary von Weizsaecker.
Berlin, 22 September 1941

[Signed] Luther

[Handwritten note], D III. For information — Under Secretary Luther, 24
September.

In future please adhere to the official channels. In urgent cases simulta-
neous information is requested.

Please pass the relevant material on to Political, Legal and Press Divisions
as well.

[Initial] W [Weizsaecker] 24 September

[Illegible handwriting]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT KOERNER 147
KOERNER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 57

BASIC ORDER OF HITLER, 25 SEPTEMBER 1941, CONCERNING THE
HANDLING AND SAFEGUARDING OF SECRETS 2

25 September 1941

Basic Order

1. No one, no office, or no officer may learn of any matter
that is to be kept secret, unless they must absolutely have knowl-
edge of same for official reasons.

2. No office and no officer may learn more of any matter that
is to be held secret than is absolutely necessary for the carrying
out of their duties.

3. No office and no officer may learn earlier of a matter to be
kept secret or of that part necessary for them unless this is
absolutely necessary for the carrying out of their duties.

4. Thoughtless passing on of orders, the keeping secret of
which is of decisive importance, according to any kind of general
distribution key, is forbidden.

Signed: Adolf Hitler

1 The enclosures mentioned in this memorandum were not pax*t of the document introduced
in evidence.

2 Introduced as Gestapo Exhibit 25 in the trial before the IMT, and as Document Schneider
182, Schneider Defense Exhibit 68, in the I.G. Farben case. Volumes VII and VIII, this series.

958402—62 12

17*

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5095
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3599

TELETYPE FROM THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN PARIS AND DRAFT REPLY
ORIGINATING WITH DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER, OCTOBER
1941, CONCERNING THE ARREST IN FRANCE OF JEWS WHO ARE
NOT NATIONALS OF FRANCE

I. Teletype from Schleier in Paris, 30 October 1941 *

TELEGRAM
(Teletype, secret)

Paris, 30 October 1941, 1080 hours
Received 30 October 1941, 1100 hours

Urgent

No. 3382 of 30 October

Military Commander France has arrested a considerable num-
ber of Jews including foreign nationals, in the course of the
big round-up on 20 August 1941 of French and foreign Jews
involved in Communist and de Gaullist activities and in attempts
against members of the Wehrmacht in the occupied zone of
France. Foreign consuls in Paris have requested assistance of
Embassy for the release of Jewish nationals of their respective
countries. [The last sentence is underlined by hand.]
[Handwritten] Submit to me 31 October. [Initial] W [Weizsaecker]

Military Commander and Security Service take the view that
the fact that arrested Jews are foreign nationals, can in no way
influence the measures taken. Release of individual Jews would
create precedents.

Also, the French law of 4 October 1940 creates a basis to put
French and foreign Jews into the concentration camps. The
French Government has already put more than 20,000 Jews into
concentration camps in the unoccupied part of France due to
this law. Jews of foreign countries had the opportunity of leav-
ing the occupied zone as late as end of last year, if they wanted
to escape anti-Jewish measures. All interventions by representa-
tives of foreign countries have been unsuccessful.

Request basic directive as to what attitude should be taken
by the Embassy.

[Handwritten] Competence? [Initial] F [Freytag]

Schleier

* Another copy of this teletype, with other communications, was found among other cap-
tured Foreign Office files introduced in evidence as Document NG-3264, Prosecution Exhibit
1695.

174

In ten copies distributed to:

1. Pol I g

2. Reich Foreign Minister

3. State Secretary [defendant Weizsaecker]

4. Office of Foreign Minister

Ambassador Ritter

Chief Political Division [defendant Woermann]

Chief Commercial Policy Division
Chief Press Division
Deputy Chief Political Division
No. 5, 8

2. Draft Teletype from defendant von Weizsaecker to von Ribbentrop, with
handwritten changes, stating that the arrests of foreign Jews generally
gives rise to no objection, but that the arrest of Jews of American
nationality creates a special problem

to Pol IX 7751/41 g

Carbon Copy
Berlin, October 1941

Referent: Senior Counsellor of Legation Freytag

[Initialed] E [Erdmannsdorf] 3 November

Dg.Pol

U.St.S.Pol [Woermann]

St.S [Weizsaecker]

[Handwritten] To the files State Secretary
[Illegible initial] 5 November.

[Handwritten on margin] Urgent! To Under State Secretary Pol. Div. on
account of the alternations made in the draft by the State Secretary
[Illegible] S [Siegfried] 3 November

Teletype

(Teletype, Secret) [G-Schreiben]

Through Office Reich Foreign Minister to Special Train
For the Reich Foreign Minister

Concerning telegram from Paris No. 3382 of 30 October, the
following is stated:

[Handwritten note] H. [Illegible] Please alter our copy. F [Freytag]
4 November

1. With respect to the arrest [Note . — Changed to “arrests” in
handwriting] of Jews of foreign nationality, the measures of the
Military Commander France give rise to no objections.

2. The arrest of Jews of American nationality on the other
hand create a more difficult [Note . — “More difficult” changed to
“difficult” in handwriting] situation. It must be anticipated with

175

certainty that the North American Government as well as all
Ibero-American States concerned, will take action on these ar-
rests and will make them the subject of diplomatic interven-
tions. The Ambassador of Chile has already Undertaken [Note.
— the capitalization of the first letter of the verb is corrected in
handwriting] steps following the arrest of two Jewish Chileans
and suggested that they be released from arrest and expelled.
The Mexican Charge d’Affaires, a few days ago, lodged a pro-
test on account of the arrest of a Mexican Jew. Embassy Paris
[Note. — “has” inserted in handwriting] in telegram No. 3882 re-
ported also that “foreign consuls in Paris” [Note. — “have” in-
serted in handwriting] requested assistance of the Embassy for
the release of Jewish nationals of their respective countries.
Embassy has been instructed to send a supplementary report
giving the names of those countries.

3. In the meantime, following the steps taken by the Chilean
Ambassador, Germany Division (D III) has got in touch with
the Reich Security Main Office in order to procure the release
of the Chilean Jews arrested in the occupied zone of France.
The Reich Security Main Office has promised examination of the
matter in concurrence with the Paris Bureaus of the Security
Service [Sicherheitsdienst] .

[The following sentence was stricken out by hand.]

4. The following has to be borne in mind for the evaluation
of this matter.

[Handwritten] F. We would get the worst of it. It * * *.

[Numeral handwritten.]

4. In case we decline the release of Jewish nationals of Amer-
ican countries, we must anticipate reprisals by the governments
concerned against Reich nationals. [Note . — The balance of this
paragraph was stricken by hand. Originally the stricken part
read: “In this respect we are at a considerable disadvantage
(sitzen wir am kuerzeren Hebei) since the number of Reich
Germans in America is many times in excess of the number
of nationals of American countries in territory under our con-
trol. In addition we must expect strong propagandist reaction
in the Jewish press, which would even further impair our al-
ready strained relations with several Ibero-American States. Any
anticipated favorable results in domestic politics would therefore
be strongly outweighed by the disadvantages likely to result in
our foreign relations.”]

It is therefore planned to instruct our Paris Embassy to make
a request, stating all relevant political reasons, to the Military
Commander France and the Chief of the Security Service (Sicher-
heitsdienst), to release the arrested Jews who possess an Amer-

176

ican nationality, as far as their arrest is not justified by any
criminal act. In addition it might be worth considering whether
all Jewish nationals of American countries should not be ex-
pelled from the occupied territories with a view to removing the
causes of friction created hereby [Note. — “hereby” changed to
“by their residence” in handwriting].

Weizsaecker

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2651
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1731

LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY POLICE AND SD TO
VON RIBBENTROP, 30 OCTOBER 1941, TRANSMITTING THE FIRST
FIVE REPORTS OF THE EINSATZGRUPPEN 1

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD
IV A 1— B. Nr. 24 B/41 gRs.

Please indicate this file number and date in your reply.

Berlin, SW 11, 30 October 1941
Prinz Albrecht Strasse 8
Telephone: Local 12 00 40
Long Distance 12 64 21

[Stamp]

Top Secret

To the Reich Foreign Minister
Subject: Activity and Situation Reports
Enclosures: 5 Reports

By order of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD I am
sending you herewith the Activity and Situation Reports com-
pleted so far, Nr. 1-5, of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security
Police and the SD in the U.S.S.R. for your information. 2
As deputy:

Signed : Mueller

[Enclosure]

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD
Berlin, 31 July 1941

1 A memorandum of 8 January 1942, transmitting to defendant von Weizsaecker these five
Einsatzgruppen reports along with other related materials, was also a part of this document
found in Foreign Office files. This memorandum is reproduced later in this section according
to its chronological order.

2 More extensive extracts from Einsatzgruppen reports are reproduced in the materials on
the Einsatzgruppen case. Volume IV, this series. In the Ministries case, 10 of 11 different
Einsatzgruppen reports were introduced in evidence with various exhibit numbers (Pros.
Exhs. 1731-1736 and 1738-1741, Documents NO-2651-2656 and 2658-2662). These reports are
dated between 31 July 1941 and 31 March 1942. In addition to the extracts reproduced in this
document, extracts from Einsatzgruppen Report 6 are reproduced below as a part of Docu-
ment NO-2656, Prosecution Exhibit 1736. Extracts from the testimony of defendants Lam-
mers, Schwerin von Krosigk, and von Weizsaecker concerning the Einsatzgruppen are repro-
duced later in this section.

177

Top Secret

Activity and Situation Report of the Einsatzgruppen of the Se-
curity Police and the SD in the U.S.S.R. and the behavior of
the Communists in the Reich and in the occupied territories

Page

INDEX

A. General notes about the deployment [Einsatz] of the Security 1-4

Police and the S.D.

Assignment of the Einsatzgruppen 1-2

Cooperation with the Wehrmacht 3

State of Health 3-4

B. Police Tasks carried out 5-18

Baltic Countries 5-7

White Ruthenia 7-12

Ukraine 12-15

Einsatzgruppe D 15-18

а. Attitude of the Hungarians in the occupied territories 15-17

б. Attitude of the Rumanians in the occupied territories 17-18

C. Economic Situation 19-24

Baltic Countries 19-20

White-Ruthenia 20-21

Ukraine 22-24

D. Attitude of the Ethnic Groups 25-38

Latvia 25-26

Lithuania 27-29

White-Ruthenia 29-32

Jewry in White-Ruthenia 32-34

Ukraine 34-38

E. Effects upon the Reich and the occupied territories 39-41

*******

A. General notes about the deployment of the Security Police
and SD . Assignments of the Einsatzgruppen

The four Einsatzgruppen (A, B, C, and D), formed pursuant
to an agreement between the Chief of the Security Police and
the SD and the High Command of the Army* have, upon the
outbreak of the war, moved into the U.S.S.R. attached to units
of the German Army. The Einsatzkommandos under their com-
mand are at present on the march to their assigned areas with
the advancing army units.

Cooperation with the Wehrmacht

The connection with the different army groups is being kept
up by the Higher SS and Police Leader who is attached to the

* Evidence concerning this agreement between the Chief of the Security Police and SD and
the High Command of the Army is reproduced in the materials on the High Command case
(Vols. X and XI of this series). Reference is to the so-called Wagner-Heydrich Agreement,
NOKW-2080.

178

Commander of the Army Group Rear Area and who received
current reports on the measures of the Security Police within
the operating theatre of the respective army group. According
to the reports from the Einsatzgruppen, the cooperation with
the Wehrmacht is excellent. The Einsatzgruppen take great
pains that this state of affairs is being kept up through personal
contact and by going about their work the correct way.

The connections with the GFP [Secret Field Police] and the
Counterintelligence III units are loyally and fully handed over
to the Einsatzgruppen, while on the other hand, everything of
military importance is handed over to the Wehrmacht.

* * * * * * *

White Ruthenia

In White Ruthenia the towns of Bialystok, Grodno, Lida, Minsk,
Nowogrodek, Slonim, Sluzk, and Vilna were occupied by Einsatz-
gruppe B and screened for Security Police purposes.

Same as in the Baltics, the entire local political leader-corps
had fled before the advancing Wehrmacht and the Vorkommandos
[advance units] of Einsatzgruppe B. Although the political ma-
terial had either been destroyed or evacuated to the rear areas,
it was possible to secure numerous documents in the Minsk Soviet
Building, the only public building left intact. But here also, the
NKWD material and the documents of the Communist Party
had been burned.

Up to the present, the executive police actions in the White
Ruthenian region were being carried out on the principle of
striking effectively against the Jewish leadership circles without,
however, disturbing more than absolutely necessary the economic
situation in the interest of warfare. It was also taken into ac-
count that the spiritual dissociation of the White Ruthenian popu-
lation from the Bolshevist system should not be impeded by police
measures.

In retaliation for arson, plundering, and murder, a total of
8,000 persons were liquidated in the area of Einsatzgruppe B,
a great number of whom belonged to the Jewish intelligentsia.
White Ruthenians were only liquidated when unmistakably veri-
fied as Bolshevist officials or agents. Among the liquidated per-
sons are Russians, Poles, and Asiatics (Kirghiz, Tatars, Ti-
betans, etc.,) who had evidently been resettled into White Ruth-
enia by the Bolshevist leaders for the purpose of undermining
work and for carrying out executions. A Jewish Council was
established in order to register the Jewry, and the formation of
ghettos was initiated.

179

Near Minsk, the same as in Kowno, two of the old fortifica-
tions were transformed into Jewish concentration camps in order
to facilitate the screening of the Jews.

As a distinguishing mark, yellow armlets were introduced for
the Jews, and they were ordered to hand over their radio sets
under threat of death.

Under the circumstances described, the seizure of the higher
Bolshevist officials can follow only after a certain period of time
and on the basis of a thorough intelligence network still to be
established. It can be assumed that these officials are keeping in
hiding in localities in other areas. From the start special atten-
tion therefore has been directed toward the setting up of an
intelligence network.

So-called information stations were established to induce the
non-Bolshevist population to take part in these search actions,
and the people were publicly invited to disclose the hiding places
of their former oppressors.

* * * * * * *

Ukraine

Similar circumstances prevailed in the Ukraine. Here also the
main activity of Einsatzgruppe C was directed toward the
liquidation of all Jews and Bolshevists responsible for the mur-
derous terror in these parts.

* * * * * * *

Rumania

A similar situation is reported from the Bessarabian front.
The lack of discipline in Rumanian units and the absence of a
proper authority resulted in large-scale looting by the civilian
population who had stayed behind, particularly the Rumanians,
and everything that was not nailed down was stolen from the
deserted dwellings.

The Rumanian police are working under the orders of the
local German Einsatzkommando. * * *

There is no system in the way in which the Rumanians are
dealing with the Jews. No objections could be raised against
the numerous executions of Jews if the technical preparations
and the execution itself were not totally inadequate. The Ru-
manians usually leave the executed persons where they have been
shot without burying them. The Einsatzkommando has issued
instructions to the Rumanian police to proceed somewhat more
systematically in this direction. For disobedience to orders from
the Security Police and as reprisal for attacks on German mili-
tary personnel, the Jewish Council of Elders in Beltsy and other
Jews, altogether 45, were liquidated.

* * * * * * *

180

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4905
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2452

CIRCULAR LETTER FROM THE OFFICE OF DEFENDANT SCHWERIN

VON KROSIGK TO SENIOR FINANCE PRESIDENTS, 4 NOVEMBER

1941, CONCERNING CONFISCATION OF THE PROPERTY OF JEWS

DEPORTED FROM GERMANY AND STATING THAT DEPORTATION

WILL BE "TO A CITY IN THE EASTERN TERRITORIES"

(Reproduction)

The Reich Minister of Finance

Berlin W 8, 4 November 1941
Wilhelmplatz 1/2

0 5205—740 VI g

[Stamp] Secret [crossed out]

Express letter

Subject: Deportation of Jews.

1. In general — Jews who are not occupied in works important
to the political economy will be deported [abgeschoben] within
the next months to a city in the eastern territories. The property
of the Jews to be deported will be confiscated [eingezogen] in
favor of the German Reich. One hundred RM and 50 kg. of
luggage are left to each Jew.

The deportation has already begun in the territories of the
Senior Finance Presidents — Berlin, Hamburg, Weser-Ems in
Bremen, Kassel, Koeln, [and] Duesseldorf.

Soon there will be deportation in the Chief Finance District,
[several lines left blank in the original.]

It can be assumed that four persons form a household.

2. Execution of the deportation — The deportation of the Jews
is executed by the Secret State Police (Gestapo). The Gestapo
also sees to the first safeguarding of the property.

The Jews whose deportation is imminent have to hand in lists
of property according to prescribed form. The Gestapo offices
seal the apartments and deposit the keys of the apartments with
the apartment managers.

3. Confiscation of the property —

Legal basis for the confiscation are the following ordinances:

Law on confiscation of property hostile to people and state of
14 July 1933 — (Reich Law Gazette I p. 479) in connection with
the law on the confiscation of Communist property of 26 May
1933 (Reich Law Gazette I p. 293).

181

Decree on the confiscation of property hostile to people and
State in the Land Austria of 18 November 1938 (Reich Law
Gazette I, p. 1620).

Decree on the confiscation of property hostile to people and
State in the Sudeten-German territories of 12 May 1939 (Reich
Law Gazette I, p. 911).

Decree on confiscation of property in the Protectorate of Bo-
hemia and Moravia of 4 October 1939 (Reich Law Gazette I,
p. 1938).

Decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor on the utilization
of confiscated property of enemies of the Reich of 29 May 1941
(Reich Law Gazette I, p. 303).

The direction for the Ostmark [Austria] , the Sudetengau, and
the Protectorate [Bohemia, Moravia] are contained in the enu-
meration because also property will be seized which is in this
part of the Reich territory.

For claims against Jews whose property is confiscated in favor
of the Reich, in the old Reich [Altreich] the Reich is liable with
the goods and rights acquired through the confiscation (para-
graph 39 of the law on the granting of compensations with the
confiscation or the transfer of property of 9 December 1937, Reich
Law Gazette I, p. 1333) . The instructions for confiscation will be
issued by the Regierungspmesidenten ; in Berlin by the Secret
State Police office, in Hamburg and Bremen by the Reich Gov-
ernors. They will be forwarded to the Jews by bailiff before
their deportation.

4. Tasks of the Reich Finance Administration — a. In general.
The administration and utilization of the confiscated property of
the Jews is my task. I transfer this task to the Senior Finance
Presidents to fulfill it. The Senior Finance Presidents can, in
this, make use of a finance office in places outside the seat of the
Chief Finance Presidency. For the transfer of the property, I
designated to the Gestapo the Senior Finance Presidents: for
Osnabrueck, the Finance Office Osnabrueck; for Dortmund, the
Finance Office Dortmund-South.

The next deportation of Jews will begin on 7 or 8 November
1941. I ask to inquire at once about the exact date for the various
cities at the locally competent Superior State Police Offices.

* * * * * * *

b. Organization of the Office [Dienststelle] . — The office en-
trusted with the execution of the measures is to be established
at once. For each case of confiscation, a separate file is to be
made, which first of all is to contain the list of the assets, and
the confiscation order. An index card for each deported Jew fa-
cilitates the work.

182

*******

c. Treatment of movable property. — I request to examine, be-
fore furniture is utilized otherwise, what objects can be used for
the Reich Finance Administration. Into consideration are to be
taken for outfitting the offices (Offices of the Chiefs and Refer-
enten office rooms) : writing desks, book-cases, armchairs, carpets,
pictures, typewriters, and so on; for the outfit of recreation
homes and schools of the Reich Finance Administration : bed-
rooms, beds, music instruments, and especially bed linen, table
linen, towels, etc.

The objects which are not used for purposes of the Reich Fi-
nance Administration are to be sold in an appropriate way. Auc-
tions within the apartments themselves are undesirable according
to former experiences.

* * * * * * *

d. Treatment of objects of art. — Objects of art (paintings,
plastics, etc.) which are not to be considered as inferior products,
are not to be sold. They are to be stored in a suitable way and
to be reported to the competent Landesleiter of the Reich Chamber
of the Fine Arts. The Landesleiter will state within 1 month if
there is an interest for these objects on the part of the museums.
With regard to these objects special directions will be issued.
The other objects of art can be sold.

*******

e. Treatment of objects made of precious metal, and stamp col-
lections. — Objects made of precious metal and stamp collections
are to be sent to the Central Office at the Municipal Pawn Office,
Berlin, Berlin W 8, Jaegerstrasse 64. This office will deliver the
proceeds to the delivering office.

/. Securities. — Securities are to be delivered to the Reich Main
Cash Office in Berlin.

g. Claims. — Bank credits and other claims are to be confis-
cated.

h. Treatment of immovable property. — Estates are first to be
taken into your administration. The realization of the estates
which are not used for the purposes of the Reich Finance Ad-
ministration (office rooms, housing welfare for civil servants)
will be regulated by special decree.

*******

6. Cases of doubt, and reports on experience gained . — I request
to report on cases of doubt at once to Ministerial Councillor Dr.
Maedel. As code word for the deportation of the Jews the desig-
nation “Action three” is to be used in trunk-calls.

183

It is to be expected that further deportations of Jews will
follow. I therefore request to report to me at any given time
after an action is completed as soon as possible on the experiences
made on this occasion and the difficulties which may have arisen
and to add any suggestions for changes in the procedure. I re-
serve to myself to order fixed dates for reports but I ask not
to wait for them.

By order:

[Signed] Schlueter

[To] Senior Finance Presidents [Oberfinanzpraesidenten]

Berlin in Berlin 8 copies.

Hamburg in Hamburg 4 copies.

Weser Ems in Bremen 8 copies.

Koeln in Koeln 16 copies.

Duesseldorf in Duesseldorf 4 copies.

Kassel in Kassel 8 copies.

Hannover in Hannover 8 copies.

Westphalia in Muenster 8 copies.

Lower Silesia in Breslau 4 copies.

Munich in Munich 4 copies.

Nuernberg in Nuernberg 4 copies.

Wuerttemberg in Stuttgart 4 copies.

Danzig-West Prussia in Danzig 4 copies.

Nordmark in Kiel ___4 copies.

184

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2656
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1736

LETTER FROM HEYDRICH TO VON RIBBENTROP, 25 NOVEMBER 1941,
TRANSMITTING EINSATZGRUPPEN REPORT 6, TOGETHER WITH
EXTRACTS FROM THIS REPORT

[Handwritten] Received 8 December
Berlin SW 11, 25 November 1941
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
Telephone: Local 12 00 40
Long distance: 12 64 21
Chief of Security Police and Security Service
IV A 1— B-No. 24 B/41 g.Rs.

When replying, kindly quote above reference number and date.

[Stamp]

Foreign Office

D II 211 g K (geheime Kommandosache)
Top Secret

Received: 9 December 1941
Enclosure received in double issue

[Stamp]

Top Secret

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs, V. Ribbentrop
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr. 74/76
Dear Sir,

I herewith enclose for your information the Activity and Situ-
ation Report No. 6 of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police
and Security Service (SD) in U.S.S.R.

Heil Hitler!

[Signed] Heydrich
SS Lieutenant General

#278

10

[Enclosure]

[Stamp] Top Secret

100 copies — 34th copy

185

41

[Handwritten] DII 211 gKs (geheime Kommandosache —

Top Secret)

Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the Einsatzgruppen of the
Security Police and the Security Service (SD) in U.S.S.R.

(Period of Report, 1-31 October 1941)
*******

I. Locations

The location of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and
the Security Service changed only in the northern section during
the period of this report.

Present location.

Einsatzgruppe A — since 7 October 1941 at Krasnogvardeisk
Einsatzgruppe B — remaining at Smolensk
Einsatzgruppe C — since 27 September 1941 at Kiev
Einsatzgruppe D — since 27 September 1941 at Nikolaev

The Einsatzkommandos and special Kommandos subordinate to
the Einsatzgruppen will remain with advancing army detach-
ments on their march to the territorial sectors assigned to them.

II. Executory Measures

A. Ostland ( Baltic States).

*******

c. Jews. In 19 UO about 4-, 500 Jews lived in Estonia, almost
exclusively in Reval, Dorpat, Narwa, and Pernau. There were
only very few Jews living in country districts. After the occu-
pation of the Ostland by the German forces there were still about
2,000 Jews in the country. Most of them had left the country
with the Soviet authorities and the Red Army, moving eastward.

Spontaneous anti- Jewish demonstrations with ensuing pogroms
by the population against the remaining Jews were not registered,
because adequate enlightenment was lacking.

However, the Estonian Citizens Guard, which was formed when
the Wehrmacht entered the country, began at once its extensive
activity with the arrest of all Jews. This action was directed by
the Einsatzgruppe of the Security Police and the Security Service.

As accomplished measures are to be listed:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16 years;

2. Arrest of all Jewesses, capable of work, aged 16-60, years,
living at Reval and neighborhood; they were employed as peat-
cutters.

186

3. Mass billeting in Dorpat Synagogue of all Jewesses living
at Dorpat and neighborhood.

4. Arrest of all able-bodied Jews and Jewesses in Pemau and
neighborhood.

5. Rounding-up of all Jews according to age, sex, and work-
ing-capacity for the purpose of housing them in a camp already
under preparation.

All male Jews above 16 years of age were killed, with the
exception of doctors and Jewish elders. This procedure is partly
still in progress. And the conclusion of the operation there will
be only 500 Jewesses and children left in the Ostland.

B. White Ruthenia.

* * * * * * *

c. Jeivs . As before it has to be noted that the population re-
frains from taking any steps of self-defense against the Jews.
The population, it is true, unanimously reports on being exposed
to Jewish acts of terror during the time of the Soviet regime or
complains of new transgressions by Jews, without, however being
prepared to start any pogroms.

All the more severely the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police
and Security Service proceed against the Jews who make inter-
vention in various spheres necessary.

At Gorodnya 165 Jewish terrorists and at Tschernigow 19
Jewish Communists were liquidated. Another 8 Jewish Com-
munists were shot at Beresna.

There has been frequent evidence of Jewish women displaying
a particularly disobedient attitude. For this reason, 28 Jewesses
had to be shot at Krugloje and 837 at Mogilew.

At Borisow 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were
shot.

At Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who, until the last, carried on
a hate campaign and spread atrocity tales against the German
occupying forces.

At Tatarsak the Jews on their own authority had left the
ghetto, returned to their old quarters, trying to drive out the
Russians who in the meantime had been housed there. All male
Jews as well as three Jewesses, were shot.

When a ghetto was set up at Sadrudubs, the Jews partly re-
sisted, so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to be shot. Among
them was a political commissioner.

Mogilew.— At Mogilew, too, the Jews tried to prevent their re-
moval to a ghetto — 113 Jews were liquidated.

Besides, four Jews were shot because they refused to work,
and two Jews were shot because they had ill-treated wounded

187

German soldiers and because they did not wear the prescribed
identification badge.

At Talka, 222 Jews were shot for carrying on anti-German
propaganda, and 996 Jews were shot at Marina Gorka because
they sabotaged the orders issued by the German occupation au-
thorities.

A further 627 Jews were shot near Schklow because they par-
ticipated in acts of sabotage.

Witobsk. — As threat of epidemics became most imminent, the
liquidation of the Jews housed in the ghetto of Witobsk was
started. This concerns about 3,000 Jews.

* * * * * * *

C . Ukraine .

*******

c. Jews . The animosity of the Ukrainian population against
the Jews is excessive, the latter being blamed for the explosions
at Kiev. One also sees in them the informers and agents of the
NKWD who brought terror on the Ukrainian people. As a meas-
ure of retribution for the arson at Kiev, all Jews were arrested
and on 29 and 30 September altogether 33,771 Jews shot . Money,
valuables, and clothes were secured and placed at the disposal of
the NSV [National Socialist Peoples' Welfare] for the equipment
of racial Germans and partly given to the provisional local ad-
ministration for distribution among the needy population.

Zhitomir. — At Zhitomir 3,11*5 Jews had to be shot as informa-
tion had been received that they had to be considered as agents
for Bolshevist propaganda and sabotage.

Kherson. — As expiatory measure for acts of sabotage A10 Jews
were killed at Kherson .

The solution of the Jewish problem [die Loesung der Juden-
frage] was taken up energetically by the Einsatzgruppen of the
Security Police and the Security Service especially in the district
east of the Dnepr. The districts recently occupied by the Kom-
mandos were cleared of all Jews. At this occasion, U,891 Jews
were liquidated. In other localities Jews were identified and
registered. In this way it became possible to put at the disposal
of the Wehrmacht agencies Jewish labor units up to 1,000 strong
for emergency work.

*******

188

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2499
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1536

EXTRACTS FROM THE NTH DECREE ON THE REICH CITIZENSHIP

LAW, 25 NOVEMBER 1941, AND ORDINANCE OF 3 DECEMBER 1941,

ISSUED BY DEFENDANT STUCKART IN AGREEMENT WITH DE-
FENDANT LAMMERS, EXTENDING THE APPLICATION OF PARTS OF

THE NTH DECREE TO TERRITORIES OCCUPIED OR ADMINISTERED

BY GERMANY

1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 722
Eleventh Decree of the Reich Citizenship Law, 25 November 1941

Under section 3 of the Reich Citizenship Law of 15 September
1935 (Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 1146), the following is decreed:

Section 1

A Jew who has his ordinary residence abroad cannot be a
member of the German State [Staatsangehoeriger] . Ordinary
residence abroad is presumed when a Jew lives abroad under cir-
cumstances which indicate that his stay is not merely a temporary

one.

Section 2

A Jew loses his status as a member of the German State —

a. On the day this decree goes into effect, if on that day he
has his ordinary residence abroad.

b. At the time he takes up residence in a foreign country, if
he takes up ordinary residence abroad later.

Section 3

(1) The assets of the Jew who loses his German nationality by
virtue of this decree are expropriated by the Reich when the loss
of nationality occurs. Furthermore, the Reich expropriates the
assets of those Jews who, at the day this decree comes into force,
are stateless but who have last possessed German nationality, if
and when they take or have taken their ordinary residence abroad.

(2) Assets thus expropriated shall serve to further all pur-
poses connected with the solution of the Jewish question.

Section 4

(1) Persons whose assets, according to section 3, are expropri-
ated by the Reich must not acquire anything from a German na-
tional by reason of death.

(2) Gifts from German nationals to persons whose assets, ac-
cording to section 3, are expropriated by the Reich, are forbidden.

958402—52 13

189

He who makes or promises such a gift in violation of this pro-
hibition will be punished by imprisonment up to 2 years and a
fine, or by one of these penalties.

*******

Section 8

(1) Whether the legal basis for expropriation of assets exists
shall be determined by the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrer SS).

(2) The Senior Finance President of Berlin shall have the
duty of administering and liquidating the expropriated assets.*

*******

Section 11

In order to avoid hardships caused by the expropriation of
property, the Reich Minister of Finance may settle questions
arising from the enforcement of sections 3-7 (and sec. 9). This
applies also to cases where the assets have been, or in the future
will be, declared forfeited on the basis of section 2 regarding the
repeal of naturalizations and the revocation of German citizenship
of 14 July 1933 (RGBI. I. p. 480).

Section 12

This decree applies also to the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia and the annexed Eastern Territories.

Section 13

Regulations necessary for the amendment and execution of this
decree will be issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior, in
agreement with the Chief of the Party Chancellery and other
Reich Ministers concerned.

Berlin, 25 November 1941

Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

Chief of the Party Chancellery

M. Bormann

The Reich Minister of Finance

As Deputy: Reinhardt

The Reich Minister of Justice
Acting: Dr. Schlegelberger

* This provision was changed by the directives from the office of defendant Schwerin von
Krosigk, dated 27 February 1942 (Doc. NG-4903, Pros. Ex. 2482, reproduced later in this
section).

190

Confidential Ordinance, 3 December 1941, concerning execution
of the 11th Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law

17512 B-6 December 1941 —

[Initial] F.

[Stamp] Reich Chancellery
The Reich Minister of
the Interior
1 e 5545/41-5013
Kindly mention the above file
no. and subject in your reply

[Stamp] Confidential
To:

a. Supreme Reich Authorities

b. Reich Governors of the Reich Gaue (State Governments)

c. Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia

d. Governor General

e. Reich Commissioner for Strengthening of Germanism
/. Oberpraesidenten

g. Regierungspraesidenten

h. Police President of Berlin

City President of the Reich Capital Berlin

k. Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans

l. Main Trustee Office East

[To] b, g , and i with additional copies for the Police Presidents,
Police Directorates, Landraete, and Lord Mayors.

Subject: Ordinance for the execution of the 11th decree to the
Reich Citizenship Law.

Pursuant to Article 13 of the 11th decree to the Reich Citizen-
ship Law of 26 November 1941, Reich Law Gazette I, page 722,
I order in agreement with the Chief of the Part Chancellery
the following:

(1) The loss of citizenship and the forfeiture of property
refers also to such Jews coming under this decree who have
their permanent place of residence, or who will reside later on,
in territories occupied by German troops or such territories which
are under German administration, especially also in the Govern-
ment General or in the Reich Commissariats Ostland and Ukraine.

[Illegible initials]

Berlin, 3 December 1941
NW 7 Unter den Linden 72
Phone: Local 120034
Long distance: 120037
Teletype: Local 317
Long distance: K 1617
Telegraph address :

Reich Ministry
of the Interior

191

(2) The publication of this ordinance shall be avoided. Sofar
as authorities subordinated to the Supreme Authorities have to
be informed of this ordinance, I request to effectuate it in a
confidential manner.

As deputy

[Initial] L [Lammers]

[Signed] W. Stuckart

[Handwritten] For the information of the Reich Minister.

[Initial] F, 6 December

[Stamp] K

[Handwritten] JPD JPD 1830

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 709-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2506

TWO LETTERS FROM HEYDRICH TO HOFMANN, CHIEF OF RACE
AND RESETTLEMENT MAIN OFFICE, 29 NOVEMBER 1941 AND 8
JANUARY 1942, CONCERNING A FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE
AT WANNSEE TO DISCUSS THE "FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE JEWISH
QUESTION IN EUROPE AND NOTING THAT OFFICIALS INVITED
INCLUDE DEFENDANT STUCKART, LUTHER OF FOREIGN OFFICE,

AND KRITZINGER OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY

I. Letter of 29 November 1941

Berlin SW 11 29 Nov 1941
Prinz Albrecht Str. 8 (

Telephone: Local 120040 I

Long Distance 126421

Personal

Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD)

IVB 4-3076/41 Secret (1180)

Request to mention in answer above

marking and date "

[Handwritten] To the Files [Initial] H 24 January. th

(Confidential) St

th

To SS Gruppenf uehrer' Hofmann *

Race and Settlement Main Office,

Berlin

* Otto Hofmann, at this time Chief of the SS Race and Settlement Main Office, was a
defendant in the RuSHA case. Volumes IV and V, this series.

192

Dear Hofmann:

On the 31 July 1941 the Reich Marshal of the Greater German
Reich commissioned me to make all necessary preparations in
organizational, factual, and material respect for the total solu-
tion [Gesamtloesung] of the Jewish question in Europe with the
participation of all interested central agencies and to present to
him a master plan as soon as possible. A photostatic copy of this
commission is included in this letter. 1 Considering the extraor-
dinary importance which has to be conceded to these questions
and in the interest of the achievement of the same viewpoint by
the central agencies concerned with the remaining work con-
nected with this final solution [Endloesung] , I suggest to make
these problems the subject of a combined conversation, especially
since Jews are being evacuated in continuous transports from
the Reich territory, including the Protectorate Bohemia and
Moravia, to the East ever since 15 October 1941.

I therefore invite you to such a conference, followed by luncheon
on 9 December 1941, 1200 hours, at the office of the International
Criminal Police Commission, Berlin, Am Grossen [handwritten]
Kleinen [crossed out] Wannsee No. 16 [crossed out] 56/58
[handwritten] .

[Handwritten in margin] According to conversation with SS Major Guenther
on 4 December 1941 street was changed.

I have sent similar letters to Governor General Dr. Frank, 2
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer, State Secretaries Stuckart, Dr. Schlegel-
berger, 3 Gutterer, and Neumann, as well as to Reichsamtsleiter
Dr. Leibrandt, Under State Secretary Luther, SS Major General
Greifelt, 4 SS Senior Colonel Klopfer, and Ministerial Director
Kritzinger.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[Signed] Heydrich

1 Goering’s letter of 31 July 1941, commissioning Heydrich with this task, is reproduced
earlier in this section as Document NG-2586-E, Prosecution Exhibit 1448.

2 Hans Frank, Governor General of the Government General in Poland, was a defendant
in the IMT trial.

3 Franz Schlegelberger, at this time Acting Reich Minister of Justice, was a defendant in
the Justice case. Volume III, this series.

4 Ulrich Greifelt, Chief of the Main Staff Office of the Reich Commissioner for the
Strengthening of Germanism, was a defendant in the RuSHA case, Volumes IV and V,
this series.

10g

2. Letter of 8 January 1942, postponing the date of the
Wannsee Conference to 20 January 1942

Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service (SD)

Prague, 8 January 1942
C.d.S B. No. 18/42 [Initial] H 13 January

[Handwritten] Submit on 19 January
To SS Major General Hofmann
Race and Settlement Main Office,

Berlin

Hedemannstr.

Dear Hofmann!

Unfortunately, at the last minute, I had to call off the con-
ference, scheduled for 9 December 1941, about the questions of
final solution of the Jewish problem because of events which
suddenly became known and of the engrossment with them of
some of the invited gentlemen.

Since the questions needing settlement do not allow further
postponement, I therefore again invite you to a conference fol-
lowed by luncheon on 20 January 1942 at 1200 hours, Berlin,
Am Grossen Wannsee 56-58.

The group of invited gentlemen, mentioned in my last letter
of invitation, remains unchanged.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, [Signed] Heydrich

194

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4667
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1449

THREE MEMORANDUMS FROM THE FILES OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
I TO 8 DECEMBER 1941, CONCERNING A PROPOSAL FOR THE
UNIFORM TREATMENT OF ALL JEWS OF EUROPEAN NATIONALITY

1. Memorandum from Siegfried to Luther, I December 1941, concerning
preparation of a memorandum on desires advanced by the Bulgarian
Foreign Minister Popoff

[Stamp] Office of the State Secretary

[Handwritten] “Very urgent!”
[Stamp] Foreign Office D III 660g
Received: 4 December 1941
Reply: copies

Berlin, 1 December 1941

In reference to the memorandum State Secretary No. 791 of 30
November, Ambassador von Rintelen informed me that the Reich
Foreign Minister requests a memorandum on paragraph (5) of
the desires which the Bulgarian Foreign Minister [Popoff] has
advanced.

Herewith respectfully submitted to Under State Secretary
Luther.

[Signed] Siegfried

[Handwritten marginal note] Party member Rademacher as per
telephone call. [Illegible initial] 3 December.

2. Memorandum from Luther to von Ribbentrop, submitted through defend-
ant von Weizsaecker, 4 December 1941, concerning PopofF's recommenda-
tion for a uniform treatment of European Jews

[Stamp] Secret

Under State Secretary Luther File D III 660 g

Memorandum

Department Germany welcomes the suggestion of the Bulgarian
Foreign Minister Popoff to have all European countries treat
the Jews of European nationality in conformity.

Inasmuch as according to the 11th decree of the Reich Citizen
Law all Jews of German nationality who reside abroad are de-
prived of their citizenship, by law these Jews are stateless and
fall, as a matter of course, under the legislation for Jews effective
in the individual countries.

195

In Germany Jews of foreign nationality were on principle
treated like Jews of German nationality with the exception of
legal financial matter whereby reprisal measures abroad were to
be avoided.

Jews of enemy nationality are treated in accordance with
regulations covering enemies.

Special consideration was generally only granted Jews of Amer-
ican citizenship because these States have the possibility of taking
reprisals against Reich Germans and therefore hold an advantage
over us.

[Handwritten note] Immediately to Dir. Legal Division. [Initial] W
[Weizsaecker].

Through the State Secretary von Weizsaecker [illegible initial]
to be submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

[Handwritten] German-Bulgarian Commerce and Shipping
Treaty of 24 June 1932.

Of the European states only Hungary, Italy, and Spain have
raised objections in the recent past. Even in a common European
settlement these states can be expected to resist. This is due
to the influence of Jewry and Catholic opinion.

The opportunity rendered by this war must be utilized to finally
eliminate the Jewish question in Europe. The most practical
preparation for this would be to make all European states in-
troduce the German legislation on Jews and to agree that all
Jews regardless of their nationality are subject to the measures
taken by the country of residence, while Jewish property should
be put at the disposal of the final solution [waehrend das Ver-
moegen der Juden fuer die Endloesung zur Verfuegung gestellt
werden sollte]. A halfway consistent enactment of the German
laws on Jews in European countries would break the back of all
elements still hostile to Germany, particularly in Hungary.

Whether the foreign political situation, in view of the inner
resistance of Hungary, Italy, and Spain, is already ripe for such
a solution cannot be judged alone from the viewpoint of Depart-
ment Germany. It is therefore suggested to reach an agreement
among the European powers allied by the Anti-Comintern Pact
to the effect that Jews of the nationality of these countries are
to fall under the Jewish measures of the country of residence.

The Jews of Norwegian, Polish, Luxembourg, Greek, Serbian,
and Soviet Russian nationality, inclusive of the former Baltic
States, will automatically fall under this settlement.

Herewith, through State Secretary von Weizsaecker, submitted
to the Reich Foreign Minister with the request for instructions.
Berlin, 4 December 1941

[Signed] Luther

[Initials] Kl [Klingenfuss] 4 December

196

3. Memorandum from Rademacher to Luther, 8 December 1941, transmitting
draft of memorandum for von Ribbentrop and noting that defendant von
Weizsaecker "considers this matter as very urgent"

[Handwritten] (1) Meeting did not take place. (2) Submit in
two weeks.

[Initial] R [Rademacher] 9 December
Ref.: Legation Councillor Rademacher

File D III 660 g
[Stamp] 23 December 1941
Resubmitted on:

The enclosed draft* for a memorandum for the Reich Foreign
Minister is resubmitted to Under State Secretary Luther.

Inasmuch as the State Secretary considers this matter as very
urgent and has twice already asked about it in the conference of
directors it will have to be submitted now.

The file was attached by section D III; why and when they
were detached on their way to you I was not able to determine.
Berlin, 8 December 1941

[Signed] Rademacher

[The following* is in purple pencil across all the document in Luther’s hand-
writing : ]

“Report sent off together with previous correspondence on 9
December. Marx. Immediate [illegible] Party member Rade-
macher: Please inform the State Secretary at once and tell him
that a meeting is taking place today concerning the matter handed
to him in [illegible] ’s office.”

[Signed] Luther 9 December

* The draft mentioned was not a part of the exhibit introduced in evidence.

197

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-F
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1450

MEMORANDUM ENTITLED "DESIRES AND IDEAS OF THE FOREIGN
OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTENDED TOTAL SOLUTION
OF THE JEWISH QUESTION IN EUROPE," PREPARED BY REFERAT
D III OF THE DEPARTMENT GERMANY, AND SUBMITTED TO LUTHER
ON 8 DECEMBER 1941 IN PREPARATION FOR THE WANNSEE CON-
FERENCE

Referat D III Secret

[Stamp] Secret

[Handwritten] to D III, 709g

The enclosed memorandum is submitted to Under State Secre-
tary Luther as preparation [als Vorbereitung] for tomorrow's
conference with SS Lieutenant General Heydrich.

Berlin, 8 December 1941 1

[Handwritten]

1. For the time being postponed

2. After one month

[Initial] R [Rademacher] 22 December

DESIRES AND IDEAS OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN CON-
NECTION WITH THE INTENDED TOTAL SOLUTION OF
THE JEWISH QUESTION IN EUROPE

1. Deportation to the East of all Jews residing in the German
Reich, inclusive of those who live in Croatia, Slovakia, and Ru-
mania.

2. Deportation of all Jews living in the territories occupied 2
by us who were formerly German citizens but lost their citizen-
ship and are now stateless in accordance with the latest supple-
mentary decree to the Reich Citizenship Law. 2

8. Deportation of all Serbian Jews.

4. Deportation of the Jews handed over to us by the Hungarian

Government. B

5. To declare our readiness to the Rumanian, Slovakian, Croa-
tian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Governments, to deport to the
East the Jews living in these countries.

6. To influence the Bulgarian and Hungarian Governments
to issue laws concerning Jews similar to the Nuernberg Laws.

1 The Wannsee Conference was originally scheduled for 9 December 1941. (See Doc. 709-PS

Pros. Ex. 2506, reproduced above in this section.) ®

2 Reference is made to the 11th decree to the Reich Citizenship Law 25 November 1941,
reproduced earlier in this section as Document NG-2499, Prosecution Exhibit 1536.

198

7. To exert influence on the rest of the European governments
to issue laws concerning Jews.

8. Execution of these measures as hitherto in friendly coop-
eration with the Gestapo.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2657
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1737

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUMS AND NOTES CONCERNING
EINSATZGRUPPEN REPORTS, 8 TO 23 DECEMBER 1941, WITH
LUTHER'S BASIC MEMORANDUM OF 10 DECEMBER 1941, FOR SUB-
MISSION TO VON RIBBENTROP THROUGH DEFENDANT VON
WEIZSAECKER

I. Memorandum from the office of von Ribbentrop, 8 December 1941, re-
questing the preparation of a short memorandum concerning the Einsatz-
gruppen reports

[Handwritten] To D II 211 G Rs
Office of the Reich Foreign Minister
First respectfully submitted to Department Germany II

[Illegible initial]

The Office of the Reich Foreign Minister intends to submit
the Activity and Situation Reports of Security Service in Russia
to the Reich Foreign Minister and requests that a corresponding
short memorandum be prepared.

Berlin, 8 December 1941

Dr. Bruns
[Illegible initial]

2. Extracts from Luther's memorandum of 10 December 1941, reporting upon
Heydrich's letter of 25 November 1941, and Einsatzgruppen Report 6*

[Stamp] Top Secret

D II 211 g. Rs.

-Sr-

Berlin, 10 December 1941

Memorandum

SS Lieutenant General Heydrich submits, with his enclosed let-
ter of 25 November of this month to the Reich Foreign Minister,
the Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the Einsatzgruppen of
the Security Police and the SD in the Soviet Union, which gives
a survey of the period from 1-31 October this year.

* Document NO-2656, Prosecution Exhibit 1736, reproduced in part earlier in this section.

199

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD maintained the
following four Einsatzgruppen in the occupied areas of the
U.S.S.R. :

A. — in Krasnogvardeisk

B. — in Smolensk

C. — in Kiev

D. — in Nikolaev

[Handwritten note] Has been reported to the Reich Foreign Minister
[illegible initial]

Subordinate to these Einsatzgruppen are “Einsatz- and Spe-
cial-Kommandos,” which advance together with the army. As far
as the partisans and countermeasures against them are concerned,
the situation has calmed in the area of Einsatzgruppe A (Ost-
land) and C and D (Ukraine). In White Ruthenia, on the other
hand, partisan activity, which is now mainly engaged in acts
of sabotage, has increased. Einsatzgruppe A succeeded in ob-
taining comprehensive knowledge of the political and military
situation in Leningrad through Russian deserters, prisoner-of-
war interrogations, as well as civilian informants * * * .

[Marginal note] To be submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister [illegible
initial] via the State Secretary [initial] W [Weizsaecker]

[Stamp] Top Secret I

[Distribution] i

[Illegible handwriting]

To D II 211 Top Secret c '

1. To be submitted for information to — [

Under Secretary of State Political Division [initial] W , 2,

[Woermann] B

Dirigent Political Division [initial] E [Erdmannsdorff] q

Section I Political Division [illegible initial] g

Section V Political Division [illegible initial]

Economics Division [illegible initial] ^

Division Deutschland Section III [illegible initial]

Information Division [illegible initial] especially see p. 19
[illegible initial]

Press Division

Broadcasting Division [illegible initial]

2. To be resubmitted to Referat [initial] F

Berlin, 23 December 1941
[Signed] Pausch [Illegible initial]

[Handwritten note] Returned from Information Div. without changes
through exchange [Illegible initial].

200

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-3058
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2585

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN ROSENBERG, HITLER, DEFENDANT
LAMMERS, AND KEITEL 18 DECEMBER 1941 TO 8 FEBRUARY 1942
CONCERNING THE CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN THE
OCCUPIED WEST AND UNDATED STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE
RESULTS OF THE "FURNITURE ACTION"

1. Memorandum from Rosenberg io Hitler, 18 December 1941, proposing
the confiscation of the household furnishings of Jews who have fled or
will flee from all occupied western territories

File Memorandum for the Fuehrer

Subject: Jewish property in France.

Pursuant to the Fuehrer decree concerning requisition of Jew-
ish cultural property, a great number of Jewish homes re-
mained unguarded. As a result of this, many household articles
have disappeared in the course of time, since supervision could
not be carried out. Housing conditions were found to be terrible
by the administration in the entire Eastern Territories and pos-
sibilities of procurement are so limited that at present no pro-
visions can be made. I therefore request that the Fuehrer give
permission for confiscation of all household furnishing of Jews
in Paris who have fled or will flee, as well as in all occupied
western territories in order to assist the administration in pro-
curing household furnishings for the Eastern Territories.
[Handwritten] Nu 37.42 secret

2. PP.

Berlin, 18 December 1941
Certified true copy.

Berlin, 14 January 1942
[Signed] Dr. Marquart
SA Obersturmbannfuehrer

[Stamp]

Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories

201

2. Letter from defendant Lammers to Rosenberg, 31 December 1941, in-
forming Rosenberg of Hitler's approval of Rosenberg's proposal and
requesting further action

Copy

Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
RK 18483 B

Berlin W 8, 31 December 1941
At present:

Fuehrer Headquarters

[Handwritten] Submitted to Minister and Degenhart
To Mr. Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Ter-
ritories
Berlin W 35
Rauchstrasse 17/18

Subject: Utilization of Jewish household furnishings from oc-
cupied western territories.

Dear Mr. Rosenberg!

Your memorandum dated 18 December 1941 has been sub-
mitted to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer in principle, agreed to the
proposal as made under paragraph 1. Together with the letter
enclosed in copy, a copy of that part of your memorandum which
deals with utilization of Jewish household furnishings was for-
warded by me to the Chief of the OKW and to the Reich Com-
missioner for the occupied territories of the Netherlands. May
I ask you to contact the other interested offices for the execution
of your proposal.

Heil Hitler!

Yours devotedly,
Signed: Dr. Lammers

'"V [Stamp]

Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories

Certified copy

Berlin, 14 January 1942

[Signed] Dr. Marquart

SA Obersturmbannfuehrer

202

3. File note of Rosenberg's Ministry, entitled The "Furniture Action,"
undated, containing statistics on materials procured

Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Office-West
The M-Action [Furniture Action] 1

Collection and removal of unclaimed Jewish household furnish-
ings, initiated by the Office-West of the Reich Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories upon the order of the Fuehrer, en-
ables us to speedily equip the offices in Occupied Eastern Terri-
tories with furnishings without additionally burdening the Ger-
man economy.

To cover increasing demands in household goods, the greater
part of the material found was made available to persons in
the Reich, suffering from bomb damage, by DRK Oberfeldfuehrer
von Behr, the Chief of Office-West.

On 31 October 1942 the Fuehrer agreed with the proposal of
Reich Minister Alfred Rosenberg to give primary consideration
to persons suffering from bomb damage in the Reich and ordered
that, in the execution of the project, all assistance be given to
Office-West and that transports are to be dispatched as Wehr-
macht goods.

Up to now, by using free freight space, 144,809 cubic meters
of household goods have been removed from occupied western
territories; 1,255 railroad cars covered a rail distance of 1,069,028
km; 57 barges a distance of 24,210 km via inland water ways.
The following effects were turned over to the Foreign Currency
Protection Bureau : securities and foreign currency amounting to
63,843,640 French francs; countervalue for furs, 1,303,560 French
francs. Food stuffs, wine stocks, and vehicles found were turned
over to the military administration.

One hundred five complete household furnishings and 2,210
household objects of all kinds were turned over to military offices
in Paris for sheltering purposes or for making such possible.
Easing the German market by supplying rationed goods; espe-
cially bed linen, table linen, under garments, porcelain, kitchen
utensils, cutlery, furnishing articles, household goods. Parts of
the material were delivered to the following German cities : Ober-
hausen, Bottrop, Recklinghausen, Muenster, Duesseldorf, Co-
logne, Osnabrueck, Hamburg, Luebeck, Rostock, and Karlsruhe. 2 3

1 *‘M” is the abbreviation for “Moebel,” furniture or household furnishings. Concerning
this action, the IMT stated in its judgment concerning Rosenberg: “In ‘Action-M’ (Moebel),
instituted in December 1941 at Rosenberg’s suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes were plundered
in the West, 38,000 of them in Paris alone, and it took 26,984 railroad cars to transport the

confiscated furnishings to Germany.’’ See Trial of the Major War Criminals, op. cit., volume I,
page 295.

3 Further material concerning the treatment of property of Jews in German occupied terri-
tory is reproduced later in section X, “Plunder and Spoliation.”

203

4. Letter from defendant Lammers to Keitel, 31 December 1941, transmitting
copy of Rosenberg's memorandum to Hitler of 18 December 1941, and
advising Keitel of Hitler's approval of Rosenberg's proposal

Copy

Berlin, 31 December 1941
At present:

Fuehrer Headquarters

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

R.K. 18483 B

To: Chief of the OKW

General Field Marshal Keitel

At present Fuehrer Headquarters

Subject: Utilization of Jewish household furnishings from oc-
cupied western territories.

Dear Field Marshal :

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories sub-
mitted to the Fuehrer the enclosed memorandum concerning the
utilization of household furnishings of Paris Jews and Jews else-
where in the occupied western territories, who have fled or will
flee for the purpose of supplying administration officials in the
Occupied Eastern Territories with furnishings. The Fuehrer
agreed in principle with the proposal. I have asked the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to contact you, the
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Territories in the Nether-
lands and the other interested parties for the execution of the
proposal. I have forwarded a copy of this letter to the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and the Reich
Commissioner for the Occupied Territories in the Netherlands
has likewise been informed by me.

Heil Hitler!

Yours devotedly,
[Signed] Dr. Lammers
[Stamp]

Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories

Certified copy.

Berlin, 14 January 1942
[Signed] Dr. Marquart

SA Obersturmbannfuehrer

204

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4669
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1451

MEMORANDUM FROM DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN OFFICE LE-
GAL DIVISION, ALBRECHT, 31 DECEMBER, 1941, INITIALLED BY
DEFENDANT WOERMANN AND SUBMITTED TO DEFENDANT VON
WEIZSAECKER, SUGGESTING METHODS OF LEGISLATION CON-
CERNING JEWS IN HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, AND OTHER FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES

Ref.: Legation Counsellor Dr. Conrad Roediger

File D III 660 g
Deputy Director Legal Division

The following observations from the viewpoint of international
law are made on the memorandum by Division D on the possi-
bilities of a treaty settlement on the treatment of Jews in the
individual states of Europe:

1. The treatment of foreign citizens is usually regulated by
trade and residence treaties between the country of residence
and the country of origin. Inasmuch as none of these treaties
differentiate between Jews and other citizens they are also valid
for Jews. In order to remove the obligations on the part of the
country of residence regarding the treatment of Jewish citizens
of their treaty partner two possibilities appear evident.

a. The states which pursue a Jewish policy similar to that of
the German Reich can agree by new bilateral treaties not to use
the rights ensuing from the existing trade and residence treaties
for the benefit of their Jewish citizens which are in contrast to
legislation on Jews prevailing in the state of residence. The
Legal Division has already pointed out this possibility in one case
submitted for its comment in which the application of German
legislation on Jews to Slovakian Jews residing in Germany was
in question.

b. The states in question can also arrange by a collective treaty
that their Jewish citizens in the territory of the other treaty
partners are subject to their legislation on Jews without regard
to existing trade and residence treaties. Such a treaty would,
of course, only be effective between the partners of the treaty and
would therefore not affect the rights of Jewish citizens of third
countries. The suggestion of Division D, to propose such a col-
lective treaty between the signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact
might meet with the obstacle emphasized by Division D itself,
that Italy, Spain, and Hungary will probably not at this time
agree to be tied down by such an approach to the Jewish ques-

958403—63 14

205

tion. The collective treaty would therefore for the time being
be at least confined to the smaller circle of such states as can
be expected to be agreeable to such a treaty. Slovakia, Rumania,
Bulgaria, and possibly Croatia can be counted among those.

But even a collective treaty confined to these states would not
be an easy matter to accomplish. The difficulties would arise
primarily from economic considerations. The extent of the as-
sets of Jewish citizens of the individual countries which are
potential partners in the collective treaty deposited in the ter-
ritory of other treaty partners are bound to be quite different.
The potential partners of the projected collective treaty will there-
fore partly fear to 'suffer losses by denouncing protection of the
assets of their Jewish citizens in other states which will not be
balanced by the assets of Jewish nationals residing on their own
territory. They might therefore insist on an economic adjust-
ment of the movement of assets created by the application of
the legislation on Jews on the part of the potential partner state
of the collective treaty to Jewish citizens of other partner states
in their territory. At least the states which are potential signa-
tories to the collective treaty will want assurances that they will
not have to accept on their territory their Jewish citizens living
in another partner state without their property. These difficult
economic questions can probably be solved better in bilateral
treaties rather than in a collective treaty. Therefore the sug-
gestion listed under a would be preferable, even though it would
only lead to a step-by-step realization of the aim projected by
Division D.

2. The Legal Division assumes that the international agree-
ment suggested by Division D is to cover only the treatment of
such Jewish citizens of potential partner states who do not reside
in their home states. The assumption of international obliga-
tion on the part of a state in regard to the treatment of a group
of its citizens in its own territory seems theoretically possible
but unusual in international usage. To assume such an obliga-
tion would as a rule be considered as intervention in the national
sovereignty. An international agreement between states per-
suading a policy similar to that of Germany regarding the treat-
ment of their own Jewish citizens in their own territory can
therefore hardly be considered.

3. In respect to the treatment of Jewish citizens of states at
war with Germany it is observed that here — from the point of
view of the other states under consideration — no members of an
enemy state are involved. For instance Spain and Bulgaria are
not at all at war, while Hungary and Rumania are merely at

206

war with the Soviet Union and England, and Slovakia is at war
only with the Soviet Union.

So far as the States under consideration are at peace with
home states of Jews residing in their territory, the rights of
these Jews are still governed by the Trade and Residence Treaties
prevailing between state of residence and state of domicile. A
legal possibility for the dissolution of these treaty obligations can
therefore only be effected with the consent of the home state,
which can not be counted on in the case of states now engaged in
hostilities with Germany.

So far as the states in question are themselves at war with
the home states of the Jews residing in their territory the prin-
ciples relevant to the treatment of enemy nationals are applicable,
as was already pointed out by Division D.

Herewith together with enclosures [Handwritten] via Divi-
sion [Illegible letter] submitted to the State Secretary.

[initial] W [Woermann]

Berlin, 31 December 1941

[Signed] Albrecht
[initial] R 11 December
[initial] St 11 December

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2651
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1731

MEMORANDUM OF PICOT, 8 JANUARY 1942, INITIALED BY DEFEND-
ANT VON WEIZSAECKER TRANSMITTING EINSATZGRUPPEN RE-
PORTS I THROUGH 6, AND TWO SUMMARIES CONCERNING THE
EINSATZGRUPPEN REPORTS PREPARED BY DEPARTMENT GERMANY
OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE

[Stamp] Secret Reich Matter File with D II 211 g Rs./41

Ang. II.

Memorandum

In the enclosures the Activity and Situation Reports Nos. 1-6
of the Einsatzgruppen of the Chief of the Security Police and
SD in the U.S.S.R. are submitted.* At the same time excerpts of
the Situation and Activity Reports Nos. 1-5, prepared by Section
D III, is attached (D III 66 g Rs./41). An indication of the

* Extracts from Einsatzgruppen Report 1, 31 July 1941, are reproduced earlier in this section
as another part of this exhibit (Doc. NO-2651, Pros. Ex. 1731) together with the letter of the
Security Police and SD of 30 October 1941 which transmitted the first five Einsatzgruppen
reports to the Foreign Office. Extracts from the sixth Einsatzgruppen report, covering the
period 1-31 October 1941, are reproduced earlier in this section as a part of Document
NO-2656. Prosecution Exhibit 1736.

207

most important contents of Report No. 6 can be found in the
attached memorandum D II 211 g. Rs./41 for the Reich Foreign
Minister, dated 10 December 1940. 1

[Initial] W [Woermann]

9 January

Herewith submitted to the Office of the State Secretary.

[Initial] W [Weizsaecker] 8 January
Berlin, 8 January 1942

[Signed] Picot

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 51 1 2
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 466

LETTER FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF OF THE MILITARY COM-
MANDER IN FRANCE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHIEF OF
THE SECURITY POLICE AND SD IN PARIS, 16 JANUARY 1942, CON-
CERNING DEPORTATION OF JEWS TO THE EAST AND REQUESTS
OF THE FRENCH RED CROSS

Paris, 16 January 1942
Hotel Majestic, Ave. Kleber
Telephone: Kle 8800/09
The Military Commander in France
Administrative Staff

Administration, File No. V pol 250/882/41

To the Representative of the Chief of the Security Police and the

SD

Paris Office
Paris

[Stamp] The Representative

Sec. Police and the SD

Received: 23 January 1942
Registry No. 1328
IV J [Initials] Dan.

[Initials] Lsch 16 January 1942
Subject: Deportation of Jewish-Bolshevist elements for compul-
sory labor in the East.

The French Red Cross has applied to this office for permission
to care, within certain limits, for those Jews who are presently
detained in the Compiegne police detention camp after having
been committed there as a retaliation measure, and who are

1 Reproduced earlier in this section as a part of Document NO-2657, Prosecution Exhibit 1787.

2 This document was introduced in the IMT trial as Exhibit RF-1212.

208

destined to be deported to the East. The following requests have
been submitted for consideration:

a. To permit the Commandant of the Compiegne camp the is-
suing of internment certificates to the detained Jews upon ap-
plication for forwarding them to the families of the detained
Jews, so that they can draw relief money from the French
authorities.

b. Furthermore, to submit a list of all Jews detained in Com-
piegne to the French Red Cross, so that their families, who might
inquire about them at the Red Cross, can be given proper in-
formation.

c. To make a statement as to what extent the detained Jews
will be allowed contact with the outer world by mail or to what
extent the detainees are permitted to receive mail. In this con-
nection, the French Red Cross submits, in urgent cases, it would
be permitted to forward, via the camp Commandant, information
to the detainees from the next of kin.

Regarding a . — The camp Commandant has been asked to issue
certificates of internment to the detained Jews if so desired and
to forward all of them to the French Red Cross for further action.

Regarding b . — It has been ruled that lists of detained Jews are
not to be communicated to the Red Cross, but that, however, it
was left to the Red Cross to direct inquiries to the Commandant
of the greater Paris area, as to whether certain individuals were
being detained at the Compiegne police detention camp at the
time of the inquiry.

Regarding c . — As to this point, a ruling will not be made for
the time being. It has been arranged, however, that in urgent
cases the French Red Cross should be permitted to forward to the
Commandant of the greater Paris area, as a temporary expedient,
brief communications from close relations of the detainees con-
cerning their health, etc., and to have such news sent to the
Compiegne camp.

All those concerned are herewith informed. We request com-
ment regarding c.

[Stamp] For the Military Commander
The Chief of the Administrative Staff

By order

Certified.

Signed: Dr. Ernst

Signed: Schneider, KVI

209

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-G
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1452

EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF THE WANNSEE CONFERENCE,
20 JANUARY 1942, WITH FIFTEEN PERSONS PARTICIPATING, IN-
CLUDING DEFENDANT STUCKART, AT WHICH PLANS FOR "THE
FINAL SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH QUESTION" WERE DISCUSSED

[Stamp] Top Secret

BO copies — 16th copy

I. The following persons took part in the conference on the
Final Solution of the Jewish problem held on 20 January 1942
in Berlin, Am Grossen Wannsee No. 56/58:

II.

IPolic

Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and
Reichsamtsleiter
Dr. Leibbrandt
State Secretary
Dr. Stuckart

State Secretary Neumann

Reich Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories

bppo
'or ti
[ ’rob
his i

I "he
in tt

Reich Ministry of the Interior

‘espe

oiga

Wick

Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan
Reich Ministry of Justice

tireeti

Office of the Governor General
Foreign Office

State Secretary
Dr. Freisler

State Secretary Dr. Buehler
Under State Secretary
Luther

SS Colonel Klopfer
Ministerial Director
Kritzinger

[Handwritten] D III 29 Top Secret

The
itive
oil m
he Gei

Party Chancellery
Reich Chancellery

SS Major General Hofmann
SS Major General Mueller
SS Lieutenant Colonel
Eichmann
t SS Senior Colonel
Dr. Schoengarth,
Commander of the
Security Police and the
SD in the Government
General

SS Major Dr. Lange,
Commander of the
Security Police and the
SD for the General

Race and Settlement Main Officejife of t
Reich Security Main Office

The(

brief

o. Fc

Security Police and SD

Security Police and SD

be Gen
In exe
•ossible
^ the J e
sale.

WE
p of t

|W Of

b) Of

210

Districts Latvia, as
representative of the
Commander of the
Security Police and the
SD for the Reich
Commissariat for the
Ostland.

II. At the beginning of the meeting the Chief of the Security
’olice and the SD, SS Lieutenant General Heydrich, reported his
ppointment by the Reich Marshal to service as Commissioner
2 or the Preparation of the Final Solution of the European Jewish
'roblem, and pointed out that the officials had been invited to
, lis conference in order to clear up the fundamental problems,
'he Reich Marshal’s request to have a draft submitted to him
p the organizational, factual, and material requirements with
espect to the Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem,
organisatorischen, sachlichen und materiellen Belange im Hin-
lick auf die Endloesung der europaeischen Judenfrage] neces-
itated this previous general consultation by all the central offices
Irectly concerned, in order that there should be coordination in
le policy [Parallelisierung der Linienf uehrung] .

The primary responsibility [Federfuehrung] for the adminis-
1 rative handling of the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem
fill rest centrally with the Reich Leader SS and the Chief of
le German Police (Chief of the Security Police and the SD) —
sgardless of geographic boundaries.

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD thereafter gave
brief review of the battle conducted up to now against these
nemies. The most important aspects are —

a. Forcing the Jews out of the various fields of the community
ice fe of the German people.

b. Forcing the Jews out of the living space [Lebensraum] of
le German people.

In execution of these efforts there was undertaken — as the only
ossible provisional solution — the acceleration of the emigration
f the Jews from Reich territory on an intensified and methodical
sale.

By decree of the Reich Marshal, a Reich Central Office for
awish Emigration was set up in January 1939 , and the direc-
on of this office was entrusted to the Chief of the Security
Dlice and the SD. It had in particular the task —

(a) Of taking all steps for the preparation for an intensified
ligration of the Jews.

(b) Of steering the emigration stream.

(c) Of expediting the emigration in individual cases .

211

The objective of these tasks [Aufgabenziel] was to clear the
German living space of Jews in a legal way.

The disadvantages which such a forcing of emigration brought
with it were clear to all the authorities. But in view of the lack
of alternative solutions, they had to be accepted in the beginning.

* H* * # * * *

Meanwhile, in view of the dangers of an emigration during
the war and in view of the possibilities in the East, the Reich
Leader SS and Chief of the German Police had forbidden the
emigrating of the Jews.

III. The emigration program has now been replaced by the
evacuation of the Jews to the East as a further solution possi-
bility, in accordance with previous authorization by the Fuehrer.*

These actions are of course to be regarded only as a temporary
substitute; nonetheless, here already, the coming Final Solution
[Kommende Endloesung] of the Jewish Question is of great im-
portance.

In the course of this Final Solution of the European Jewish
Problem, approximately 11 million Jews are involved. They are
distributed among the individual countries as follows:

Country Number

A. Original Reich Territory [Altreich] 131,800

Austria 43,700

Eastern Territories 420,000

Government General 2,284,000

Bialystok 400,000

Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia 74,200

Estonia — free of Jews

Latvia 3,500

Lithuania 34,000

Belgium 43,000

Denmark 5,600

France: Occupied territory 165,000

Unoccupied territory 700,000

Greece 69,600

The Netherlands 160,800

Norway 1,300

B. Bulgaria 48,000

England 330,000

Finland 2,300

Ireland 4,000

Italy, including Sardinia 58,000

Albania 200

Croatia 40,000

Portugal 3,000

Rumania, including Bessarabia 342,000

* The original shows this paragraph underscored by hand and on the margin a large
exclamation point covering the length of the paragraph.

212

Country

Number

Sweden 8,000

Switzerland 18,000

Serbia 10,000

Slovakia 88,000

Spain 6,000

Turkey (European part) 55,500

Hungary 742,800

U.S.S.R. 5,000,000

Ukraine 2,994,684

White Russia, excluding Bialystok 446,484

TOTAL over 11,000,000

In the Jewish population figures given for the various foreign
countries however, only those of Jewish faith are included as
the stipulations for defining Jews along racial lines still are
in part lacking there.

* Hs * * sj: *

Under proper direction the Jews should now in the course of
the Final Solution [Endloesung] be brought to the East in a suit-
able way for use as labor. In big labor gangs, with separation
of the sexes, the Jews capable of work are brought to these
areas and employed in road building, in which task undoubtedly
a great part will fall out through natural diminution [natuerliche
Verminderung] .

The remnant that finally is able to survive all this — since this
is undoubtedly the part with the strongest resistance — must be
treated accordingly [entsprechend behandelt werden] since these
people, representing a natural selection, are to be regarded as
the germ cell of a new Jewish development. (See the experience
of history.)

In the program of the practical execution of the Final Solution
[Endloesung], Europe is combed through from the West to the
East. The Reich area, including the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia, will have to be taken in advance, alone, for reasons
of the housing problem and other social and political necessities.

The evacuated Jews are brought first group by group into the
so-called transit ghettos, in order to be transported from there
farther to the East.

An important prerequisite for the whole execution of the evacu-
ation, so SS Lieutenant General Heydrich explained further, is
the exact establishment of the category of persons who are to be
included.

It is intended not to evacuate Jews over 65 years of age, but
to remove them to a ghetto for the aged — Theresienstadt is under
consideration.

21S

Along with these old age classes of the perhaps 280,000 Jews
who on 31 October 1941 were in Germany proper and in Austria
— perhaps 30 percent are over 65 years old — there will also be
taken to the ghettos for the aged the Jews who are serious war
wounded cases and Jews with war decorations (Iron Cross, First
Class) . With this appropriate solution the many petitions for ex-
ceptions will be eliminated with one blow.

The beginning of the individual larger evacuation actions will
be very much dependent on the military development. With
regard to the handling of the Final Solution in the European areas
occupied and influenced by us, it was proposed that the competent
officials in the Foreign Office should confer with the competent
specialists of the Security Police and the SD.

In Slovakia and Croatia the matter is no longer too difficult,
as the most essential problems in this respect have already been
solved there. In Rumania likewise the government has mean-
while appointed a Commissioner for Jewish Affairs. For settling
the problem in Hungary it will be necessary in the near future
to force upon the Hungarian Government acceptance of an ad-
viser on Jewish problems.

With regard to taking up the preparations for the settling of
the problem in Italy, SS Lieutenant General Heydrich thinks a
liaison with the Police Chief in these matters is suitable.

In occupied and unoccupied France the taking of the Jews for
evacuation can in all probability proceed without great difficulties.

Under State Secretary Luther stated at this point that in a
more basic treatment of this problem in a few countries, such
as in the northern countries, difficulties would come up, and it is
therefore advisable to postpone these countries for the time being.
In consideration of the small number of Jews in question here
this postponement constitutes no appreciable limitation anyway.

On the other hand, the Foreign Office sees no great difficulties
for the south and west of Europe.

SS Major General Hofmann intends to ask to have an official
of the Race and Settlement Main Office* sent along to Hungary
for general orientation, when the affair is started there by the
Chief of the Security Police and the SD. It was decided to
assign this official of the Race and Settlement Main Office, who
is not to be active, temporarily in the official capacity of assistant
to the Police Attache.

IV. In the course of the Final Solution plans [Entloesungsvor-
haben], the Nuernberg Laws are in a certain degree to form the
basis, and accordingly the complete settlement of the problem

* See the materials on the RuSHA case, Volumes IV and V, this series.

214

is to include also the solution of the mixed marriage and the
Mischling* problems.

In connection with a letter of the Chief of the Reich Chan-
cellery, the Chief of the Security Police and the SD discussed
the following points, for the time being theoretically:

1. Treatment of the first degree Mischling s. — First degree
Mischlings are to be treated the same as the Jews as regards
the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem. From this treatment
exception will be made in the case of —

a. First degree Mischlings married to persons of German
blood, from whose marriage there are children (2d degree Misch-
lings). These second degree Mischlings are to have essentially
the same position as Germans.

b. First degree Mischlings for whom the exception approvals
for certain groups have been accorded previously by the highest
authorities of the Party and the State.

Each individual case must be examined and the possibility is not
to be excluded that the decision may be retaken in the Mischling’s
disfavor.

Conditions for the granting of an exception must always be
the fundamental merits of the Mischling concerned himself. (Not
merits of the racial German parent or marriage partner.)

The first degree Mischling excepted from the evacuation is to
be sterilized in order to prevent any offspring and to settle the
Mischling problem once and for all. The sterilization takes place
on a voluntary basis. It is, however, the condition for remaining
in the Reich. The sterilized Mischling is afterwards to be free
from all restrictive stipulations to which he has previously been
subject.

2. Treatment of the second degree Mischlings. — The second
degree Mischlings are to be treated in principle like persons of
German blood with exception of the following cases in which the
second degree Mischlings are to have the same position as Jews:

a. Derivation of the second degree Mischling from a bastard
marriage (both parents Mischlings).

b. Racially especially unfavorable appearance of the second
degree Mischling, so that even in appearance he is considered a
Jew.

c. Especially bad police and political appraisal of the second
degree Mischling which shows that he feels and conducts himself
like a Jew.

But even in these cases exceptions are not to be made if the
second degree Mischling is married to a person of German blood.

* Persons partly of Jewish descent.

215

3. Marriages between full Jews and persons of German blood,

•}• He He

4. Marriages between first degree Mischlings and persons of
German blood.

* ******

5. Marriages between first degree Mischlings and first degree
Mischlings or Jews.

* * * * * * *

6. Marriages between first degree Mischlings and second de-
gree Mischlings.

*******

SS Gruppenfuehrer Hofmann is of the opinion that extensive
use must be made of sterilization ; particularly since the Mischling,
when confronted with the choice as to whether he is to be evacu-
ated or sterilized, would prefer to submit to sterilization.

State Secretary Dr. Stuckart states that the practical execution
of the possibilities just discussed for settling the mixed marriage
and the Mischling problems in this way would entail an endless
administrative task. On the other hand in order also to take
into account in every event the biological actualities, State Sec-
retary Dr. Stuckart suggested that compulsory sterilization be
undertaken.

In order to simplify the mixed marriage problem, further pos-
sibilities must be considered with the objective that the legisla-
tor should perhaps say: “These marriages shall be deemed dis-
solved” [sind geschieden].

In connection with the problem of the effect of the Jewish
evacuation on the economic life, State Secretary Neumann stated
that the Jews employed in important war industries could not
be evacuated for the present, as long as there were no replace-
ments available.

SS Major General Heydrich pointed out that those Jews, in
accordance with the directives approved by him for the execu-
tion of the current evacuations, would not be evacuated.

State Secretary Dr. Buehler states that the Government General
would welcome the initiation of the Final Solution of this problem
in the Government General, because here for once the transport
problem plays no out of the ordinary role, and here labor com-
mitment considerations would not hinder the course of this ac-
tion. Jews would have to be removed as quickly as possible from
the territory of the Government General because just here the
Jew constitutes an eminent danger as a bearer of diseases and
he otherwise brings the economic structure of the country con-

216

stantly into disorder by his black market activities. Further-
more, of the approximately two and one half million Jews here
in question, the majority of cases are reported to be unfit for
work .

State Secretary Dr. Buehler further states that the solution of
the Jewish problem in the Government General is primarily the
responsibility of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD
and his work is supported by the agencies of the Government
General. He had only one request, that the Jewish problem in
this territory be solved as quickly as possible.

In conclusion the various kinds of solutions were discussed, and
here both Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and also State Secretary Dr.
Buehler advocated that certain preparatory tasks in the course
of the Final Solution be performed immediately in the territories
concerned ; in this however, any disturbing of the population must
be avoided.

With the request of the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD to those participating in the conference to afford him their
support in the carrying out of the tasks in connection with the
solution, the conference was concluded.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4903
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2432

EXTRACTS FROM A DIRECTIVE OF THE REICH MINISTER OF FINANCE,
27 FEBRUARY 1942, CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION AND
UTILIZATION BY THE REICH FINANCE ADMINISTRATION OF PROP-
ERTY OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF NATIONALITY AND OF DEPORTED
JEWS WHOSE PROPERTY IS CONFISCATED

Berlin W 8, 27 February 1942
Wilhelmplatz %

The Reich Minister of Finance
0 5210—1839 VI

Subject: Administration and utilization [Verwertung] of
property forfeited to the Reich. Regulation of
competence.

1. General . — The administration and utilization of the prop-
erty which forfeits to the Reich in connection with the loss [by
its owner] of German nationality, and which thereby becomes
property of the Reich, is the task of the Reich Finance Ad-
ministration [Reichsfinanzverwaltung] . Such forfeiture to the
Reich takes place —

217

a. After deprivation of German nationality through declara-
tion of the Reich Minister of the Interior according to the law
of the Revocation of Naturalization and the Deprivation of Ger-
man Nationality, of 14 July 1933, Reich Law Gazette I, page
480 (Decree on German Nationality in the Sudeten-German Ter-
ritories, of 12 February 1939, Reich Law Gazette I, p. 205,
Decree on the Deprivation of Nationality and the Revocation
of the Acquisition of Nationality in the Ostmark [Austria] of
11 July 1939, Reich Law Gazette I. p. 1235).

b. In the case of Jews, immediately with the loss of citizen-
ship according to the 11th decree to the Reich Citizenship Law, 1
of 25 November 1941, (Reich Law Gazette I, p. 722) .

2. Hitherto existing regulation of competence.
*******

3. New regulation of competence. — It has proved inexpedient
that a senior finance president administrates and utilizes real
estate and industrial works which are situated outside his su-
perior finance district.

I therefore order —

a. The administration and utilization of the real estate and
the industrial works for the valuation of which a finance office
outside the superior finance district Berlin-Brandenburg is com-
petent according to section 72 of the Tax Code, is to be trans-
ferred immediately to those senior finance presidents to the dis-
trict of which the competent finance offices belong. The per-
tinent documents are to be transmitted as soon as possible. It
is left to the senior finance presidents while administrating the
real estate to make use of the finance offices of the district
concerned.

b. The Senior Finance President Berlin-Brandenburg continues
to be in charge of the total winding-up of the respective assets
(paying of debts, realization of movables, etc.) as far as they
do not come under c. The senior finance presidents who, ac-
cording to paragraph a, have taken over the administration and
utilization of parts of property, must therefore inform the Senior
Finance President Berlin-Brandenburg on (a) the liabilities on
the real estate, (b) the proceeds from the sale of real estate or
industrial works, (c) the value of real estate which is used for
purposes of the Reich.

c. The competence of the senior finance presidents according
to the decrees of 4 November 1941 2 and 9 December 1941 on

1 Document NG-2499, Prosecution Exhibit 1536, reproduced in part earlier in this section.

2 Document NG-4905, Prosecution Exhibit 2452, reproduced in part earlier in this section.
The present document (directive of 27 February 1942) was issued after the “11th Decree to
the Reich Citizenship Law” of 25 November 1941, whereas the previous directive (Doc. NG-
4905) dated 4 November 1941, was issued before the 11th decree.

218

the administration and utilization of deported [abgeschobener]
Jews will continue.

Ne * * * * * *

d. The Senior Finance President Berlin-Brandenburg sets up
a master index [Gesamtkartei] concerning all property forfeited
to the Reich. Therefore, it is necessary that he be informed of
all forfeited property. Hence, the senior finance presidents who
administer and utilize the property of deported Jews, have to
transmit to the Senior Finance President Berlin-Brandenburg
one index card, as of enclosed specimen, for each deported Jew.

This applies also in cases where the property of the deported
Jews does not forfeit [verfaellt] to the Reich by virtue of section
3 of the 11th decree but where it is confiscated [eingezogen] in
favor of the Reich by virtue of a special order [Verfuegung].
The confiscation of the property is to be marked on the index
card.

* * * * * * *

To the Senior Finance Presidents — except Prague — 10 copies
each.

By order:

[Signed] Maass

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-H
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1453

EXTRACTS FROM THE RECORD OF A CONFERENCE ON THE FINAL
SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH QUESTION IN THE REICH MAIN SECU-
RITY OFFICE ON 6 MARCH 1942, NOTING A DISCUSSION OF DE-
FENDANT STUCKART'S PROPOSALS ON THE STERILIZATION OF
PERSONS OF "MIXED BLOOD"

[Stamp] Top Secret

20 copies — 3d copy

Conference Record

At the conference on the Final Solution of the Jewish Problem
which took place in the Reich Security Main Office Section IV B
4, on 6 March 1942 the following participated :

Senior Government Counsellor Reich Ministry for Public
Carstensen and Enlightenment and

Dr. Schmid-Burgh Propaganda

Senior District Court Judge Reich Ministry of Justice
Massf elder

219

Government Counsellor
Dr. Feldscher
Senior Government
Counsellor Dr. Boley
Municipal Judge Dr. Wetzel

Senior Government
Counsellors Reischauer
and Ancker

City Solicitor Dr. Hammerl
Senior Government
Counsellor Dr. Bilfinger
Municipal Judge Liegener
Attorney and Notary
Pegler

SS Captain Preusch and SS
1st Lieutenant
Dr. Grohmann
Legation Counsellor
Rademacher

Reich Ministry of the Interior

Reich Chancellery

Reich Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories
Party Chancellery

Office of the Governor General
Reich Security Main Office

Plenipotentiary for the Four
Year Plan

Race and Settlement Main Office
Foreign Office

(Photostat: 371962)
[Handwritten] D III 59 Top Secret

The conference showed the following results:

1. Mischlings . — At the beginning of the conference the repre-
sentative of the Reich Ministry of the Interior [Dr. Feldscher]
was asked to explain in detail the proposal of State Secretary
Dr. Stuckart, made in the State Secretaries’ conference of 20
January 1942, that all Mischlings be sterilized, and in particular
to state his attitude on the following questions:

(1) Persons who would come under the sterilization plan.

(2) Legal basis of the sterilization plan.

(8) Legal status of the Mischlings after having undergone
sterilization.

(4) Administrative execution of the sterilization.

The individual points were then discussed in detail.

* * * * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1544

MEMORANDUM BY RADEMACHER CONCERNING A CONFERENCE

AT THE REICH SECURITY MAIN OFFICE ON 6 MARCH 1942, CON-
CERNING FURTHER HANDLING OF THE JEWISH QUESTION, AND

EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF A SECOND INTERDEPART-
MENTAL CONFERENCE ON THE SAME SUBJECT ON 27 OCTOBER

1942

I. Rademacher memorandum of 7 March 1942, submitted to defendant
Woermann and others in the Foreign Office

Ref.: LR Rademacher

Top Secret
Memorandum

On 6 March I attended a meeting in the Reich Main Security
Office concerning the further handling of the Jewish problem. * 1
The purpose of the meeting was to clarify how the general direc-
tives laid down in the “meeting of the State Secretaries” of 20
January 1942 2 are to be carried out actually in practice.

The question of the sterilization of the persons of mixed blood
amounting to approximately 70,000 individuals was considered to
be particularly difficult. According to a report by the Supreme
Medical Authority (Reichsaerztefuehrung), this would be equal
to 700,000 days spent in hospitals. As the hospitals are occupied
by the wounded, this method does not seem practicable, at least
during the war. As an alternative to the solution mentioned
in section IV/1 of the minutes of 20 January it was, therefore,
suggested to assemble all persons of mixed blood (first degree) in
a single city either in Germany or in the Government General
and to postpone the question of sterilization to the period after
the war.

With regard to the question of mixed marriages broached in
sections IV-3 and IV-4, it will be proposed to dissolve marriages
between racial Germans and Jews of pure blood, and marriages
without issue between persons of mixed blood and Germans, by
special law. Objections to a divorce by a simple act of legis-
lation were put forward for reasons of propaganda by the rep-
resentative of the Ministry of Propaganda, and for general legal
considerations by the representative of the Ministry of Justice.

1 The record of the conference of 6 March 1942, Document NG-2586-H, is reproduced in
part immediately above.

1 Reference is made to the “Wannsee Conference” on the “Final Solution” of the Jewish
question. Extracts from the minutes of this conference are reproduced earlier in this section
as Document NG-2586-G, Prosecution Exhibit 1452.

953402—52 15

221

For these reasons, the final suggestion provides for a simplified
method of divorce by way of nonlitigious procedure, to be initiated
on the application either of the racial German partner or of the
public prosecutor. The qualification of being a Jew will, in this
procedure, exclusively be determined by the Higher State Police
Regional Headquarters which has the jurisdiction over the Jew
in question.

Herewith — through Under State Secretary Luther — [Signed]
Luther 10 March

Submitted for information to —

Under State Secretary Gaus [Initial] G [Gaus] 13 March
Under State Secretary Woermann [Initial] W [WOERMANN]
14 March

State Secretary von Weizsaecker [crossed out in the original]
Berlin, 7 March 1942

[Signed] Rademacher

2. Extracts from the minutes of a conference at the Reich Security
Main Office on 27 October 1942

To IV B 4— B No. 1456/41 Top Secret (1344)

Minutes of Conference

Top Secret!
First copy

The following persons attended the conference held on 27 Octo-
ber 1942 at the Reich Security Main Office, Referat IV B 4, at
which the Final Solution of the Jewish problem was discussed :

Oberregierungsrat
Dr. Boley
SS Captain Preusch

SS First Lieutenant Harders

Referent Dr. Schmid-Burgh

Oberlandesgerichtsrat
Massf elder
Reichsamtsleiter Kap
Regierungsrat Raudies
Bereichsleiter Leuschner

Reich Chancellery

Race and Settlement Main
Office SS

Race and Settlement Main
Office SS

Reich Ministry for Public
Enlightenment and
Propaganda

Reich Ministry of Justice

Party Chancellery

Party Chancellery

Office for Racial Politics
of the NSDAP

222

Oberreg. Rat Dr. Wetzel

Legation Counsellor
Dr. Klingenfuss
Amtsgerichtsrat Liegener

Reg. Rat Dr. Feldscher

Landesoberverwaltungsrat

Weirauch

SS Major Dr. Stier

SS Lieutenant Colonel OR.
Dr. Bilfinger

SS Major Reg. Rat Neifeind

SS Major Dr. Rodemberg
SS Lieutenant Colonel
Eichmann
SS Major Guenther

SS Major Reg. Rat. Suhr

Reg. Rat Hunsche

Reich Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories

Foreign Office

Plenipotentiary for the Four
Year Plan

Department I of Reich Ministry
of the Interior

Government of Government
General

Reich Commissioner for the
Strengthening of Germanism

Reich Security Main Office II A

Reich Security Main Office II A
2

Reich Security Main Office III A

Reich Security Main Office IV B
4

Reich Security Main Office IV B
4

Reich Security Main Office IV B
4

Reich Security Main Office IV B
4

The discussion showed the following results:

I. Persons of Mixed Blood

a. Persons of mixed blood of the first degree. — At the begin-
ning of the discussion it was said that owing to new knowledge
and experience gained in the field of sterilization, it would prob-
ably be possible to carry out sterilizations, already during the war ,
in simpler form and with shorter procedure. In view of that, the
suggestion to sterilize all reproductive persons of mixed blood of
the first degree, was agreed upon. The sterilization should be on
a voluntary basis. But it is the prerequisite for their remaining
in the Reich territory, and therefore constitutes a voluntary re-
turn service of the person of mixed blood of the first degree for
allowing him graciously to remain [gnadenweise Belassung] in
Reich territory. Consequently, the person of mixed blood (first
degree) is to be given the option to decide either to be deported
which, should the occasion arise, would also mean the taking to a

223

“person of mixed blood settlement/’ according to results of dis-
cussion held on 6 March 1942,* or to be sterilized. When giving
this choice, it serves a better purpose to depict deportation as
the more severe measure in comparison to sterilization. Thus,
the aim should be that in the few cases where an exception —
generally not provided for — has to be made, the possibility of
compulsory sterilization should still exist. For this reason, steril-
ization is to be considered a gracious favor [gnadenweise Ver-
guenstigung] which will be recognized as such and will lead
to the results that the number of applications for exemption from
these prescribed measures is likely not be very large. As it can
be assumed that almost all persons of mixed blood of the first
degree will decide on the lesser evil of sterilization, the endeavored
sterilization stands out clearly as the primary choice. Would,
on the other hand, on giving the choice, sterilization be depicted
as the greater evil, the person of mixed blood of the first degree,
to whom the possibility of an exception must be left open after
all, despite the directives, would not be subjected to any restric-
tions apart from those already in existence which, under no cir-
cumstances, can be tolerated because the intended sterilization
would then be made impossible. Giving the possibility of choice
also takes away to a certain degree the semblance of compulsion
for the intended measures and, above all, offers the advantage
that the creation of a legislative basis for the carrying out of
sterilization can perhaps be abandoned, because the person of
mixed blood of the first degree has voluntarily consented to be
sterilized. In order to prevent serious psychological repercus-
sions, sterilization measures should be carried out without much
ado wherever possible and under application of a simplified pro-
cedure and code-mark [Tamungsbezeichnung] . The persons of
mixed blood of the first degree are subject with few modifica-
tions to restrictions in the Reich territory as before and as laid
down previously. Should in single cases persons of mixed blood
of the first degree decide on deportation, measures are to be taken
to separate them from the opposite sex and to prevent any pos-
sibility of procreation.

b. Persons of mixed blood of the second degree . — As the per-
sons of mixed blood of the second degree are to be taken as of
German blood without exception, no particular measures are to
be taken against them. Certain existing restrictions, in connec-
tion with their legal status, will still remain in force.

* See file note on the preceding interdepartmental conference on the same questions. Docu-
ment NG-2686, Prosecution Exhibit 1644, reproduced immediately above.

224

II. Mixed Marriages

For marriages between persons of mixed blood of the first de-
gree or Jews, no additional divorce possibilities, except those
already existing, will be created, because there is no interest
for it.

1. Divorce by compulsion . — a. In the case of mixed marriages
between pure Germans and pure Jews, a compulsory divorce is
to be effected as laid down previously, in case the German blooded
marriage partner cannot make up his or her mind, within a
given time, to apply for divorce. Compulsory divorce seems ap-
propriate because in view of the Jew being deported a clear
legal situation within this field must be created. Exceptions are
also forbidden, contrary to the regulation intended up to now,
in the case of persons considered as Jews who only possess
two racially pure Jewish grandparents on either side or less,
because to check such cases would entail too many difficulties and
there is no reason to deviate from the legal classification as pure
Jew in accordance with Articles 2 and 5 of the First Decree to
the Reich Citizen Law dated 14 November 1935 (Reich Legal
Gazette I, p. 1333). Unless there is no other decision within
the meaning of Article 7 of the mentioned decree, no pure Jew
can be exempted from this regulation, even if their legitimate
children have already been recognized as equals to persons of
German blood or if their recognition can be expected on account
of being soldiers as members of the Wehrmacht.

b. At the same time, the possibility must exist for compulsory
divorce, as laid down, between persons of mixed blood in the
second degree and Jews.

2. Simplified divorce on application.

*******

The above results of this discussion shall, as agreed upon, be
forwarded to the appropriate offices for their final attitude which
is to be given within 4 weeks at the latest.

2 25

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1805
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2357

EXTRACT FROM THE INTRODUCTION TO THE SS PAMPHLET "THE

SUBHUMAN," A PUBLICATION OF THE SS MAIN OFFICE*

*******

“As long as there are human beings on earth, the fight be-
tween humans and subhumans will be a historical law and the
fight led by the Jew against the nations belongs, as far back as
we can see, to the natural course of life on our planet. One
can safely arrive at the conclusion that this struggle for life
and death is as much a law of nature as the fight of the plague
germ against the healthy body.”

Reich Leader SS Heinrich Himmler 1935
Just as the night rises against the day, as light and shadow
are eternal enemies — so the greatest enemy of man who rules the
earth is man himself. The subhuman — this biologically appar-
ently entirely man-resembling creation of nature with hands, feet,
and a sort of brain, with eyes and mouth, is yet an entirely dif-
ferent, a terrible creature, is only tending towards a human with
anthropoid facial features — but mentally and morally lower than
any animal. In the interior of this being is a cruel chaos of wild,
unsuppressed fury — the inexpressible will to destruction, most
primitive greed, entirely inconcealed obscenity.

Subhuman — nothing else. For not all that wears human fea-
tures is equal. Woe to him who forgets this !

Whatever this earth possesses of great works, ideas and arts —
man has contrived, created, and completed ; he meditated and in-
vented, for him there was only one goal — to work himself up
to a higher level of existence, to shape the inadequate, and to
replace the insufficient by something better.

So culture grew.

So the plow, the tool, and the house came into existence.

So man became gregarious; so family, nation, and state came
into existence.

So man became good and great. So he rose far above all crea-
tures.

So he became nearest to God.

* The pamphlet is a 50-page publication consisting of an introduction and numerous photo-
graphs with lengthy captions. For technical reasons none of the photographs are reproduced
here. Concerning support for the distribution of this pamphlet, see the letter of defendant
Berger to Himmler, dated 31 March 1942, reproduced in part immediately below. A slightly
revised edition of “The SubHuman” was also introduced in evidence as Document NO-5889,
Prosecution Exhibit 3498, not reproduced herein.

226

But the subhuman also lived. He hated the work of the other.
He raged against it, secretly as thief, publicly as slanderer — as
murderer.

He associated with his ilk.

Beast called to beast.

Never did the subhuman preserve peace, never did he relax.
For he needed semi-darkness, chaos. He avoided the light of
cultural progress.

* * * * * * *
Publisher . — The Reich Leader SS, the SS Main Office.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF NO-537
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2358

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM DEFENDANT BERGER TO HIMMLER,
31 MARCH 1942, CONCERNING A VISIT OF BERGER TO THE
TREASURER OF THE NAZI PARTY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUPPORT
FOR THE CIRCULATION OF THE SS PAMPHLET "THE SUBHUMAN"
AND OTHER MATTERS

Berlin W 35, 31 March 1942
Luetzowstr. 48/49
POB 43
[Stamp] Secret

[Illegible initial]

The Reich Leader SS
Chief of the SS Main Office
CdSSHA Re/Vo. Journal No. 1109
Quote above reference number
and date when replying.

Concerns: Inspection Trip Munich

Departure: Friday, 27 March 1942, 2205 hours.
Arrival: Berlin, Sunday, 29 March 1942, 0850 hours.
To the Reich Leader SS H. Himmler
Fuehrer Headquarters
Reich Leader

1. Reich Treasurer [of the Nazi Party] Schwarz.

On Saturday I visited Reich Treasurer Schwarz in order to
show him the pamphlet “Der Untermensch” [“The Subhuman”]
personally and in order to be able to ask him for his support.

The Reich Treasurer was very talkative and told me about his
conference with the Reich Leader SS, which had provided him

227

with incentive for three whole months. He liked the pamphlet
very much and said that every German family should have it
and that he himself will support its circulation.

Germanic work is important to the Reich Treasurer. He defi-
nitely agreed with my ideas about the consolidation and uniform
coordination under the Reich Leader SS. He proposed that Ger-
manic work should somehow constitute a basic principle in the
regulation implementing the Fuehrer decree concerning the con-
solidation of “folkdom work” [Volkstumarbeit] in the “folkdom
community” [Volkstumsverband] . However, he could not sur-
vey the situation at present but believed that it would be the
best solution. He would do all in his power for the Reich schools
in the Germanic countries.

Reich Treasurer Schwarz is especially grateful to me for having
warned him at the time in November to accept the invitation of
the Governor General Frank. During early summer Reich Treas-
urer Schwarz intends to visit a number of Gaue. The itinerary
is to be sent to me, and he asks the Reich Leader SS to check
whether it would be better not to visit one or the other of the
Gauleiters. It is of particular interest to him that suddenly a
number of Gauleiters again wish to cooperate more closely and
without exception base it on the fact that in spite of all ill will
and misunderstanding the Reich Leader SS and his SS never-
theless form the nucleus of the Party.

*******

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-1
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1454

MEMORANDUM FROM RADEMACHER TO DEFENDANT VON WEIZ-
SAECKER. THROUGH LUTHER, GAUS, AND DEFENDANT WOER-
MANN, 1 1 JUNE 1942, CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF PERSONS
OF "MIXED BLOOD"

Branch D III

D III 53 g
[Stamp] Top Secret

via Under State Secretary Luther, Under State Secretary Gaus,
Under State Secretary Woermann, and to State Secretary von
Weizsaecker

As per enclosures* I submit a graphic presentation of the re-

* The enclosures were a part of the exhibit introduced in evidence but they are not repro-
duced here because of their length. The enclosures begin with a memorandum on the State
Secretary Conference of 20 January 1942 concerning the handling of persons of "mixed blood”
and include numerous letters from various Ministries on the question.

228

suit of the conferences and correspondence up to date regarding
the question of future measures toward persons of mixed blood
(first and second degree).

Viewing the matter from the angle of foreign policy it should
be immaterial whether the persons of mixed blood are deported
to the East or whether they are sterilized and permitted to remain
in Germany.

Berlin, 11 June 1942

[Signed] Rademacher

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-I5I6
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1704

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT WOERMANN TO DEPARTMENT
GERMANY III, 19 MAY 1942, CONCERNING THE EXEMPTION OF
CERTAIN FOREIGN JEWS FROM JEWISH MEASURES IN FRANCE
AND THE NETHERLANDS

to D III 447 g (secret) II
Berlin, 19 May 1942

The State Secretary sent me the enclosed agenda* with a note
that I should settle the matter with the Division Germany direct.

From the note, dated 18 May, I cannot see distinctly what
ultimate suggestion is now being made by Division Germany. I
initialed the suggestion dated 15 May at the time, but I have
now come to the conclusion that to afford privileged treatment
just for American and British Jews in France is not practicable
and would also contradict the directives given by the Reich For-
eign Minister. Otherwise I call your attention to the fact that,
according to a report sent by Minister Bene to the Germany Di-
vision, all foreign Jews were exempted in the occupied Nether-
lands. Generally it seems to me expedient if, in questions of this
nature, the same policy is followed in all occupied countries.

In carefully considering the various circumstances it seems to
me that the simplest solution would be to proceed in occupied
France either in the same way as in the Netherlands or as in
Germany.

I do not see any sound reason why one should introduce a
third regime in France. The argument that any exemption of
foreigners could only take place by internal regulations with the
cooperation of French authorities, and would be interpreted as a
weakness in France, appears to me more relevant to the case —
that only our enemies, the British and Americans, are privileged
— than if the regulations valid in Germany were to be introduced.

The enclosure was not a part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

229

The possibility mentioned at the close of the note dated 18
May, namely to induce the French Government to issue a simul-
taneous, adequate decree for unoccupied France, suggests caus-
ing the French Government to pass an adequate decree for oc-
cupied and unoccupied France. I recommend asking Ambassador
Abetz to give his opinion and to get that of the military com-
mander on this question. It would not be practicable for the 1
June deadline not to be met. Please call me up or discuss the
matter with me before a final settlement is made.

Herewith.

Department D III
Signed : Woermann

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4409
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1633

MEMORANDUM FROM WUESTER TO DEFENDANTS VON WEIZSAECKER
AND WOERMANN, 9 SEPTEMBER 1941 , CONCERNING THE SIGNING
OF NEW JEWISH LAWS IN SLOVAKIA SAID TO BE "MUCH MORE
SEVERE" THAN PREVAILING GERMAN LAWS

Berlin, 9 September [1941]
Memorandum

During a telephone conversation Embassy Counsellor Dr. En-
droes in Bratislava just informed me that the new Jewish laws
will be signed today by the Slovakian Council of Ministers. In
their effect upon the Jews they are said to be much more severe
than the prevailing German (Nuernberg) Laws. Dr. Endroes
points out that this is of special significance inasmuch as a Catho-
lic priest is head of the Slovakian State. Minister Ludin will
report fully after the signing. Dr. Endroes asked that this event
be thoroughly discussed in the German press and radio because
of the aforementioned significance.

[Signed] Wuester

To the State Secretary [Initial] W [WEIZSAECKER]

Director Political Division
Director Radio Division
each

230

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT N0-44O7
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1635

EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN THE GERMAN MINISTER IN
SLOVAKIA AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 26 AND 30 JUNE, 1942,
CONCERNING DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCE BY GERMANY IN CON-
NECTION WITH THE DEPORTATION OF SLOVAKIAN JEWS

I. Telegram from Minister Ludin to the Foreign Office, 26 June 1942

Telegram

(Secret)

Bratislava, 26 June 1942, 1205 hours
Received: 26 June 1942, 1215 hours
No. 992 of 26 June

Citissime!

Evacuation of Jews from Slovakia has reached a deadlock.
Because of clerical influence and the corruption of individual
officials, 35,000 Jews have received special consideration on the
basis of which they need not be evacuated. The deportation of
Jews is very unpopular in wide circles of the Slovakian popu-
lation. This attitude is strengthened by English counterpropa-
ganda which commenced sharply in the last few days. Minister
President Tuka wishes to continue the deportations, however,
and requests strong support by diplomatic pressure on the part
of the Reich.

Request directives as to whether this direction is to be fol-
lowed.

Ludin

[Distribution Form]*

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Secretary Political Div.

Under State Secretary Legal Div.

Under State Secretary Luther

Ambassador Ritter

Chief Personnel

Chief Trade Political

Chief Cultural

Chief Press

Chief Radio

Chief Information

* On the distribution form, handwritten checkmarks appear after the following entries:
“State Secretary Keppler;” “Under State Secretary, Political Division” [defendant Woermann];
“Under State Secretary Legal Division;” “Under State Secretary Luther;” “Dirigent Political
Division.”

231

Chief Protocol

Dirigent Political Division [checked]

Work copy with Pol IV D [Illegible initial]

[Handwritten] State Secretary

2. Telegram from defendant von Weizsaecker to Ambassador Luther,
dispatched on 30 June 1942

Teletype — Secret

For Ambassador Ludin Personally

To the German Embassy Bratislava
Under State Secretary Luther
[Handwritten] No. 976

State Secretary
Under State Secretary
Subject: Deportation of Jews from Slovakia

After Dispatch : Pol IV for information.

In reply to your telegram No. 992 of 26 June. You can render
the diplomatic assistance requested by Minister President Tuka
by stating on occasion that the stopping of the deportation of
Jews and particularly the exclusion of 35,000 Jews reported in
your telegram would cause surprise* in Germany, particularly
since the previous cooperation of Slovakia in the Jewish question
has been much appreciated here.

Weizsaecker

[Handwritten] Sent 30 June

* In original document, the words “would leave a very bad impression” were crossed out,
and the phrase “would cause surprise” inserted by hand.

232

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-183
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1680

CORRESPONDENCE AND DRAFT CORRESPONDENCE OF THE GER-
MAN FOREIGN OFFICE, JUNE AND JULY 1942, CONCERNING THE
TRANSPORT OF JEWS FROM FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS, AND
BELGIUM TO AUSCHWITZ

I. Telegram of 28 June 1942, with notes and initials

Berlin, 28 June 1942 File reference: D III 516 g

[Stamp] Diplogerma
Consugerma

[Stamp] Secret

[Stamp] Telegram (Secret Code)

1. To the Diplogerma —

a . German Embassy in Paris. [Handwritten] No. 2709.

b. Branch of the Foreign Office at Brussels. [Handwritten]
No. 788 Foreign Office.

c. The Representative of the Foreign Office to the staff of the
Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherland Territories at
The Hague, Plein 23 [Handwritten] Zc IIV 601 g

— each separately. [Handwritten] No. 207 [illegible initial].
State Secretary [initial] W [Weizsaecker] 28 [June]

Under State Secretary
Referent: Under State Secretary Luther
Legation Councillor Rademacher

2. Before Dispatch —

To Section Pol. II Ref. 1, with the request to take note and to
cosign.

[Handwritten on margin] Resubmit at once after dispatch with respect to
Hague (no code material, no secret teletype!) 30/6 [Illegible initials] 28/6
to: a and b.

The Chief of the Security Police and the SD issues the fol-
lowing information :

“Provisions have been made to run daily special trains with
a capacity of 1,000 persons each, from the middle of July and
beginning of August on, respectively, by means of which the
deportation to the Auschwitz camp for labor service of at
first approx [imately] 40,000 Jews from Occupied French ter-
ritory, 40,000 Jews from the Netherlands, and 10,000 Jews
from Belgium will be carried out.

233

“Persons at present coming within the scope of these meas-
ures are able-bodied Jews, insofar as they do not live in a
mixed marriage and do not possess a citizenship of the British
Empire, the United States, Mexico, or of the enemy states of
Central and South America, or of the neutral and allied states.”
An early reply is requested.

[Signed] Luther 25 June
[Initial ] R [Rademacher] 25 June

2. Telegram from Ambassador Abetz m Paris, 2 July 1942, with
initials and distribution

[Stamp] Work-copy

Telegram, (by secret teletypewriter)
[Stamp] Foreign Office
D III 539 0
In: 3 July 1942

Paris, 2 July 1942, 2245 hours.

Arrival: 3 July 1942, 0200 hours.

No. 2784 dated 2 July

To decree by cable No. 2709* dated 28 June and in reply to
cable report No. 2783** dated 2 July

[Marginal note]

* D III 516 g.

** D III.

[Distribution Stamp]

Fifteen copies of the above were produced, which were dis-
tributed as follows : *

No. 1— D III (Working Staff).

2 — Reich Foreign Minister

3 — State Secretary [defendant von Weizsaecker] .

5 — Office of the Reich Foreign Minister.

6 — Chief of the Political Division [defendant Woermann].

7 — Chief of the Legal Division.

8 — Chief of the Personnel Division.

9 — Chief of the Trade Policy Division.

10 — Chief of the Cultural Division.

11 — Chief of the Press Division.

12 — Chief of the Protocol Division.

13 — Chief of the Division Germany.

14 — Chief of the Radio Division.

15 — Deputy Chief of the Political Division.

9 The number “4” space on this distribution list was left a blank in the original document.

234

This is copy No. 1

The Embassy has no objections on principle against the de-
portation of 40,000 Jews from France to be allocated for labor
to the Auschwitz camp. In carrying out these measures, however,
the following points should be taken into consideration:

Whenever anti- Jewish measures were taken, the Embassy took
the view that they should be carried out in such a form as to
continuously add further to the anti-Semitic sentiment, which has
increased of late. Just as former influx of eastern and other
foreign Jews into Germany lent a special zest to the anti-Semitic
trend among the German people, so it can also be observed in
France that the increase of anti-Semitism is to a large degree
caused by the immigration of Jews of foreign nationalities in the
last few years. It will therefore have a psychological effect on
the broad masses of French people, if the evacuation measures
are at first applied to such foreign Jews, and French Jews are
at first only drawn upon to the extent which foreign Jews do not
fill the above mentioned quota.

Such a procedure would by no means establish a privileged po-
sition for the French Jew, as in any case he must likewise dis-
appear in the process of liberation of the European countries
from Jewry. This already finds its expression in the fact that
in any case a certain number of French Jews will be included in
the stipulated quota.

Abetz

3. Teletype from Luther to the German Embassy in Paris, 10 July 1942

Berlin, 10 July 1942 File reference: D III 539 g

[Stamp] Diplogerma

Consugerma Teletype, by secret teletypewriter
No. 2964

To the German Embassy Paris

[Stamp] Dispatched 11 July, [Illegible number] hours

Concerning telegram 2 July, No. 2783 and No. 2784.

After dispatch — To Section Pol II for information. [Illegible
initial] .

At the time not yet possible to give priority in deportation to
Jews of foreign nationality.

Further orders pending concerning the extension of expulsion
measures to foreign Jews.

Evacuation now to be carried out without delay.

[Signed] Luther

[Stamp]

Leave Space for Telegram Control

235

4. Draft express letter from the Foreign Office to the Reich Main Security
Office, with various initials, dated in late July 1942

Draft Regarding D III 558 g.

Express letter

1. To Reich Security Main Office — IV B 4 —

Attention: SS Lieutenant Colonel Eichmann
Berlin W 62
Kurfuerstenstr. 116.

Concerning Express letter of 22 of last month
IV B 4a— 3233/41 Secret (1085).

State Secretary [initial] W [Weizsaecker] 29
Under State Secretary [initial] W [Woermann]

Chief Political Division
Under State Secretary
Germany Div. [Illegible initials]

27 July

Ref. : Legation Counsellor Klingenfuss

In principle the Foreign Office has no objection to the planned
deportation of the given number of Jews from the occupied
territory in France, the Netherlands, and Belgium for labor at
the Auschwitz camp. In view of the psychological effect, I
should like to request that first of all the stateless Jews be de-
ported, thus including to a large extent the number of foreign
Jews who had emigrated to the West. There are nearly 25,000
of these Jews in the Netherlands alone. For the same reason
the Military Administration in Brussels [crossed out : “intends”]
select first only Polish, Czech, Russian, and other Jews [crossed
out: “while it (the Brussels Military Administration) has doubts
as to include Belgian Jews, the Foreign Office does not share
these doubts”].

[Handwritten marginal note] Will, as far as known here.

Jews of Hungarian and Rumanian nationality can be deported;
however, it is requested that care be taken to secure all property
in each case.

By order:

[Signed] Luther 26 July

2. WV.

[Initial] R [Rademacher] 27 July

236

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 510a*
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 465

MEMORANDUM ON A CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS FOR JEWISH QUES-
TIONS OF THE SECURITY POLICE IN PARIS, I JULY 1942, CON-
CERNING THE DEPORTATION OF 50,000 JEWS TO THE AUSCHWITZ
CONCENTRATION CAMP

IV J— SA 24 Paris, 1 July 1942

Ah/Ge

Subject: Conference with the specialists for Jewish questions of
the Security Police (SD) — units in the Referat
IV J on 30 June 1942;

Re: Deportation of Jews from the Occupied Zone [of
France] to Auschwitz

1. Memorandum. The specialists for Jewish questions of the
SD units were advised in connection with the deportation of Jews
from the occupied zone that it was decided in a conference at
the Reich Security Main Office to deport within a short time
50,000 Jews from the Occupied Zone of France. The necessary
preliminary work shall be commenced at once. It is contemplated
to use the following trains for the movement:

First train from Bordeaux (first shipment to leave 13 July
1942).

Second train from Bordeaux.

Third train from Angers.

Fourth train from Rouen.

Fifth train from Chalons-sur-Marne — Nancy.

Sixth train from Orleans.

The first train to leave from Bordeaux has already been made
available for 13 July 1942. The other trains probably will be
made ready for departure at 2-day intervals.

The Security Police (SD) units [at] Dijon, Poitiers, Rennes,
and St. Quentin shall ship the Jews who were registered in their
districts to the nearest railroad stations designated for the de-
parture according to the following schedule:

St. Quentin to Chalons-sur-Marne.

Dijon to Orleans.

Poitiers and Rennes to Angers.

The specialists were once more instructed to carry out the
necessary actions at once allowing no leniency and to report not
later than 6 July 1942 on the following points:
a. How many Jews are eligible for the shipments?

* This document is an excerpt of Document RF-1222 introduced in the IMT trial as Exhibit
RF-1222, and the full German text is reproduced in Trial of the Major War Criminals, op. cit.,
volume XXXIX, pages 4-6.

953402—62 16

237

b. How many children are going to remain behind?

c. How many old Jews and such who are partially disabled
are going to remain behind?

d. How many not wearing the Jewish Star of David are still
in the command area of the SD Commandos?

e. Have arrangements been made to have the trains guarded
by military police?

2. Submitted for information to SS Colonel Dr. Knochen.

3. Submitted for information to SS Lieutenant Colonel Lischka.

4. Returned to IV J.

Signed : Dannecker

SS Captain

* * * * * * *

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT STEENGRACHT 66
STEENGRACHT DEFENSE EXHIBIT 66

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT LAMMERS TO SUPREME REICH AUTHORI-
TIES AND OFFICES UNDER IMMEDIATE COMMAND OF HITLER, 5
JULY 1942, REQUESTING SUPPORT OF ROSENBERG AS LEADER OF
THE INTELLECTUAL STRUGGLE AGAINST JEWS AND FREE MASONS,
AND DEFINING AUTHORITY OF ROSENBERG'S "EINSATZSTAB" IN
OCCUPIED TERRITORY*

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Rk. 9495 B

Please use this reference in any further correspondence.

Berlin W8, 5 July 1942
Voss Str. 6

At present Fuehrer Headquarters
Mail is to be addressed
exclusively to the Berlin
address.

To the Supreme Reich Authorities and the offices under the
immediate command of the Fuehrer

In his capacity as the Fuehrer’s delegate for the supervision of
the entire spiritual and ideological indoctrination and training of
the NSDAP, the Fuehrer has entrusted Reichsleiter Rosenberg
with the intellectual struggle against the Jews and Free Masons
as well as their allied ideological opponents of national socialism
as the originators of the present war. For this purpose the

* This letter was introduced in the IMT trial as Document 1015-D-PS, Exhibit USA-385,
and the German text is reproduced in Trial of the Major War Criminals, op. cit., volume
XXVI, pages 632 and 633.

238

Fuehrer has ordered that, in the occupied territories under mili-
tary administration and in the Occupied Eastern Territories under
civilian administration, (not including the Government General)
the Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg shall have the right
to search libraries, archives, lodges, and other ideological and
cultural institutions for material suitable for the execution of
its task and to ask the competent Wehrmacht and police authori-
ties to requisition material thus obtained to implement the ideo-
logical tasks of the NSDAP and for subsequent scientific research
by the Academy for Political Science [Hohen Schule], in which
process the files pertaining to police and political matters will
remain with the police, all the rest will be handed over to the
Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. The Einsatzstab shall
have the right to make the same request with regard to cultural
objects which are the property or possession of Jews, which are
without owner, or the owner of which cannot be established with
certainty. The implementation regulations on collaboration with
the Wehrmacht will be issued by the Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht in agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg. In
his capacity as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Terri-
tories, Reichsleiter Rosenberg will take the necessary steps in
the eastern territories under German administration.

I inform you of this instruction of the Fuehrer and request
that you support Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his
task.

[Signed] Dr. Lammers

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-3631
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1100

LETTER FROM HIMMLER TO ROSENBERG, JULY 1942, CONFIRMING
THE APPOINTMENT OF DEFENDANT BERGER AS LIAISON OFFICER
OF HIMMLER WITH THE EAST MINISTRY

Fuehrer Headquarters
July 1942*

Dear Party Member Rosenberg:

With this letter I wish to confirm our oral discussion of yes-
terday regarding the appointment of a liaison officer.

After the death of SS Lieutenant General Heydrich, I appoint
the Chief of the SS Main Office, SS Major General and Major
General of the Waffen SS Berger — with whom you personally,
as well as your office, hitherto had good contact — as liaison offi-
cer with the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

* The original document had no day in the date. The document was found in folder C-lll
of the SS files collected in the Berlin Document Center after the war.

239

Current official relations between my Main Offices, especially
the Main Office Uniformed Police and the Main Office Security
Police and your Ministry are not affected thereby. The chiefs
of my Main Offices will, on their own part, inform the liaison
officer of all developments.

Consultation and visits of the individual Chiefs of Main Offices,
as for example, of the SS General Daluege, of the SS Lieutenant
General Wolff, of the SS Lieutenant General Pohl, of the SS
Major Generals Streckenbach, Mueller, Greifelt, Juettner, and
others will likewise not be affected by the activity of the liaison
officer.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[Signed] H. Himmler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-626*
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2378

LETTER FROM HIMMLER TO DEFENDANT BERGER, 28 JULY 1942,
INFORMING BERGER THAT THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WILL BE
PURGED OF JEWS, AND ADVISING BERGER OF A FORTHCOMING
MEMORANDUM BY DEFENDANT LAMMERS

The Reich Leader SS Reval, 28 July 1942

1279/42

Top Secret

Dear Berger, 1 Copy

Concerning your file notes —

1. I urgently request that no ordinance regarding the defini-
tion of the word “Jew” be issued. We are only tying our own
hands by establishing these foolish definitions. The occupied ter-
ritories will be purged of Jews. The Fuehrer has charged me
with the execution of this very difficult order. No one can re-
lease me from this responsibility in any case. Hence, I strongly
resent all interference. You will receive the memorandum of
Lammers in a short time.

2. What is the idea of this marital law? I want it to be sub-
mitted to me. I can already say that I am of the opinion that
alliances [Verbindungen] of Germans with local women cannot
for the present be regulated by law. They should be prohibited
by law altogether. Exceptions for Estonia and Latvia would
have to be sent to central authorities there and decided individu-
ally according to racial considerations. In a year's time the

• Photographic reproduction of this document appears in Appendix A, Volume XIV.

240

knowledge gained by practical experience can be expressed in
legal form.

That is the way to govern and not otherwise.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[Initials] H. H. [Heinrich Himmler]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2633
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1683

MEMORANDUM FROM ALBRECHT TO DEFENDANT VON WEIZ-
SAECKER, 31 JULY 1942, CONCERNING COMPLICATIONSARISING
WITH SWEDEN AS THE PROTECTING POWER FOR HOLLAND IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INTERNMENT AND DEATH OF DUTCH
JEWS IN GERMAN CONCENTRATION CAMPS

to File III 581, Secret

Sweden is still recognized as the Protecting Power for the
Netherlands, because in case of a withdrawal of the functions of
the Protecting Power there would be the risk that the Netherland
authorities in Surinam and Curasao, on their part, might also
cease to recognize Switzerland as the Protecting Power for Ger-
many, in which case the Germans residing in those places would
be deprived of an effective protection. Sweden’s authority as a
Protecting Power relates to the German Reich and the occupied
territories, not however, to Holland directly. For this reason, the
Foreign Office has repeatedly suggested, in the case of internment
measures against Dutch citizens, that the internments should be
undertaken in Holland, in order to prevent the Swedish delegation
raising a claim from visiting the internees. Moreover, due to in-
ternal administrative measures, Sweden’s activities as the Protect-
ing Power for Dutch citizens have been so limited that they are
very small. When the prospective deportation of Jews from Hol-
land takes place, it can be assumed without doubt that interna-
tional Jewish circles will try to persuade the Swedish delegation,
via the Dutch Government in exile, to make an attempt 'at inter-
vention on behalf of these Jews. The Reich government will not
be in the position to reject such attempts on the grounds that these
Jews have been deprived of their Dutch citizenship by a German
Government authority. The regulation in prospect will therefore
not achieve its purpose to eliminate Sweden in its role as a
Protecting Power.

[Handwritten] In connection with this see Foreign Office report from
London.

241

When, after the Amsterdam uprisings, several hundred Jews of
Dutch nationality were taken to the Mauthausen internment camp,
the police turned down the repeated requests of the Swedish dele-
gation for permission to inspect this camp. On the other hand,
the police currently forwarded death certificates to the relatives
of these Jews in the Netherlands from which it could be deter-
mined that gradually all these Jews died.

With the deportation of Jews now imminent, it would have to
be investigated whether it is necessary for the police to continue
to furnish the interested parties with material from which they
could authentically determine the result of the measures which
have been taken. As long as Jewish internees were present in
Mauthausen the Swedish delegation took the occasion to renew
their requests to visit the camp whenever further death certificates
arrived. Should it be unavoidable to place the Dutch Jews out-
side Holland, it would be expedient if the police would not allow
any information to leak out with regard to their whereabouts, or
possible cases of death. Then it would presumably be possible to
turn down the requests of the Swedish delegation to visit the
camp. However, the risk that Germans in Dutch colonies may
experience worse treatment as a consequence of the measures
against the Jews, cannot be prevented.

Herewith respectfully submitted to the State Secretary

Berlin, 31 July 1942
[Signed] Albrecht

[Marginal note in Weizsaecker’s handwriting] For final decision.

[Initial] W [Weizsaecker] 1 August.

242

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2586-J
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1455

EXTRACTS FROM A MEMORANDUM OF LUTHER, 21 AUGUST 1942,

REVIEWING ANTI-JEWISH MEASURES SINCE 1939, THE RELATION

*OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE THERETO, AND FURTHER MEASURES

CONNECTED TO THE "FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE JEWISH

QUESTION

Memorandum 1
Berlin, 21 August 1942

Most Urgent ( Citissime )

Reference: No. 954 of 19 August [1942]

1. The principle of the German Jewish policy after the seizure
of power consisted in promoting with all means the Jewish emi-
gration. For this purpose in 1939 Field Marshal Goering in his
capacity as Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan established a
Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration and the direction was
given to SS Major General Heydrich in his capacity as Chief of
the Security Police. 2 The Foreign Office is represented in the
committee of the Reich Central Office. The draft of a letter to
this effect to the Chief of the Security Police was approved by
the Reich Foreign Minister as 83/24 B in February 1939.

2. The present war gives Germany the opportunity and also
the duty of solving the Jewish problem in Europe. In considera-
tion of the favorable course of the war against France , D III
proposed in July 19 UO as a solution — the removal of all Jews from
Europe and the demanding of the Island of Madagascar from
France as a territory for the reception of the Jews. 3 The Reich
Foreign Minister has basically agreed to the beginning of the
preliminary work for the deportation of the Jews from Europe .
This should be done in close cooperation with the offices of the
Reich Leader SS (compare D III 200/40).

The Madagascar plan was enthusiastically accepted by the Reich
Security Main Office which in the opinion of the Foreign Office is
the agency which alone is in the position technically and by ex-
perience to carry out a Jewish evacuation on a large scale and
to guarantee the supervision of the people evacuated. 4 The com-

1 The italicized portion of this document was underlined by hand on the copy introduced in
evidence. The document, one of many related documents found in Foreign Office files, does
not indicate to whom it was addressed, or to whom it was circulated.

* See Document NG-2586-A, Prosecution Exhibit 1443, reproduced earlier in this section.

* See Rademacher’s memorandum of 3 July 1940 on “The Jewish Question in the Peace
Treaty,” Document NG— 2586— B, Prosecution Exhibit 1445, reproduced earlier in this section.

* This sentence was introduced in evidence as Document Stuckart 638, Stuckart Defense
Exhibit 374.

243

petent agency of the Reich Security Main Office thereupon worked
out a plan going into detail for the evacuation of the Jews to
Madagascar and for their settlement there . This plan was ap-
proved by the Reich Leader SS. SS Major General Heydrich
submitted this plan directly to the Reich Foreign Minister in
August 1940 (compare D III 2171) . The Madagascar plan in fact
has been outdated as the result of the political development .

The fact that the Fuehrer intends to evacuate all Jews from
Europe was communicated to me as early as August 19 U0 by
Ambassador Abetz after an interview with the Fuehrer (compare
D III 2298).

Hence the basic instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister, to
promote the evacuation of the Jews in closest cooperation with
the agencies of the Reich Leader SS, is still in force and will
therefore be observed by D III.

3. The administration of the occupied territories brought with
it the problem of the treatment of Jews living in these territories .
First, the military commander in France saw himself compelled
as the first one to issue on 27 September 1940 a decree on the
treatment of the Jews in occupied France. 1 The decree was
issued with the agreement of the German Embassy in Paris. The
pertinent instruction was issued directly by the Reich Foreign
Minister to Ambassador Abetz on the occasion of a verbal report.

After the pattern of the Paris decree similar decrees have been
issued in the Netherlands and Belgium. As these decrees, in the
same way as German laws concerning Jews, formally embrace all
Jews independent of their citizenship, objections were made by
foreign powers, among others protest notes by the Embassy of the
United States of America, although the military commander in
France through internal regulation had ordered that the Jewish
measures should not be applied to the citizens of neutral countries.

The Reich Foreign Minister has decided in the case of the
American protests that he does not consider it right to have mili-
tary regulations issued for making an exception of the American
Jews. It would be a mistake to reject objections of friendly states
(Spain and Hungary) and on the other hand to show weakness
toward the Americans. 2 The Reich Foreign Minister considers
it necessary to make these instructions to the field commandants
retroactive (compare D III 5449).

In accordance with this direction the Jewish measures have
been given general application.

1 See telegram of Minister Schleier of the German Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Office
in Berlin, 9 October 1940, reproduced earlier in this section as item 5 of Document NG-4893,
Prosecution Exhibit 1688.

* See Rademacher’s file note of 19 December 1940, reproduced earlier in this section as
item 8 of Document NG-4893, Prosecution Exhibit 1688.

244

4. In his letter of 24 June 1940 — Pol XII 136 — SS Major Gen-
eral Heydrich informed the Reich Foreign Minister that the whole
problem of the approximately three and a quarter million Jews
in the areas under German control can no longer be solved by
emigration — a territorial final solution [ territoriale Endloesung']
would be necessary.

In recognition of this Reich Marshal Goering on 31 July 1941
commissioned SS Major General Heydrich to make, in conjunction
with the interested German Control agencies, all necessary prep-
arations for a total solution [ Gesamtloesung ] of the Jewish prob-
lem in the German sphere of influence in Europe 1 (compare D
III 709 secret) . On the basis of this instruction, SS Major Gen-
eral Heydrich arranged a conference of all the interested German
agencies for 20 January 19 42, 2 at which the State Secretaries
were present from the other Ministries and I myself from the
Foreign Office. In the conference General Heydrich explained
that Reich Marshal Goering’s assignment to him had been made
on the Fuehrer’s instruction and that the Fuehrer instead of the
emigration had now authorized the evacuation of the Jews to the
East as the solution (compare page 5 of the enclosure to D III
29/42 Secret). State Secretary Weizsaecker had been informed
on the conference ; 1 * 3 for the time being the Reich Foreign Minister
had not been informed on the conference, because SS Major Gen-
eral Heydrich agreed to holding a new conference in the near
future in which more details of the total solution should be dis-
cussed. This conference has never taken place due to Major Gen-
eral Heydrich’s appointment as acting Reich Protector of Bo-
hemia and Moravia and due to his death.

hi the conference on 20 January 1942 I demanded that all
questions concerned with countries outside Germany must first
have the agreement of the Foreign Office, a demand to which SS
Major General Heydrich agreed and also has faithfully complied
with, as in fact, the office of the Reich Security Main Office
handling Jewish matters has from the beginning carried out all
measures in frictionless cooperation with the Foreign Office. The
Reich Security Main Office has in this matter proceeded indeed
almost over cautiously.

5. On the basis of the Fuehrer’s instruction mentioned under 4
[above], the evacuation of the Jews from Germany was begun.
It was urged that at the same time these Jews should also be

1 See Document NG-2586-E, Prosecution Exhibit 1448, also Stuckart Document 635, Stuckart
Defense Exhibit 371, reproduced earlier in this section.

* Reference is made to the “Wannsee Conference.” Extracts from the minutes of this con-
ference are reproduced earlier in this section (Doc. NG-2586-G, Pros. Ex. 1452).

•The defendant von Weizsaecker denied having: been informed of the discussion of the
“Final Solution” at the Wannsee Conference. See extracts from his testimony reproduced
later in this section.

245

taken who were nationals of the countries which had also under-
taken Jewish measures. The Reich Security Main Office accord-
ingly made an inquiry of the Foreign Office. For reasons of
courtesy, inquiry was made by way of the German legations in
Bratislava, Zagreb, and Bucharest to the governments there as
to whether they wanted to recall their Jews from Germany in due
time or to agree to their deportation to the ghettos in the East.
To the issuance of this instruction agreement was given before
dispatch by the State Secretary, the Under State Secretary in
Charge of the Political Division, the Director of the Division for
Economic Policy and the Director of the Legal Division (com-
pare D III 336 Secret).

The German Legation in Bucharest reports with reference to D
III 602 Secret, that the Rumanian Government would leave it to
the Reich government to deport their Jews along with the Ger-
man Jews to the ghettos in the East. They are not interested in
having the Rumanian Jews return to Rumania.

The Legation in Zagreb has informed us that the Croat Gov-
ernment expresses gratitude for the gesture of the German Gov-
ernment; but it would appreciate the deportation of its Jews to
the East (compare D III 624 Secret).

The Legation in Bratislava reported with reference to D III
661 Secret that the Slovak Government is fundamentally in agree-
ment with the deportation to the eastern ghettos. But the Slovak
claims to the property of these Jews should not be endangered.

The wire reports have also been submitted, as customary, to
the Reich Foreign Minister's Bureau.

On the basis of the reports of the Ministers I have informed
the Reich Security Main Office with reference to D III 661 Secret
that the Jews of Rumania, Croat, and Slovak nationality could
also be deported ; their property should be blocked. The Director
of the Political Division, Section IV of the Political Division,
Section IX of the Legal Division and Section IV of the Division
for the Economic Policy have cosigned the document. Accord-
ingly, the deportations of the Jews from the occupied territories
was undertaken.

6. The number of the Jews deported in this way to the East
did not suffice to cover the labor needs there. The Reich Security
Main Office therefore, acting on the instruction of the Reich
Leader SS, aproached the Foreign Office to ask the Slovak Gov-
ernment to make 20,000 young, strong Slovak Jews from Slovakia
available for deportation to the East. The German Legation in
Bratislava was provided, by D III 87 U, with proper instruction.
The instruction was signed by the State Secretary, the Under

246

State Secretary in charge of the Political Division, and Section IV
of the Political Division.

The Legation in Bratislava reported re D III 1002 that the
Slovak Government has taken up the suggestion eagerly; the
preparatory work could be begun.

Following up this pleased concurrence of the Slovak Govern-
ment, the Reich Leader SS proposed that the rest of the Slovak
Jews also be deported to the East and Slovakia thereby be made
free of Jeivs. The Legation was, re D III 1559 Ang. II, provided
with proper instruction . The draft of the instruction was signed
by the State Secretary; after its dispatch it was submitted for
their information to the bureau of the Reich Foreign Minister and
the Under State Secretary in charge of the Political Division.

As the Slovak Episcopacy meanwhile raised objections to the
deportation of the Jews before the Slovak Government, the in-
struction carries the express statement that in no case must
there develop internal political difficulties on account of the evacu-
ation of the Jews in Slovakia. By the telegraphic report, re D
III 2006, the Legation reported that the Slovak Government,
without any German pressure, has declared itself agreeable to the
deportation of all Jews and that the State President agreed per-
sonally to the deportation. The telegraphic report was submitted
to the bureau of the Reich Foreign Minister. The Slovak Gov-
ernment has furthermore agreed that it will pay as a contribution
to the cost entailed RM 500 for every evacuated Jew.

In the meantime 52,000 Jews have been removed from Slovakia .
Due to church influences and the corruption of individual officials
35,000 Jews have received a special legitimation . However, Min-
ister President Tuka wants the Jewish removal continued and
therefore has asked for support through diplomatic pressure by
the Reich (compare D III 8865). The Ambassador is authorized
to give this diplomatic help in that he may state to State President
Dr. Tiso that the exclusion of the 35,000 Jews is a surprise in
Germany, the more so since the cooperation of Slovakia up to now
in the Jewish problem has been highly appreciated here. This
instruction has been cosigned by the Under State Secretary in
charge of the Political Division, and the State Secretary.

7. The Croat Government is likewise fundamentally agreeable
to the removal of the Jews from Croatia. It especially considers
the deportation of the four to five thousand Jews from the Italian
occupied Second Zone (centered around Dubrovnik and Mostar)
to be important, as they represent a political burden and their
elimination would serve the general pacification. The removal
can of course take place only with German aid, as difficulties are
to be expected from the Italian side. There have been practical

247

examples of resistance against the Croat measures by Italian
officials on behalf of well-to-do Jews. Furthermore, the Italian
Chief of Staff in Mostar has stated that he cannot approve the
removal since all the people living in Mostar have been assured
of the same treatment .

Since meanwhile according to a telephone communication from
Zagreb, the Croat Government has given its written approval of
the proposed measure, Minister Kasche thinks it right to begin
with the removal, and in fact to begin for the whole country.
One could therefore take the risk of having difficulties develop in
the course of the action, so far as concerns the zone occupied by
Italians.

A report for the Reich Foreign Minister to this effect (D III
562 Secret) has been held up by State Secretary von Weizsaecker
since he considered an inquiry should first be made at the Em-
bassy in Rome. The answer has not been received.

The problem of the Italian Jews has come up in the same way
in connection with the evacuation of the Jews in France.

Ambassador Abetz points out in connection with the deporta-
tion in preparation from the Occupied French Territory that
there was an urgent political interest to take the foreign Jews
first in the evacuation measures. Since these Jews were regarded
as foreign bodies they were already especially hated and passing
them over and giving them thereby a quasi privileging would
cause bad feeling, the more so since among them were to be
found responsible instigators of Jewish terror and sabotage acts.
It was regrettable that the Axis appeared exactly in this point
to pursue no uniform policy.

If the evacuation of the foreign Jews were not immediately
possible, the Italian Government should be for the time being
asked to repatriate their Jews from France.

On the Italian side economic interests appear to play a decisive
role. The safeguarding of these interests however is entirely
possible, so that on this point there needs to be no obstacle to the
planned solution.

On this question of the Italian Jews in France a conference
record of 24 July, re D III 562 Secret, has been submitted to
the Reich Foreign Minister.

8. On the occasion of a reception by the Reich Foreign Minister
on 26 November 19 Al the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popoff
touched on the problem of according like treatment to the Jews of
European nationalities and pointed out the difficulties that the
Bulgarians had in the application of their Jewish laws to Jews
of foreign nationality.

248

The Reich Foreign Minister answered that he thought this
question brought up by Mr. Popoff not uninteresting. Even now
he could say one thing to him , that at the end of this war all
Jews would have to leave Europe. This was an unalterable de-
cision of the Fuehrer and also the only way to master this prob-
lem, as only a global and comprehensive solution could be applied
and individual measures would not help very much. Furthermore,
one should not attribute too much worth to the protests on behalf
of the Jews of foreign nationality. At any rate, we would not
let ourselves be taken in any further by such protests from the
American side. He — the Reich Foreign Minister — would have
the problem described by Mr. Popoff investigated by the Foreign
Office.

The Reich Foreign Minister commissioned me to undertake the
investigation promised (compare D III 660g).*

I should like to make reference to my basic conference memo-
randum of 4 December 1941, re D III 660 Secret, which I am
dispatching, together with the proper files. This conference mem-
orandum was held up by the State Secretary, because he con-
sidered a further examination by the Legal Division first neces-
sary. In their opinion the German-Bulgarian trade and shipping
pact was not in agreement with the German-Bulgarian arrange-
ments proposed by me. I therefore notified the German Legation
in Sofia, re D III 497 Secret, under date of 19 June, in reference
to the suggestion of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popoff at his
reception to contact the Bulgarian Government and find out
whether it was prepared to come to an agreement in the Jewish
problem that there should be no rights from the trade and ship-
ping pact given effect in favor of the Jews in the promise of
reciprocality.

*******

The intended deportations are a further step forward on the
way of the total solution and are in respect to other countries
(Hungary) very important. The deportation to the Government
General is a temporary measure. The Jews will be moved on
further to the Occupied Eastern Territories as soon as the technical
conditions for it are given.

I therefore request approval for the continuation of the nego-
tiations and measures under these terms and according to the
arrangement made.

Signed : Luther

* Document NG-4669, Prosecution Exhibit 1451, reproduced earlier in this section.

249

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 491
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 480

MEMORANDUM OF LEGATION COUNSELLOR RADEMACHER, I SEP-
TEMBER 1942, TRANSMITTING INFORMATION THAT THE REICH
COMMISSIONER IN HOLLAND ABANDONED THE IDEA OF DEPRIV-
ING DUTCH JEWS OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP

Secret

Referent: Legation Counsellor Rademacher

Regarding D III 683 g

According to the attached report* by Minister Bene, the Reich
Commissioner [Seyss-Inquart] now has dropped the idea of de-
priving the Jews of Dutch nationality of their citizenship. Since
this matter falls exclusively within the competence of the Reich
Commissioner, there is no reason for the Foreign Office to make
further investigations.

Referring to memorandum 581 g of 10 August 1942, to be sub-
mitted to —

State Secretary von Weizsaecker with the request to take notice
[Initial] W [Weizaecker] .
via

Under State Secretary Luther [Signed] Luther 3 September

[Illegible initial]
and

Under State Secretary Woermann [Initial] W [WOERMANN]

[Handwritten] R 96

Berlin, 1 September 1942

[Signed] Rademacher

* The enclosure was not part of the exhibit introduced in evidence.

250

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2631
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1684

TWO REPORTS OF BENE, FOREIGN OFFICE REPRESENTATIVE WITH
THE REICH COMMISSIONER FOR THE OCCUPIED NETHERLANDS,
TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 1 1 SEPTEMBER AND 16 NOVEMBER 1942,
CONCERNING PROGRESS IN THE DEPORTATION OF JEWS IN
HOLLAND AND RELATED MATTERS

I. Report of 1 1 September 1942

The Hague, 11 September 1942
[Stamp]
Foreign Office
D III 776 g.

Reed.

Enel, extra copy

The Reich Commissioner

for the Occupied Dutch Territories
The Representative of the Foreign Office
D Pol 3 No. 8
2 extra copies

Subject: Deportation of the Jews.

The latest position shows the following number of Jews so far

deported :

To Rauschitz* 15,603 Jews

To Mauthausen 2,000 Jews

Total 17,603 Jews

About 140,000 Jews are still reported to be living in the
Netherlands, of whom about 5,000-6,000 crossed the frontier in
the course of the years. f

About 46,000 are for the time being exempted from deporta-
tion, because they live in mixed marriages, work in the arma-
ment industry and in the diamond trade or because they are
“protected Jews” [Protektionsjuden] .

It is estimated that about 25,000 Jews are in hiding inside the
Netherlands. The figures scheduled for the shipments have so
far been reached. Various measures are in preparation to secure
these figures also in future.

[Signed] Bene

* “Rauschitz” is used throughout Bene’s reports. It is not known whether he meant
“Rauschitz” or “Auschwitz,” the largest of the concentration camps. In testifying, the
defendant von Weizsaecker assumed that "Auschwitz” was the word here used. See extracts
from the testimony of von Weizsaecker reproduced later in this section.

251

To the Foreign Office in Berlin

[Handwritten notes]

1. Pol IV [Illegible initial] 19 September

2. To the files

[Illegible initial] 18 September
2. Report of 16 November 1942

[Stamp] Foreign Office received 17 November 1942 Vm.

The Hague, 16 November 1942
[Stamp]
Foreign Office
D III 1020 g.

Reed. 17 Nov 1942
Enel, extra copies

The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Dutch Territories.
The Representative of the Foreign Office
D Pol 3 No. 8/No. 1558
2 extra copies

Subject: Deportation of the Jews

Since my report of 11 September 1942 — D Pol 3 No. 8 — the
deportation of the Jews to camp Rauschwitz has been going on
without difficulties and incidents. Up to 15 October about 45,000
Jews have been deported.

According to a directive of the Reich Commissioner, all Jews
are to be deported by 1 May 1943. That means, that the weekly
deportation figure would have to be raised from 2,000 to 3,500.
The deportation of this increased figure offers no difficulties either
with regard to the assembling of the Jews here or with regard
to actual deportation.

Altogether about 61,000 full Jews must still be deported, 43,000
of whom had so far been exempted from deportation, so that
about 18,000 are at present still available for deportation.

The 43,000 exempted Jews are composed of armaments Jews
(fur trade, diamond, glass, and radio workers), people of Jewish
faith and so-called “protected Jews.” A conference with the
Wehrmacht Commander in Chief has had the result that a large
part of the armament Jews has at once been made available for
deportation, whereas the remainder will be made available in
the course of the coming months. These armament Jews will
mostly be replaced by female Dutch workers.

Until the deadline, 1 January 1941, 1,500 Protestant Jews had
been reported. Now the Protestant Church has reported further

252

3,500 Jews as baptized. Obviously these subsequently baptized
Jews cannot be regarded as convinced Christians and cannot be
exempted from deportation. They will have to depart like all
the others in the course of time.

The Dutch population are used to the deportation of the Jews.
They are making no trouble whatsoever. Reports from Rausch-
witz camp sound favorable. Therefore the Jews have abandoned
their doubts and more or less voluntarily come to the collecting
points.

[Signed] Bene

To the Foreign Office
Berlin

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 487
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 444

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER TO DEPART-
MENT GERMANY, 12 SEPTEMBER 1942, RECOMMENDING THAT THE
FOREIGN OFFICE DISINTEREST ITSELF IN ANTI-JEWISH LEGISLA-
TION IN TUNISIA

Berlin, 12 September 1942

Subject: Telegraphic Report Paris No. 4021 [handwritten] en-
closed *

I fail to see why we should commit ourselves so heavily in
Tunisia, as the Paris Embassy suggests, considering that the
Italians lay claim on that country. I am rather of the opinion
that we ought to disinterest ourselves in the anti- Jewish legisla-
tion in Tunisia.

To Department Germany

[Signed] Weizsaecker

[Handwritten note by Luther] Party Member Rademacher please
R.

[Signed] Luther

12 September

* This enclosure was not part of the original exhibit.

953402—52 17

253

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 406
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 290

MEMORANDUM FROM DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER TO LUTHER,
16 SEPTEMBER 1942, NOTING THAT FOREIGN OFFICE LACKS BASIC
KNOWLEDGE ON LEGISLATIVE MEASURES CONCERNING JEWS
AND SHOULD INDICATE IN EACH CASE THAT THE MORE LENIENT
SOLUTION IS PREFERABLE FROM THE FOREIGN POLICY POINT OF
VIEW*

[Stamp] Top Secret

To D III 67 gRs Berlin, 16 September 1942

Through Under State Secretary Gaus

[Initial] G [Gaus] 16 September
And Under State Secretary Woermann.

[Initial] W [Woermann]

16 September

To Under State Secretary Luther.

[Illegible initial]

[Handwritten] Rademacher, according to agreement. [Signed]
Luther 20 September

It seems to me that the Foreign Office lacks data as well as
the basic knowledge necessary to form a competent opinion on
the legislative measures* planned in this respect. I think we
ought therefore to limit ourselves to the general remark that in
each case the more lenient solution is preferable from the foreign
policy point of view, in order —

a. Not to give any pretexts to enemy propaganda.

b . To facilitate cooperation of other European States, whose
interest is to be gained.

[Signed] WEIZSAECKER

* According to von Weizsaecker’s testimony ( Tr. p, 8570), the “legislative measures” here
referred to concern persons of mixed or part Jewish origin. See Rademacher’s memo (Doc.
NG-2586, Pros. Ex. 1544) reproduced earlier in this section.

254

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-I5I7
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1457

NOTE FROM LUTHER TO DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER, WITH
COPIES TO DEFENDANT WOERMANN AND OTHERS, 24 SEPTEMBER
1942, CONCERNING VON RIBBENTROP'S INSTRUCTIONS ON
SPEEDING UP EVACUATION OF JEWS FROM EUROPE AND NOTING
THAT ALL STEPS TAKEN BY DEPARTMENT GERMANY WILL BE SUB-
MITTED TO VON WEIZSAECKER FOR APPROVAL

Under State Secretary, D.-No. 6062

[Handwritten] Instructions received
Berlin, 24 September 1942

Secret !

Memorandum

The Reich Foreign Minister has given me instructions today
over the telephone to hurry as much as possible the evacuation
of Jews from the various countries of Europe, because it is a
known fact that the Jews stir up people against us everywhere
and that they must be made responsible for attempts of murder
and acts of sabotage. Upon a brief report concerning the present
stage of evacuation of the Jews from Slovakia, Croatia, Rumania,
and the occupied territories, the Reich Foreign Minister has
given instructions now to start contacting the governments of
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Denmark with the object of starting the
evacuation of the Jews from these countries.

With regard to the settlement of the Jewish question in Italy,
the Reich Foreign Minister has reserved for himself all steps to
be taken. This question shall be discussed personally either be-
tween the Fuehrer and the Duce or between the Reich Foreign
Minister and Count Ciano.

Herewith to the State Secretary v. Weizsaecker with the re-
quest to take notice. All steps taken by us will be submitted to
you at the time for your approval.

Original returned.

[Signed] Luther

Copies :

Under State Secretary

Political Division [Initial] W [Woermann].

Under State Secretary

Legal Division [Handwritten initials and illegible

notes] .

Dirigent Trade Policy

D II
D III

255

Dirigent Pol [Illegible initials] 26/9
Pol IV
Pol X

[Illegible initial] 29/9 [Initial] W 26/9

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-724*
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1908

LETTER FROM SS BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANK TO THE SS HEAD-
QUARTERS ADMINISTRATION, LUBLIN, AND TO THE CHIEF OF
ADMINISTRATION IN THE AUSCHWITZ CONCENTRATION CAMP,
26 SEPTEMBER 1942, CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION AND DISTRI-
BUTION OF PROPERTY AND PERSONAL EFFECTS OF EVACUATED
JEWS

Copy 26 September 1942

Top Secret

6 copies — 4th copy

Chief A/Pr./B.

Journ. Nr. 050/42 seer.

VS 96/42

Subject: Utilization of property on the occasion of settlement and
evacuation of Jews.

To the Chief of the SS Administration, Lublin.

To the Chief of Administration Concentration Camp Auschwitz.

Without taking into account the over-all regulations which are
expected to be issued during October, pertaining to the utilization
of mobile and immobile property of the evacuated Jews, the fol-
lowing procedure has to be followed with regard to the property
carried by them — property, which will in all orders in the future
be called goods originating from thefts, receiving of stolen goods,
and hoarded goods:

1. a. Cash-money in German Reich Bank notes has to be
paid into the account Economic and Administrative Main Office
[SS WVHA] 158/1488 with the Reich Bank in Berlin-Schoene-
berg.

b. Foreign exchange (coined or uncoined), rare metals, jew-
elry, precious and semiprecious stones, pearls, gold from teeth,
and scrap gold have to be delivered to the SS Economic and
Administrative Main Office. The latter is responsible for the
immediate delivery to the German Reich Bank.

* Document NO-724 has also been introduced in the Pohl case (Vol. V, this series) as
Prosecution Exhibit 472.

256

c. Watches and clocks of all kinds, alarm clocks, fountain
pens, mechanical pencils, hand and electrical razors, pocket knives,
scissors, flashlights, wallets, and purses are to be repaired by the
Economic and Administrative Main Offices in special repair shops,
cleaned, and evaluated, and have to be delivered quickly to front
line troops.

Delivery to the troops is on a cash basis through the post ex-
changes. Three or four price grades are to be set, and it has
to be made sure that each officer and man cannot buy more than
one watch. Exempt from sale are the gold watches, the utiliza-
tion of which* rests with me. The proceeds go to the Reich.

d. Men’s underwear and men’s clothing including footwear has
to be sorted and valued. After covering the needs of the concen-
tration camp inmates and in exceptions for the troops they are
to be handed over to the Repatriation Office for Ethnic Germans
[Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle] . The proceeds go to the Reich in
all cases.

e. Women’s clothing and women’s underwear including foot-
wear, children’s clothing and children’s underwear including foot-
wear have to be handed over to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
against payment. Underwear of pure silk is to be handed over
to the Reich Ministry of Economics according to orders by the
SS Economic and Administrative Main Office. This order refers
also to underwear under [section] d.

/. Featherbeds, quilts, woolen blankets, cloth for suits, shawls,
umbrellas, walking sticks, thermos flasks, earflaps, baby carriages,
combs, handbags, leather belts, shopping baskets, tobacco pipes,
sun glasses, mirrors, table knives, forks and spoons, knapsacks,
and suitcases made from leather or artificial material are to be
delivered to the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. The question of pay-
ment will be decided later.

The needs in quilts, woolen blankets, thermos flasks, earflaps,
combs, table knives, forks and spoons, and knapsacks can be
furnished from Lublin and Auschwitz from these stocks against
payment from budget funds.

g. Linen, such as bed sheets, covers for featherbeds, pillows,
towels, wiping cloths, tablecloths are to be handed over to the
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle against payment.

Bed sheets, bed linen, towels, wiping cloths, and table cloths
can be furnished for the needs of troops from these stocks against
payment from budget funds.

h. Spectacles and eyeglasses of every kind are to be handed
in to the Medical Office for utilization. (Spectacles with golden
frames have to be handed in without glasses together with the
rare metals). A settlement of accounts for the spectacles and

257

eyeglasses need not take place with regard to their low value and
their limited use.

1. Valuable furs of all kinds, raw and cured, are to be delivered
to the SS WVHA. Ordinary furs (lamb, hare, and rabbit skins)
are to be reported to the SS WVHA, Amt B II, and are to be
delivered to the clothing plant of the Waffen SS, Ravensbrueck
near Fuerstenberg (Mecklenburg) .

k. All items mentioned under the letters d, e, f, which have
only y 5 or % of the full value or are useless altogether will be
delivered via the SS WVHA to the Reich Ministry for Economics
for utilization. For the decision on items which are not men-
tioned under the letters 1 b, application for a decision as to their
utilization should be made to the Chief of the WVHA.

2. The SS WVHA will establish all prices under observation
of the legally controlled prices. This estimation, however, can be
made later on. Petty evaluations which only waste time and per-
sonnel may be eliminated.

Average prices for single items have to be established in gen-
eral. For instance, one pair of used men’s trousers 3.0 RM, one
woolen blanket 6.0 RM, etc.

For the delivery of useless items to the Reich Ministry for
Economics average kilo prices will have to be established.

It has to be strictly observed that the Jewish star is removed
from all garments and outer garments which are to be delivered.
Furthermore, items which are to be delivered have to be searched
for hidden valuables sewn in. This should be carried out with the
greatest possible care.

By order:

[Signed] Frank

SS Brigadier General and Brigadier General of the Waffen SS

258

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5086
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3592

EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF LUTHER, 6 OCTOBER 1942, FOR
VON RIBBENTROP THROUGH DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER,
INITIALED BY DEFENDANTS VON ERDSMANNSDORFF AND WOER-
MANN, CONCERNING DISCUSSION WITH MINISTER SZTOJAY ON
TREATMENT OF HUNGARIAN JEWS AND PROPOSED DISCUSSIONS
TO INDUCE "A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH QUESTION" IN
ITALY

Under State Secretary D. No. 6932

Berlin, 6 October 1942

Memorandum

On the occasion of his visit on 2 October I had informed the
Hungarian Minister that I was willing to discuss once more the
question of the treatment of the Hungarian Jews in the occupied
territories, in Germany, and in Hungary itself; Sztojay accord-
ingly visited me yesterday. I referred to my conversation with
him on 11 August, a copy of which I attach,* and stated the
following :

[Handwritten]

Dirigent Pol. Office U. St. Pol. [Initial] E. [Erdmannsdorff] 9/10.

1. Hungarian Jews in the occupied territories. — I said that
the anxiety concerning the security of the German troops in the
occupied territories did not permit us to exclude Jews of any
particular nationality from the measures which have been ordered
by the military commanders and/or Reich Commissioners (wear-
ing of the Jewish star, internment, and subsequent evacuation).
We had therefore recently approached all the governments con-
cerned, and thus also the Hungarian Government, to approve by
31 December 1942, the anti- Jewish measures ordered to deprive
the Jews of their nationality by that date. After 31 December
1942 the evacuation of all Jews would otherwise be commenced.

*******

2. Hungarian Jews in Germany. — I informed Mr. Sztojay that
it was now time to include the Hungarian Jews in Germany in
the general anti- Jewish measures (marking and subsequent evac-
uation) since it was really no longer possible for us to evacuate
all German Jews and also foreign Jews from Germany for the
well known reasons and to leave behind only the Hungarian Jews,
who were causing daily provocation, always referring to their
Hungarian nationality. I said that we intended to approach his
government on this account, with the request that they should

* The enclosure was not a part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

259

either agree to these measures or take the Jews back to Hungary
by 31 December 1942. In view of the property regulations we
suggested the “territorial principle,” that is, we should retain the
property of Hungarian Jews in Germany, and Hungary should
retain that of the former Reich German Jews in Hungary. But
this matter should be dealt with in a special manner with the
Hungarian Government, in the same way as with the other states.
Mr. Sztojay immediately raised the question of the treatment of
the Italian Jews once more, whereupon I replied that the Italians
would be treated in the same way for that reason. Mr. Sztojay
said that his government would similarly not make any difficulties
in this respect, if the Italian Government would give the same
consent with regard to the Italian Jews. It only stressed particu-
larly that Hungary should be treated according to a “most favored
nation principle” in the Jewish question.

3. Treatment of the Jewish question in Hungary . — I explained
to Mr. Sztojay in detail the reasons which are leading us to re-
quest the Hungarian Government to urge the regulation of the
Jewish question in Hungary itself and to achieve some result as
soon as possible. The following measures appear desirable to us :

a. Progressive legislation with the aim of excluding all Jews
from cultural and political life.

b. Marking of Jews.

c. Expulsion to the East in conjunction with ourselves, with
the ultimate object of the final settlement of the Jewish problem
in Hungary [Endziel einer restlosen Erledigung der Judenfrage
in Ungarn].

Conference with us with respect to the regulation of property
of former Reich German and Hungarian Jews with the aim that
property is confiscated by the state in whose territory it is situ-
ated (territorial principle).

Mr. Sztojay again raised the question, whether we intended to
take similar steps toward the Italian Government, to which ques-
tion I replied in the affirmative. He went on to ask me whether
my statements to him could be regarded as an official step made
by the German Government to the Hungarian Government. I
answered this in the negative as far as points 2 and 3 were con-
cerned. I replied that we should undertake this step by means
of Minister von Jagow,* whereupon Mr. Sztojay requested that
we state our suggestions and/or wishes if possible before the 18
October, as he was staying in Budapest until then and intended
to discuss the whole matter thoroughly with the Prime Minister
and if necessary also with the Regent. He had often had such
conversations, particularly with the Regent, and we could abso-

* Dietrich Ton Jagow, German Minister to Hungary.

260

lutely rely on the fact that the Regent would show the greatest
understanding for our wishes on the basis of his experiences with
Bela Kun in 1919. Hungary had had to suffer particularly heavily
under the Jews, and it was unfortunately a definite fact that, in
view of Galicia’s proximity to Hungary, the Jews had settled in
Hungary in enormous numbers and had obtained to a particularly
large degree influential positions in all the important branches
of industry.

*******

From his previous conversations he knows that the Prime Min-
ister is especially interested in the question of whether any pos-
sibilities of a livelihood would exist in the East for the Jews after
their evacuation. Many rumors were being circulated in this con-
nection, which he personally, of course, did not believe, but Prime
Minister Kallay was somewhat uneasy about them. He said he
did not wish to reproach himself with having exposed the Hun-
garian Jews to misery or worse after their evacuation. He was
visibly calmed by my reply that all evacuated Jews, and thus also
the Hungarian Jews in the East, were employed first in road
construction work and would later be accommodated in a ghetto.
He said that this information would have a particularly calming
and encouraging effect on the Prime Minister. I reminded Mr.
Sztojay of the statements of Prime Minister Kallay concerning
the Jewish question on the occasion of his inaugural address in
Parliament. These statements had shown that Prime Minister
Kallay had a particular understanding of the settlement of the
Jewish question as we planned it and was apparently also pre-
pared to solve this problem as soon as possible with regard to
Hungary. When he left, Mr. Sztojay told me emphatically that
he welcomed our suggestions especially, since he had seen, not
only in Hungary, but above all in Germany, what a terribly un-
dermining influence the Jews had everywhere. I request the
Reich Foreign Minister to authorize me to send the directives
mentioned under 2 and 3 to Minister von Jagow. It seems to me
particularly important for us to induce the Italian Government
to bring about a Final Solution [endgueltigen Loesung] to the
Jewish question also on their part. This matter will presumably
be discussed by the Reich Foreign Minister with Count Ciano per-
sonally.

In the next few days I will submit a memorandum concerning
the state of the Jewish question and the suggestions and/or wishes
which it would be expedient for us to make to the Italian Govern-
ment.

[Signed] Luther

For Submission to The Reich Foreign Minister via State Secretary

261

Copies to:

Under State Secretary, Political Division

[Initial] W [Woermann]
Director, Trade Policy Division
Pol IV

D III

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5085
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3593

MEMORANDUM OF DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER TO VON RIB-
BENTROP, DEFENDANT WOERMANN, LUTHER, AND OTHERS, 14
OCTOBER 1942, CONCERNING HIS DISCUSSION OF THE JEWISH
PROBLEM WITH HUNGARIAN MINISTER SZTOJAY

Berlin, 14 October 1942

State Secretary No. 612

Today I received the Hungarian Minister to discuss with him,
at the order of the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Jewish
problem. I ascertained that the Minister was informed as per
memorandum of the Under State Secretary D. No. 6932.* I again
impressed the subject on him as per cable decree No. 1283 of
the special train, reminding Sztojay of the comment of the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs that the recent air raids on Buda-
pest have given another proof of how strongly the Jews there
contributed to spreading panic in Hungary.

The Minister in turn is going to bring the subject up for dis-
cussion on his next visit to Budapest and to contribute to the
realization of our wishes. He asked me whether he could act
on the assumption, that when he arrived in Budapest, Minister
von Jagow would already have carried out the relative instruc-
tion given him. I reassured him in this respect.

[Signed] Weizsaecker

Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs

Under State Secretary Pol. [Chief of Political Division]

[Initial] W [Woermann]

Dg. Pol. [Deputy Chief of Political Division]

Under State Secretary Department Germany

Please make sure that Minister von Jagow calls at the Buda-
pest Foreign Ministry as per his instructions prior to Sztojay’s
arrival there. It would appear that Sztojay will stay on in Berlin
till Wednesday next.

* Luther’s memorandum of 6 October 1942, Document NG-5086, Prosecution Exhibit 3592,
reproduced in part immediately above.

262

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5562
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-284

TELEGRAM FROM LUTHER TO THE GERMAN LEGATION IN BUDAPEST,
16 OCTOBER 1942, SUMMARIZING THE CONTENTS OF DEFENDANT
VON WEIZSAECKER'S CONFERENCE WITH HUNGARIAN MINISTER
SZTOJAY

Berlin, 16 Oct 1942 File Ref. D III 893 Secret

Standard telegram form: Diplogerma
The German Legation, Budapest, No. 2494
Referent: Under State Secretary Luther
Legation Councillor Klingenfuss
Subject: Jewish question in Hungary
Following the telegraphic instruction dated 14 October D III
872 g II, State Secretary von Weizsaecker received the Hungarian
Minister in order to discuss the Jewish problem with him accord-
ing to instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister. The State Sec-
retary once more emphasized the matter along the lines of the
instructions received there, referred to the importance of the
Hungarian Government approving of the Jews being deported to
the East, recalling remarks made by the Reich Foreign Minister,
that the recent air raids on Budapest had once more shown to
what degree the Jews were contributing toward creating a panic
in Hungary.

The Minister agreed also for his part to discuss the subject in
Hungary and to contribute to the realization of our wishes. The
State Secretary promised that a corresponding step would be
taken even before his arrival, that is at once.

[Handwritten notes] 16 October, Thomas.

[Signed] Luther

16 October
[Illegible initial]

16 October

263

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5728
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3766

MEMORANDUM FROM DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER TO VON
RIBBENTROP, DEFENDANT WOERMANN AND OTHERS, 20 OCTOBER
1942, CONCERNING A LONG DISCUSSION WITH HUNGARIAN
MINISTER SZTOJAY ON THE NATURE OF HUNGARY'S COOPERA-
TION WITH GERMANY, HUNGARY'S TREATMENT OF THE JEWISH
QUESTION, AND OTHER MATTERS

Berlin, 20 October 1942

State Secretary No. 619

I had the Hungarian Minister visiting me today for a long
discussion. The discussion took place in my apartment and its
character was entirely private. Mr. Sztojay had suggested it.

Shortly after the celebration of the Tripartite Pact, Minister
Sztojay reported a remark of the Reich Foreign Minister to Buda-
pest, which allegedly took exception to the treatment of the ethnic
groups in Hungary. This remark supposedly caused quite some
sensation in Hungary and, together with some other observations
which were supposedly made in Budapest, had led to discussions
as to whether everything was all right with the present relations
between Germany and Hungary. There are some people who say
that Hungary is not cooperating whole-heartedly and using all its
efforts for the common cause.

I answered the questions of Minister Sztojay very frankly: I
was going to take the point of view of a completely unbiased
observer who had nothing to do with our mutual relations. From
this point of view I wanted to state first, that it was not even
possible for the relations between Germany and Hungary to un-
dergo any serious disturbance. Everybody who knows recent
Hungarian history knows that the fate of Hungary is linked with
that of Germany; if Germany fares badly, Hungary will fare
badly, too. If things were improving in Germany, Hungary would
always profit, as was proved especially by the last years. Any
unpleasant Hungarian individuals who think they can afford part-
ly or entirely to be on the other side — I mentioned the name of
Tibor von Eckart — could not change this picture, because it
would only be a bad deal for Hungary if it associated with our
opponents. For this reason I did not have to name the individual
links and assets of our mutual relationship.

With regard to its liabilities I could not help but mention the
following points to Minister Sztojay.

The constant appeal to Hungary’s greatness under the Crown
of St. Stephen could naturally be matched by similar claims of

264

other countries if they were going to look back a thousand years
or more.

Hungary’s social system of classes appears out-moded in other
countries with social progress, for example, in Germany.

The way Hungary treated the Jewish problem has so far not
been in accordance with our principles.

People in Germany learn that the Rumanians are now using
all their efforts in combatting bolshevism, whereas Hungary is
holding back part of its forces for an eventual conflict with
Rumania.

The Germans consider Hungary most egotistic in its treatment
of alien ethnic groups.

I elaborated somewhat more on these remarks when talking to
Mr. Sztojay than I am doing here; I discussed the subjects in a
friendly and complaisant way so that Mr. Sztojay took it well.
His statements with regard to the aforementioned points are
worth noting only in so far as the Minister expressly admitted
that the Slovakian and Rumanian ethnic groups in Hungary were
actually treated worse than the German ethnic group. With re-
gard to the latter the provisions of the treaty are strictly en-
forced. The Minister asked me to report this to the Reich For-
eign Minister in view of his recent criticism.

For the rest Sztojay thanked me for my deliberations. He is
going to Budapest within a few days.

Signed : Weizsaecker

To:

Reich Foreign Minister

Under State Secretary, Political Division [defendant Woer-
mann]

Dirigent, Political Division

Under State Secretary Luther

265

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 492-B
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 448*

DRAFT OF LETTER FROM LUTHER TO THE CHIEF OF THE SECURITY
POLICE AND SD, 8 DECEMBER 1942, REQUESTING THAT ALL LETTERS
DESIGNATED FOR THE FOREIGN OFFICE BE ADDRESSED TO DE-
PARTMENT GERMANY II

Foreign Office Berlin W 8, 8 December 1942

Department II 6849 Ang. I Wilhelmstrasse 74-76

Subject: Addressing of letters from the Chief of the

Security Police and SS designated for the Foreign
Office

[Crossed out] By order of Under State Secretary Luther

I ask herewith that all letters from the Chief of the Security
Police and SD designated for the Foreign Office be sent to the
following address:

Foreign Office, Referat D II,

Attention: Vice Consul Geiger or Deputy
Berlin W 35
Rauchstrasse 27

[Handwritten] To Personnel. To the files.

As was already expressed in the letter of 18 August 1942 —
D II 4110 — this will also apply to all secret matters (top secret
and secret) which were addressed so far alternately to the ad-
dress of “Foreign Office, Attention: Legation Counsellor Kra-
marz” or “Hofrat Schimpke,” and the uniform reception of which
under the address of Department D II (attention of Vice Consul
Geiger) is necessitated in the interest of correct treatment on the
part of the Foreign Office.

Please be kind enough to see to it that a respective regulation
is issued effective within the entire jurisdiction of the Chief of
the Security Police and SD.

By order:

[Signed] Luther

12 December
[Handwritten] R 50

To the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Amt IV,
Attention of SS Major General Mueller
Berlin SW 11
Prinz-Albrechtstr. 8.

* This exhibit, as introduced in evidence by the defense, had two parts. The first part
(Doc. 492-A), a note of 16 August 1941 pertaining to the same general subject, has been
reproduced earlier in this section.

266

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5369
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3920

EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE IN THE REICH
MINISTRY OF FINANCE ON II AND 12 DECEMBER 1942, CON-
CERNING THE SEIZURE, ADMINISTRATION, AND UTILIZATION OF
JEWISH PROPERTY IN THE WEST

Minutes of a conference on 11 and 12 December 19 U2 in the
Reich Ministry of Finance

Present :

Kriegsverwaltungsrat [KVR] Military Commander for
Pichier Belgium and Northern France

Kriegsverwaltungsrat
Ziehr

Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat
[OKVR]

Teichmann
Ministerialrat
Dr. Maedel
Regierungsrat
Dr. Schwarzat
Amtsrat Witzschel
The subject under discussion was the question of seizure, ad-
ministration, and utilization of Jewish property both now and
in the future in the zones of command of the military com-
manders in Belgium, Northern France, and France. KVR
Pichier stated that the recently set up Brussels Trustee Company
[Bruesseler Treuhandgesellschaft] had proved very useful. The
enclosed decree draft illustrated the customary confiscation pro-
cedure in his area of command. In general the establishment of
the citizenship of the Jews concerned was the only difficulty en-
countered thus far. He went on to say that many reports had
been received of assets belonging to Jews who emigrated or fled
from Belgium, and no details other than the name were avail-
able. KVR Pichier intends to compile lists of the names of
these doubtful cases and to send these lists to the Senior Finance
President Berlin-Brandenburg. On the basis of his central file,
the Senior Finance President is to investigate whether the Jews
named on these lists have been dealt with by him. KVR Pichier
hopes that this will settle a number of doubtful or duplicated
cases. He considers it advisable that the Senior Finance Presi-
dents, regardless of his own steps, should compile lists based on
data available to them of Jews emigrated from their districts,

Military Commander France

Military Government Area
Headquarters, Lille, France

Reich Ministry of France

267

which lists should be sent to the military commanders. This
procedure would probably also help to cut down the number of
doubtful cases.

* * * * * * *

Real estate is hard to sell. The Belgian population is disin-
clined to buy, from the military commander, real estate formerly
owned by Jews. In order to be able to sell real estate at all, it
is frequently being exempted from confiscation. In these cases,
the Brussels Trustee Company appears outwardly as trustee for
the Jewish owner and sells on behalf of the Jew. The proceeds
are then confiscated.

*******

Objects of rare metals are to be smelted for the production of
raw materials and for purposes of military economy. Procedure
is the same as in the Reich.

Considerable quantities of uncut diamonds and diamond jewelry
have been found. Sales are being effected with discretion. Small
quantities of diamond jewelry have occasionally been sold for
hard currency, in the south of France. Details are to be sub-
mitted at a later date. Small quantities of uncut diamonds have
been handed over to the Reich Office for the manufacture of
various commodities.

Furniture and other equipment . — Immediately after deporta-
tion of the former owner, the apartments of Jews were inspected
and evaluated by an agent from the Brussels Trustee Company.
Art treasures were placed at the disposal of German Red Cross
Senior Field Director [DRK-Oberfeldfuehrer] von Behr, Chief
of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in Paris. They are to be sold in
the Reich at a later date. Particularly valuable furniture and
carpets are for the time being to be put into safekeeping. Some-
times, the Brussels Trustee Company has taken over some ar-
ticles from the apartments in order to pay rents which have
become due. The Wehrmacht administrator wishes to acquire
these articles for the use of the staff troops in the East. In this
connection, KVR Ziehr stated that in France, it had not been
possible to sort the articles because the apartments were being
evacuated at great speed. Moreover, he said, the work in the
command area of France was in its first stages since the imple-
mentation regulations for the 11th decree to the Reich Citizen
Law* had been released only a few days ago.

Concerning the suggestion made at the conference of 1 June
1942 (0 5210 Fr 1 VI) to the effect that small assets up to 3,000

* Document NG-2499, Prosecution Exhibit 1536, reproduced in part earlier in this section.

268

RM should be exempt from confiscation, it was unanimously
agreed that no general minimum could be fixed. The question
whether the exemption of small assets is advisable must be de-
cided from case to case. KVR Ziehr stated this procedure was
already being adopted, and that easily utilized assets (bank notes,
cash, etc.) are being confiscated, irrespective of the amounts in-
volved.

[Stamp]

Ministerial Office II
No. 496 66

Drawn up on 24 December
[Illegible initials]

Read 24

[Illegible initials]

Received, Berlin 19 December 1942
23 December 1942
Dispatched 28 December
[Illegible initials]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1128
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2370

5 1 ST REPORT OF HIMMLER TO HITLER, 29 DECEMBER 1942, CONCERN-
ING "RESULTS IN COMBATTING PARTISANS FROM I SEPTEMBER
TO I DECEMBER 1942," CONTAINING STATISTICS SHOWING THE
EXECUTION OF OVER 300,000 PEOPLE, THE CAPTURE OF WEAPONS
AND AMMUNITION, VILLAGES SEARCHED OR BURNED DOWN,
GERMAN CASUALTIES, AND RELATED MATTERS*

Submitted 31 December 1942
[Initial] A.
Headquarters 29 December 1942

The Reich Leader SS

Subject: Reports to the Fuehrer concerning the combatting of
Guerrillas.

4 fr.

Report No, 51

Southern Russia , Ukraine, Bialystok,

Results in combatting Guerrillas from 1 September to 1 De-
cember 19 U2.

1. Bandits.

a. Counted dead after engagements (x) .

August September October November Total

227 381 427 302 1337

* Another item of Document NO-1128, not reproduced herein, showed that the figures in
this report were derived from a report to Himmler from the Higher SS and Police Leader
for Southern Russia, the Ukraine, and Northeast Russia.

953402—52 18

269

b. Prisoners executed immediately.

125 282 87 243 737

c. Prisoners executed after lengthy and thorough interrogation.

2100

1400

1596

2731

7828 [sic]

2. Accomplices of guerrilla and guerrilla suspects.

a. Arrested.

1343

3078

8337

3795

16553

b. Executed.

1198

3020

6333

3706

14257

c. Jews executed.

31,246

165,282

95,735

70,948

363,211

3. Deserters owing to German propaganda.

21

14

42

63

140

(x) As the Russians remove their dead or rather, bury them immediately,
the figures quoted can be regarded as considerably higher, also, according to
statements made by the prisoners.

4. Weapons captured or destroyed.

a.

Heavy mortars, guns etc.

August September

October

November

Total

8 10

21

16

55

b.

Automatic weapons.

33 51

53

37

174

c.

Other small arms.

482 654

560

207

1903

Ammunition.

a.

Various kinds.

524467 531403

551612

9165

1616647

b.

Hand grenades.

1049 1296

1225

1181

4751

c.

Mines.

20 21

46

216

303

d.

Explosive (kilo).

2 235

570

409

1216

Radio sets captured or destroyed.

August September

October

November

Total

6 2

3

5

16

7. Captured cattle and implements,
a. Cattle, cows and oxen 3442

pigs 2869

sheep 2930

270

horses

calves

b. Cereal.

c. Linseed.

d. Implements [equipment].

8. Engagements.

August September
83 106

9. Guerrilla camps destroyed.

15 24

10. Villages and localities,
a. Searched and combed.

223 481

b. Burned down or destroyed

35

12

11. Single farms,
a. Searched.
1026

1040

b. Burned down.
257

621

12. Own casualties.

(1) SS Regular and Security

a. Dead.
43

16

b. Wounded.

16

5

c. Missing.
2

3

(2) Indigenous Security Units

a. Dead.
67

67

b. Wounded.
34

33

c. Missing.
16

10

486 ,

65

1600 cwt.

48 cwt.

1 surgical kit

2 radio sets
2 bicycles

12 fodder machines
200 farming implements

(spades, shovels, saws).

October

108

November

150

Total

447

143

103

285

625

387

1716

20

92

159

1376

386

3828

312

788

1978

r Police.

24

91

174

16

95

132

3

5

13

[Schutzmannschaft] .

58

93

285

17

43

127

39

68

133

271

13. Raids.

August September October November Total

153 171 168 191 683

14. Destroyed property.

a. Estates belonging to the state and others.

18 64

21

10

113

Saw mills and forest service stations.

9 7 6

8

30

Industrial plants.

6 13

11

5

35

Other property.

18 57

15

20

110

15. Acts of sabotage,
a. Railroads.

44

59

86

73

262

Bridges.

15

8

9

22

54

Communication stations.

11 13

12

18

54

Others.

8

15

9

8

40

[Signed] H. Himmler

272

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NCM404
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3504

EXTRACT FROM THE SS GUIDANCE PAMPHLET* FOR JANUARY
1943, ISSUED BY THE SS MAIN OFFICE, REPRODUCING AN EX-
TRACT FROM A LETTER OF A DECEASED SS LIEUTENANT ON THE
EXECUTION OF TWO RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR

SS GUIDANCE PAMPHLET [SS LEITHEFT]

9th Year, No. 1 January 1943
* * * * * * *
From the letter of an SS Lieutenant who was killed in the
Eastern campaign:

9 November 1941

“Dear Else,

*******
“Together with three other soldiers I received [the] order
tonight to shoot two members of the Red Army, so that they
cannot be of danger to us anymore. They were ragged and
apathetic, just like animals. I give a spade to each of them,
and they begin to dig their own grave, and I light a cigarette
in order to calm down. There is no sound — Russians have no
souls, they are animals, they became animals during the past
years. They don't beg for their lives, they don’t laugh, they
don’t cry — three guns are pointed at them. All of a sudden
one of them starts to run, but he does not get far, 20 meters
and he is dead. The other does not move, he steps into his hole,
and then he is dead too. Two minutes later the earth covers
everything, — and we light another cigarette.”

*******

* The inside of the cover page of this pamphlet states: “Publisher: The Reich Leader SS,
SS Main Office Berlin 35, Luetzowstrasse 48/49.” The document also shows that defendant
Berger, Chief of the SS Main Office, also wrote an article for this issue entitled: “To the 30th
of January 1943.” Defendant Berger testified that “at the end” about 450,000 copies monthly
of the “SS Guidance Pamphlets” were circulated. See extracts from the testimony of defend-
ant Berger reproduced later in this section.

273

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2501
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2353

EXTRACTS FROM THE SS PAMPHLET "SAFEGUARDING EUROPE"

SAFEGUARDING EUROPE

The Reich Leader SS, SS Main Office*

Table of Contents

The Second World War — An Ideological Discussion [weltanschau-
liche Auseinandersetzung] .

[Chapter] I. The East-Germanic Land Taking in Eastern
Europe.

The Repulsion of Mongolian-Slavonic Nations from
the Central European Area.

The Foundation of the Russian Empire and Its
Consequences for Europe — Turks and Jewry
Menace Europe.

The First Signs of a Threat to Europe by the
Russian Empire. The First attempts of the Czar
to Exercise Influence on the Destiny of Europe.
The Development of Parties and Intellectual Influ-
ences in the Russian Empire Destroys the last
Germanic Influences in the East of Europe and
Creates the Basis for the Threat to Europe in
the 20th Century.

The Contrasts between the European Powers in
the 19th Century Prevent a Clear Attitude To-
ward the Eastern Problem and Cause a Stronger
Influence of the Czar on the Fate of Europe.
The Security of Europe Established by Bismarck.
The Natural Contrasts between the Nations of Cen-
tral Europe and the Efforts of Expansion in the
East Come Again into Force.

Germany Repulses the Danger Coming from the
East during World War, 1914-1918.

Bolshevism Interferes in Domestic Politics of the
European States. Concerning Foreign Politics,
Stalin Continues the Policies of the Czar.
National Socialist Germany Again Shoulders the
Old Historic Task of Safeguarding Europe
Against the East.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.

* The title page states at the Ibottom: “Edited and published by the Reich Leader SS,

SS Main Office.”

274

Proposal for 8 Weeks Training

First week — Introduction: The Second World War — Ideological
discussion (p. 7). Chapter I: The East-Germanic taking of land
in Eastern Europe (p. 10) . Germanic tribes — a living east wall
of Europe (p. 10). The first invasions of the Huns threaten
Europe (p. 12). The infiltration of Slavs threatens the central
European area (p. 15).

Second week — Chapter II: The Repulsion of Mongolian-Sla-
vonic nations from the central European area (p. 16). The re-
gaining of the area east of the River Elbe — River Saale — River
Drava — line (p. 17). The consolidating Polish State threatens
Europe’s heart (p. 20). The second Mongolian onslaught
threatens Europe, (p. 20).

Chapter III: The foundation of the Russian Empire and its
consequences for Europe — Turks and Jewry are menacing Europe
(p. 22). The Varangians conquer eastern Europe (p. 22). The
expansion of Greek-Orthodox Christianity in eastern Europe sep-
arates the Russian Empire from Europe (p. 25). The Mongolian
onslaught destroys the Germanic wall between River Dnepr and
River Volga (p. 27). The Turkish danger threatens Central
Europe from the southeast (p. 28). Jewry gains power in Eu-
rope and extends to the East (p. 28).

Third week — Chapter IV : The first signs of a threat to Europe
by the Russian Empire. The first attempts of the Czar to exer-
cise influence upon the destiny of Europe (p. 29). Ivan III and
Ivan IV look to Europe (p. 29). Peter the Great’s policy of
power threatens Europe (p. 80).

Chapter V: The development of the parties and intellectual
influences in the Russian Empire destroys the last Germanic in-
fluences in the east of Europe and creates the basis for the threat
to Europe in the 20th century (p. 33). The establishment of the
parties leads to the fatal party policy referring to foreign policy
and to home policy (p. 33). Russia’s political starting position
from 1815 is deciding concerning foreign policy and home policy
for the further development between Russia and Europe (p. 35).
The Czar’s foreign policy means always interference in Europe
(p. 35). The Muscovite course attacks the Germanic head of the
Russian Empire (p. 36) . The Pan-Slavism threatens Europe (p.
38) . “Young Russia” proclaims the destruction and salvation of
the Russian Empire and of the world (p. 39). The poison of
Marxist infiltration (p. 40).

Fourth week — Chapter VI : The contrasts between the European
powers in the 19th Century prevent a clear attitude toward the
eastern problem and cause a stronger influence of the Czar on
the fate of Europe (p. 42). The Czars guide the tensions in home

275

politics consciously concerning foreign politics against Europe
(p. 42). England, the opponent of Russia in the 19th Century
(p. 44). Germany’s central situation compels to a permanent
readiness against the East and the West (p. 44). Europe’s se-
curity apparently recedes to the background (p. 45). Nikolas I
threatens Europe by his Balkan politics (p. 46). The Polish
Revolution in 1830 shows the possibility of a threat to the Ger-
man soil (p. 46). The revolt of the Hungarians strengthens the
Russian predominance and prevents the hegemony of Prussia (p.
46).

Fifth iveek — Chapter VII: The security of established Europe
by Bismarck (p. 48). Bismarck eliminates the Russian Empire
in its capacity as a disturbing factor when establishing the Ger-
man Reich (p. 48) . Bismarck’s endeavors for unification (p. 49) .
The German rear cover enables Asiatic conquests of the Russian
Empire (p. 49).

Chapter VIII : The natural contrasts between the nations of the
central European area and the efforts of extension of the East
again come into force (p. 50). Pan-Slavism for the first time
opposes Central Europe in the personality of Gorchakov (p. 50) .
Russian preparations for war against Central Europe (p. 50).
The war on two fronts threatens (p. 52) . In 1905 Germany omits
to prevent the threatening danger from the East (p. 53). Free
Masonry and Jewry cooperate with England in the battle against
Germany (p. 54).

Sixth iveek — Chapter IX: In the World War 1914-1918 Ger-
many repulses the danger which came from the East (p. 55). A
view on the military geographical situation of the central Euro-
pean area in the year 1914 shows the danger of the threat (p. 55) .
The course of the battles in the east protects Central Europe (p.
58). The World War shows Czechs and Poles as doubtful ele-
ments (p. 58). The peace of Brest-Litovsk does not protect
Central Europe from the Slavonic influence ; it only withdraws a
Slavonic power from the central European area (p. 59). The
revolution in Russia destroys Czardom (p. 60). Bolshevism de-
stroys the last Germanic blood-streams in Eastern Europe (p. 62) .
The revolution in Russia in 1917 eliminates the Czaristic danger
for Central Europe, but brings the Bolshevistic danger much
nearer (p. 62). The infamous Treaty of Versailles became the
soil for the revival of the German nation (p. 64).

Seventh week — Chapter X: Bolshevism interferes in domestic
politics of the European States. Concerning foreign politics
Stalin continues the policies of the Czars (p. 64) . The Dictate of
Versailles (p. 64). Czechs and Poles delegated to Versailles (p.
65). The time of the agreements and contracts creates a per-

276

manent threat to Central Europe in the East and West (p. 68).
The revolts in Germany show the interference of bolshevism in
Europe (p. 69). The alliance between Jewish bolshevism and
Jewish plutocracy is starting (p. 70). The German-Russian
treaty of Rapallo brought only little freedom of movement back
to Germany but gave new influence on European politics to the
U.S.S.R. (p. 71). France’s collective treaties include no Euro-
pean task toward the East (p. 72). The foreign-political meas-
ures of the Soviet Union in the twenties aimed at the consolida-
tion of the state and at the preparation of the military inter-
vention in Europe (p. 78). The union of plutocracy and bolshe-
vism. England’s and France’s treason to Europe (p. 74). Ger-
many’s reascension sprang from the strong reciprocal effects of
internal events and foreign-political consequences (p. 74). The
pressure of Slavic and Slavic-Mongolian peoples since the First
World War (p. 75).

Eighth iveek — Chapter XI: National-Socialist Germany again
shoulders the old historic task of safeguarding Europe against
the East (p. 76) . England sells Europe again (p. 77) . The Fueh-
rer, conscious of his responsibility, takes the fate of Europe into
his hands (p. 78). The Fuehrer attempts a peaceful settlement
of the eastern relations with Pilsudski (p. 78). The Fuehrer’s
policy toward the East was obliged, (1) to expel the internal
Bolshevist danger, (2) to solve the western Slav problems, (3)
to prevent Bolshevist attempts to influence other states in Europe,
(4) to clear up the relationship to the U.S.S.R. the source of all
disturbances (p. 79). The Fuehrer’s efforts for peace show again
and again — The Fuehrer follows European policy (p. 81). The
German responsibility concerning the safeguarding of Europe is
justified not only from an ideological but also from a military-
geographical point of view (p. 81). The Polish attitude finally
brings about the second World War (p. 82). The Soviet Union
moves closer to Europe (p. 84). The Soviet demands on Germany
mean the overture of the attack on Europe (p. 85).

*******

XI. National Socialist Germany Takes Over Again the Historical
Task of Securing Europe Against the East.

*******

The thought of safeguarding German and European territories
against the dangers threatening from the East has run like a red
thread through the Fuehrer’s active policy ever since he took over
the government.

*******

277

Safeguarding of Europe! Europe is safeguarded but limited
too, in the North, West, and South by military geographical con-
ditions. From these directions no people was ever able to con-
quer and keep for long essential parts of the European soil. In
the East, however, Europe lacks all natural protection ; streams of
foreign blood were flowing into the European space from the
East through the Caspian plain. Thousands and thousands of
Germanic families were annihilated in this eastern area because
the motherland was not able or not willing to protect them. From
now on Germany will no more abandon the safeguarding of Eu-
rope neither racially nor politically, neither in a military nor in
an economic sense. The most valuable human races of Europe
shall never again be spoiled by alien blood and ideologies of alien
races. German energy will take care that all the sword has won
will never again be lost in times of peace. For the accomplish-
ment of this task, however, a saying of the Reichsfuehrer SS has
to become true.

“It is our task not to Germanize the East in the old meaning
that is to bring the German language and German laws to the
people living there, but to take care that only people of genuine
German, Germanic blood are living in the East.”

278

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4715
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1264

EXTRACTS FROM THE "PERIODICAL SERVICE" OF 5 FEBRUARY 1943,
CONCERNING PRESS DIRECTIVES FOR THE HANDLING OF MAT-
TERS PERTAINING TO JEWS AND NOTING THAT "REFERENCE CAN
BE MADE TO HITLER'S WORDS THAT AT THE END OF THIS WAR
THERE WILL BE ONLY SURVIVORS AND ANNIHILATED"*

Strictly confidential

Not

for publication

196/65 Edition

Periodical Service
5 February 1943

No. 8312-8351

* *

* * *

* *

Current Topics

8314

If the Jew comes into power

The Periodical Service [Zeitschriften-Dienst] has already re-
ferred several times to the necessity for rousing all power to
resist in the German people. The “German Weekly Report"
[Deutsche Wochendienst] shows what has happened to those na-
tions which have become the victims of Judaism. In this con-
nection reference can be made to Hitler's words, that at the end
of this war there will be only survivors and annihilated. In
pointing to the firm intention of Judaism to destroy all Germans,
the will for self-assertion must be strengthened. It would be
wrong, of course, when describing the seriousness of the situation
to paint it unnecessarily black or to over estimate the power
of Judaism. Political-religious controversies concerning the rela-
tionship between Jews and Christians are also out of place. The
“Deutsche Wochendienst” acts as an agency for the distribution
to the editors of extensive working material and many sugges-
tions for subject matter.

Europe protects herself against the Jews

The declaration of war by the Jews against the European na-
tions resulted in energetic measures being taken against the Jews,
not only in Germany but also in many other European states.
The “Deutsche Wochendienst” recommends the periodicals to is-
sue comprehensive descriptions and in this connection furnishes
material and suggestions for subject matter. It must be pointed
out in the articles that, as a result of their racial composition, the

* As a defense document, the table of contents to this entire issue of the Periodical Service
was offered in evidence. See Document Dietrich 260, Dietrich Defense Exhibit 260, reproduced
immediately below.

279

Jews are hostile to anything constructive and any peaceful com-
munity life. For reasons of self-preservation, the nations must
protect themselves against the Jewish destructive forces. The
present war, which was started by the representatives of world
Judaism, shows how strong these are. The victory of Germany
and her Allies will at the same time be a victory over world
Judaism and will secure the conditions necessary for a more peace-
ful future. Let us avoid any criticism of the measures taken
against the Jews by individual countries, and comments on their
suitability and the extent to which they can be put into practical
effect.

*******

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT DIETRICH 260
DIETRICH DEFENSE EXHIBIT 260

TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THE "PERIODICAL SERVICE" OF 5 FEBRU-
ARY 1943, AND DESCRIPTION OF THE EDITOR AND PUBLISHER

Contents

8312: The Battle Cry

Topics of the day — * 8314 : When the Jew is in power. 8315 :
Europe rejects the Jews. 8316: Total war in action. 8317 : The
achievements of the health service in war. 8318: Work saving
in the home.

Information — 8319: The German food situation at the begin-
ning of February 1943.

Anniversaries — 8320: Commemoration days in May 1943.
8321 : The Italian Air Force. 8322 : Commemoration days of
World War II April 1943. 8324 : Commemoration days : Arts and
Sciences in March 1943.

“Must” Coverage — 8338 : Increase in German arms production.
8339 : Exchange of experience in the regional armament industry.
8340 : Sinking of freighter in winter storm. 8341 : Victore Am-
brosio appointed army general. 8342: Germans expelled from
Chile. 8343 : Health Chief. 8344 : Shut-down of factories planned.
8345: On the classical German mind. 8346: Central agency
for Cultural Exchange Registered Society (e.V.). 8347: Fashion
magazines. 8348 : Friedrich Wilhelm, Graf von Schmettau. 8349 :
10 years* development of the “More Babies” program. 8350:
Architectural exhibition. 8351: Reichswerke Hermann Goering.

* The first two summaries concerning press directives from this issue of the “Periodical
Service” for 5 February 1943 are reproduced immediately above. Document NG-4715, Prose-
cution Exhibit 1264.

280

Editor in chief : Dr. Kurt Lothar Tank, Berlin. Deputy; Heinrich
Bertsch, Berlin. (Letters and inquiries of an editorial nature to
be addressed only to the editors of the Zeitschriftendienst, Berlin
NW 7 Schiffbauerdamm 19, Telephone: 42 50 31). Publishers
and Distributors : Publishing house Presse-Bericht G.m.b.H., Ber-
lin SW 68, Wilhelmstr. 107, Telephone 11 17 85. Postal Checking
Account Berlin 20828, (Zeitschriftendienst/Deutscher Wochen-
dienst) Printed Auslandsdruckerei G.m.b.H., Berlin SW. 68

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2053
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2339

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT BERGER TO HIMMLER, 10 FEBRUARY 1943,
URGING GREATER IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF SS TROOPS AND
SUBMITTING DRAFT OF A HIMMLER ORDER CHARGING BERGER
WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING

The Reich Leader SS Berlin W 35, 10 February 1943

Chief of the SS Main Office Luetzowstrasse 48/49

Post Office Box 43

Chief of the SS Main Office
Be/Vo. VS-diary No. 897/43 Secret
C.Adj. VS-diary No. 366/43 Secret

[Stamp]

Personal Staff Reich Leader SS
Administration for documents
Ref. No. Secret 171/25

When answering please give above references and dates.

Secret

[Initials] H. H. [Heinrich Himmler]
Subject: Ideological training of Troops
Enclosure: 1

To the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police
Field Command Office

Reich Leader!

I have learned that up to quite recently the Russians in all
reserve units are giving 8 hours of political training weekly, in
the hours of the early morning.

Neglect or insufficient knowledge are punished with fatigue-
duty, arrest, and finally by being detained by the GPU. Even in
the front line the political training does not stop.

281

This was one of the reasons why the Russians, from the be-
ginning, regarded the war as a total war and behaved correspond-
ingly, just as they have consistently looked upon this war as an
ideological war, and inspired the Russian soldier with this un-
heard of will of resistance by fanatic hate, by Jewish methods
of misrepresentation, lies, and phrases.

I therefore request, all the more so since the end of the war
cannot be awaited and since we now have a great many young
volunteers whose education in their parent’s home failed com-
pletely and whose relatives often do not believe in national so-
cialism, that every means is used to introduce and to order, as
part of the training plan, the ideological and political schooling
of the Waffen SS ; that furthermore the ideological training is
assigned that place which is due it within the framework of
over-all training. May I submit the enclosed order and may I
add that we are going to change training within the next 3
weeks so far as we will publish the pamphlet “Fight the Bol-
shevist” (not bolshevism) as, if I may say so, a “negative”
literature and “heroism” as a “positive” one. For the latter we
shall take examples from our history, which in short stories and
easily readable to the ordinary man, will be compiled in certain
chapters for practical application.

[Signed] G. Berger

SS Gruppenfuehrer

[Stamp]

The Reich Leader SS

Personal Staff Reich Leader SS
Administration for documents
Ref. No. : Secret /171/25
Fuehrer Headquarters, d.

Subject: Ideological education and cultural care for the SS

(1) The Chief of the SS Main Office is responsible to me for
the whole ideological education and cultural care of the SS —
the General SS, the Waffen SS, the Security Police, and the
Uniformed Police.

(2) The planning, the carrying out, and the supervision of
ideological education and cultural care of the SS, the training of
suitable SS leaders and men in charge of the ideological training
of individual SS units, and procurement as well as use of material
for training and care is the responsibility of Department IV —
Department for Ideological Education — in the SS Main Office.

(3) The detachments set up for the ideological education and
cultural care (welfare of troops) for the General SS, the Waffen

282

SS, the Security Police, and the Uniformed Police, with indi-
vidual main offices, in main sectors, and sectors with divisions
and regiments, etc., are subordinated to the SS Main Office as far
as technical and personnel matters are concerned, and to Chiefs
of the Main Offices at the time, and to Commanders, etc., with
respect to disciplinary matters.

(4) The Chief of the SS Main Office in his capacity as “In-
spector for Ideological Education” is delegated by me to carry
out inspections in the individual SS units — that is the General
SS, the Waffen SS, the Security Police, and the Uniformed
Police. The Chiefs of the Main Offices and Commanders, etc., are
to be informed prior to inspections.

(5) The provisions necessary for the implementation of this
order will be issued by the Chief of the SS Main Office.*

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-031
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1109

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT BERGER TO HIMMLER, 9 MARCH 1943,
CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SS AND THE NATIONAL
SOCIALIST MOVEMENT, BERGER'S DUAL POSITION AS CHIEF OF
THE SS MAIN OFFICE AND STATE SECRETARY IN THE EAST MIN-
ISTRY, BERGER'S LOYALTY TO HIMMLER, AND RELATED MATTERS

Berlin-Charlottenburg
An der Heerstrasse 95
9 March 1943

Reich Leader: [Initials] H. H. [Heinrich Himmler]

In our human life it often happens that for years nothing
special takes place and that then great and important events fol-
low one after the other in a matter of days and hours. Thus,
my last report at the field headquarters of the Reich Leader SS
was for me personally one of the most decisive events of my
life. First of all, because my Reich Leader took me into his
confidence and told me personal things, which one does only if
the visor has been opened in every respect and one knows that
the person to whom one is speaking will honor this confidence and
will, as far as possible, try to repay it by redoubled industry.

Reich Leader, if I have written by typewriter what is on my
mind instead of writing it by hand, I do so only in order that
it may be easier to read.

In recent days and weeks you have experienced a great per-
sonal disappointment. This matter was not entirely unexpected

* Defendant Berger testified that Himmler never signed this proposed order. See extracts
from Berger’s testimony reproduced later in this section.

283

on my part. You approach everyone, Reich Leader, with enor-
mous confidence and in your own goodness often overlook the
fact that not everyone is worthy of this confidence, that such
great confidence imposes strong obligations on the individual,
which not everyone is capable of taking upon himself.

We are living in very wild and stormy times. Our forefathers
were better off, as far as the officers' corps was concerned. The
old saying of the Huguenot and refugee nobility, who were largely
of high-bred Germanic blood, was —

“Mon dme a Dieu, mon epee au Roi, mon coeur aux dames”*
(Old French)

That was really easy, for it was a clear separation, a clear
delimitation of competency. Now, national socialism demands
everything, the soul, the sword, and the heart for the idea,
victory. As in a tropical jungle after the rainy season, eve^
time to prove ourselves. This change, Reich Leader — one must
gree of self-observation, self-control, personal criticism. It is
thing grew, the sap rose into the leaves. And now comes the
time of deepest humiliation, there has now come the ideal for
be very just here — demands of the individual an enormous de-

After a brief period of transition, which was simultaneously a
obvious that one cannot ask that of everyone. One should, of
course, be able to ask that a person who is one of the confidants
of the Reich Leader SS should now learn something and take
something over from the Reach Leader SS personally.

The subordination of one's own person, work for the cause,
must be all the more clear to everyone that every single one of us
is, or can become, a historical personality in some form or other,
like the generals of Frederick the Great.

These little (seen from the standpoint of the whole) personal
disappointments, Reich Leader, must, however, not be permitted
to change your goodness and the path you have followed up to
now. I can assure you most emphatically that there are thousands
and tens of thousands of old, and particularly of young, SS-men
who are touchingly devoted and loyal to you and who are at all
times prepared not only to risk and to give their lives for your
principles and orders, but also, which is often much more diffi-
cult, to live according to them.

May I say one more thing. I am not one of those people who
wear their heart on their sleeve. In personal matters I am
always terribly clumsy and awkward; I am just as clumsy when
such personal matters are discussed with the Reich Leader as I
am otherwise skillful in taking care of my Reich Leader's busi-
ness interests with other people. I always get the best ideas

* “My soul to God, my sword to the Kiny, my heart to the ladies."

284

* D i > X U

ERRATA

Volume XIII, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals

Page 284. Change lines 15 to 22, inclusive, to read :

After a brief period of transition, which was simultaneously a time
of deepest humiliation, there has now come the idea for victory. As
in a tropical jungle after the rainy season, everything grew, the sap
rose into the leaves. And now comes the time to prove ourselves.
This change, Reich Leader — one must be very just here — demands of
the individual an enormous degree of self-observation, self-control,
personal criticism. It is obvious, of course, that one cannot ask that
of everyone. One should, of

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afterwards, according to the old Swabian saying: “When the
city councillor comes from the town hall he is always wiser than
before.”

The NSDAP, and therefore the SS, is still suffering from one
thing: the fact that we have many officers who at one time were
not able to earn a decent living by the work of their hands, that
is, who came to us because they hoped in the bottom of their
hearts that their life would thus be made somewhat easier and
more comfortable. You said, Reich Leader, when I was there,
that a woman can be esteemed only if she has children by her
husband, and if she is willing, if necessary, to perform the hard-
est work with her husband in order to make ends meet. Many
of our SS officers do not share this logical attitude. Therefore
they also lack what has been called “a man's pride before the
throne of kings,” the courage to express a contrary opinion even
to one's supreme superior, while of course preserving the proper
formalities. The superior always has the power to make the
decision. Then, however, when he has made his decision, this
order is carried out to its utmost limit. Reich Leader, we must
put this new concept of service and manliness into effect. It
exists — and this fact often depresses me — among the enlisted men
and in the lower ranks. Unfortunately it often does not exist in
the upper ranks. The SS officers forget that loyalty must be not
only from subordinates to superiors but also from superiors to
subordinates, since otherwise leadership is impossible in the long
run.

We have one other thing among our officers which is not right,
and that is criticism. Criticism is necessary, but criticism by
officers of the superiors and of the supreme authorities is un-
worthy. For a higher ranking SS officer has at all times, par-
ticularly in view of the attitude of the Reich Leader SS, an op-
portunity to reach the Reich Leader SS himself and to present
his worries or his point of view in person to the Reich Leader SS.
Here we have many officers who have not got beyond the old
lientenants’ standpoint. There is an old saying. “No one has
more call to exercise objective criticism than a dissatisfied lieu-
tenant.” Many of our SS officers have not developed beyond
this standpoint.

Their external form as commanding officers is very good, but
they lack the growth within, often also a sense of responsibility
for a commanding officer. That in itself, Reich Leader, is not
so bad. It all results from rapid development. I do not cite this
in order to criticize, but really only in order that the Reich
Leader will not let such severe disappointments swerve him from
the path which he has followed hitherto and will not let them

953403 — 62 19

285

change the goodness of his heart. There are many people who
are not worthy of such generous treatment, but there will be
many who will be inspired to their utmost effort only with and
by this treatment.

Concerning the East Ministry.

On the one hand, I have more or less got used to the idea, albeit
with difficulty. With difficulty particularly because, as Chief of
the SS Main Office, I believe I can give the Reich Leader SS more
than as State Secretary in the East Ministry. Then I picked out
all the pleasant aspects, such as the many minor details, which
today make difficulties for me as Main Office Chief and worry
me, would not exist in the East Ministry, because there I could
stop them on my own initiative and because now our future lies
in the East and I could have seen to it that in 1 or 2 years the
East Ministry would be working internally only according to the
great principles and directives of the Reich Leader SS.

I am proud that I am now able to remain in my Main Office.
For no one likes to leave work which has been achieved with
part of his life force. I shall now attempt, however, to reach
the goal in the Reich East Ministry as well, although I am not
regularly employed there.

I believe that on the whole we in Germany have learned nothing
from history about the treatment of foreign peoples. It was
always believed that if the eastern people (see Polish policy)
were given economic concessions and political freedom, they would
be won over for us and would fight for us. The more we did
along these lines, the more the people thought of themselves. It
was really this consideration which gave them the idea of their
national unity. In my opinion it was a mistake for us, in the
Ostland as well as in the Ukraine, to fall upon these peoples
like poor starved have-nots. The immediate concession of small
and middle sized property, the concession after tests of later
larger allotments would have been quite sufficient, and above all
the populations who once welcomed us as liberators would not
now be unsympathetic or even hostile toward us. In the last
analysis, that is a question of faith and shows only how few of
the German people, particularly the leading classes, are convinced
of national socialism as a new faith.

In the last analysis this war is to determine which nation is
called to stamp its mark on the world and to destroy the old
belief that the Lord is of a different nationality in every country
and that each time he must help to kill the people beyond the
border. But that too is only a question of development, a ques-
tion of time. Fate was against us here, in that it did not leave

286

us time for development, but called us to the decision before we
had brought the best part of the German people to these clear
thought processes.

Today we are facing the great decision. Either a new era will
begin with national socialism, hard, difficult, and clear, which
will mark not only the Germanic world but also the rest of the
world for hundreds, perhaps for thousands of years, or national
socialism will finally put an end to the Germanic period, to be
compared with the rays of the evening sun which lights up the
world once more before it sets.

In any case, Reich Leader, I regard this calmly and confidently.
I hope that I am above the matter and that I will thus be best able
to serve my Reich Leader. I am aware that in difficult times
there have always been single men who directed the fate of a
people in this or that way, and that, if these men fall, they must
fall like centuries-old oaks in the forest.

I do not believe I need emphasize that within my heart I
cherish the profound hope that after my most personal sacri-
fices we are founding a new era. As long as I live I shall be
your loyal follower on whom you can rely, no matter what you
order.

[Handwritten]

Heil Hitler!

Yours grateful,
[Signed] Gottlob Berger

287

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1817
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2337

LETTER FROM DR. LEIBBRANDT OF THE EAST MINISTRY TO DEFEND-
ANT BERGER, 24 MARCH 1943, TRANSMITTING A COUNTER-
SIGNED COPY OF HIMMLER-ROSENBERG AGREEMENT CONCERN-
ING THE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION OF NATIONALS OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SERVING IN SECURITY UNITS
UNDER GERMAN COMMAND

8 24 March 1943
U.d.Linden 63
12 00 58
East Ministry

Ministerial Director Dr. Leibbrandt
(I 3/397)

Zu C I 4-Az. 30 e-Dr. E/Rei

To the Chief of the SS Main Office
SS Major General Berger
Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1
Hohenzollerndamm 31

Subject: Agreement between the Reich Leader SS and Chief of
the German Police and the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories concerning the political
training of nationals of the eastern European coun-
tries, assigned to the indigenous security units
[Schutzmannschaften]

Enclosure: 1
Dear Major General:

I have countersigned the above-mentioned agreement and, as
desired, return one copy to you.*

Heil Hitler!

[Initial] L [Leibbrandt]

[Handwriten] Copy handed by me to Berger personally today
[Initials] Kl [Kinkelin]

* Document NO-1818, Prosecution Exhibit 2338, reproduced immediately below.

288

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1818
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2338

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REICH LEADER SS AND CHIEF OF THE

GERMAN POLICE AND THE REICH MINISTER FOR THE OCCUPIED

EASTERN TERRITORIES CONCERNING THE POLITICAL INDOC-
TRINATION OF NATIONALS OF EASTERN NATIONS ASSIGNED TO

THE INDIGENOUS SECURITY UNITS (SCHUTZMANNSCHAFTEN)*

It has become evident that military-political training, economic
improvements, and rigid disciplinary supervision alone are not
sufficient to bring to full and reliable assignment the members of
the eastern nations enrolled in the indigenous security units. It
is necessary, over and above this, that they will be won over
spiritually for their particular task and be convinced of it. This
has to be achieved through a planned political schooling, adapted
to the time and the conditions prevailing.

The political schooling of the non-German members of the in-
digenous security units is a matter for the Reich Leader SS, who
issues implementing instructions to the Chief of the SS Main
Office or, as the case may be, the local Higher SS and Police
Leader. It will be carried out within the framework of and in
conformity with the over-all political line pursued by the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

The aim of this indoctrination is to convert the non-German
members of the indigenous security units to convinced cofighters
against bolshevism and for the All-European New Order. Special
attention is to be paid to the following points:

1. Effective and quick warding off of Bolshevist propaganda.

2. Tying up with the strong instinctive anti-Semitism of the
eastern nations; the Jewish face of bolshevism; Jewry as motive
power behind bolshevism as well as the capitalism of the Western
Powers; the Jewish aims for world domination and the various
ways toward it (world revolution and capitalism) ; the nationalist
disguises of Jewish bolshevism; Stalin’s army as a power instru-
ment to gain Jewish world domination with the blood of the other
peoples. Bolshevist aims and methods (question of land, deporta-
tion, GPU., church question, etc.).

3. The Reich’s and its Fuehrer’s fight against world Jewry.
The differences between national socialism and bolshevism; na-
tional socialism’s positive attitude toward folkdom and racial dis-
tinctions, its respect of and care for national culture, homeland,

* See documents on the reports of two German officers (NO-2007, Pros. Ex. 3344; NO-2008,
Pros. Ex. 3345; and NO-2009, Pros. Ex. 3346), concerning the activity of these indigenous
security detachments in the execution of the forced labor policy in the East. These documents
are reproduced below in section XI B (Slave Labor).

289

family, property. Germany safeguards life and folkdom, national
culture, and order for the European nations. Germany’s social
achievements. Personality and life of the German Fuehrer.
Everybody fighting on Germany’s side, also fights for his or her
folkdom, homeland, and family.

4. Realization of the new European community of nations un-
der the Reich as the leading, protecting, and marshaling power.
The common work and fight of the European nations against the
Jewish aims for world domination. Causes, meaning, and under-
lying reasons of the war. (Jewry as instigator of the First and
Second World War.) Germany’s and Europe’s allies in a common
front in fight against the Jewish-Capitalist and the Jewish-Bol-
shevist powers. The hard necessities of the war; common work,
common sacrifices, and common fight for the New Europe. The
joint economic, political, and cultural interests of Germany, the
eastern nations, and all Europe’s.

5. Avoidance of any utterance liable to violate self-esteem,
honor and self-pride both in words and illustrations. Linking
with the ethnological national culture and history, their connec-
tions with Europe and the Nordic-Germanic sources must be par-
ticularly stressed.

Berlin, 15 March 1943

[Signed] Leibbrandt
[Signed] G. BERGER

290

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2220-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2256

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT LAMMERS TO HIMMLER, 17 APRIL 1943,
CONCERNING "THE SITUATION IN THE GOVERNMENT GENERAL,"
INDICATING STEPS TAKEN FOR AN INTENDED JOINT REPORT OF
LAMMERS AND HIMMLER TO HITLER, AND TRANSMITTING A
MEMORANDUM ON TASKS AND PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF OCCUPIED POLAND

Berlin W 8, 17 April 1948
Vosstrasse 6, at present:
Fieldquarters. Mail must
exclusively be directed to
Berlin address.

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
RK.318D g III

Secret

To Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler.
Subject: The situation in the Government General
Dear Reich Leader:

We had agreed at our conference on 27 March of this year that
written texts should be worked out about the situation in the
Government General, on which our intended mutual report to the
Fuehrer could be based.

The material gathered for this purpose by SS Lieutenant Gen-
eral Krueger has been submitted to you immediately. Based on
this material I have had a memorandum prepared which sums
up the most important points of this material, subdivided so as
to give a clear picture culminating in crystallizing the measures
to be taken.

The memorandum was checked with SS Lieutenant Krueger
who agrees fully with it. I hereby enclose part of it.

Another conference concerning this matter would only be neces-
sary if you or Reich Leader Bormann have essential objections
against the contents of this memorandum. I ask you to let me
know as soon as possible if this is the case or not.

Heil Hitler!
Respectfully yours,
[Signed] Dr. Lammers

291

12 April 1943

Copy to RK. 318 D g III

[Stamp] Secret
Subject : The situation in the Government General

A . The task of the German administration in the Government

General

The German administration in the Government General has to
fulfill the following tasks :

1. For the purpose of securing food for the German people,
to increase agricultural production and utilize it to the fullest
extent, to allot sufficient rations to the native population occupied
with work essential for the war effort, and to deliver the rest
to the armed forces and the homeland.

2. To employ the manpower of the native population in the
Government General itself only for war important purposes, and
to put at the homeland’s disposal such manpower which is not
needed for the purpose mentioned above.

3. To strengthen Germanism in the Government General in
general, and by means of inland settlement in particular ; to create
a stronghold of Germanism in the eastern border districts, also
by means of colonization with ethnic Germans transferred from
other places, thus safeguarding these very districts.

4. To safeguard the Government General as a transit zone for
replacements and supplies to the East front.

5. To obtain troops as far as possible out of the native popu-
lation for the fight against bolshevism.

B. Wrong ways chosen for the fulfillment of these tasks

The German administration in the Government General has
failed by a wide margin in achieving the tasks listed under A.
Although, in the year of 1942, one succeeded in meeting the de-
livery quota of agrarian products for the armed forces and the
homeland at a relatively high percentage, namely over 90 percent,
and also met the demands of the homeland concerning the con-
scription of labor in general, one has to consider two things on
the other hand : First, these accomplishments in the year of 1942
were achieved for the first time, prior for instance, only 40,000
German tons in bread grain had been delivered to the armed
forces. Second, above all one had failed to create for the bringing
about of such achievements the necessary organizational eco-
nomic and political basis which is absolutely required, if such
achievements shall not strongly affect the entire situation, may
eventually cause chaotic conditions in the future. This failure of
the German administration can for one thing be explained by
the system of the German administrative and governmental ac-
tivity in the Government General personally represented by the

292

Governor General, second, by the wrong basic principles of policy
in all those questions, which were decisive of conditions in the
Government General.

* * * * * * *

II. The mistaken [ verfehlten ] basic 'principles of policy

1. The Economy . — The realization of the task, listed in A 1
necessitates in the first place a strict and clear-cut structure of
economics, as well as a disciplined and clear-cut official economic
policy, accompanied by an elimination as total as possible of
clandestine trading and black markets. This stipulates above all
the fullest utilization of the harvest and its public management,
the stopping of all trade enterprises which are not essential to
the war, and the care to be taken for a clear-cut management in
war essential enterprises.

The German administration was in no respect capable of living
up to these requirements. In the matter of raising food it took
a request of a delivery contingent for the Reich and the armed
forces amounting to 750,000 metric tons of bread grain in the
summer of 1942, in order to have the attempt made of drawing
up an inventory of food products. For this purpose a census was
taken. The result however turned out to be unreliable. The
utilization of harvest [Ernteerfassung] did not even permit the
full delivery of the contingent for the Reich and the armed forces
(instead of 750,000 metric tons only 690,000 tons) let alone the
ample feeding of the native population working for German in-
terests. While 1.4 million metric tons were demanded, only 1.2
million metric tons of bread grain could be taken hold of, of
which 690,000 m.t. were delivered to the Reich and the armed
forces, so that for roughly 16 million natives only 510,000 m.t.
were left. Accordingly, the weekly bread rations for the normal
consumer had to be cut down to only 1050 g, compared with 1675
g in the Protectorate and 2600 g in Incorporated Eastern Terri-
tories. To make supplies available for the native population,
black markets and clandestine trading were tolerated to the
greatest extent, resulting in prices entirely unattainable for the
population working for German interests. A married Polish offi-
cial, without children, with high school education, for instance,
has a net income of 234.27 zloty per month. Compared with this
the prices in the clandestine trade are:

1 kg. rye bread 11.00 zloty

1 kg. potatoes 2.40 zloty

1 kg. pork 80.00 zloty

1 kg. bacon 160.00 zloty

1 kg. butter 170.00 zloty

293

Under such conditions the foreign worker remains at his place
of work for about 4 to 5 days per week only in order to purchase
the missing provisions for himself and his family on the remain-
ing other days. Daily ransackings, robberies, murders, and other
crimes are the further consequences of those conditions.

The farmer received, as an incitement* for delivery of his agra-
rian products, premium certificates for the obtaining of com-
modities, (articles needed for farming, household necessities, salt,
cigarettes, brandy, etc.). These commodities very often could
not be had however, despite the fact that they were obtainable
in any desired quantity in the clandestine trade but at exorbitant
prices.

1 bricklayers’ brush 1 cow

1 dz. coal [Druschkohle] 30.00 zloty

1 pair of boots __ 1,500.00 zloty

1 horse shoe nail 8.00 zloty

1 pair of wooden slippers 2 calves

1 dress 1 cow

The consequence of this situation naturally leads to a severe curb-
ing of the farmer’s willingness to produce. Instead of reducing
prices in the trade section by means of taking the necessary
measures in regard to the management, a decree of the Governor
General recommended to adjust the prices of agrar-products to
the prices of commodities, which were as much as 300 to 400
percent higher.

The trade economics are entirely built up according to capi-
talistic viewpoints with the aim of earning quickly and much,
and any planned leadership, which might take war requirements
into consideration, is lacking. There is a lack of state super-
vision and of guidance in the line of production and in the line
of trade. The German individual business man as a “trustee,”
on his own, of enterprises personally directed by him, is given
a free hand to do what he wants, in the unrestricted play of
powers. These trustees very often make use of former Polish
and Jewish owners of enterprises as agents empowered to sign
in their names. These trustees make tremendous profits in
clandestine trading tolerated by the government, and make them
within the shortest time. Prohibition of production and control
of individual management as requested by the Armament Inspec-
tion (Major Gen. Schindler) were not carried out. Part of the
trade production, directed only at putting at the disposal of
the native population objects for the trade-in of food, metals, ma-
terials for spinning, leather, etc., are thus being drained off from
war economy.

294

2. The utilization of manpower . — The most important presup-
position for a proper and relatively frictionless regulation to
utilize manpower taken from the native population within the
Government General itself, as well as within the Reich, is
normal conditions in the sphere of economics. Lack of this coor-
dination influences the directing of labor employment unfavor-
ably in many respects. If it would be possible to provide the
population, working in the interest of Germany, with the mini-
mum of food needed and everyday objects, and to render im-
possible the access to other items by way of black market chan-
nels and clandestine trade, then the reserves of manpower at hand
would volunteer for employment as planned out of their own
volition. This would mean a basis for a sensible shaping of
agrarian property-units. It is necessary in this respect that
parts of the population thus available may then be employed in
such work which will guarantee them a satisfactory standard of
living. After the failure of having created the necessary suppo-
sition for a well-planned and well-steered employment of man-
power, the utilization of manpower is confronted with the greatest
difficulties. It is clear that those difficulties have been increased
by the elimination of Jewish manpower. But it is incorrect to
consider this elimination as the cause of difficulties. If the neces-
sary basis for proper management of manpower had been given,
the elimination of the Jewish manpower would not have caused
any difficulties worth mentioning. As things were, the utiliza-
tion of manpower had to be enforced by means of more or less
forceful methods, such as the instances when certain groups, ap-
pointed by the Labor Offices, caught church and movie-goers here
and there and transported them into the Reich. That such
methods not only undermine the people’s willingness to work and
the people’s confidence to such a degree that it cannot be checked
even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought
about by a strengthening of the political resistance movement.

3. The treatment of the native populations . — Can only be led
into the right channels based on a foundation of a clear-cut and
well-organized administration and management. Only such a
foundation permits that the native population may be handled
strictly if necessary, even severely. On the other hand it can be
dealt with in a big-hearted manner and may be granted certain
liberties, especially in cultural respect, causing a certain amount
of contentment. Without such a foundation severity would only
strengthen the resistance movement and meeting the native popu-
lation half-way would only undermine the German reputation.
That this foundation is missing can be concluded from the facts
mentioned above. Instead of trying to create this basis, the

295

Governor General inaugurates a promotion of cultural life on
the part of the Polish population, which knows no bounds in
itself. Under prevailing circumstances and last but not least,
in connection with our military situation last winter, this could
only be explained as a weakness and thus had to bring about
exactly the opposite results of the aspired aim.

* * * * * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 032-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3901

LETTER FROM ROSENBERG TO HIMMLER, 2 APRIL 1943, WITH COPY
TO DEFENDANT LAMMERS, TRANSMITTING ROSENBERG'S MEMO-
RANDUM ON "REICH COMMISSIONER KOCH AND THE ZUMAN
WOODED AREA" WHICH REPORTS UPON EVENTS ALLEGEDLY
OCCURRING IN THE EVACUATION OF THE ZUMAN AREA 1

[Handwritten] Copies to:

1. Dr. Lammers

2. Gauleiter

[Illegible initial] 2 April
2 April 1943

The Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Territory
Nr. 847/43 g R/H

Personal
[Stamp] Secret

To the Reich Leader of the SS and Chief of the German Police,

Himmler

Berlin SW 11

Prince-Albrecht Street 8

Dear Party Comrade Himmler!

By and large you have been informed by SS Major General
Berger 2 about my conflict with Reich Commissioner for Ukraine
Koch. Once in Poznan I told you my opinion of his so-called
policy. I am transmitting to you attachments on the Zuman
case about which you have perhaps already heard. Likewise, I
am adding the detailed account of this affair from my main
forestry and wood section. 3 I request you to obtain at once an

1 Document 032-PS was introduced in the IMT trial as Exhibit GB-321 and the German text
appears in Trial of the Major War Criminals, volume XXV, pages 92-96.

2 At this time defendant Berger was liaison officer of Reich Leader SS Himmler with the
East Ministry.

* This report, not reproduced herein, was also a pail; of the document introduced in evidence.

296

1

official report and explanation in this case from the Higher SS
and Police Leader with the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine.

Heil Hitler!

Signed : A. Rosenberg

Enclosure

[Handwritten] Copy 1 to Dr. Lammers

Berlin, 2 April 1943

R/H

Subject: Reich Commissioner Koch and the Zuman wooded area.

How little the Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine Koch felt
himself conscientiously bound to his mission was demonstrated at
the beginning of his activity in office. From the time of his
installation in September 1941 until the beginning or the middle
of February 1942, he visited the Reich Commission only a few
times. These visits lasted only a very short time whereupon he
would go out to hunt. During this whole time the General Com-
missioners, the District Commissioners and the Agricultural
leaders were obliged to perform their duties uninterruptedly in
hard winter and under the most difficult circumstances. Soon
there were rumors that the Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine
wished to appropriate the former Polish Zuman hunting land as
his personal hunting preserve. On the occasion of a visit in
Berlin the conversation also turned to the matter. Then the
Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine declared that he had made
hunting preparations for the future on the expressed wish of the
Minister. Upon my declaration that I had not given a thought
to this, he explained that he had received a letter from Gauleiter
Meyer. Now, Gauleiter Meyer had informed the Reich Com-
missioner of the Ukraine, with respect to future visits from the
Reich, that he might foresee such a possibility for the guests in
case they were hunters. In no way had any instruction for
extraordinary preparations been given by this. After that the
Reich Commissioner of the Ukraine got from me the unequivocal
instruction that he was not to undertake anything in this respect.
Later upon repeated questioning he named every one a defamer
who attributed to him the intentions of having a large hunting
area in Zuman. Nonetheless later there came again the news,
this time under the title of a forest land, that some 70,000
hectars of the Zuman area had been condemned for the Reich
Commissioner of the Ukraine, and it was intended to root up or
burn down the villages standing in the area.

Now, I receive the following information from an old Party
Comrade who has worked for 9 months in Volhynia and Podolia

297

for the purpose of preparing for the taking over of a District
Commissiariat or a main section in general district Volhynia and
Podolia. This information goes as follows:

On the order of the highest position, it was directed that the
whole district of Zuman be evacuated. Germans and Ukrainians
both stated that this was happening because the Reich Com-
missioner wished to have the whole wooded area Zuman for his
personal hunting area. In December 1942 (when the cold was
already severe) the evacuation was begun. Hundreds of families
were forced to pack all their possessions over night and were
then evacuated a distance of over 60 Km. Hundreds of men in
Zuman and the vicinity were mowed down [ abgeknallt ] by guns
of an entire police company, “because they were Communist party
members ” No Ukrainian believed this, and likewise, the Ger-
mans were perplexed by this argument, because if the security of
the area were at stake it would have been necessary to execute
communistically inclined elements in other districts. On the
contrary, it was generally maintained that these men were ruth-
lessly shot down without judgment because so extensive an evacu-
ation in so short a time was out of the question and furthermore,
there was not enough space available at the new place for settling
the evacuees. The district Zuman is today depopulated on a
wide area. The greater portion of the peasants have been re-
moved from the region. Now it suddenly appears that in order to
take timber out of this very richly wooded Rayon, peasants must
be forced to come from a distance of 30 and UO km., which for
the time being is the case in being obliged to carry on the export
of wood in the bandit-Eldorado [Banden-Eldorado ] developed out
of the Zuman wood area.

I maintain that it is necessary in this case, which has become
known to me unofficially and which has created the greatest irri-
tation in whole of Volhynia and Podolia, to probe it thoroughly
with the responsible police and to let the competent Higher SS
and Police Leader, SS Obergruppenfuehrer Pruetzmann hear
about the matter officially.

[Signed] A. Rosenberg

298

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF NG-I5I
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1551

FILE NOTE OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON A STATE SECRETARIES

CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF DEFENDANT STUCKART, 21 APRIL

1943, SUBMITTED TO AND INITIALED BY DEFENDANT LAMMERS,

CONCERNING A PROPOSED DECREE LIMITING LEGAL RIGHTS OF

JEWS 1

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Reich Chancellery 4611 Concerning Reich Chancellery 4748 E

Berlin, 21 April 1943

The State Secretaries conference, suggested by this office [von
hier] about the draft originally worked out in the Reich Ministry
of the Interior of a decree concerning the limitation of legal
rights of Jews [Rechtsbeschraenkungen] , took place today at the
office of State Secretary Stuckart. State Secretary Rothenberger, 2
State Secretary Klopfer, SS Major General Kaltenbrunner, and I
were present in addition to State Secretary Stuckart.

The discussion showed that only articles 6 and 7 of the pro-
visions of the draft of the order are considered necessary, in
which connection article 7 is to be supplemented by a regulation
which makes possible, in the case of a confiscation of property, a
settlement in favor of non- Jewish heirs and legal dependents.

It was furthermore considered suitable to have the regulation
issued as a supplementary decree to the Reich Citizenship Law. 3

The regulation would accordingly approximately take the form
as shown in appendix II. 4
Enclosure II

2. To the Reich Minister for information

[Initial] L [Lammers] 28 April

3. Reich Cabinet Counsellor, Dr. Ficker respectfully. Just. 1

[Initials] Kr. [Kritzinger]

s.Rk 5761 344550

1 This file note is only one of many captured documents on the drafting of the 13th Decree
to the Reich Citizenship Law contained in Document NG-151. Other items from this docu-
ment are reproduced in section V D 2, Volume III, this series, concerning the Justice case.

2 Curt Rothenberger, a defendant in the Justice case.

3 The supplementary decree was issued on 1 July 1943 as the “13th Decree to the Reich
Citizenship Law.” See Document 1422-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 2456, reproduced later in
this section.

4 Not reproduced herein.

299

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT STEENGRACHT 64
STEENGRACHT DEFENSE EXHIBIT 64

LETTER FROM EICHMANN, CHIEF OF THE RSHA SUBDIVISION ON
JEWISH MATTERS, TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 2 JUNE 1943, CON-
CERNING PROTESTS OF SLOVAKIAN BISHOPS ON ANTI-JEWISH
MEASURES AND CONCERNING REPORTED TREATMENT OF JEWS
EVACUATED FROM SLOVAKIA

Copy

Berlin SW 11, 2 June 1943
Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8
The Chief of the Security Police and SD
IV B 4

2145/42 secret (1090)

Order — Forward to Ini. IIA. Ini. IIB [crossed out in original]
wants to participate

[Stamp] Secret

Berlin 5 June 43
[Illegible initials]

To the Foreign Office

Attention Legation Councillor von Thadden or deputy
Berlin

Rauchstr. 11

[Stamp]

Foreign Office
Ini. 11/579 Secret
Received 7 June 1943
1 enclosure

[Handwritten] AR Tuengler Ini. ID [illegible] [Initials] V. Th. [v. Thadden]
7 June

Subject: Deportation of Jews from Slovakia — Pastoral letters
from Slovakian bishops protesting against anti- Jew-
ish measures adopted by the State
Reference : Your letter dated 15 May 1943 Ini. II 932 secret [Il-
legible initial]

Enclosure: 1 newspaper

With reference to the proposal put forward by Prime Minister
Dr. Tuka to the German Minister in Bratislava to send a mixed
Slovakian commission to one of the Jewish camps in the occupied
territories, I wish to state that an inspection of this kind already
took place recently on the part of Slovakia by Fiala, the chief
editor of the periodical “Der Grenzbote,”

300

With regard to the description of conditions in Jewish camps
requested by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka, attention should be drawn
to the comprehensive series of articles by this editor which has
appeared with numerous photographs, etc., in the periodicals “Der
Grenzbote,” “Slovak,” “Slovenska Politika,” “Gardiste,”
“Magyar Hirlap” and in the Paris newspaper, and which was
sent via the ^Transcontinental Press Agency to almost all im-
portant newspapers in the Southeast.

[Handwritten] Jews Sg.

The issues of the newspapers required — with the exception of
the Paris paper referred to — can be obtained from the adviser on
Jewish affairs with the German Legation in Bratislava, SS Haupt-
sturmfuehrer Wislizceny. I am enclosing a copy of the Paris
newspaper.

[Handwritten] See page 8 of the newspaper.

For the rest, to counteract the fantastic rumors circulating in
Slovakia about the fate of the evacuated Jews, attention should
be drawn to the postal communications of these Jews with Slo-
vakia, which are forwarded directly through the adviser on Jewish
affairs with the German Legation in Bratislava, and which for
instance amounted to more than 1,000 letters and postcards for
February-March this year. Concerning the information appar-
ently desired by Prime Minister Dr. Tuka about the conditions
in Jewish camps, no objections would be raised by this office
against any possible scrutinizing of the correspondence before it is
forwarded to the addressees.

By order:

Signed: Eichmann

Certified.

[Illegible signature]
clerk.

[Stamp of Chief of Security Police and SD]

50

SOI

95S402 — 62-

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-5901
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3272

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT BERGER, CHIEF OF THE SS MAIN OFFICE,
TO RUDOLF BRANDT, 16 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING MILITARY
SERVICE FOR SO-CALLED ETHNIC GERMANS IN CROATIA AND
SERBIA

The Reich Leader SS
Chief of the SS Main Office
CdSSHA/Be/Ra./VS-Diary No. 3706/43 Secret
Adjutant’s diary No. 1884/43 secret

[Stamp] Personal Staff Reich Leader SS
Archives
Secret/332/3

Berlin- Wilmersdorf 1, 16 June 1943
Hohenzollerndamm 31
P. 0. Box 58
[Stamp] Secret

Subject: Compulsory military service [wehrpflicht] for Eth-

nic Germans [Volksdeutsche] in the Southeast.
Reference: None
To the Reich Leader SS
Personal Staff

SS Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Brandt*

Berlin SW 11
Prinz Albrecht Str. 8

[Handwritten] Belongs to the file which I gave to

SS Captain Wascher
[Initials] Bg. 6/9

Dear Doctor:

With the discussion of the compulsory military service for
ethnic Germans we want to bring to a clarification a topic which
is not yet ripe for it and which does not demand a clarification
at all at this moment.

The Reich Leader SS has proclaimed general compulsory mili-
tary service for the ethnic group in the Serbian territory — that
is, Dr. Janko. The Serbian territory is under German sov-
ereignty, since it is occupied by Germany. From the point of
public law there can be no objection, leaving apart the question

* Rudolf Brandt was a defendant in the Medical case. Volumes I and II, this series.

302

that really nobody cares what we do down there with our ethnic
Germans.

The formation of the division “Prinz Eugen”* was not only
based on the principles of universal military service, but the
Tyrolese General Levy Act [Landsturm Ordnung] of 1872. But
since some friction occurred between SS Major General Phleps
and Dr. Janko, because Dr. Janko saw his throne collapse, SS
Lieutenant General Lorenz stepped in; he was told to desist
[abgewiesen] by the Reich Leader SS, though.

To proclaim compulsory military service for Croatia and Ser-
bia is impossible under public law. And it is not at all necessary
either, for when an ethnic group is under a moderately good
leadership, everybody volunteers anyway, and those who do not
volunteer get their houses broken to pieces. (Such cases are said
to have occurred in the Rumanian Banat during the last few
days.)

But the SS Legal Main Office [Hauptamt SS Gericht] wants
something quite different. They want, at long last, clarity and,
above all things, a simplification so that they can more easily and
better apply the legal provisions which, alas, exist; and I am of
the opinion that we cannot take away these worries from the
SS Legal Main Office. All that is necessary is to treat the racial
Germans a little differently from the German citizens. Just as
we show some indulgence to the Germans, for the sake of fair-
ness, we have to show this indulgence to our ethnic Germans, at
least until they finish their training. I think it is quite wrong
to goad the Reich Leader SS into something because of this mat-
ter and make him commit himself, and I refuse to do it.

I should be grateful, however, if you would inform me of the
decision.

These questions — please don’t take this personally — are not
questions which the SS Leadership Office [SS Fuehrungsamt] has
to solve, but are questions which concern the SS Main Office. But
of course, it’s Mr. Nordmann again.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[Signed] G. Berger,

SS Major General

[Stamp of Personal Staff Reich Leader SS]

* Reference is to the 7 — SS Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division “Prinz Eugen” — (7th SS Volun-
teer Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen”), whose personnel consisted mainly of ethnic Germans
from Yugoslavia and Rumania.

303

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2607
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2393

LETTER FROM REICH COMMISSIONER LOHSE TO ROSENBERG, 18
JUNE 1943, COMMENTING ON "SPECIAL TREATMENT" OF JEWS,
ATROCITIES, KILLING OF PERSONS ON SUSPICION OF PARTISAN
ACTIVITY, THE MANNER OF EXECUTIONS, THE FAILURE TO BURY
EXECUTED PERSONS, AND RELATED MATTERS

Copy

Riga, 18 June 1943

The Reich Commissioner for Ostland
Journal No. 3628/43 g.

Secret

To : The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Berlin

Commissioner General Kube has submitted the enclosed secret
reports, which deserve special attention.

The fact that the Jews receive special treatment [sonderbe-
handelt werden] requires no further discussion. It seems hardly
credible, however, that incidents have occurred like those men-
tioned in the report by the Commissioner General, dated 1 June
1943. What is Katyn compared to that? Just imagine the enemy
finding out about such incidents and making capital of them ! Such
propaganda would probably remain ineffective, only because those
who hear and read it would not believe it.

Even the combatting of partisans has assumed a form which
is highly questionable, if it is the aim of our policy to pacify
and exploit the individual territories. For example, the persons
who had been killed on suspicion of partisan activity — listed at
5,000 in the report of operation “Cottbus,” dated 5 June 1943* —
would, in my opinion, have been suited, with few exceptions, for
assignment to work in the Reich.

In this connection, it shall be conceded that in view of language
difficulties and especially on the occasion of such purge operations,
it is very hard to distinguish between friend and foe. It is, how-
ever, possible for cruelties to be avoided and for those liquidated
to be buried. I myself do not think that locking men, women,
and children in barns and then setting fire to the latter, is a
suitable method for combatting partisans, even if Qne wishes to
exterminate [ausrotten] the population. This method is not wor-

• In the documents this operation is spelled either as “Cottbus” or "Kottbus.” A later
report of 23 June 1943 on operation “Kottbus,” Document NO-2608, Prosecution Exhibit 2390,
is reproduced immediately below.

304

thy of the German cause and damages our reputation.
Please take the necessary steps at your end.

Signed Signature

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2608
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2390

REPORT FROM THE CHIEF OF ANTI-PARTISAN UNITS TO HIMMLER,
23 JUNE 1943, UPON THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION "KOTTBUS,"
NOTING GERMAN LOSSES OF 88 KILLED AND ENEMY LOSSES OF
9,751 KILLED IN BATTLE OR LIQUIDATED, THE LOSS OF 2,000 TO
3,000 LOCAL PEOPLE IN CLEARING MINE FIELDS, AND RELATED
MATTERS

[Stamp] Secret

Minsk, 23 June 1943

Copy of copy

The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police
Chief of the Anti-Partisan Units

To : The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police
Personal

Field Headquarters

Special Report concerning the major operation called “Kottbus”

Commander : SS Brigadier General and Brigadier General of the
Police, von Gottberg

Troops : Combat strength fighting force of our own formations,
including non-German formations — 16,662 men

a. Einsatzgruppe North:

2d SS Police Regiment with one battery

13th SS Police Regiment

12th Police Armored Company

2d Security Service Company

11th Field Howitzer Battery (motorized)

Company 1/ Antiaircraft Division Detachment of Head-
quarters Staff of the Reich Leader SS
Indigenous Security Battalion 57 with 1 Infantry howitzer
platoon (heavy-weapons Infantry platoon), 1 antitank
platoon (Pak-Zug), 2 heavy mortar platoons (Higher Field
Headquarters 392 — 61st Reserve Infantry Regiment).

1 half Battalion Teschendorf

Regimental Staff of the 2d Bicycle Infantry Regiment.

305

637th Battalion East
1st Battalion, 61st Security Regiment
2d Battalion, 931st Security Regiment
469th Security Battalion minus 1 company
1 platoon of 1st Battalion Artillery Regiment 221 with a bat-
tery unit

1 platoon of the 8th Battery Artillery Regiment Smolensk
with a battery unit

2d Battalion of Artillery Regiment 213 minus 1 battery
1st Battalion of 931st Infantry Regiment
Company 8 (Reserve) 61st Security Regiment (Area Com-
mand Center)

3d Company Armored Artillery 80
2d Artillery Regiment 56

b. Einsatzgruppe West
3 Gendarmerie platoons (motorized)

2 Companies) Higher Field Headquarters 392 (Half Bat-
1 battery £ talion Hensel)

1 police tank company
SS drushina-formations
Indigenous Security Battalion 54
1 half battalion Dr. Reiche
Indigenous Security Battalion 102

Gendarmerie Einsatzkommando, for special assignments
Auxiliary Battalion 118 (Kreikebom)

1 antitank platoon 1 Higher Field Headquarters 392

1 heavy mortar platoon Battalion Muel]er)

2 Companies J

1 Company Dunker (603d Security Regiment) under Half
Battalion Mueller

c. Blockade Group South

SS Special Battalion Dirlewanger
Auxiliary Battalion 15

600th Eastern Detachment (Cossacks — 3 squadrons, 1 head-
quarters platoon, 1 half battery)

633d Eastern Detachment (2 Companies and Headquarters
Company)

237th Security Battalion (4 Companies and Headquarters)
1st Battalion Police Rifle Regiment 31

Emergency units of the Commissioner General for White
Ruthenia

The success of major operation “Cottbus” consists of the total
annihilation of the partisan republic of Lake Palik, the troops of

306

which had been formed for the most part from regular Russian
paratroopers. The severity of the battles is most clearly shown
by the regrettably high losses among our own troops. The final
decision to attack such a powerful opponent was difficult and in
contradiction with the situation reports from all authoritative
and responsible offices in this territory. Since only our own
troops were available in the early first days of the battle, several
crises in the individual phases of the operation could not be
avoided. Continuous negotiations with the authorities responsible
for this territory for the assignment of supporting forces, nego-
tiations which hindered any kind of final decision, resulted in
the satisfactory assignment of the necessary troops corresponding
to the position of the enemy only after the Reich Leader SS had
personally intervened. In order to do justice to Major General
Schwarzenecker, commander of the Security Area of White Ru-
thenia, it must be emphasized that in the initial stages of the
operation, partly by exceeding his own powers and on his own
initiative, he assigned all troops that could one way or another
be assembled. The large booty of heavy and extra heavy weapons
confirms all the statements by prisoners to the effect that the
Moscow Central Command regard the large marshy area between
Polozk and Borrissow as a troop concentration area. The de-
struction by the Luftwaffe of 50 troop or cargo-carrying gliders
and one Russian plane, and that of four of our own planes by
enemy anti-aircraft fire, indicates the excellent organization of
the enemy. In this connection, the use of the Luftwaffe against
partisan groups of some size must be stressed. The decisive
crises could only be overcome by the heroic action of the crews
of the aircrafts made available by Air Fleet 6. Our own en-
circled forces, sometimes whole battalions, were supplied from
the air, not only with ammunition but also with food, by con-
tinuous service of our flight units. But the decisive factor for
the general success of the operation was the fact that the respon-
sible commander of the operation, SS Brigadefuehrer and Briga-
dier General of the Police von Gottberg, kept his head. Apart
from the tremendous number of enemy dead and the large booty
of weapons, especially those of extra heavy caliber, the total suc-
cess of this major operation is brought home by the fact that
among the large number of enemy dead there was also the Bol-
shevist Brigade Commander Kolja (code name), the man who
last fall had been put in charge of all partisan forces in White
Ruthenia by the Moscow Central Command. The wiping out of
the enemy’s central command organization has been confirmed by
the capture or destruction of radio stations which had been veri-
fied months ago by the Wehrmacht radio detection posts. The

307

seriousness of the battle and the number of our own losses,
furthermore, the fact that the local population supported partisan
operations, fanatically and voluntarily, especially by the laying of
mines on our rear lines of communication, demand elimination
of all human consideration for this population. For the same
decisive reasons, and in the interest of the security of the troops,
the assignment for labor could only be justified in operational
border areas. It is impossible to report the figures involved since
they can only be estimated. The hitherto unknown high number
of mines in the whole area necessitates special protective measures
for the life and security of our troops. Approximately 2,000 to
3,000 local people lost their lives in the cleaning-up of the mine-
fields.

Enemy losses.

Killed in battle 6042

Liquidated [erledigte] 3709

Prisoners 599

Assigned for labor.

Men 4900

Women 600

Our losses.

Germans killed 3 officers (one of these

a battalion commander)

85 noncommissioned officers
and men

wounded 10 officers (2 of these

regimental commanders)
373 noncommissioned officers
and men

missing 3 noncommissioned officers

and men

Non-Germans killed 39

wounded 152

missing 4

Booty

19 guns, 7.62 cm
9 antitank guns

1 antiaircraft gun
18 mortars

113,025 rounds of rifle ammunition
7,530 rounds of pistol ammuni-
tion

2,404 kg of explosives
36 boxes of explosive

308

SO heavy machine guns
31 light machine guns
16 antitank rifles
45 submachine guns
903 rifles
303 bombs

14 boxes of detonators
6 boxes of packets of

Eukrasit

305 electric fuses
1,053 rounds of tank munition

2 dispensaries with surgical

1,533 grenades
1,543 mines

and dental instruments
1 printing press

Noncountable equipment — signal pistols, machine gun and sub-
machine gun drums, horse saddles, typewriters, telephone instru-
ments, hand-grenades, cartridges, sewing machines, bicycles,
harnesses, field-kitchens, gas cans, uniforms, parachutes, propa-
ganda materials, filing cabinets, photographic post, film equip-
ment, silencers, medical library, etc.

Destroyed — 194 partisan camps consisting partly of buildings
used for housing bakeries, slaughterhouses, dyeing plants, grain
storage sheds. 422 block houses [Bunkers] were blown up.

The following of our own vehicles were destroyed by mines:

4 motor cars
2 trucks

1 armored car

2 tanks

Collection of country produce:

3,228 heads of cattle
2,182 sheep
903 horses
664 tons of grain
430 sledges
181 carts

The work of collecting and cleaning-up is still in progress.
The results of this work will be reported at a later date.
Signed: von DEM Bach [von dem Bach-Zelewski]

SS Lieutenant General and Lieutenant General of the Police
Certified :

Signature :

Police Captain.

Certified true copy.

[Illegible signature.]

309

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-3295
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1384

TELEGRAM FROM KASCHE, GERMAN MINISTER TO CROATIA, TO
THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 25 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING THE "RUTH-
LESS METHODS OF RECRUITING" OF "ETHNIC GERMANS" BY THE
WAFFEN SS IN CROATIA

Telegram

(Secret Teletypewriter)

Zagreb: 25 June 1943, 14.50 hours
Received: 25 June 1943, 15.50 hours

Urgent !

No. 2584 dated 25 June.

Situation among the ethnic Germans caused by ruthless methods
of recruiting, regardless of all regulations on the part of the
Waffen SS recruiting offices, is critical. As Altgayer has not ex-
plained the situation to his representative Klicker or told him
anything about his latest agreements with the Waffen SS, and
as Waffen SS excludes the ethnic German Military District Head-
quarters, the ethnic group leadership can at present no longer
exercise any supervision of, or control over, men under arms. In
view of the unusual high percentage of the male population in
the armed services and the state of unrest in the country, these
arbitrary methods can no longer be tolerated. Klicker, therefore,
has taken it upon himself not to pass on the latest calling-up
orders of SS Brigadier General Kammerhofer. I have therefore
decided to call together next week Klicker, Commandant of the
Ethnic German Military District Command, Kammerhofer, and
the German Plenipotentiary General [sic] and hold a discussion.
It is my intention to draw up at this meeting clear and reasonable
regulations on the strength of former agreements made with the
Croatian Government and those between SS Lieutenant General
Lorenz and SS Lieutenant General Berger. Should the discussion
prove fruitless as regard some points, I will see that a compre-
hensive report is made, based upon the minutes of the discussion,
quoting the points in dispute, so that a decision can be taken on
these on your side. Please advise Repatriation Office for Ethnic
Germans, [Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle] but do nothing more for
the time being. Please explain on what authority Kammerhofer
interferes in the military service of the ethnic group. Nothing
is contained about his being assigned to do this in the Fuehrer
order in my possession.

Signed : Kasche

310

L Stamp]

Distribution :

To Inland II
Reich Foreign Minister
State Secretary
Office Reich Foreign Minister
Ambassador Ritter
[remainder of stamp illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1422-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2456

I3TH DECREE ON THE REICH CITIZENSHIP LAW, I JULY 1943, SIGNED
BY FRICK, BORMANN, DEFENDANT SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, AND
THIERACK, PROVIDING THAT CRIMES OF JEWS ARE TO BE PUN-
ISHED BY POLICE, THE CONFISCATION BY THE REICH OF THE
PROPERTY OF DECEASED JEWS, AND RELATED MATTERS

1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 372
13th Decree to the Reich Citizenship Law, 1 July 1943

Under Article 3 of the Reich Citizenship Law of 15 September
1935 (RGB1 I, p. 1146), the following is ordered:

Article 1

1. Criminal actions committed by Jews shall be punished by
the police.*

2. The provision of the Polish penal laws of 4 December 1941
(RGB1 1, p. 759) , shall no longer apply to Jews.

Article 2

1. The property of a Jew shall be confiscated by the Reich
after his death.

* Correspondence between various Reich leaders and agencies preceded the issuance of this
decree. A part of this correspondence is reproduced in the materials on the Justice case.
Volume III, this series. Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, in a letter to Bormann,
dated 13 October 1942, stated: “With a view to freeing the German people of Poles, Rus-

sians, Jews, and gypsies, and with a view to making the eastern territories incorporated into
the Reich available for settlements of German nationals, I intend to turn over criminal pro-
ceedings against Poles, Russians, Jews, and gypsies to the Reich Leader SS. In so doing
I work on the principle that the administration of justice can make only a small contribution
to the extermination of members of these peoples * * *. I am, on the other hand, of the
opinion that considerably better results can be accomplished by surrendering such persons to
the police, who can then take the necessary measures unhampered by any legal criminal
evidence * * (Doc. NG-558, Pros. Ex. 143, Vol. III). Concerning this decree, Kalten-

brunner, in a letter to the Reich Minister of the Interior, dated 8 March 1943, stated: “The
provision according to which the application of criminal law against Jews is transferred from
the judicial authorities to the police is based on an agreement between the Reich Leader SS
and the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack.” (Doc. NG-151, Pros. Ex. 204, Vol. III).

311

2. The Reich may, however, grant compensation to the non-
Jewish legal heirs and persons entitled to sustenance who have
their domicile in Germany.

3. This compensation may be granted in the form of a lump
sum, not to exceed the ceiling price of the property which has
passed into possession [Verfuegungsgewalt] of the German Reich.

4. Compensation may be granted by the transfer of titles and
assets from the confiscated property. No costs shall be imposed
for the legal processes necessary for such transfer.

Article 3

The Reich Minister of the Interior with the concurrence of
the participating higher authorities of the Reich shall issue the
legal and administrative provisions for the administration and
enforcement of this regulation. In doing so he shall determine to
what extent the provisions shall apply to Jewish nationals of
foreign countries.

Article 4

This regulation shall take effect on the seventh day of its
promulgation. In the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia it shall
apply where German administration and German courts have
jurisdiction; Article 2 shall also apply to Jews who are citizens of
the Protectorate.

Berlin, 1 July 1943

The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

Chief of the Party Chancellery

M. Bormann

Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Thierack

312

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2287-A
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1098

TELETYPE FROM HIMMLER TO DEFENDANT BERGER, 5 JULY 1943,
GIVING NOTICE THAT HITLER HAS AWARDED THE GERMAN
CROSS IN SILVER TO BERGER FOR HIS WORK IN THE RECRUIT-
MENT AND IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF THE SS AND POLICE
AND IN ACQUIRING ETHNIC GERMAN AND GERMAN VOLUN-
TEERS FOR THE SS

[Handwritten note] SS-PHA [SS Personnel Main Office] Diary
No. 1398/435 5 July 1943/b

Teletype [Illegible initial]

To the Chief of SS Main Office SS Lieutenant General Berger
Berlin

Dear Berger,

I have the very special pleasure to inform you in this manner
that the Fuehrer, on my proposal, in appreciation of the great
merits which you have gained in the recruitment and ideological
training of the SS and Police, and in particular for the acquisi-
tion of the ethnic German and Germanic Volunteers, has bestowed
upon you the German Cross in silver. My sincere and cordial
congratulations thereon.

Heil Hitler!

In cordial friendship Yours

[Signed] H. Himmler

*******

313

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2034
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3354

LETTER FROM RUDOLF BRANDT TO THE DEFENDANT BERGER, 12 JULY
1943, TRANSMITTING HIMMLER'S ORDER OF 10 JULY 1943 ON THE
EVACUATION OF INHABITANTS OF PARTS OF OCCUPIED RUSSIA
AND THE UTILIZATION FOR LABOR OF THE ADULTS AND CHIL-
DREN AFFECTED

The Reich Leader SS Field Headquarters 12
Personal Staff [Stamp]

Registry No. 39/160. 43g Personal Staff Reich

Records Office

Bn. File No. Secret 227

Secret

To the Chief of the SS Main Office
SS Lieutenant General Berger
Berlin

July 1943
Leader SS

Dear Lieutenant General!

Enclosed please find a copy of a letter of the Reich Leader SS
to the Chief of the Anti-Partisan Forces, the Higher SS and
Police Leader Ukraine-Russia-South and the Higher SS and Police
Leader Central Russia. Please take note of the contents and in-
form the Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories.

Heil Hitler!

1 Enclosure

[Initials] R B [Rudolf Brandt]

SS Lieutenant Colonel

Copy

The Reich Leader SS

227 — 3—

10 July

Field Headquarters, 10 July 1943
To

1. Chief, Anti-Partisan Forces

2. Higher SS and Police Leader, Ukraine

3. Higher SS and Police Leader, Central Russia

4. SS Lieutenant General Berger

5. SS Lieutenant General Backe

(1) The Fuehrer has decided that the partisan-infested areas
of the north Ukraine and Central Russia are to be evacuated of
their entire population

314

(2) The entire able-bodied male population will be assigned
to the Reich Commissioner for Allocation of Labor, in accordance
with arrangements yet to be decided upon — under conditions ap-
plicable to prisoners of war, however.

(3) The female population will be assigned to the Reich Com-
missioner for Allocation of Labor for employment in the Reich. 1

(4) A part of the female population and all orphaned children
will enter our reception camps [Auffangslager] .

(5) In accordance with an agreement yet to be reached with
the Reich Minister for Food and the Minister for Occupied
Eastern Territories, the Higher SS and Police Leaders are to
arrange, as far as is practicable, for the farming of the areas
evacuated of their population; to have them planted, in part,
with Kok-Sagys and to utilize them for agricultural purposes,
as far as possible. The children’s camps are to be located at
the border of these areas, so that the children will be available
as manpower for the cultivation of Kok-Sagys and for agriculture.

[Signed] H. Himmler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-1649
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3273

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SS COURT MAIN OFFICE TO THE SS
MAIN OFFICE, 12 JULY 1943, CONCERNING "COMPULSORY MILI-
TARY SERVICE FOR ETHNIC GERMANS OF FOREIGN NATION-
ALITY"

Copy

Enclosure 1

la 155 Journal No. 35/42 12 July 1943

28 a

Subject: Compulsory military service for ethnic Germans of for-
eign nationality.

Reference: none
Enclosures: 1 copy
To SS Main Office
Berlin

I hereby forward to you for your information enclosed copy
of a letter from the SS judge assigned to the Reich Leader SS
dated 19 June 1943. 2 In order to be able to outline the rules
desired by the Reich Leader SS to govern the registration of
ethnic Germans for military service in a legally acceptable form,

1 More extensive evidence concerning the procurement and utilization of labor from German
occupied Russia is reproduced below in section XI B ( Slave Labor ) .

2 The enclosure was not a part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

315

it will be necessary first of all to determine which directives
have thus far been issued in this matter, and what legal basis
they have. As I have in the meantime ascertained, there exist,
for example, orders governing the question of military service
of resettlers “liable to such service ,, issued by the High Com-
mand of the Armed Forces with the approval of the Reich Com-
missioner for the Strengthening of Germanism (compare for in-
stance “General Army Bulletin” 1943, p. 246). The SS Court
Main Office has thus far not dealt with the question of general
military service, since the relevant cases apparently are prepared
in other offices, for instance in the SS Main Office. I therefore
request information about the present status of the matter, in
particular concerning the practical procedure followed in the
drafting of replacements from among ethnic Germans in the
various territories. For instance the SS and Police Court in
Belgrade reported on 14 August 1942 that the SS volunteer divi-
sion “Prince Eugen” no longer was an organization of volunteers,
that on the contrary, the ethnic Germans from the Serbian
Banat were “drafted to a large extent under threat of punish-
ment by the local German leadership, and later by the replace-
ment agency.” If this should be the case, I request information
about the regulations which can be used as a basis for such
threat of punishment. From correspondence carried on some
time ago by the headquarters of the Waffen SS I believe I can
conclude that the SS Leadership Main Office does not so far
assume general military service for ethnic Germans, but it also
is making an attempt to arrive at a basic decision in this matter,
I suggest that other interested agencies be contacted now to co-
operate in preparing the directives of the Reich Leader SS, so
far as this is deemed expedient on their part.

I should be grateful for a prompt reply.

For the Chief SS Court Main Office as Deputy :

Signed : Dr. Reinecke
SS Colonel and Chief of Office

316

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-348
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1101

LETTER FROM ALFRED ROSENBERG TO DEFENDANT BERGER, 10
AUGUST 1943, CONFERRING UPON BERGER THE MANAGEMENT
OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP STAFF OF THE REICH MINISTRY
FOR THE OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES

Copy for the Minister's Office

Berlin, 10 August 1943

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories

SS Lieutenant General and
Lieutenant General of the Waffen SS Berger
30/31 Hohenzollerndamm
Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1

In agreement with the Reich Leader SS I am herewith con-
ferring upon you the management of the newly formed Political
Leadership Staff [die Leitung des neugebildeten Fuehrungsstabes
Politik] of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Ter-
ritories.

Signed : Rosenberg

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-349
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1102

NOTE OF MEYER OF THE EAST MINISTRY, 10 AUGUST 1943, CON-
CERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
STAFF IN THE EAST MINISTRY

Copy for the Minister’s Office
For Publication in the Official Journal
Political Leadership Staff

The hitherto existing Political Department [Hauptabteilung
Politik] is converted into a Political Leadership Staff. A special
decree will regulate the organization of the Political Leadership
Staff. Until then the hitherto existing organization will remain.

Ministerial Director Dr. Leibbrandt, Chief of the former Po-
litical Department, upon his own request, has been granted leave
until further notice for reasons of health. SS Lieutenant General
and Lieutenant General of the Waffen SS Berger, who retains
his sphere of work in the SS Main Office as before, is charged
with the direction of the Political Leadership Staff.

953402—52 21

317

The Political Leadership Staff, until further notice, will bear
reference number I. The individual departments will keep their
old reference numbers until the reorganization is effected.

As Deputy:

Alfred Meyer

II 1 c 1365

II Pers. a 1390 (Berger)

10 August 1943

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1919-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2368

EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH OF HIMMLER AT A POZNAN MEETING
OF SS MAJOR GENERALS, 4 OCTOBER 1943, CONCERNING THE
ROLE OF GERMANY AND GERMAN BLOOD IN HISTORY, UTILIZA-
TION OF OTHER NATIONALITIES FOR GERMANY'S PURPOSES,
EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWISH RACE, ROLE OF THE SS, AND
RELATED MATTERS*

Speech of the Reich Leader SS at the meeting of the SS Major
Generals at Poznan, 4 October 1943

Memorial Service for the War Dead

In the months that have gone by since we met in June 1942
many of our comrades were killed, giving their lives for Ger-
many and the Fuehrer. In the first rank — and I ask you to rise
in his honor and in honor of all our dead SS men, soldiers, men,
and women — in the first rank our old comrade and friend from
our ranks, SS Lieutenant General Eicke. (The [SS] Gruppen-
fuehrers have risen from their seats.) Please be seated.

The Situation in the Fifth Year of War

I have considered it necessary, now at the beginning of the
fifth year of war, to call you, the high leader corps of the SS
and Police together. Sober as we always were, truthful toward
ourselves, we will discuss several matters in this troop leader
meeting [Truppenfuehrerbesprechung] . Just as I was accus-

* Document 1919-PS was introduced in the IMT trial as Exhibit USA-170 and the full
German text appears in Trial of the Major War Criminals, volume XXIX, pages 110-173. The
original was found in Rosenberg’s files, a large collection of materials which Rosenberg desired
to preserve and which fell into Allied hands. During the course of the Ministries trial, the
Rosenberg files were rescreened and 44 records were discovered to be a phonographic recording
of Himmler’s Poznan speech of 4 October 1943. During the cross-examination of Berger, who
denied that the transcript of the speech (Doc. 1919-PS) showed accurately what Himmler
actually said at this conference of SS generals, the prosecution introduced the 44 records in
evidence (Doc. NO-5909, Pros. Ex. 3507). Parts of the phonographic recording were heard
in open Court while defendant Berger was still on the witness stand. See extracts from the
testimony of defendant Berger reproduced later in this section.

318

tomed to do during long years of peace, I will give you my
opinion of the situation, as I see it, about our tasks, about what
we have done and achieved, as well as about what the future
holds for us, as briefly as possible.

The Russian Leadership

First of all the war situation. I start with Russia. When, I
think it was in 1937 or 1938, in Moscow the big show trials took
place and the former Czarist corporal and later Bolshevist Gen-
eral Tuchatschweski [Tukhachevski] and other generals were
shot, at that time people all over Europe, also we in the Party
and the SS, were of the opinion that the Bolshevist system and
Stalin had made one of its biggest mistakes. We were entirely
mistaken in our judgment of the situation. That we can truth-
fully say. I think Russia could not have lasted through 2 years
of war — and it is now the third year of war — if it had kept the
former Czarist generals. I emphasize, it has made the political
commissioner a general, or chosen him who came of the ranks
of the Red Army as a commander in such a way that he could be
a political commissioner at the same time. That as far as is
shown in transcript. The most fanatic advocate of the Bolshevist
doctrine, I would like to call it, not ideology, is there at the same
time as commissioner and leader.

The 1941 attack . — In 1941 the Fuehrer attacked Russia. That
was, as we can well see now, shortly — perhaps 3 to 6 months —
before Stalin prepared to embark on his great penetration into
central and western Europe. I can give a picture of this first
year in a few words. The attacking forces cut their way through.
The Russian Army was herded together in great pockets, ground
down, taken prisoner. At that time we did not value the mass
of humanity as we value it today, as raw material, as labor.
What after all, thinking in terms of generations, is not to be
regretted but is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labor,
is that the prisoners died, in tens and hundreds of thousands, of
exhaustion and hunger.

*******

It is basically wrong for us to infuse all our inoffensive soul
and spirit, our good nature, and our idealism into foreign peoples.
This is true since the time of Herder who clearly wrote “Voices
of the nations” [Stimmen der Voelker] when in a state of drunk-
enness, thereby bringing on us, who come after him, such im-
measurable sorrow and misery. This is true for instance, of
the Czechs and the Slovenes to whom we gave their consciousness
of nationality. They were just not capable of it themselves;
we had to discover it for them.

319

One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS men —
we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of
our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian,
or to a Czech does not interest me in the slightest. What the
nations can offer in the way of good blood of our type we will
take, if necessary by kidnapping their children and raising them
here with us. Whether nations live in prosperity or starve to
death interests me only so far as we need them as slaves for
our culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether
10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging
an antitank ditch interests me only so far as the antitank ditch
for Germany is finished. We shall never be rough and heartless
when it is not necessary, that is clear. We Germans, who are the
only people in the world who have a decent attitude toward ani-
mals, will also assume a decent attitude toward these human
animals. But it is a crime against our own blood to worry about
them and give them ideals, thus causing our sons and grandsons
to have a more difficult time with them. When somebody comes
to me and says: “I cannot dig the antitank ditch with women
and children, it is inhuman, for it would kill them,” then I have
to say, “You are a murderer of your own blood because if the
antitank ditch is not dug, German soldiers will die, and they
are sons of German mothers. They are our own blood.” That
is what I want to instill into this SS — and what I believe have
instilled into them — as one of the most sacred laws of the future.
Our concern, our duty is our people and our blood. It is for them
that we must provide and plan, work and fight, nothing else.
We can be indifferent to everything else. I wish the SS to adopt
this attitude to the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples,
especially Russians. All else is vain, fraud against our own
nation, and an obstacle to the early winning of the war.

Russian Soldiers on our Side

One thing must be understood in this war — it is better that
a Russian dies than a German. When we employ Russians, the
principle is to mix them in a ratio of 1:2 or 1 :3 with Germans.
The best thing is that you use Russians singly, then you can ride
with them in a tank. One Russian with two or three Germans
in a tank, marvelous, nothing at all. The only thing you have to
avoid is letting the Russian meet other Russian tank drivers, lest
these fellows conspire. If for some reason, however, you de-
sire companies made up entirely of Russians, then gentlemen
take care — and this is not just an idea, but this is an order — that
this company has your informer set-up, your NKVD organization.
Then you can rest quietly. Besides — this is one of the earliest

320

lessons that I have taught — take care that these subhuman beings
always look in your face, that they always have to look their
superiors in the eye. That is as with animals. As long as it
looks its tamer in the eye it won’t do anything. But never forget
— it is a beast. With this attitude we can make use of the Rus-
sian, with this attitude we shall always be superior to the Slav.
*******

Foreigners in the Reich

We must also realize that we have 6 to 7 million foreigners in
Germany. Perhaps it is even 8 million now. We have prisoners
in Germany. None of them are dangerous so long as we take
severe measures at the merest trifles. It is a mere nothing today
to shoot 10 Poles, compared with the fact that we might later
have to shoot tens of thousands in their place and compared to
the fact that the shooting of these tens of thousands would then
be carried out even at the cost of German blood. Every little
fire will immediately be stamped out and quenched, and ex-
tinguished — otherwise — as in the case of a real fire — a political
and psychological surface fire may spring up among the people.

The Communists in the Reich

I don’t believe the Communists could attempt any action, for
their leading elements, like most criminals, are in our concentra-
tion camps. And here I must say this — that we shall be able to
see after the war what a blessing it was for Germany that in
spite of the silly talk about humanitarianism, we imprisoned all
this criminal substratum of the German people in concentration
camps. I’ll answer for that. If they were going about free, we
would be worse off. For then the subhumans would have their
NCOs and commanding officers, then they would have their coun-
cils of workers and military. As it is, however, they are locked
up and are making shells or projectile cases or other important
things and are very useful members of human society.

*******

Chief of the Anti-Partisan Units [ Bandenkampf-Verbaende ]

In the meantime I have also set up the department of Chief of
the Anti-Partisan Units. Our comrade SS Lieutenant General von
dem Bach [Bach-Zelewski] is Chief of the Anti-Partisan Units.
I considered it necessary for the Reich Leader SS to be in au-
thoritative command in all these battles, for I am convinced that
we are best in a position to take action against this enemy
struggle, which is a decidedly political one. Except where the
units have been supplied and which we had formed for this pur-

321

pose were taken from us to fill in gaps at the front, we have
been very successful.

It is notable that, by setting up this department we have gained
for the SS in turn a division, a corps, an army, and the next step,
which is the headquarters of an army or even of a [army]
group — if you wish to call it that.

Uniformed Police and the Security Police

Now to deal briefly with the tasks of the regular Uniformed
Police and the Security Police. They still cover the same field.
I can see that great things have been achieved. We have formed
roughly 30 police regiments from police reservists and former
members of the police — police officials, as they used to be called.
The average age in our police battalions is not lower than that
of the security battalions of the armed forces. Their achieve-
ments are beyond all praise. In addition, we have formed police
rifle regiments by merging the indigenous security battalions of
the “savage peoples” [wilden Voelker]. Thus, we did not leave
these police battalions untouched but blended them in the ratio
of about 1 :3. That is why we have, at the present moment of
crisis, a far greater stability than could be seen among the other
units made up of natives or local inhabitants.

* * * H« He * Hs

The other side doesn’t make life easy for us. And you must not
forget that the fortunate position in which we are placed by
occupying large parts of Europe carries with it also the disad-
vantage that in this way we have among ourselves, and thus
against us, millions of people and dozens of foreign nationalities.
Automatically, we have against us all those who are convinced
Communists, we have against us every Free Mason, every Demo-
crat, every convinced Christian. These are the ideological ene-
mies whom we have against us all over Europe and whom the
enemy has totally for himself.

He He * * * He *

SS Industrial Concerns

I now come to other individual great spheres of activity, of
which it is important for you all to know. We have huge arma-
ment works in the concentration camps. This is the sphere of
activity of our friend SS Lieutenant General Pohl. Every month
we put in many millions of hours of work for armaments. We
tackle the most thankless tasks and — I must give this its due —
whether in the concentration camps, in Pohl’s industrial works,
or outside at the offices of the Higher SS and Police Leaders, or

322

in the workshops of the SS Leadership Main Office, one thing is
obvious — wherever we are, we are SS men. Where things are in
a bad way, we act. I want every subordinate trained to this end.
We want to help, unhampered by quibbles regarding authority,
for we want to win the war. What we are doing, we are doing
for Germany. Whether it is a question of building a road, if a
tunnel is not going ahead somewhere, or if it is an invention
which for sheer red tape does not come to fruition, or anything
else; where we can get to work, we get to work. What we are
doing in our armament works will be a remarkable and note-
worthy achievement, even if we can only assess it and prove it
when the war is ended.

The Evacuation of the Jews

I also want to talk to you, quite frankly, on a very grave mat-
ter. Among ourselves it should be mentioned quite frankly, and
yet we will never speak of it publicly. Just as we did not hesitate
on 30 June 1934 to do the duty we were bidden and stand com-
rades who had lapsed up against the wall and shoot them, so we
have never spoken about it and will never speak of it. It was
that tact which is a matter of course and which I am glad to say,
is inherent in us, that made us never discuss it among ourselves,
never speak of it. It appalled everyone, and yet everyone was
certain that he would do it the next time if such orders are issued
and if it is necessary.

I mean the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination of the
Jewish race. It's one of those things it is easy to talk about,
“The Jewish race is being exterminated,” says one Party Mem-
ber, “that's quite clear, it's in our program — elimination of the
Jews and we're doing it, exterminating them.” And then they
come, 80 million worthy Germans, and each one has his decent
Jew. Of course the others are vermin, but this one is an A-l
Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has watched it, not
one of them has gone through it. Most of you must know what
it means when 100 corpses are lying side by side, or 500, or
1,000. To have stuck it out and at the same time — apart from
exceptions caused by human weakness — to have remained decent
fellows, that is what has made us hard. This is a page of glory in
our history which has never been written and is never to be
written, for we know how difficult we should have made it for
ourselves, if with the bombing raids, the burdens and the depriva-
tions of war we still had Jews today in every town as secret
saboteurs, agitators, and troublemongers. We would now prob-
ably have reached the 1916-1917 stage when the Jews were still
in the German national body.

323

We have taken from them what wealth they had. I have issued
a strict order, which SS Lieutenant General Pohl has carried out,
that this wealth should, as a matter of course, be handed over to
the Reich without reserve. We have taken none of it for our-
selves. Individual men who have lapsed will be punished in ac-
cordance with an order I issued at the beginning which gave
this warning; whoever takes so much as a mark of it is a dead
man. A number of SS men — there are not very many of them —
have fallen short, and they will die without mercy. We had the
moral right, we had the duty to our people, to destroy this
people which wanted to destroy us. But we have not the right
to enrich ourselves with so much as a fur, a watch, a mark, or
a cigarette, or anything else. Because we have exterminated a
germ, we do not want in the end to be infected by the germ and
die of it. I will not see so much as a small area of sepsis appear
here or gain a hold. Wherever it may form, we will cauterize
it. Altogether however, we can say that we have fulfilled this
most difficult duty for the love of our people. And our spirit,
our soul, our character has not suffered injury from it.

****** *

The Principle of Selection

We are a product of the law of selection. We have made our
choice from a cross-section of our people. This people came into
being aeons ago, through generations, and centuries, by the throw
of the dice of fate and of history. Alien peoples have swept over
this people and left their heritage behind them. Alien blood
streams have flowed into this people, but it has, nevertheless in
spite of horrible hardships and terrible blows of fate, still had
strength in the very essence of its blood to win through. Thus,
this whole people is saturated with and held together by Nordic —
Phalian — Germanic blood, so that after all one could and can still
speak of a German people. From this people of such varied
hereditary tendencies as it emerged from the collapse after the
years of the battle of liberation, we have now consciously tried
to select the Nordo-Germanic blood, for we could best expect this
section of our blood to contain the creative, heroic, and life pre-
serving qualities of our people. We have gone partly by outward
appearances and for the rest have kept these outward appear-
ances in review by making constantly new demands, and by re-
peated tests both physical and mental, both of the character and
the soul. Again and again we have sifted out and cast aside
what was worthless, what did not suit us. J ust as long as we have
strength to do, thus will this organization [Orden] remain healthy.
The moment we forget the law which is the foundation of our

324

race and the law of selection and austerity toward ourselves, we
shall have the germ of death in us and will perish, just as every
human organization, every blossom in this world, does some time
perish. It must be our endeavor, our inner law, to make this
blossoming and fructifying last for our people as long as possible,
bringing as much prosperity as possible and — don’t be alarmed —
if possible for thousands of years. That is why, wherever we
meet and whatever we do, we must be mindful of our principle —
blood, selection, and austerity. The law of nature is just this —
What is hard is good, what is vigorous is good; whatever wins
through in the battle of life, physically, purposefully, and spiritu-
ally, that is what is good — always taking the long view. Of
course sometime — and thi£ has happened often in history — some-
one can get to the top by deceit and cheating. That makes no
difference to nature, to the fate of the earth, or to the fate of
the world. Really, that is nature. Fate removes the impostor
after a time — time not reckoned in generations of man but in
historical periods. It must be our endeavor never to deceive our-
selves but always to remain genuine, that is what we must con-
tinually preach and instill into ourselves, and into every boy and
each one of our subordinates.

The SS After the War

One thing must be clear. One thing I would like to say to you
today, the moment the war is over we will really begin to weld
together our organization, this organization which we have built
up for 10 years, which we imbued and indoctrinated with the
first most important principles during the 10 years before the
war. We must continue to do this — we — if I may say so, we
older men — for 20 years full of toil and work, so that a tradi-
tion 30, 35, 40 years, a generation, may be created. Then this
organization will march forward into the future young and strong,
revolutionary and efficient to fulfill the task of giving the German
people, the Germanic people, the superstratum of society which
will combine and hold together this Germanic people and this
Europe, and from which the brains which the people need for
industry, farming, politics, and as soldiers, statesmen, and tech-
nicians, will emerge. In addition, this superstratum must be so
strong and vital that every generation can unreservedly sacrifice
two or three sons from every family on the battlefield, and that
nevertheless the continued flowing of the bloodstream is assured.

*******

325

The Future

* Hs * Hs Hs Hs *

When the war is won — then, as I have already told you, our
work will start. We do not know when the war will end. It may
be sudden, or it may be long delayed. We shall see. But I say
to you now, if an armistice and peace comes suddenly, let no one
think that he can then sleep the sleep of the just. Get all your
commanders, chiefs, and SS Fuehrers attuned to this ; only then,
gentlemen, shall we be awake, for then, so many others will fall
into this sleep. I am going so to rouse the whole SS, and keep
it so wide awake that we can tackle reconstruction in Germany
immediately. Then Germanic work will be begun immediately in
the General SS, for then the harvest will be ripe to be taken into
the granary. We shall then call up age groups there by law.
We shall then immediately put all our Waffen SS units into ex-
cellent form, both as regards equipment and training. We shall
go on working in this first 6 months after the war, as though the
big offensive were starting on the next day. It will make all the
difference, if Germany has an operative reserve, an operative
backing, at the peace or armistice negotiations, of 20, 25, or 30
SS divisions intact.

If the peace is a final one, we shall be able to tackle our great
work of the future. We shall colonize. We shall indoctrinate
our boys with the laws of the SS organization. I consider it to
be absolutely necessary to the life of our peoples, that we should
not only impart the meaning of ancestry, grandchildren, and
future, but feel these to be a part of our being. Without there
being any talk about it, without our needing to make use of
rewards and similar material things, it must be a matter of course
that we have children. It must be a matter of course that the
most copious breeding should be from this racial superstratum
of the Germanic people. In 20 to 30 years we must really be
able to present the whole of Europe with its leading class. If
the SS, together with the farmers — we together with our friend
Backe, then run the colony in the East on a grand scale, without
any restraint, without any question about any kind of tradition,
but with nerve and revolutionary impetus, we shall in 20 years
push the national boundary [Volkstumsgrenze] 500 kilometers
eastward.

I requested of the Fuehrer already today, that the SS — if we
have fulfilled our task and our duty by the end of the war —
should have the privilege of holding Germany’s eastern-most
irontier as a defense frontier. I believe this is the only privilege
for which we have no competitors. I believe not one person will
dispute our claim to this privilege. We shall be in a position

326

there to train every young age group in the use of arms. We
shall impose our laws on the East. We will charge ahead and
push our way forward little by little to the Urals. I hope that
our generation will successfully bring it about that every age
group has fought in the East, and that every one of our divisions
spends a winter in the East every second or third year. Then we
shall never grow soft, then we shall never get SS members who
only come to us because it is distinguished or because the black
coat will naturally be very attractive in peacetime. Everyone
will know that “if I join the SS, there is the possibility that I
might be killed/' He has contracted in writing that every second
year he will not dance in Berlin, attend the carnival in Munich,
but that he will be posted to the Eastern Frontier in an ice-cold
winter. Then we will have a healthy elite for all time. Thus,
we will create the necessary conditions for the whole Germanic
people and the whole of Europe: controlled, ordered, and led by
us, the Germanic people, to be able in generations to stand the
test in her battles of destiny against Asia which will certainly
break out again. We do not know when that will be.

Then, when the mass of humanity of one to one and one-half
billions line up against us, the Germanic people numbering, I hope,
250 to 300 millions and the other European peoples making a
total of 600 to 700 millions (and with an outpost area stretching
as far as the Urals or a hundred miles beyond the Urals) must
stand the test in its vital struggle against Asia. It would be an
evil day if the Germanic people did not survive it. It would
be the end of beauty and culture, of the creative power of this
earth. That is the distant future. It is for that we are fighting,
pledged to hand down the heritage of our ancestors.

We see into the distant future because we know what it will
be. That is why we are doing our duty more fanatically than
ever, more devoutly than ever, more bravely, more obediently,
and more thoroughly than ever. We want to be worthy of being
permitted to be the first SS men of the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler
in the long history of the Germanic people which stretches be-
fore us.

Now let us remember the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler who will create
the Germanic Reich and will lead us into the Germanic future.

Our Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler, Sieg Heil, Sieg Heil, Sieg Heil,

327

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-4670
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2340

DIRECTIVE OF HIMMLER, I JANUARY 1944, APPOINTING FICK IN-
SPECTOR OF IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF THE SS AND POLICE
AND SUBORDINATING HIM TO DEFENDANT BERGER

The Reich Leader SS

Command Post in the Field, 1 January 1944
[Stamp]

Personal Staff of the Reich Leader SS
Document Control File No. secret 353
Subject: Inspector of Ideological Training
Reference : Order dated 25 April 1940
As from 1 January 1944, I hereby appoint the SS Senior
Colonel Fick Inspector of the entire Ideological Training of the
SS and the Police.

He will be directly subordinated to the Chief of the SS Main
Office. Implementing regulations supplementing this order will
be issued by the Chief of the SS Main Office.

[Initials] H. H. [H. Himmler]

[Handwritten] Original handed to [SS] Lieutenant General
Berger

[Initials] Br. [Brandt]

14 January

328

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-1689
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1749

MEMORANDUM FROM DEFENDANT STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND
TO ROSENBERG, 22 JANUARY 1944, SUGGESTING THE APPOINT-
MENT OF A LIAISON OFFICER TO THE "OFFICE FOR ANTI-JEWISH
ACTIVITY ABROAD" OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND OTHER MEANS
OF COLLABORATION

[Handwritten] Submitted to Rosenberg on 25 January
[Stamp]

Register Office Rosenberg
Entered No.

305 Mo on 1 February 44 file 1
Foreign Office Nr. Inland II
[Handwritten]

To be entered.

Send copy to Staff Leader

26 January

Delivered by Party Member Hagemeyer, 25 January 44
Send copy to Mr. Sch. for his information.

Berlin W 8, 22 January 1944
75 Wilhelmstrasse

Dear Reich Minister:

In the interest of an intensified collaboration between the For-
eign Office and the Rosenberg office in the field of the anti- Jewish
struggle [antijuedischen Kampfes], I should like to suggest that
a member of your office be appointed permanent liaison officer to
the “Office for Anti- Jewish Activity Abroad” [Antijuedischen
Auslandsaktionsstelle] of my office.

Should you agree to this proposal in consideration of the ex-
ceedingly productive collaboration between the Foreign Office and
Dienstleiter Hagemeyer, I would especially welcome your choosing
Party Member Hagemeyer.

Furthermore, I should like to ask your consent for Dr. Klaus
Schickert, commissioned with the management of the Reich Insti-
tute for Research on the Jewish Question at Frankfurt-on-the-
Main, to be occasionally called in for a certain collaboration within
the field of the “Office for Anti- Jewish Activity Abroad” of the
Foreign Office.

As I regard the intensification of the collaboration between my
office and the Frankfort Institute as a suitable means for the
furthering of our common tasks, I should be obliged if you would

329

consent to Schickert’s being called in for the purpose proposed.
The Reich Foreign Office, on its part, would be in the position to
assist and further, with its material, Party Member Schickert in
his work in a very far reaching manner. I believe that such a
collaboration would produce satisfactory results in every way.

Heil Hitler !

Your very obedient,
[Signed] Steengracht

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-5394
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-272

EXTRACTS FROM A COPY OF A MEMORANDUM OF GAULEITER
FRAUENFELD, COMMISSIONER GENERAL FOR THE CRIMEA, 10
FEBRUARY 1944, FOUND IN THE FILES OF REICH LEADER SS
HIMMLER, COMMENTING UPON GERMAN OCCUPATION POLI-
CIES IN THE OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES

Secret

The Commissioner General for the Crimea

Vienna XIII, 10 February 1944
Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld Weidlichgasse 1
F/Lu.

[Handwritten] [Handwritten]

V.S. No. 1282/44g Reich Leader SS

Adjutant’s Journal No. 575/g*

Please submit 9 March f.
36/36/44g
RF

Memorandum on the Problems of Administration of the
Occupied Eastern Territories

The longer large parts of the European Continent are con-
quered by German troops and are being administrated by Ger-
man authorities, the more important the question becomes of how
to handle this administration and how to treat the population.
Especially in times of unavoidable crisis resulting from a long
drawn-out war and from the changing fortunes of war, questions
concerning the treatment and consequently the morale of the
population in the occupied territories may become not only essen-
tial but even decisive for the outcome of the war.

* The two handwritten entries indicate the file registration number of different branches
of the central SS offices.

330

The individual components, which together form the relation-
ship of the population of the occupied territory to the German
people, can be divided into two groups. One group represents
all those elements originating with the population of the occupied
territory ; the other group is determined by the measures and the
conduct of the German occupation and administration authorities.

In the course of the war some parts of Europe were occupied
where the population was hostile toward us from the very be-
ginning, as, for example, in Poland, France, Belgium, Holland,
Denmark, and Norway. On the other hand, some countries were
occupied, or conquered, the population of which greeted the Ger-
man troops as their liberators and met the German administra-
tion absolutely in a positive way. This was especially the case
with some peoples of the Balkans and the Baltic countries — espe-
cially, however, the Ukrainians.

The numerically second-largest people on the continent (if we
do not consider the Russians as part of Europe) — of whose more
than 40 millions, three quarters came under German civilian and
military administration — received the German soldiers jubilantly
as their liberators from the hated yoke of bolshevism, and they
met them with the greatest of confidence and sympathy.

On the other side we have that masterpiece of wrong treatment
and the most remarkable and astonishing achievement — to have,
within the period of 1 year, chased into the woods and swamps,
as partisans, a people which was absolutely pro-German and had
jubilantly greeted us as their liberator and to have thus influenced
the course of events in the East in a decisively negative way.

The reason why things developed in this way is only to a very
minor extent due to the fact that the Ukrainian people expected
things from its liberator which were not along the lines of our
policies and therefore caused disappointment gradually growing
into enmity.

The truth is that the incorrect as well as incomprehensible at-
titudes of some of the competent authorities or of some individuals
have to be blamed for this unfortunate course of affairs.

The principle of ruthless brutality, the treatment of the popu-
lation of the country according to points of view and methods
used in past centuries against colored slave peoples ; and the fact,
defying any sensible policy, that the contempt for that people
was not only expressed in actions against the individuals but was
also expressed in words at every possible and impossible occasion
and was even printed and propagated by pamphlets — all this bears
ample testimony to the complete lack of instinct with regard to
the treatment of alien peoples, which, in view of its consequences
can only be called pathetic and disastrous.

331

At this point I must state with the greatest of emphasis that
the situation is by no means such as the Reich Commissioner for
the Ukraine [Koch] constantly pictures it in his reports to the
highest authorities — namely that there are now two camps; on
the one side those people who first of all want to safeguard Ger-
many’s interests in the East; and on the other side the day
dreamers and weaklings who, in an almost traitorous way, would
be ready to neglect, indeed even to sacrifice, German interests
in favor of their “Eastern complex,” their “Russian soul,” out of
their sympathy for the foreign peoples.

On account of this complete distortion of the actual facts an
entirely wrong impression of the actual situation was created.
The facts were rather the following:

On the one side there were persons who could shape their poli-
cies only in accordance with their character, their disposition,
and their education, namely, “politics with the sledge hammer.”

On the other side there were those persons — in many cases
border Germans [Grenzdeutsche] or Germans from abroad — who
on the basis of their theoretical knowledge and their practical ex-
perience were of the opinion that a policy of brutality and force
could not work in the long run, but that the administration of
occupied territories would have to be handled on a higher level
and one would have to use the (to be sure) more complicated
and difficult method of guiding the peoples which, however, prom-
ises success.

One cannot repudiate sharply and emphatically enough the argu-
ments that sentimentalities or perhaps special sympathies for
the eastern people are involved which are opposed to the interests
of the German people; such suspicions, raised again and again,
are aimed at discrediting all evidence coming from this side. It
is rather appalling to notice how little some people know about
history and what we could have learned from it in order to avoid
mistakes and act in the right way. In the long run a policy
trying to reach its goals in the cold way always proved to be the
better and more successful one. This kind of policy will have
much more serious and disadvantageous effects on a subjugated
people than the “head through the wall policy of the bulls and
boars.” Anybody who knows history will be able to name a hun-
dred examples to prove that pressure will produce counterpres-
sure, and that in many a case a people was not smashed on the
anvil but was made as hard as steel and thus bring about the
desired result quickly and reliably while flexible tactics with re-
gard to the treatment always prove to have a dividing and disin-
tegrating effect.

332

Apart from these fundamental deliberations it was also stupid
that these champions of a thick-headed policy of force did not
only apply this force, but talked about it constantly and always
in the wrong moment; and that in threatening and ridiculing
the native population they went much farther than they could
actually afford to, since, on account of the insufficient means of
power at their disposal, they could not back up their words by
action. Although one might argue as to whether one should do
such things, however, there should be no doubt that in any case
one keeps silent about it instead of talking constantly about it.

It takes a naivete which borders on stupidity for anybody to
believe that in the 20th century a people, which, to be sure had
a pathetically sad history, but nevertheless does have some his-
torical past and which — though of different character than the
German people — certainly has some racial and character qualities,
will accept constant abuses and contempt and, at the same time,
will gladly and perhaps voluntarily place its working capacity
and its strength at the disposal of its master.

If, on top of all this, the policies of the British in the colonies
of the Empire are quoted as an explanation and excuse for such
senseless conduct, and if the point of view of the German master
race is set against the slave character of Slavic mixed peoples,
and if this difference is emphasized loudly and with a lot of
ado, one must state that even a policy of catastrophes planned
and financed by our opponents could hardly have such disastrous
effects as the measures resulting from such nonsense.

All people, but especially naive and rather simple primitive
peoples who have, despite a quarter of a century of Bolshevist
subjugation, preserved extraordinary sound moral strength (a
fact which is worth thinking about), possess like a child that
strong ability of differentiating between harsh and unjust treat-
ment, between punishment and arbitrary acts.

In this connection I want to emphasize that even among the
champions for a “sensible” eastern policy there is nobody who
would hesitate to approve even of the most serious and ruthless
actions if they were required in the interest of the German people.
It seems justifiable and can be justified, even in the fact of history,
in the case of dire necessity to let thousands and hundreds of
thousands of foreigners die if this is necessary for the future and
the victory of the German people. Such action would also with-
stand the judgment of world history. Killing a single person,
however, without such higher necessity demanding it, is murder.
An action like that has always been condemned by history and
its perpetrators were punished by history with the worst of pun-
ishments, failure!

958402—52 22

333

The tactics of brutality born of stupidity and inclination are
usually supplemented by a complete misunderstanding of political
and ideological concepts. It can only be considered as the height
of miscomprehension if people believe that they must, already
during the war, advocate those basic points of view which are to
guide our policies in the East in the postwar area, and fail to take
into consideration their psychological effects. Such rigid, dog-
matic attitude proves the lack of ability of such people to guide
alien peoples; such tasks demand merciless severity in the last
and most important questions, but also a rather far extending
elasticity and flexibility as well as adaptability in questions of
tactics, which do not necessarily have to influence the strategies
of our eastern policies in any way. Only one principle must be
observed during a war which is waged at the cost of such high
sacrifices and is fought for the highest ideal.

What actions are in order to contribute to the victorious conclu-
sion of the war — Applying principles of bourgeois morality to the
problems of world history shows that the persons displaying bru-
tality and a master race attitude are inwardly just little Philis-
tines [Spiessbuerger] without any greatness ; also if they declare
that at this early date basic questions must be treated in agree-
ment with our future intentions with regard to the treatment and
administration of the eastern peoples, since, we cannot, in a few
years assume a different attitude.

Just the opposite is true. If I have the choice of acting in
accordance with my policies, but might thus cause embitterment
and hostility among the subjugated peoples, or if I can act in a
way that will have a favorable propagandistic effect, though it
may not be completely in the line of our future policies, there
should not be the slightest doubts that it is correct to choose the
action which is not quite in keeping with the political line, but
will be favorable for the course of the war.

After the German people have won the war, there will be no-
body to hinder it in changing its individual measures as well as
its entire policies in any way it pleases. World history and
German history contain numerous examples for cases in which,
afterward, a form based on national or international law was
found, or when it could be proved that one partner to the treaty
had violated its provisions, whereupon it was possible to cancel
former promises or agreements or to change them according to
the new situation.

It was doubtlessly right, during the first months of the Eastern
Campaign, when everybody was under the illusion that a fifth
Blitzkrieg would follow the first four, to advocate the principle of
brutality and ruthlessness, since it is doubtlessly apt to produce

334

a maximum of effect within the shortest possible time. When
we found out that events in the East became an uninterrupted
chain of surprises, it would have been necessary to show our elas-
ticity and to be brave enough to change basically our method of
administrating the country just as the battle tactics and the
military situation was basically changed. When it became evi-
dent that these persons, to whom the policies of ruthlessness and
forceful exploitation had been entrusted in case the Blitzkrieg was
successful, did not possess the adaptability and flexibility to adapt
themselves to the changed situation, one would also have had to
bring about the necessary change of policies by means of chang-
ing the personnel. Even if in the occupied eastern territories,
especially, however, in the Ukraine, the method of ruthlessness
was right on principle it would not only have been wrong from the
propagandistic point of view thus endangering the course of the
war, but also from the tactical point of view, since the civilian
administration never has enough executive power in order to
maintain such policies with the necessary perseverance and
severity.

[Here follows nearly 30 pages of supplementary material, most of which the
author specifies as “concrete examples” of his general criticism. This mate-
rial has been omitted since most of it is similar in nature to materials repro-
duced herein in documents bearing an earlier date.]

*******

No attempt is intended here to shift all obvious shortcomings
and resulting difficulties to the different agencies or individuals
mentioned here. It should only be shown how a task by itself
difficult, but a beautiful and solvable task, can be made insolvable
within the shortest time due to the lack of know how, but also
due to the lack of seriousness and the conceited indolence of cer-
tain people who seriously hampered the problem of conducting
our war.

If in the further course of the war, and after the victorious
ending of the war, we will get these territories back, a basic
change in the judgment of the population and their treatment
must take place, also a fundamental change in the set up of the
organization of the civilian administration and of the field of
economy lest the most serious difficulties arise for Germany.

Signed : Frauenfeld

(Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld)

335

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2947
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1806

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT STEENGRACHT, 20 MARCH 1944, TRANS-
MITTING COPY OF HITLER’S DECREE APPOINTING DEFENDANT
VEESENMAYER AS GERMAN PLENIPOTENTIARY AND MINISTER
IN HUNGARY AND DEFINING VEESENMAYER'S AUTHORITY

[Stamp] Top Secret

The Foreign Office

Political Division IV 771 g Rs Berlin W 8, 20 March 1944

[Stamp]

Express Letter

Foreign Office

Ini. 11 309 Top Secret

I enclose for your confidential information a copy of the Fueh-
rer’s power of attorney for the Plenipotentiary of the Greater
German Reich in Hungary, Party Member Dr. Edmund Veesen-
mayer.

[Signed] Steengracht

1. [Illegible handwriting]

2. Wagner

[Initials] v. Th. [von Thadden]

[Stamp]

Top Secret

Copy Top Secret

The Fuehrer

(1) The interests of the Reich in Hungary will henceforward
be protected by a Plenipotentiary of the Greater German Reich
in Hungary, who will simultaneously bear the designation Min-
ister.

(2) The Reich Plenipotentiary is responsible for all political
developments in Hungary and receives his directives through the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs. He has the special task
of paving the way for the formation of a new national govern-
ment which will be resolved to fulfill loyally and until final vic-
tory is achieved the obligations imposed upon it by the Tripartite
Pact. The Reich Plenipotentiary will advise this government on
all important matters and represent always the interests of the
Reich.

(3) The Reich Plenipotentiary is to ensure that the entire ad-
ministration of the country, as long as German troops are there,

336

is carried out by the new national government under his guid-
ance in all fields, and with the object of utilizing to the fullest
all the resources the country has to offer, in particular the
economic possibilities, for the joint conduct of the war.

(4) German civilian offices, no matter of what nature, which
are to operate in Hungary may be established only with the
consent of the Reich Plenipotentiary; they will be subordinate to
him and will act in accordance with his directives.

To perform tasks of the SS and Police to be carried out by
German agencies in Hungary, and especially police duties in
connection with the Jewish problem, a Higher SS and Police
Leader will be appointed to the staff of the Reich Plenipotentiary
and will act in accordance with his political directives.

(5) As long as German troops remain in Hungary, military
sovereignty will be exercised by the commanding officer of these
troops. The commanding officer is subordinated to the High
Command of the Wehrmacht and receives his directives from
him. The commanding officer of troops is responsible for the
internal military security of the country and for its defense
against threats from abroad. He supports the Reich Plenipo-
tentiary in his political and administrative duties and acquaints
him with all Wehrmacht requirements, especially with regard to
the utilization of the country for the provisioning of the German
troops. The requirements of the Wehrmacht, so far as they
concern the realm of civilian affairs, are met by the Reich Pleni-
potentiary. In cases of imminent danger the commanding offi-
cer of German troops has the right to order also in the realm of
civilian affairs, measures necessary for the fulfillment of military
tasks. He will arrive at an agreement with the Reich Pleni-
potentiary concerning this as soon as possible. The Reich "Pleni-
potentiary and the commanding officer of German troops, must
cooperate as closely as possible wherever their spheres of activity
overlap and agree on all measures.

(6) I name Party Member Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer, Pleni-
potentiary of the Greater German Reich, and Minister in Hungary.
Fuehrer Headquarters, 19 March 1944

Signed : Adolf Hitler

337

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5522
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-438

TELETYPE FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO VON RIBBENTROP
THROUGH DEFENDANT RITTER, 20 MARCH 1944, CONCERNING
VEESENMAYER'S CONFERENCE WITH THE HUNGARIAN REGENT,
HORTHY, ON GERMANY'S WISHES IN THE FORMATION OF THE
HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT

Top Secret

[Stamp] To be treated as sealed matter only
Teletype

(Secret teletypewriter)

Budapest, 20 March 1944, 1555 hours
Arrival: 20 March 1944, 1700 hours
Nr. 493 of March 20th

Most Urgent!

Top Secret

For the Reich Foreign Minister through Ambassador Ritter.

Just had discussion with the Regent lasting for 1 hour. He
stated that in his opinion formation of the government had to
be completed by today but that, after discussion with Imredy, he
realized that for the time being only a government of civil servants
headed by Sztojay or Csatay was tolerable for him. Contrary
to Imredy’s account, he left it open how long such a government
was to remain in office. Any other solution would force him to
violate his oath on the constitution and to the law. I emphatically
pointed out that I considered such an interim solution politically
unwise and impossible in point of time. The time of eternal
compromising was past, and I said I was under the impression
that the Regent was merely out to gain time which was not in
accordance with the will of Hitler and the Reich government.
In the ensuing conversation we once again referred to Kallay
and the Regent said literally: “He regretted that neither Hitler
nor the Reich government had so far been frank with him. Until
a few days ago he did not know that the Reich government ob-
jected to Kallay, else he would have dismissed him long ago.”
I voiced my consternation and stated that on Horthy’s last visit
Hitler, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister since, had suggested
in no uncertain terms that Herr Kallay did not enjoy the con-
fidence of the Reich government. I pointed out that Hitler ob-
jected on principle to .receiving Herr Kallay once more and that

338

for a year the German Minister had virtually ceased relations
with Herr Kallay. Reverting to the question of a government
composed of civil servants, I told the Regent that I could not
understand how the appointment of a government headed by
Imredy would drive the Regent into committing perjury and
argued my case.

Unable to retort, he said that I was much too intelligent and
too well versed in rhetoric for him but that he had to stick to
his opinion. I stated in conclusion that I had to report and re-
quest new instruction first, but that I much regretted his un-
compromising attitude and that I felt compelled even now to voice
my anxiety lest it entail grave consequences.

From hereon secret cipher V.

After having had three longer talks with the Regent within
24 hours, I increasingly gained the impression that Horthy on
the one hand is lying inordinately and on the other is no longer
physically fit to cope with his task. He is repetitious, often con-
tradicting himself within a few sentences, and sometimes does
not know how to continue a statement. His statements sound
like a formula learned by heart, and I am afraid that he can
hardly be convinced, let alone gained for our cause.

Signed : Veesenmayer

[Stamp] Distribution suggested to the Reich Foreign Minister
[Distribution form]*

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Secretary, Political Division
Ambassador Ritter
Ambassador Gaus
Chief of Personnel Division
Chief of Trade Policy Division
Chief of Legal Division
Chief of Cultural Policy Division
Chief of Press Division
Chief of Radio Division
Chief of Records
Dirigent Political Division
Chief Inland I
Chief Inland II

Work Copy at [handwritten] Pol. IV
Minister Schnurre
Minister Benzler
Minister Frohwein

* On the distribution form, handwritten check marks appear after the following entries:
“Understate Secretary, Political Division” (Defendant Woermann); “Ambassador Ritter”;
“Dirigent Political Division”; and “Minister Benzler.”

339

Minister v. Grundherr
Legation Counselor Melchers
Dr. Megerle

This is copy No

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5526
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-440

TELEGRAM FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO DEFENDANT RITTER,
22 MARCH 1944, REPORTING THE IMPENDING MILITARY OCCU-
PATION OF THE RESIDENCE OF THE HUNGARIAN REGENT HORTHY

[Stamp]

Top Secret

To be treated as sealed matter only
Telegram
(Secret code)

Budapest, 22 March 1944, 2340 hours.

Arrival: 23 March 1944, 0130 hours.

No. 508 of 22 March

Very urgent
Top Secret

For Ambassador Ritter

Re wire decree Fuschl 1 No. 3(*) of 22 March 1944.

(*) Probably No. 560 of 20 March

Sudden occupation [alarmartige Besetzung] of the castle with
present distribution of troops will take 3 hours according to
Army Group report. It is hardly possible to surround the castle
effectively in view of its cellars and unknown secret exits.

VEESENMAYER

[Distribution Form] 2
State Secretary Keppler
Under State Secretary, Political Division
Ambassador Ritter
Ambassador Gaus
Chief of Personnel Division
Chief of Trade Policy Division
Chief of Legal Division

1 Von Ribbentrop maintained headquarters at Fuschl in Austria.

2 On the distribution form, handwritten checkmarks appear after the following entries:
“Understate Secretary Political Division” (Defendant Woermann) ; “Ambassador Ritter”;
“Minister Benzler”; and “Minister Frohwein.”

340

Chief of Cultural Policy Division

Chief of Press Division

Chief of Radio Division

Chief of Records

Dirigent Political Division

Chief Inland I

Chief Inland II

Work Copy with Pol IV

Minister Schnurre

Minister Benzler

Minister Frohwein

Minister V. Grundherr

Legation Counsellor Melchers
Dr. Megerle

This is copy No

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5574
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3701

TELETYPE FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE TO DEFENDANT VEESEN-
MAYER, 2 APRIL 1944, GIVING VON RIBBENTROP'S INSTRUCTIONS
ON RELATIONS WITH HORTHY AND THE NEW HUNGARIAN
GOVERNMENT

[Stamp]

Top Secret

To be treated as sealed matter only
Telegram

(Secret teletypewriter)

Fuschl, 2 April 1944, 1940 hours
Received: 2 April 1944, 2000 hours
Reich Foreign Minister 249/44

Top Secret

No. 532 dated 2 April

1. Telegram Control

2. German Legation Budapest

Coded telegram (secret code system)

Secret note for Secret Reich matter

Note:

Transmitted under No. 750 to German Legation Budapest
Telegram Control, 2 April 1944

For Minister personally

341

The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to work along political
lines toward the goal of keeping the Regent more and more away
from government business, pushing into the background and
gradually isolating him in the castle. The aim therefore is, to
eliminate him gradually and to continue the necessary political
work with the new Hungarian Government alone.

Altenberg

This is copy No. 5

[Handwritten] State Secretary I, Hungary — 1178
[Distribution Form]

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Secretary, Political Division

Ambassador Ritter

Ambassador Gaus

Chief of Personnel Division

Chief of Trade Policy

Chief of Legal Division

Chief of Cultural Division

Chief of Press Division

Chief of Radio Division

Chief of Protocol

Dirigent Political Division

Chief Inland I

Chief Inland II

Working copy at [Handwritten] Political IV.

* On the distribution form handwritten checkmarks appear after the following entries:
“Under State Secretary, Political Division” (Defendant Woermann) and “Dirigent Political
Division.”

342

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3947-PS
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1914

FILE NOTE, 31 MARCH 1944, CONCERNING (I) THE ORAL CONFI-
DENTIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFENDANT PUHL AND SS LIEU-
TENANT GENERAL POHL ON THE UTILIZATION BY THE REICH
BANK OF PRECIOUS OBJECTS ACQUIRED BY THE SS; (2) A DIREC-
TIVE OF FUNK AND DEFENDANT SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK ON
THE DELIVERY TO THE REICH BANK OF PRECIOUS OBJECTS IN
THE HANDS OF THE MAIN TRUSTEE OFFICE EAST; AND RELATED
MATTERS 1

Berlin, 31 March 1944

Subject: Utilization [Verwertung] of jewelry [Schmuckwaren]
and similar things which fall to [anfallen] official
agencies in favor of the Reich

According to an oral confidential agreement [muendlichen ver-
traulichen Vereinbarung] between Vice President Puhl and the
chief of a Berlin official agency [einer Berliner Amtsstelle], the
German Reich Bank has taken over the utilization of domestic
and foreign currency, gold and silver coins, precious metals, se-
curities, jewels, watches, diamonds, and other precious objects
which fall to this agency [die bei dieser Stelle anfallenden] . 2 All
incoming objects are processed under the code name “MELMER.”

The large number of objects acquired hereby have been turned
over to the Municipal Pawn Shop, Division III, Central Office,
Berlin N 4, Elsaesser Str. 74, for the best possible utilization
after checking the number of pieces and their weight, provided
they have not been smelted.

As it is evident from the enclosed copy of a letter from the
pawn shop, dated 29 March 1944, 3 it refuses further acceptance
of such items and declines to process items already in their
possession, whose processing has not yet been completed. We
have been informed that the City Treasurer, to whom the Central

1 Document 3947-PS was introduced in the IMT trial as Exhibit USA-850 and the German
text is reproduced in Trial of the Major War Criminals, volume XXXIII, pages 577-579.

2 That the agency referred to was the SS was stated by defendant Puhl when he testified in

the IMT trial as a witness for defendant Funk, President of the Reich Bank: “I had a very

simple talk with Mr. Funk. It turned on the request of the SS to make use of our bank
installations by depositing valuables for which, it was said, there was not sufficient protection
in the cellars of the SS building. Perhaps, for the sake of completeness, I may add that SS
in this connection, always means the Economic Department of the SS * * *. After this con-
versation the head of the Economic Department of the SS, whose name was Pohl, Obergruppen-
fuehrer Pohl, contacted me. I asked him to come to my office, and there he repeated what
I already knew, namely that he would welcome it if we would take over these valuables as
soon as possible * * *. I confirmed what we had arranged and said, “If you will designate
officials from your department, I shall inform our department, and together they can discuss
the technical details." See Trial of the Major War Criminals, volume XIII, pages 565 and 566.

3 The enclosure was not a part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

343

Office as a municipal office is subordinated, wants to use its per-
sonnel in the Office for War Damages.

The question of a uniform utilization of the precious objects is
important not only because the Reich Bank should be given the
opportunity to sell unprocessed jewels, etc., from the Melmer
delivery, the same way as it did before and not only because its
proceeds belongs to the Reich, but also due to the following
reasons :

So far the pawn shop made the purchases according to the
world wide gross prices minus 10 percent for purchasing charges.
In case the price obtained in the final disposition was a higher
one, this surplus went to the benefit of the Reich. Through sales
to foreign countries, a considerable amount of foreign currency
ought to have been acquired. A large number of goods ready
for export are still in possession of the pawn shop. Among
others, diamonds of 35,000 carats and rose diamonds of a very
high value.

The Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich, the Pleni-
potentiary for the Four Year Plan, informed the German Reich
Bank in a letter of 19 March 1944, a copy of which is enclosed, 1
that considerable amounts of gold and silver objects, jewels and
so forth at the Main Trustee Office East, should be delivered to
the Reich Bank according to the order issued by the Reich Min-
isters Funk and Graf Schwerin von Krosigk. The utilization of
these objects should be accomplished in the same way as the
Melmer deliveries. The Reich Marshal informed us also about
the utilization of objects of the same kind, which have been
acquired in the occupied western territories. We do not know
to which office these objects have been delivered and how they
are utilized.

We received a further inquiry about the utilization of jewels
and similar objects from the Reich Bank in Katowice 2 3 (compare
with enclosed copy 1 ).

Besides the above-mentioned cases, where the Reich Bank is,
or will be indirectly participating in selling of jewelry, there is
yet to clear the question of utilization of jewels and similar
objects which have been acquired as war booty. As far as we
know, the entire war booty consisting of jewelry and similar
objects is in the safes of the Reich Finance Main Office [Reichs-
hauptkasse]. Probably there are objects and items still fit for
export which after smelting can give us gold and silver. The

1 The enclosures mentioned in this document were not part of the exhibit introduced in

evidence.

3 The city of Katowice, in Upper Silesia, is located near Auschwitz, where the largest of
all the concentration camps was located.

344

official in charge of it is Ministerialrat Dr. Maede,* as attorney —
in fact — from the Reich Ministry of Finance in Sigmaringen.

In our opinion it is absolutely essential that uniform utiliza-
tion be established of goods acquired by official agencies. The
simplest solution would be to separate the pawn shop, which has
the necessary skilled personnel and the connections necessary for
sale abroad, from the municipal authorities for this war job.
Should this be impossible, another appropriate agency should be
appointed for this work.

Considering the large amount of incoming foreign currency as
a result of the sale of these objects in foreign countries and the
considerable acquisition of gold and silver not fit for export
from smelting — the immediate uniform settlement of this prob-
lem seems to be very advisable.

Main Cashier’s Department [Hauptkasse]

[Signed] Kropp

[Handwritten] Transactions concerning gold II [Gold-Bewirt-
schaftung] .

* “Maede” should be “Maedel.” Note that the minutes of the conference of 11 and 12
December 1942 (Doc. NG-5369, Pros. Ex. 3920, reproduced earlier in this section) on the
handling of confiscated Jewish property in the West show that “Ministerial Counsellor Dr.
Maedel” was the ranking representative of the Reich Ministry of Finance at that conference.

345

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2287-C
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1097

MEMORANDUM OF THE SS MAIN OFFICE, 19 APRIL 1944, CON-
CERNING THE "DECORATIONS AND BADGES OF DISTINCTION"
OF DEFENDANT BERGER*

Berlin-Grunewald, 19 April 1944

Reich Leader SS
SS Main Office
Amt AI — 2a (1) Az: 16/0

Subject: Decorations and badges of distinction of SS Lieutenant
General Berger

Reference: Telephone conversation with SS Lieutenant Colonel
Reich — First Lieutenant Paeseler
To the SS Main Personnel Office
The Personnel office of SS Main Office reports on the decora-
tions and badges of distinction of the Chief of SS Main Office,
SS Lieutenant General Berger.

Iron Cross, Second Class conferred on 26 November 1914

Gold Medal of Merit of Wuerttemberg

for Military Services conferred on 21 May 1915

Iron Cross, First Class conferred on 21 January 1918

The Knight’s Cross of Merit

for Military Services conferred on 4 May 1918

Medal for War Injured

(soft white) conferred on 18 June 1918

Frederic Medal with Swords. __ conferred on 8 November 1918

SA Sport Badge (bronze) conferred on 15 December 1934

Cross of Honor for

Front Soldiers conferred on 16 November 1935

Cross for War Merit First Class

with Swords conferred on 1 July 1941

Commander’s Cross First Class with Swords
of the Order of the White Rose

of Finland conferred on 26 August 1942

Golden Party Emblem .conferred on 30 January 1943

Silver German Cross. conferred on 1 July 1943

Great Cross of Croatia (of the order
of King Zvonimir) . _ ...... conferred on 12 July 1943

* Defendant Berger, in his testimony, stated that “not all the orders and decorations I
received are listed” in this and other exhibits concerning the subject. See extracts from the
testimony of defendant Berger reproduced later in this section.

346

Honor Emblem of the
Hitler Youths _

By order:

conferred on 30 January 1944

[Signed] Graeper

SS Major (F)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2234
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1807

TELEGRAM FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO VON RIBBENTROP
THROUGH DEFENDANT RITTER, 3 APRIL 1944, WITH COPIES TO
DEFENDANTS STEENGRACHT AND WOERMANN, CONCERNING
THE POSSIBLE SHOOTING OF JEWS AS RETALIATORY MEASURES
TO AIR RAIDS UPON BUDAPEST

Telegram from Budapest No. 65 dated 3 April 1944
Most Urgent

[Handwritten] 216 Top Secret
For Reich Foreign Minister via Ambassador Ritter

The reaction of the population of Budapest to the two air raids
led, in large circles, to an intensified anti-Semitic attitude. Yes-
terday leaflets were distributed, asking the life of 100 Jews for
each Hungarian killed. Even if this cannot actually be carried
out, since in that case we would have to shoot at least 30,000 to
40,000 Jews, the idea of revenge creates an effective propaganda
possibility and perhaps also a warning example. At the next
attack I would have no scruples against having 10 suitable Jews
shot for every Hungarian killed. In view of a conference which
I had last night with the Ministers Ratz and Kunder, I have
the impression that the government would be willing to carry
out such a measure on its own. On the other hand such an action
once begun should be carried out consistently. In view of the
suggestions made to the Fuehrer by the Reich Foreign Minister,
offering all Jews as a present to Roosevelt and Churchill, I would
like to be informed whether this idea is being followed up, or
whither after the next attack I may start with retaliatory meas-
ures described above.

VEESENMAYER

Distribution :

State Secretary 3 [defendant Steengracht]

Under State Secretary, Chief of the Political Division 1
[defendant Woermann]

347

Deputy Chief Political Division 1
Political IV b 2
Inland II 1

[Handwritten] Inland II

[Handwritten] No. 8

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2233
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 181 T

TELEGRAM FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO FOREIGN OFFICE,
23 APRIL 1944, CONCERNING THE CONFINEMENT OF HUNGARIAN
JEWS IN GHETTOS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEPORTATION
TO AUSCHWITZ OF 3,000 JEWS DAILY

[Stamp] Foreign Office
INL II 764 g
Received 24 April 1944

Telegram
(Teletype, Secret)

Budapest, 23 April 1944, 0130 hours
Received: 23 April 1944, 0800 hours
No. 1022 of 23 April. Secret!

Also for Ambassador Ritter
Reference: Telegraphic report No. (X) 117, of 19 April.
[Handwritten] (X) Ini II 220 top secret
In connection with telegraphic report No. 117, and after having
spoken with the competent specialists, I inform you of the fol-
lowing :

The work of putting Jews into ghettos began in the Carpathian
area on 16 April. Thus far 150,000 Jews have been affected.
The action will probably be completed by the end of next week,
approximately 300,000 Jews. The same is already in prepara-
tion and is planned to follow immediately in Transylvania and
in a number of counties bordering on Rumania. An additional
250,000 to 300,000 Jews are to be dealt with. Subsequently it
will be the turn of the counties bordering on Serbia and Croatia,
with the final ghetto work to be done in the interior of the coun-
try, and its conclusion in Budapest.

Negotiations about transportation have been started. They
call for a daily shipment of 3,000 Jews, mainly from the Car-
pathian area, beginning on 15 May. If transportation facilities
permit, there will be later on also simultaneous shipments from
other ghettos. Auschwitz is designated as receiving station.

348

Provisions have been made that far reaching consideration will
be taken for war economy requirements in the execution of this
action. In order not to jeopardize the execution of this action,
it appears advisable to delay somewhat the transport of the
50,000 Jewish workers from the Budapest area, whose shipment
has been demanded by me and has been agreed on by the govern-
ment; this will be necessary anyway in view of the existing
transportation difficulties. Transport by marching is not prac-
ticable, since it entails great difficulties in the questions of feed-
ing, shoes, and guarding. Since the Jewish action is an entity,
I deem the above sketched plan correct, and I request wired orders
if you have any doubts or special requests.

Veesenmayer

[Distribution Form]*

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Secretary Political Division

Ambassador Ritter

Ambassador Gaus

Chief Personnel

Chief Trade Policy Division

Chief Legal Division

Chief Cultural Policy Division

Chief Press Division

Chief Radio Division

Chief Protocol

Dirigent Political Division

Chief Inland I

Chief Inland II

Work copy to [Stamp]

Minister Schnurre Work copy !

Minister Benzler Register with Inland II

Minister Frohwein

Minister v. Grundherr

Senior Legation Counsellor Melcher

Dr. Megerle

[Handwritten] S. Hungary

* On the distribution form, handwritten checkmarks appear after the following entries:
“Under State Secretary, Political Division” (defendant Woermann); “Ambassador Ritter”;
“Dirigent, Political Division”; “Chief Inland II”; and “Minister Frohwein.”

953402—52 23

349

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5535
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3705

TELETYPE FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO THE FOREIGN OF-
FICE, 27 APRIL 1944, CONCERNING THE IMMINENT DEPORTATION
OF TWO SHIPMENTS OF 2,000 JEWS TO AUSCHWITZ

[Stamp] Secret Reich Matter

To be treated only as sealed matter

Telegram
(secret teletype)

Budapest, 27 April 1944, 1910 hours
Arrival: 27 April 1944, 2325 hours
No. 1089 of 27 April 1944

In the following up telegraphic report No. 117 of 19 April (*)
[Marginal Note] (*) Ini. II Secret Reich Matter

Of the Jews made available for deportation by the Honved
Ministry,* two shipments, each of them made up of about 2,000
able-bodied men and women in the age-groups of 16 to 50 years,
will leave for Auschwitz on 27 and 28 respectively.

The Hungarian Police have been consulted and the processing
camps have been visited to make sure that Jews who are nationals
of neutral or enemy countries are exempted from deportation.

VEESENMAYER

Distribution

Inland II 2 copies

Reich Foreign Minister 3 copies

State Secretary 3 copies

Under State Secretary Political

Division [defendant Woermann] . _ 1 copy

Dirigent Political Division 1 copy

Political Department IV 1 copy

This is copy No. 6

[Handwritten] Hungary State Secretary 1 1595

* The Hungarian Ministry of War was commonly referred to as Honved Ministry. The term
“Honved” meaning “home defense” also was the name of the Hungarian Army in the revo-
lutionary war of 1848-1849.

350

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT VEESENMAYER 223
VEESENMAYER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 155

EXTRACT FROM THE NEWSPAPER "VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER,"
II MAY 1944, REPORTING DISCOVERIES OF BOMB CASINGS AND
SECRET RADIO TRANSMITTERS IN THE HOMES OF BUDAPEST JEWS 1

Secret Transmitters in Jewish Homes

Budapest, 10 May

In the Monday meeting of the administrative committee of
the Budapest City Council it was announced that a considerable
number of bomb cases had recently been found in Jewish prem-
ises. Furthermore secret transmitter installations were again
and again detected in Jewish homes.

In view of these announcements, which furnish further weighty
proof of the criminal machinations of the Jews, the greatest
possible severity against the Jews was demanded.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT VEESENMAYER 224
VEESENMAYER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 156

EXTRACT FROM THE NEWSPAPER "VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER,"
17 MAY 1944, REPORTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GHETTOS IN
34 HUNGARIAN CITIES AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE HUNGARIAN
POPULATION TOWARD ANTI-JEWISH MEASURES 2

The De-Judaization of Hungary Continues
By our Budapest reporter

He. Budapest, 16 May

State Secretary Vitez Endre Laszlo who is in charge of de-
Judaization and of cleansing the public life of Jews has returned
from a prolonged inspection trip which took him into all parts of
the country. He visited no less than 34 cities and numerous com-
munities. He explained to a staff reporter of the large metro-
politan paper “Uy Mag Yarsag” that the conclusion of the ini-
tiated de-Judaization scheme represented a gigantic task. It
meant making up for decades of omissions and moreover doing
so at top speed. He was pleased to find that nowhere had the
law been ignored. ‘‘We defend the life of our nation, by ridding
it from the Jewish poison, a self-defense, which will end Jewish
predominance.”

1 This extract was taken from the South German edition of the “Voelkischer Beobachter”
of 11 May 1944, page 6.

2 This extract was taken from the South German edition of the “Voelkischer Beobachter”
of 17 May 1944, page 6.

351

Ghettos had been established in all the 34 cities which he
visited. One of the strongest impressions he retained from his
long trip was that the population in all cities and communities
hailed the government measures with genuine delight, and took
a keen interest in their enactment from Kosice [Kaschau] to Cluj
[Klausenburg] and from Szeged [Szegedin] to Subotica [Maria
Theresiapol] . Especially in the cities of Mukachevo [Munkacs],
Uzhgorod [Ungvar], Bereszasz, and Marmaros Sziget, which had
borne the brunt of the flood of eastern Jews, the population re-
joiced and frequently supplied means of transportation to speed
resettlement and get rid of the Jews.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2424
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1754

MEMORANDUM OF DR. SCHMIDT, CHIEF OF THE INFORMATION
AND PRESS DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, TO DEFENDANT
STEENGRACHT, 27 MAY 1944, SUGGESTING "EXTERNAL CAUSES
AND REASONS" BE CREATED FOR THE "CURRENT AND PLANNED
ACTIONS" AGAINST THE JEWS IN HUNGARY

The Chief of the Information and Press Division

[Stamp] Foreign Office

Inland II Section 308 secret
Received: 1 June 1944

Top Secret

Memorandum for the State Secretary:

(Copy for Ambassador v. Rintelen)

From a very good report on the current and planned Jewish
“actions” [Judenaktionen] in Hungary, I see that a major “ac-
tion” [Grossaktion] is planned for June against the Budapest
Jews.

On account of its proportions the planned action will excite a
lot of attention abroad and will certainly cause violent reactions.
The enemies will cry out and talk of manhunts [Menschenjagd]
and so on, and by the use of atrocity reports [Greuelberichten]
will try to stir up opinion at home and in neutral countries.
Therefore, I should like to suggest that perhaps these things
should be averted by creating external causes and reasons
[aeussere Anlaesse und Begruendungen] for the action, for ex-
ample, the discovery of explosives in Jewish clubs and syna-
gogues, the unearthing of sabotage organizations, revolutionary
plots, attacks on the police, illegal currency transactions on a large

352

scale aimed at undermining the Hungarian monetary system.
The keystone of such an action would have to be a particularly
serious case, which would then become the occasion for the great
raid [Grossrazzia] .

Berlin, 27 May 1944

[Signed] Dr. Schmidt*

[Stamp]

Has been submitted to the State Secretary. [Illegible initial]

30 May

[Handwritten note] Through Chief of Press Division to Inland II
The State Secretary requests that the above suggestions of
Minister Schmidt be communicated to Minister Veesenmayer and
that he be asked for his opinion.

[Signed] Mirbach

27 May

* Dr. Paul Karl Schmidt appeared as a prosecution witness. His testimony is recorded in
the mimeographed transcript, 5 February 1948, pages 1351-1428.

353

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5561
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3916

CORRESPONDENCE AND FILE NOTES FROM THE REICH MINISTRY
OF FINANCE, 15 JUNE TO 25 AUGUST 1944, CONCERNING FUNDS
FOR THE DEMOLITION OF THE WARSAW GHETTO, THE DISPOSI-
TION OF FUNDS REALIZED BY THE CONFISCATION OF MOVABLE
JEWISH PROPERTY, AND OTHER MATTERS

I. Copy of a letter from defendant Schwerin von Krosigk to Himmler, 15
June 1944, informing Himmler that the documents submitted in support
of the Waffen SS budget for 1944 do not warrant amounts requested
for demolition of the Warsaw ghetto and other matters

The Reich Finance Minister Berlin, 15 June 1944

J. 7461-217 I

Referent: Ministerial Counsellor Dr. Gossel

Original and enclosures compiled and read.
[Signed] Schulz 26 June
1 dispatched 22 June 1944 with 2 enclosures*

[Initial] M.

1. Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police
SS Economic and Administrative Main Office
B erlin-Lichterf elde- W est
Unter den Eichen 126/135

Budget of the Waffen SS for the Fiscal Year 1944

The basis for the Waffen SS budget for the fiscal year 1944
is contained in a memorandum on the budgetary conferences of
28 January, 17 March, and 28 March 1944, which I enclose.
The table of organization of the Waffen SS remains unchanged.
In future it will be supplied with funds in accordance with the
ruling made in the conference of the 28 March 1944, which pro-
vides for an operating fund averaging 145 million reichsmark
per month for the Waffen SS for the fiscal year 1944.

[Handwritten] Arrangements have been made for an audience with [illegible
name] .

The documents submitted to me with respect to the planned
demolition of the Warsaw ghetto and the Kok-Sagis cultivation
are not sufficient for me to authorize at present the amounts
requested for the above-mentioned operations, totaling 150 and
40 million reichsmark respectively. Therefore, I cannot make a
decision at this time with respect to your requests of 24 and 25

* The enclosure was not part of the exhibit offered in evidence.

354

March 1944 — A I 1/Br/Bre — but I am willing to make available
now the necessary installments upon request.

2. Files.

(Name of the Reich Minister)
[Initial] K [Krosigk]
[Initial] R [Reinhardt]
[Illegible initials]

Copy of 1 and enclosures to —

Referent Gossel
Referent Kallenbach
A. R. Miemietz
[Initial] M. [Mayer] 9 June

2. Draft of a letter from the office of defendant Schwerin von Krosigk to
the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office, with extensive hand-
written remarks and changes, concerning information about the destruc-
tion of the "Warsaw Ghetto" and the utilization of property found there*

[Note. — Typewritten text.]

[Handwritten] 23.11 [23 November]
Berlin, July 1944

The Reich Minister of Finance
J 7461-214 I

Referent: Ministerial Counsellor Dr. Gossel
Co-Referent: Ministerial Counsellor Burmeister
1. Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police
SS Economic and Administrative Main Office

Berlin-Lichterfelde
Unter den Eichen 126

Destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto
Your letter of 24 March 1944
A I/l/Br/Bre

The planned destruction of the ghetto requires a large amount
of money and labor. I request that you examine if — considering
the present conditions — the demolition of the ghetto is an opera-
tion of highest war priority, or if the possibility exists to arrange
the necessary security measures in the ghetto in some other way.

To cover the costs arising from the destruction, I request that
the material values found in the ghetto will be utilized first, and

* Because the handwritten additions are so extensive, the entries on this document have been
reproduced in the following three parts: (1) the typewritten draft; (2) a lengthy hand-

written note which appeared at the top right hand side; (3) and the typewritten draft as
changed by handwritten insertions and deletions.

355

that I be informed as how these great values of gold and goods
there available should be utilized or have been utilized in the
meantime.

By order:

2. To be resubmitted after dispatch

[ Note . — The following handwritten note was inserted at the top
right hand side of the original draft.]

To Referent Dr. Gossel. Paragraph 2 can not be left as it is.
Even if one were to consider, and that is very questionable, the
destruction of the ghetto as “the carrying out of a construction
enterprise, the credits for the value as represented by goods found
in the ghetto” would not be covered by [illegible abbreviation].
The reference would actually amount to an invitation to establish
a black fund which would take any control over the financial
course of events out of our hands. However, I too deem it en-
tirely necessary to follow up separately the question of the treat-
ment within the budget [haushaltmaessige Behandlung] of the
value of material which is found there.

[Illegible initial] 26/7 [26 July]

[ Note . — The typewritten text of the draft letter, as changed in
the handwriting of at least two persons, reads as follows]

The planned destruction of the ghetto requires a large amount
of money and labor. I request that you examine if — considering <
the present conditions — the destruction of the ghetto is still an
operation of highest war priorities, or if the security measures
necessary in the ghetto area can be taken in any other way.

If the destruction should still be considered necessary, I re-
quest that in order to cover the cost you first utilize material
values found in the ghetto or inform me how the gold and goods,
there available in great values, are to be utilized otherwise or
have been utilized in the meantime.

3. Letter from the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office to Defend-
ant Schwerin von Krosigk, 25 August 1944, concerning the suspension of
the demolition of the Warsaw ghetto and the disposition of movable
Jewish property

The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police SS Economic
and Administrative Main Office
[Handwritten] J 7461—214 I g

[Stamp] Secret

[Stamp] Received 28 August 1944
Reich Ministry of Finance

356

Reference: A I/l/155/lla/Br/Bre. Berlin, 25 August 1944
Diary No. 234/44/secret Lichterfelde-West

Subject: Demolition of the Unter den Eichen 126-135

Warsaw ghetto

Reference: Your letter of 28 July 1944 — J 7461-214 I. 1

[Handwritten] Enclosed

To the Reich Minister of Finance
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmplatz V 2

The demolition of the Warsaw ghetto has been suspended for
some time. Thus, the reason given in paragraph 1 of the above
letter for the investigation of the matter has become pointless.

The material hitherto obtained as a result of the demolition has
been handed to the offices of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS
against proforma bills [Scheinwechsel] .

The movable property in Jewish hands — inasmuch as this was
confiscated by the Waffen SS offices in the course of the resettle-
ment operation — was realized and the proceeds paid into the
Reich Main Finance Office [Reichshauptkasse] in favor of the
Reich Minister of Finance.

Chief of the Budget Office

[Signed] Koerner 2

SS Senior Colonel

1 The letter referred to was not introduced in evidence and apparently was not found. How-
ever, the file reference “J 7461-214 I” is the same as the draft letter reproduced just above,
on which comments concerning revision were made on 26 July 1944.

2 Not the defendant Koerner.

357

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5567
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3713

TELEGRAM FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO DEFENDANT RITTER,
17 JUNE 1944, REPORTING THAT 326,009 JEWS HAVE BEEN DE-
PORTED FROM HUNGARY

[Stamp] Foreign Office

Inland II 1213 g
Received: 20 June 1944
end.

[Stamp] To be treated as sealed matter only.

Telegram from Budapest No. 1820 of 17 June for
Ambassador Ritter

Addition to wire report No. 258 of 15 June. The Higher SS and
Police Leader reported to me on 15 June:

Note — Telegram was sent by Budapest Embassy directly to Fuschl. Tele-
gram control.

1. Communism . — KDS [Commander of Security Police] Buda-
pest arrested the Jew Deutsch and his wife because he is sus-
pected of being a Bolshevist agent. Deutsch was in Moscow
from 1932 to 1936 and was visited there a number of times by
his wife. After her return from Moscow she frequently stated
that she worked there as a tailor for GPU commissars.
[Handwritten] (1) ... Inland II . . . (2) Pol VI for information (3) to the
files — S — Hungary . . . [Initials] v. Th. [von Thadden] 20/6.

2. Jews . — Total number of Jews deported to the Reich, 326,-
009.* From circles of the Rumanian Consul General in Cluj
we found out that the Hungarian Jews who have fled to Rumania
are treated there like political refugees and that the Rumanian
Government intends to make it possible for them to emigrate
to Palestine.

[Stamp] Working copy to be registered with Inland II

[Handwritten] Jews Hungary
VEESENMAYER

Distribution list:

Reich Foreign Minister 2x
State Secretary 3x
Under State Secretary Pol. Div lx
Deputy Chief, Pol. Div. lx
Pol. I M lx
Pol. IV b lx

* Auschwitz concentration camp was located in that part of Poland which was incorporated
into the Reich after Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939. Veesenmayer, in an earlier report
of 27 April 1944 to the Foreign Office mentioned Auschwitz as the destination for two ship-
ments of Jews. See Document NG-5535, Prosecution Exhibit 3705, reproduced earlier in this
section.

358

Inland II (working copy) lx
Minister Frohwein lx

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-2263
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1821

TELEGRAM FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO THE FOREIGN
OFFICE, 30 JUNE 1944, REPORTING ON THE PROGRESS OF THE
DEPORTATION OF HUNGARIAN JEWS

[Stamp]

To be treated as sealed matter only
[Stamp]
Foreign Office
Inland II 1347 secret
Received: 4 July 1944
Enel Copies

Letter Telegram
(Open)

Budapest, 30 June 1944
Arrival : 3 July 1944, 1105 hours

No. 1838 dated 30 June subsequent to report by telegram — No.
1657— (with Inland II V.S. 1159 g lb) dated 13 June.

I. Deportation of Jews from zone III with 50,805 concluded
according to plan. Total figure from zones I— III 340,162.

II. Concentration in zone IV and deportation with 41,499 con-
cluded according to plan. Total figure 381,661, continuation of
activities has been reported separately by teletype — No. 279 —
dated 27 June; — No. 287 — dated 29 June; and No. 289 — dated 30
June, to Fuschl. Concentration in zone V (area so far not in-
cluded, west of the Danube not including Budapest) has started
29 June. Simultaneously small special actions in suburbs of
Budapest as preparatory measures have started. Furthermore,
a few small special transports with political Jews, intellectual
Jews, Jews with many children and especially skilled Jewish
workers are still on the way.

VEESENMAYER

Working Copy at Inland II register

359

[Distribution form]*

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Secretary, Political Division

Ambassador Ritter

Ambassador Gaus

Chief of Personnel Division

Chief of Trade Policy Division

Chief of Legal Division

Chief of Cultural Policy Division

Chief of Press Division

Chief of Radio Division

Chief of Records

Dirigent Political Division

Chief Inland I

Chief Inland II

Work copy at

Ambassador Rintelen
Minister Schnurre
Minister Frohwein
Minister v. Grundherr
Senior Legation Counsellor Ripken
Senior Legation Counsellor Melchers
Legation Counsellor von Grothe
Dr. Megerle
[Handwritten]

1. Chief Inland II for information

2. To the Files S Hungary

[Initials] V. Th. [von Thadden] 4 July

* On the distribution form, handwritten checkmarks appear after the following entries:
“Under State Secretary, Political Division”; “Ambassador Ritter”; “Dirigent, Political Divi-
sion”; “Chief Inland II”; and “Minister Frohwein.”

360

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5586
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3715

TELEGRAM FROM DEFENDANT VEESENMAYER TO THE FOREIGN
OFFICE, II JULY 1944, CONCERNING DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING
OUT THE JEWISH POLICY IN HUNGARY BECAUSE OF THE DIF-
FERENT HANDLING OF THE JEWISH QUESTION IN RUMANIA AND
SLOVAKIA

[Stamp] To be treated as sealed matter only
Telegram
(Teletype Secret)

Budapest, 11 July 1944, 2225 hours
Received: 12 July 1944, 1100 hours
No. 1939 dated 11 July

Secret!

The Deputy Foreign Minister today pointed out to me how
difficult the situation of the Hungarian Government was as a re-
sult of the discriminatory handling of the Jewish question by the
competent German agencies in Hungary, Rumania, and Slovakia.
While we would demand of the government in this country a most
ruthless proceeding against the Jews, the Rumanians and Slo-
vakians would be allowed to treat the Jews in a far more indul-
gent manner. Even regular transports of Jews from Rumania
to Palestine are still running now. According to the reports of
the Hungarian Legations in Bucharest and Bratislava, numerous
Hungarian Jews would have crossed in the last weeks illegally
the borders respectively, to Rumania and Slovakia, where they
would be tolerated by the national authorities more or less openly.
The Rumanians would proceed even so far, to add actually 20
percent Hungarian Jews to their Jewish transports to Palestine.
This is obviously done to create a good impression with our ene-
mies. To the outside world the impression is created that the
Rumanians and Slovaks are taking a quite different attitude
toward the Jewish question than Hungary, against whom the
whole hatred of the enemy and neutral states will be directed.
This would reflect very unfavorably upon the situation of the
Hungarian Government.

VEESENMAYER

[Handwritten] Hungary, State Secretary 1 4196
[Distribution form]*

State Secretary Keppler

Under State Secretary, Political Division

• On the distribution form, handwritten checkmarks appear after the following entries:
’’Under State Secretary, Political Division" [defendant Woermann]; "Ambassador Ritter”:
"Dirigent Political Division"; "Chief Inland II"; and "Minister Frohwein."

361

Ambassador Ritter

Ambassador Gaus

Chief of Personnel Division

Chief of Trade Policy Division

Chief of Legal Division

Chief of Cultural Policy Division

Chief of Press Division

Chief of Radio Division

Chief of Records

Dirigent Political Division

Chief Inland I

Chief Inland II

Working copy with Inland II

Ambassador V. Rintelen

Minister Frohwein

Minister von Grundherr

Senior Legation Councillor Ripken

Senior Legation Councillor Melchers

Legation Councillor v. Grothe

362

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4096
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2449

COPY OF A LETTER FROM POHL, CHIEF OF THE SS ECONOMIC
AND ADMINISTRATIVE MAIN OFFICE, TO DEFENDANT SCHWERIN
VON KROSIGK, 24 JULY 1944, STATING THAT PROCEEDS OF
JEWISH VALUABLES ACCUMULATED IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS
ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE REICH FINANCE MAIN OFFICE FOR
THE CREDIT OF THE REICH MINISTRY OF FINANCE IN THE SPECIAL
ACCOUNT "MAX HEILIGER"*

[Stamp] Secret
Copy of 0 5400 — 32/44 VI
The Chief of the SS Economic and
Administration Main Office

Berlin 24 July 1944

Lichterfelde-West

Unter den Eichen 126-135

A II/3 Reinh./Ma/Ro

Secret Journal No. 66/44

Subject: Confiscated Jewish property.

Reference: Your letter of 15 July 1944 file No. 5221 A— 225 VI.
To the Reich Minister of Finance
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmplatz V 2

In reply to the above letter, Jewish property [Judenwerte]
which has been confiscated for the benefit of the Reich, that is,
reichsmark amounts, Reichskreditkassen bonds, foreign currency
in bank notes and specie, securities, jewelry, and items of all
kinds made of precious metals is referred to.

It is impossible to enclose a list because of the vast quantity
involved. The valuables accumulate in concentration camps. Ref-
erence is made to the fact that in this matter discussions have
already repeatedly taken place with a deputy of the Reich Finance
Minister. The last discussion was on 11 May 1943 between SS
Major General and Major General of the Waffen SS Frank and
Accounting Director Patzer. The realization [Verwertung] is to
be carried out as follows : currency of all kinds as well as securi-
ties are to be dealt with by the Reichshauptbank, Department
Precious Metals, Bank Counsellor Thoms; jewelry and utilitarian
articles made of precious metals are to be realized by the Munici-

* This document was found in a folder of the Reich Ministry of Finance. The cover of this
folder is marked “Secret Files. Reich Ministry of Finance, Department Gen. B. Group: Ref.
Patzer. Contents: Gen. B/5.”

363

pal Pawn Shop [Staedtische Pf andleihanstalt] , Department 3,
Central Office, Berlin N 4, Office Counsellor Wieser. In a dis-
cussion with the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, which
took place on 24 July 1944, agreement was reached on the further
expeditious disposition of accumulated valuables.

The proceeds [Erloese] are to be transferred to the Reich Fi-
nance Main Office [Reichshauptkasse] and be credited to the Reich
Ministry of Finance, in the special account “Max Heiliger.”
Reference is made to our report in this matter to the Ac-
counting Office of the Reich, for information to the Reich Min-
istry of Finance of 19 November 1943 — file No. A II/3 Reinh.
secret journal No. 1-2/43, your file No. J 7070-89. I.

[Signed] SS Lieutenant General and
Lieutenant General of the Waffen SS

[Handwritten note]

To I (Fiebiger)

I request the previous paper J 7070-99 I and other previous
or following files referring to the same matter.

Patzer 31 August

[Handwritten Note]

To Reich Accounting Office Director [R. Rech. Dir.] Patzer
J 7070-89 is enclosed, other pertinent records not available.
Please return as soon as possible, as its resubmission has been
ordered.

Fiebiger, Record Office I k

364

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4094
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2451

LETTER FROM REFERENT DR. GOSSEL OF THE REICH MINISTRY OF
FINANCE TO PATZER, REICH ACCOUNTING OFFICE DIRECTOR,
7 SEPTEMBER 1944, REQUESTING INFORMATION ON VALUABLES
ORIGINATING FROM THE WARSAW GHETTO

[Handwritten] A 2070 — 12 — Gen. B g
[Illegible initials]
Berlin, 7 September 1944

Referent Dr. Gossel
j 7461—214 I g 2 Ang.

To Reich Accounting Office Director Patzer

[Initial] P [Patzer]

The Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police — SS
Economic and Administrative Main Office — has answered the
question in what manner the property items found in the Warsaw
ghetto were secured and utilized in a letter of 25 August 1944. 1
The letter states that the property owned by Jews — so far as
it was confiscated during the resettlement operations by offices
of the Waffen SS — was realized and the proceeds were paid to
the Reich Finance Main Office [Reichshauptkasse] and the pro-
ceeds 2 credited [zugunsten] to the Reich Minister of Finance.
[Handwritten] “Account Heiliger?”

According to the statements you have made till now, valuables
with the mark of origin “Warsaw” have not been delivered to
the Reich Finance Main Office.

Further investigations are requested.

[Signed] Gossel

1 This letter is the last item in Document NG-5561, Prosecution Exhibit 3916, reproduced
earlier in this section.

* The handwritten entry “Account Heiliger ?” is in the margin of the original just beside
the word “proceeds.”

963402—62 24

365

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-4097
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2450

HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF REICH ACCOUNTING OFFICE DIRECTOR,
PATZER, TO GOSSEL AND MAEDEL, REFERENTEN IN THE REICH
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, 16 NOVEMBER 1944, CONCERNING THE
UTILIZATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY

General bureau
Referat Patzer
A 2070—12 Gen. B.g.
here booked 11

Berlin, 16 November 1944
[Stamp]

[Handwritten] November 17 [Illegible initial]
Read: [Illegible initial] November 17
Sent off: November 17 1944 [Illegible initial]

Secret

1. To Referent Dr. Gossel, Division I.

Utilization of property of Jews.

Your letter of 7 September 1944,* J 7461 — 214 I G 2 matter.
I recently ascertained at the Reich Finance Main Office that
valuables with the mark of origin “Warsaw” have not been de-
livered there. According to a letter of 24 July 1944 AII/3 Reinh.
/Ma./Ro. Secret Diary No. 66/44, from the Chief of the SS
Economic and Administrative Main Office made known to me in
the interim, the arrival of such valuables at the Reich Finance
Main Office cannot be expected because the realization of them
will take place in the following way :

The office may insert in the final copy from the attachment
of the letter of Referent Maedel, dated 18 August 1944 (until).

The sums booked on the holding account “Max Heiliger” are
wound up from time to time by Referat Maedel of Division VIII
(formerly div. VI), as far as the budget is concerned. The
amounts will be transferred to the account of the individual
plan XVII, chapter 7, title 3, paragraph A.

2. To Referent Dr. Maedel, Division VIII.

Utilization of property of Jews.

Your letter of 18 August 1944, 5400-32/44 VI.

I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give more detailed
information on the utilization of Jewish property falling [to
the Reich] in concentration camps. I did not participate in the

* Document NG-4094, Prosecution Exhibit 2451, reproduced immediately above.

366

discussions mentioned in the letter of the Chief of the SS Eco-
nomic and Administrative Main Office, dated 24 July 1944. The
statement, referring to this, in the above indicated letter is
due to a mistake. I do not consider my Referat principally re-
sponsible [Federfuehrend] in this matter.

The copy of the communication of the Accounting Office of the
German Reich, dated 19 November 1943, which is mentioned
in the enclosure to your letter of 18 August 1944, cannot be
found out according to statements of the register office in the
Reich Finance Ministry. In all probability it was destroyed by
fire in the Reich Finance Ministry on 23 November 1943 before it
reached the register office.

The answer to your letter has been delayed due to the search
for the documents in the Reich Finance Ministry.

(Note) To 3 off

A.M. 16/11
By order:

[Initial] P [Patzer]

3. Reg. Gen. B.

Document I 7070-89 I of 19 October 1943 has to be returned

to Reg. I.

4. After sending off to [illegible]. [Initials] Gos 21 November.

5. Files.

367

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2287-B
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1106

TELETYPE FROM HIMMLER TO BERGER, 9 SEPTEMBER 1944, NOTIFY-
ING BERGER OF HIS BEING AWARDED THE CLASP OF THE IRON
CROSS, SECOND CLASS, FOR WORK AS GERMAN COMMANDER
IN SLOVAKIA

Teletype

To the German Commander in Slovakia
SS Lieutenant General Berger
Engerau

[Stamp]
For circulation

15 September 1944 /s/Pe
[Stamp] To the file No. 3209

Illegible initials

For your hitherto gallant and successful assignment in the
pacification and reconquest of Slovak territory I bestow upon you
the clasp to the Iron Cross, Second Class.

[Signed] H. Himmler

9 September 1944 RF/M.

Carbon copies with the request to take notice to —

1. Chief of the SS Personnel Main Office

2. Chief of the SS Leadership Main Office

3. Department for Medals and Decorations — SS Major Kment

4. SS Colonel Dr. Brandt

[Signed] Grothman

SS Lieutenant Colonel and Chief Adjutant

[Stamp]

[Illegible initials]
[Stamp] 25 September 1944

SS Personnel Main Office,

Received 14 September 1944

368

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-2282
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1107

SS MEMORANDUM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1944, CONCERNING THE TER-
MINATION OF BERGER'S POSITION AS GERMAN COMMANDER
IN SLOVAKIA AND HIMMLER'S ENTRUSTING BERGER WITH THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE HOME GUARD IN GERMANY

[Stamp]

To File No. 3219

[Handwritten] To be filed
Berlin, 19 September 1944

Amt I

Subject: SS Lieutenant General Berger

[Stamp]

Placed in circulation
[Handwritten] I 2
To:

1. Chief of Main Office

2. Amtsgruppe II

3. Amt I

SS Lieutenant General Berger turns over his task in Slovakia
to SS Lieutenant General Hoefle. As a special task, the Reich
Leader SS entrusted SS Lieutenant General Berger with the or-
ganization of the home guard [Landsturm] in Germany. All
males, 15-65 years of age and as yet unassigned, shall be formed
into the home guard. On 18 September 1944, SS Lieutenant Gen-
eral Berger has been awarded the clasp to the Iron Cross First
Class by the Reich Leader SS for his performance in Slovakia.

[Illegible initials]

SS Lieutenant Colonel
[Stamp] 27 September 1944

339

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NID-15534
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-4

DRAFT OF FORTY-SIXTH DELIVERY LIST FROM THE GERMAN REICH
BANK TO THE PRUSSIAN STATE MINT, 24 NOVEMBER 1944, WITH
ENTRIES SHOWING DISPATCH OF VARIOUS QUANTITIES OF ARTI-
FICIAL TEETH MADE OF GOLD AND PLATINUM ALLOYS AND OF
VARIOUS QUANTITIES OF GOLD AND SILVER

Ka.

[Stamp]

Processed :

Read:

Dispatched with 7 Enclosures
24/XI 1944

[Initial] H

To Prussian State Mint
Berlin

Subject: 46th delivery (M).

We send you herewith —

378 No. 1/1: Artificial teeth, plati-

num alloy [ Weiss -
metal]

/4: Plated

379 No. 1/1: Artificial teeth, gold

/4: Gold

380 No. 2/1: Silver

381 No. 4/1: Gold plated

/2: Artificial teeth, gold
Artificial teeth,
platinum alloys

382 No. 5/1: Silver

383 Silver

384 Silver

Clear copy handed out
Berlin, 24 November 1944
Main Cashier’s Department
[Signed] Thoms*

Draft

24 November 1944

kilograms

gross kilograms

bag no.

4,370

5,647

1

1,206

0,156)
4,817 ^

5,043

2

28,591

28,855

4

25,157

25,373

7

22,950 23,385 8

21,235 21,503 9

17,633 17,910 10

with the request to melt and test the same.

German Reich Bank
Main Cashier’s Department [Hauptkasse]

[Illegible signature] [Signed] Thoms
[Initial] M

* Albert Thoms, official of the Reich Bank, appeared as a witness in this trial. His com-
plete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcripts for 9 June and 28 October 1948,
pages 7929-7990 and 26636-26645.

370

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NG-5248
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3926

INSTRUCTIONS OF DEFENDANT SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK, 19 DE-
CEMBER 1944, CONCERNING THE TRANSFER AND USE OF PRE-
CIOUS OBJECTS ACCRUING TO THE REICH, AND ATTACHING
A DIRECTIVE DECREE OF THE REICH MINISTER OF ECONOMICS
TO THE MUNICIPAL PAWN SHOP, DATED 16 OCTOBER 1944

I. Directive of the Reich Minister of Finance to the Senior Finance Presidents,
excepting Prague, 19 December 1944

(1) Berlin W 8, 19 December 1944
Wilhelmplatz %

The Reich Minister of Finance

0 5221 A— 250/44

Utilization of precious metals and jewels through the Municipal
Pawn Shop in Berlin

Decree of 81 March 1944 0 5400—51/44 VI -
The Municipal Pawn Shop, Department III, Central Office,
Berlin-NW 4, Elsasserstrasse 74, has started operations again. 1

1 request that all objects made of precious metal, precious stones,
and pearls, accruing to the Reich, be transferred to it.

The Pawn Shop carries out the utilization in the interest of
the war economy and for the foreign exchange allocation office,
and according to instruction of the decree of 16 October 1944,
II/2/2 — 3129/44, issued by the Reich Minister of Economics. I
enclose a copy of this decree. 2 I specially point to its paragraph
7. According to it, the Pawn Shop shall take over in the future,
at domestic prewar prices, objects to be utilized.

Signed : Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
To : Senior Finance Presidents — except in Prague.

2. Directive of the Reich Ministry of Finance to the War Booty Office,
Reich Main Finance Office, 19 December 1944

(1) Berlin W 8, 19 December 1944
The Reich Minister of Finance
0 5221 A— 250/44 VIII

Copy for your information

I request you to allow the Municipal Pawn Shop to utilize
also the objects made from precious metals, precious stones, and
pearls, which are stored with you.

1 According to the file note of Kropp of the Reich Bank, dated 31 March 1944 (Doc. 3947-PS,
Pros. Ex. 1914, reproduced earlier in this section), the Municipal Pawn Shop had refused to
accept further precious objects or to process further precious objects already in its possession.

2 Reproduced below as a part of this document.

371

Objects made from platinum and gold (bracelets, rings with-
out stones, and pearls), old and working silver, silver shavings,
and silver in rolls are immediately to be transferred to the Reich
Office for Precious Metals in Berlin.

I enclose copy of the decree of 16 October 1944, II/2/2 —
3129/44, pursuant to which the Reich Minister of Economics
has issued instructions to the Municipal Pawn Shop concerning
the utilization of objects.

Signed : v. Krosigk

Reich Finance Main Office [Reichshauptkasse]

War Booty Office
(1) Berlin W8

3. Directive of the Reich Minister of Economics, to the Municipal Pawn Shop,
16 October 1944, concerning the "utilization of war booty"

Copy

(1) Berlin C 2, 16 October 1944
Neue Koenigstrasse 27-37
The Reich Minister of Economics
II 2/2—3129/44

Appendix to my letter of 27 July 1944 — II, 2/2-2603/44
Subject: Utilization of war booty.

The directives of 29 April and 12 May 1941 which were issued
to you shall apply as a matter of principle for the utilization of
all objects accrued, or to be accrued, in favor of the Reich — be
it upon orders of the Reich Finance Ministry, the Reich Leader
SS, the Reich Ministry of Justice, or of other authorities. For
their detailed compliance I order the following:

1. Objects from platinum, as well as ornaments of low value
but containing large parts of gold and silver, will be melted down
and offered as raw material, through the Reich Office for Pre-
cious Metals, to the armament industry.

2. The remainder of the objects, except those mentioned un-
der 4 and 5, are to be sorted out according to their suitability
for export or domestic sale, in connection of which the greatest
stress should be laid to export as many items as possible against
foreign cash payments.

3. Valuable ornaments not suitable for export, particularly
those with stones and pearls, or with a relatively low content
of precious metals, are not to be used as scrap if the piece
would fetch several times as much in Germany as the scrap
would abroad.

372

4. Diamonds are to be selected according to the following
viewpoints :

a. Items which can be exported as loose goods without re-
cutting.

b. Those suitable for export after recutting.

c. Items suitable for indirect export after processing by the
jewelry industry (so-called barrel-goods).

d. Items suitable neither for direct or indirect export. Items
falling under a and b will be selected according to international
standards and the directives of the Examination Office for Metal
Goods. Items now available or becoming available under para-
graph d shall be tendered for utilization as industrial diamonds
to the Reich Office for Precious Metals in its capacity as alloca-
tion office for industrial diamonds.

5. Watches (pocket and wrist watches) must be separated ac-
cording to whether they are in working order or not. Tenders
will be submitted to the “Branch Group Watches and Watch
Parts,” located at Halle a. d. Saale, of (a) watches in working
order (except those with platinum cases which must be broken
up in every instance), taking into consideration the regulations
concerning consumption of watches meanwhile put into effect;
and ( b ) watches with cases from precious metals against a
corresponding delivery of precious metal contents. Watches which
are not in working order are to be removed from their cases
and the precious metal as well as the mechanism utilized as
usual. Repairable watches are also to be tendered the above
branch group, and if expedient, they shall be sold to watch-
makers.

6. Each item is to be valuated at its prewar price, and in
addition —

a. The minimum export price will be determined for export
merchandise.

b. The current market value shall be fixed for domestic sales
goods.

7. The pawn shop shall pay for the items taken over at prewar
prices.

8. Items to be used in Germany will be collected in parcels
having a prewar value of about RM 10,000 and utilized through
trustworthy commercial firms. Concerning the firms in question,
I request that proposals be submitted to me in agreement with
the “Economic Group Wholesale and Export Trade — Branch
Group Stones and Pearls,” which proposals are to take into con-
sideration the entire Reich area. The firms receiving these items
are to be instructed to resell them on preferential terms to per-
sons who suffered damages from air raids. The sale must be

effected at the current domestic value determined according to
paragraph 6 b.

9. Appraisers are prohibited from participating in the utili-
zation.

10. Items designated for sale abroad are to be assorted in
parcels according to sales possibilities in the countries in ques-
tion. For each item, especially in the case of diamonds, a price
is to be set on the basis of an export price list issued by the
price examination office. Concerning the sales abroad of dia-
monds as well as jewels, the commission shall amount to 3 per-
cent of the receipts and it shall be paid in reichsmarks at the
official rate of exchange. In addition, the insurance expenses
shall be reimbursed. Instead of cash payment for commission
in case of export to —

Switzerland 50 percent

Spain and Portugal 40 percent

Sweden 30 percent

All other countries 25 percent

may be paid for in merchandise of equal value on the basis of
prewar prices.

11. If required, a large number of appraisers are to be em-
ployed in order to expedite the work on hand. Furthermore,
additional firms are to be drafted to handle the business abroad.
As Deputy to the State Secretary:

Signed : Ohlendorf *

To: Municipal Pawn Shop, Section III, Central Office,

Berlin C 2, Elsaessischestrasse 74

* Otto Ohlendorf, formerly Chief of one of the Einsatzgruppen and later a defendant in the
Einsatzgruppen case (Vol. IV, this series), was at this time an official of the Reich Ministry
of Economics.

374

DOCUMENT NID-15647
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT C-167

MEMORANDUM FROM THE CHIEF, FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEPOSI-
TORY, OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY, TO
THE OFFICE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR
CRIMES, 27 MAY 1948, CONCERNING THE DISCOVERY IN A SALT
MINE OF PRECIOUS OBJECTS WHICH HAD BEEN EVACUATED
FROM THE REICH BANK

Confidential (Classification)

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

Office Military Government for Germany, United States
(Rear Echelon) APO 757

File No.:

Subject: Melmer loot. Date: 27 May 1948

No.

From

Pass

Date

Has this paper been coordi-

to—

nated with all concerned —

1 .

Chief,

OCC, War

27 May

Attached in duplicate are pho-

FED,

Crimes,

1948

tostats requested by you in

APO 757

APO

connection with the subject

696-A

matter as follows:
a. Receipt dated 24 November

1944 covering Shipment
#46.

Attn:

b. Quittungsbuch der Edelmet-

Mr.

allankaufskasse 10 Octo-

Verber

ber 33.

c. Folio page 14, above record.

d. Folio page 15, above record.

e. Synopsis of shipment # 1

(certified copy).

Enel: a/s

[Signed] William G. Brey
Colonel GSC

Chief, Foreign Exchange Depository

Telephone :

Frankfurt 21191
or Red line 61

Confidential ( Classification )

375

Shipment No. 1

On 8 April 1945 an immense amount of gold, silver, jewelry,
art objects, etc., was discovered in a salt mine in Merkers, Ger-
many. These valuables had been evacuated from the Reich Bank
in Berlin in the early part of 1945 and hidden in a vault in the
salt mine for safe-keeping. Vast amounts of gold bars (8807),
gold, silver coins, and currency made up the cache.

Included in the Merkers cache were 207 containers of SS-looted
jewelry, silverware, coins, rings, teeth fillings, etc. A copy of
a preliminary inventory is attached, in which the items are
listed by general classification with the approximate weight of
each classification.

Substantiation of the belief that these valuables are SS loot
has been found in a Berlin Reich Bank record book known as
the “Quittungsbuch der Edelmetallankaufskasse” in which the
207 containers are listed and numbered in the “Melmer” ac-
count. (“Melmer” is a code designation for SS loot deposits.)
30 January 19 U7

This shipment now completely inventoried. More exact sta-
tistical information can thus be obtained from inventory forms.
Also (so far as gold and silver and platinum non-SS stuff is
concerned) from “gold report.”

Contents of Shipment 1 ( Part which is SS loot)

Estimated gross
weight (lbs.)

tableware 1842.9

watches 594.8

fountain pens and pencils 2.6

scrap metal 3219.0

metal trays, candlesticks 169.8

gold coins 65.0

coins (other) 1776.5

paper currency 836.5

precious and semiprecious stone 256.7

rings (gold and other metal) 369.6

eyeglasses frames, metal and plastic 47.4

teeth filling, gold and silver 385.0

Reichsmarks 11.0

nondescript bars (appears silver) 120.0

gold bars 4.0

stamp collection 18.6

prepaid postage stamps 83.6

novelty jewelry 2270.6

376

Miscellaneous bars (apparently alloy of silver and gold)

20 large
3 medium

4 [sic]

2 small
1 bag

[Handwritten] Certified a true copy of record used by this office.

[Signed] F. J. Roberts
Chief, Claims Section,

Foreign Exchange Depository

27 May 1948

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT PUHL 45
PUHL DEFENSE EXHIBIT 45

EXTRACTS FROM THE "GERMAN REICH BANK LAW," 15 JUNE 1939,
CONCERNING REICH BANK FUNCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO PUR-
CHASE AND SALE OF GOLD AND FOREIGN CURRENCY, CUSTODY
AND ADMINISTRATION OF VALUABLE ASSETS, PURCHASE AND
SALE OF PRECIOUS METALS FOR THE ACCOUNT OF OTHERS, AND
RELATED MATTERS

1939 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1015
The German Reich Bank Law, dated 15 June 1939

The German Reich Bank, as the German bank of issue, is
subject to the unrestricted authority of the Reich. Within the
scope of its delegated functions, in particular the safeguarding
of the German currency, it shall act for the attainment of the
objectives set by the National Socialist government.

In order to establish the legal position of the Reich Bank,
founded under the Bank Law of 14 March 1875 (RGB1. 177),
the government of the Reich has enacted the following law, which
is hereby promulgated :

I. Legal form and functions
Article 1

(1) The German Reich Bank is placed under the direct au-
thority of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

(2) It is a corporate body under public law with its Main
Office in Berlin. It is entitled to maintain branches.

* * * * * * *

377

IV. Scope of Business of the German Reich Bank
Article 13

(1) The German Reich Bank is authorized to undertake the
following types of transactions:

* * * * * * *

4. To buy and sell gold and foreign currency.

He * * * * * *

6. To receive sums of money free of interest — in exceptional
cases at interest — on Giro account [payments involving no actual
cash transfer] or on deposit.

7. To assume the custody and administration of valuable as-
sets, especially securities, the German Reich Bank has the posi-
tion of a collecting agency for securities [Wertpapiersammel-
bank] .

8. For account of others, upon receipt of cover in advance —

a. To effect banking operations.

b. To buy and sell precious metals.

(2) The Reich Bank Directorate shall publish the rates of
interest applicable in the transactions of the German Reich Bank.

Article 14

(1) The German Reich Bank is required to purchase bar
gold at its headquarters in Berlin at the fixed rate of 2.784 reichs-
marks for one kilogram fine. It is authorized to have such gold
examined and assayed at the expense of the seller.

(2) The German Reich Bank sells gold in bars from its avail-
able stocks at the price of 2.790 reichsmarks for one kilogram
fine against payment in cash, if it is satisfied that the gold is
to be used for purposes justifiable from the standpoint of the
national economy.

*******
Berchtesgaden, 15 June 1939.

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Economics

Walther Funk
The Reich Minister of Finance
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
The Reich Minister of the Interior

Frick

The Acting Reich Minister of Justice

Dr. Schlegelberger

The Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery

Dr. Lammers

378

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NCM67I
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 2341

LETTER FROM DEFENDANT BERGER TO HIMMLER, 8 JANUARY 1945,
PROPOSING A REORGANIZATION OF OFFICE GROUP C FOR THE
PURPOSE OF IMPROVING SS IDEOLOGICAL AND OTHER TRAINING,
AND LETTER OF BRANDT TO BERGER, 19 JANUARY 1945, STATING
HIMMLER'S APPROVAL WITH ONE QUALIFICATION

I. Letter from Berger to Himmler, 8 January 1945

[Stamp]

Personal Staff Reich Leader SS
The Reich Leader SS Registry

The Chief of the SS Main Office Secret/353
Chd SS/H A/Be/S teg/Diary No. 41/45

Berlin-Grunewald, 8 January 1945
Douglas Strasse 7-11

Subject: Reorganization of Office Group C [Amtsgruppe C]

Enclosure : 1

To the Reich Leader SS

and Reich Minister of the Interior
Berlin SW 11
Prinz Albrecht-Str. 8.

Reich Leader:

I ask for the approval of the enclosed plan for reorganization
of my Office Group C.

The departure of SS Colonel Dr. Dambach, who has been my
Referent for these subjects, compels me to introduce a new office
to take over the work so far done by him.

I propose to appoint SS Brigadier General Fick as Amtsgruppe
Chief, thereby reestablishing the connection between inspection
and leadership of the Amt ideological guidance as it previously
existed and proved valuable. As Chief of the Amtsgruppe, the
inspector can exploit the results of his inspection most speedily
and most completely.

Reasons

1. The importance of Department C I has very much increased
as a result of the development of the past year. Altogether there
are now 118 independent units which receive from Department C
I instructions on specific assignments. Therefore, it is urgently
necessary that Department C is led by a general of the Waffen
SS.

379

2. The fact that Department C will be headed by the Inspector
for the entire Ideological Training of the Waffen SS and Police
will bring gratifying results because thereby the exploitation of
the inspection results will be fully guaranteed.

3. The Department Chief cannot personally, for lack of time,
take charge of the examination of ideological training pamphlets.
He must, therefore, have a correspondingly trained staff leader
at his side.

4. A limitation of the previous Amt C I to training and edu-
cation and directly related subjects will increase the working
efficiency of the Amt.

5. The previous Main Department C I 3 (Troop Guidance)
has increased as a result of the constant growth of the assign-
ments to such an extent that it must be rebuilt into an Amt. It
need not be feared that training and troop guidance will be split,
because the Department Chief will take care of the collaboration.

[Shorthand notes] applied for.

6. The main Department C I 2 has the task of maintaining, in
the cultural political sector, liaison with all Main Offices of the
SS itself and the corresponding guidance agencies of State, Party,
and Wehrmacht. It must exert influence upon these agencies, of
an informative as well as a guiding nature, and must be exemplary
in the various fields (graphics, painting, sculpture, film, and
theater) through practical performance. Above all it has the
task of acting as an adviser to all agencies of the SS Main Office
and of creating for this purpose the corresponding equipment,
for example, a photograph center, etc.

7. The previous Amts C II and C III will gain by a closer
union with Amt C I. For the rest their structure remains un-
changed.

[Signed] G. BERGER
SS Lieutenant General
[Stamp] Personal Staff, Reich Leader SS
12 January 1945
No. 36/7/45

Plan for the Reorganization of Department C, Especially Amt C I
The Department Chief with Staff

1. Amtsgruppe Chief: SS Brigadier General Fick.

Attached to him: 1 Adjutant and some assistants who are

exclusively at the disposal of the Brigadier General in his
capacity as Inspector

2. Staff leader : Of the whole Department C

380

3. Personnel Officer for the Department VI: SS Major Hoh-
mueller

The Departments:

1. Amt C I:

Ideological Guidance and Education: SS Lieutenant Colonel
Webendoerfer

C I 1— Ideological training and education

C I 2 — People’s Grenadier Divisions

C I 3 — Literature and production of publications

2. C II :

Troop Guidance : SS Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Wolf
C II 1 — Purchasing and delivery
C II 2 — Technical Department
C II 3 — Cultural Department
C II 4 — Stage, film, choirs, and amateur theater
C II 5 — Soldiers’ Homes

3. C III :

Cultural Political Guidance: SS Captain Dr. Heydt
C III 1 — Film and radio

C III 2 — Cultural Political Information Service and literature
C III 3 — Music and pictorial art. Further an independent
branch directly under the Amt Chief: Guidance of new-
comers and the liaison with Directing Staffs VI

4. C IV: Physical training (may retain its old structure with

the old war strength record)

5. C V:

Vocational Training: SS Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Borst

2. Brandt's reply to Berger on behalf of Himmler, 19 January 1945

[Stamp] Personal Staff of Reich
Leader SS
Registry
Secret/353

36/7/45 Bra/H

Field Command Post, 19 January 1945
Subject: Reorganization of Department C

Reference: Your letter of 8 January 1945 — ChdSS/HA/Be/Steg/
Diary No. 41/45

To SS Lieutenant General Berger
Berlin

2 25

953402 — 52

381

[Handwritten] To be filed. [Initials] Br [Brandt]
Dear Lieutenant General:

The Reich Leader SS has agreed to the reorganization of
Department C as suggested by you. He wishes, however, that
SS Brigadier General Fick not be appointed permanent Depart-
ment Chief but, for the present, only Acting Chief.

Heil Hitler!

Yours

[Illegible initials]

[Initials] R Br [Rudolf Brandt]

SS Colonel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO-347
PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 1103

LETTER FROM ROSENBERG TO DEFENDANT BERGER, 20 JANUARY
1945, GRANTING HIS REQUEST TO BE RELIEVED AS CHIEF OF THE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP STAFF OF THE EAST MINISTRY BUT RE-
QUESTING HIM TO CONTINUE AS LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN
HIMMLER AND ROSENBERG

20 January 1945
No. 015798.45— R/H.—

Personally !

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
To the Chief of the SS Main Office
SS Lieutenant General Berger
Berlin-Grunewald
Douglasstr. 10

Dear Party Member Berger!

In view of the strenuous duties recently conferred upon you,
you asked me to relieve you as Chief of the Political Leadership
Staff of my Ministry. I hereby comply with this request and
thank you for your good will and cooperation which you showed
toward me at that time and for the work you performed up
to now. By the development of the last months, unfortunately it
so happened that through the strenuous work mentioned before
not everything could be as clearly discussed as we both would
have desired it. But at this opportunity I would like to state
that there is no change in our friendly relationship toward each
other, and I hope that the necessary cooperation between the
East Ministry and the SS Main Office will lead to a positive
and loyal relationship as the interests of the Reich demand it just
at the present time. Furtheron I would like to ask you also
in future to remain liaison officer between the Reich Leader SS

382

and myself in order to safeguard the desired cooperation in this
respect. I would appreciate it, if sometime we could once more
discuss affairs which are of interest to both of us.

Thank you very much for your birthday greetings.

Heil Hitler!

Signed : Rosenberg

2. AFFIDAVITS OF DEFENSE AFFIANTS DONANDT, SCHROE-
DER, AND SONNLEITHNER, AND TESTIMONY OF DE-
FENSE WITNESS VON SCHLABRENDORFF

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT KROSIGK 24
KROSIGK DEFENSE EXHIBIT 101

AFFIDAVIT OF MINISTERIAL COUNSELLOR WALTER DONANDT*, 20
MAY 1948, CONCERNING THE CARRYING OUT OF THE FINE ON
JEWS AND THE POSITION TAKEN BY DEFENDANT SCHWERIN
VON KROSIGK

I, Walter Donandt, born on 31 August 1904 at Bremen, formerly
Ministerialrat at the Reich Ministry of Finance, now attorney
at law in Hamburg, residing there at Breitenfelder Strasse 80,
have been cautioned that I render myself liable to punishment by
making a false affidavit. I declare on oath that my statement
is true and was made to be submitted as evidence to the Military
Tribunal IV at the Palace of Justice, Nuernberg, Germany.

1. As from 1943 I was personal adviser to the Reich Minister
of Finance, and latterly I held the rank of Ministerialrat. As
early as 1937 I was assigned to the Reich Ministry of Finance
as Regierungsrat and worked in the department for taxes (Dept.
Ill) of the Ministry as juridical assistant, section for evaluation
and taxation of property. In 1939 I became a soldier. The be-
ginning of 1940 I was once more with the Ministry for 3 months
and was called up again for military service from which I was
discharged in 1943 after having been severely wounded.

2. When by an order of Goering in November 1938 a special
tax [Abgabe] of 1 billion reichsmarks was imposed on the Jews,
which was to be collected by the Reich Administration of Finance,
the Section for Evaluation and Taxation of Property in the De-
partment for Taxes (Dept. Ill) of the Reich Ministry of Finance
was the proper authority for the assessment of taxes, since the
property of the Jews was to form the basis for the collection.
I was — as already mentioned — working as Regierungsrat in this
section and for this reason I know the following:

* Defense affiant Donandt was not called for cross-examination.

383

3. Neither our section chief, Ministerialrat Dr. Uhlich, nor
we co-workers made any secret of our aversion to this new task,
and we knew that in this we were in agreement with our Min-
ister who had hitherto been openly endeavoring to keep the Reich
Ministry of Finance aloof from everything which violated the
principle of uniform treatment for all taxpayers. We had heard
that the reason the Minister did not offer further resistance to
the special tax on Jewish property was because in those days it
appeared to him the only measure suitable to remove the cause
of the wild excesses against the Jews before they culminated in
a general pogrom.

4. The practical implementation of the assessment regulations
issued by the Reich Ministry of Finance in regard to the special
tax on Jewish property was effected in accordance with the
wishes of the Minister, the tendency being to meet the taxpayer
in individual cases and thus so far as possible to concentrate all
cases requiring decisions at the Ministry; for this reason exten-
sion of the time limit for payment and abatement of taxes was
in principle not to be granted by tax offices and Senior Finance
Presidents. At that time we received Jews at the Ministry in
numerous instances and in each case a solution was found which
meant an alleviation of his difficulties for the party concerned.
Many written applications from Jews bore the green cross of
the Minister signifying that the Minister himself reserved the
right to sign the decision. I can remember that the Referent
was repeatedly called to the Minister in such individual cases
and each time he returned with instructions that as many allow-
ances as possible were to be made.

5. Subsequently the special tax on Jewish property even of-
fered a means of putting a stop to unbridled Aryanizations. Ary-
anization purchases were often concluded for such a ridiculous
countervalue that it made impossible the payment of the tax on
Jewish property. The Reich Ministry of Finance repeatedly inter-
vened in such cases and declared that profits from Aryaniza-
tion transactions to the benefit of individuals were not allowed;
it was to be insisted upon that the purchase price should cor-
respond to the full value of the transaction. I remember that
we had great difficulties in this respect, especially with the office
of the SS Leader Raffelsberger in Vienna.

6. In this connection I wish to point out that the Reich emi-
gration tax [Reichsfluchtsteuer] had nothing to do with the spe-
cial tax on Jewish property nor was it in any way directed against
the Jews or against political opponents of the Third Reich. The
Reich emigration tax was introduced in 1931 by the then Reich
Chancellor Bruening in one of his emergency decrees and applied

384

to all taxpayers who gave up their residence in Germany and
thus were no longer subject to unlimited tax liability. The pur-
pose of the Reich emigration tax was, as its name implies, to
stem the flight of capital from Germany; it is still collected
today in Germany as I know from my own experience as attorney
at law.

Nuernberg, 20 May 1948

[Signed] Walter Donandt

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 95
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 292

AFFIDAVIT OF HANS SCHROEDER * FORMERLY CHIEF OF THE PER-
SONNEL DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, 20 APRIL 1948,
CONCERNING THE POSITION OF LUTHER AND DEPARTMENT GER-
MANY IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE

I, Hans Schroeder, born 22 October 1899 in Bruel/Mecklen-
burg, at present residing in Nuernberg, Muggenhoferstr. 2, have
been cautioned that I render myself liable to punishment by giv-
ing a false affidavit. I hereby depose that the following state-
ment is true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and was
made to be submitted as evidence to the American Military Tri-
bunal IV, case 11, in Nuernberg.

As a result of my work in the Personnel Department of the
Foreign Office since 1936, where I was Department Chief from
March 1941 onward, I was able to obtain an exact picture of
the persons and events in the Foreign Office.

Regarding the former Under State Secretary and Chief of
Department Germany, Martin Luther, I can testify the following :
Luther, having been a member of the so-called “Office Ribbentrop”
— a Ribbentrop institution outside the Foreign Office, which or-
iginated from the time before he became Minister — was called
into the Foreign Office in the beginning of 1940. As Ribbentrop’s
special favorite, he was in charge of the so-called Department
Germany and was instructed by Ribbentrop to wage war against
the regular Civil Service and Foreign Office representatives, who
were not well-disposed toward the Party. He was to collect evi-
dence against these persons, report this to Ribbentrop and thus
finally achieve the “Nazification ,, of the [Foreign] Office. Re-
gardless of competence and rank he pursued this aim, just like
his other business, independently or under Ribbentrop’s imme-
diate direction. His first ambition was to obtain the position of
a Second State Secretary. In this capacity he would be in charge

* Defense affiant Hans Schroeder was not called for cross-examination.

385

of the Department Germany, the Information Department, Radio
Department, Personnel Department, etc.

With the greatest indifference Luther persistently ignored the
existence of the State Secretary as an institution. He did not
observe that rule of etiquette which demanded his subordination
to the State Secretary, von Weizsaecker. When reporting, or
during verbal orientation, Luther bypassed von Weizsaecker when-
ever he felt like it, and this was easy for him since he was the
favorite of Ribbentrop. His personal attitude toward Weiz-
saecker, too, was one of extreme antagonism.

It was not until winter 1942-1943 that Luther’s position in
the Foreign Office changed, inasmuch as it was at this time that
he started to oppose also von Ribbentrop.

Nuernberg, 20 April 1948

[Signed] Hans Schroeder

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT WEIZSAECKER 19
WEIZSAECKER DEFENSE EXHIBIT 293

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANZ VON SONNLEITHNER, FORMERLY OF THE
OFFICE OF VON RIBBENTROP, 7 JANUARY 1948, CONCERNING
LUTHER'S FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENDANT VON WEIZSAECKER
OF MATTERS SUBMITTED TO VON RIBBENTROP*

I, Franz Sonnleithner, born 1 June 1905 in Salzburg, residing
in Berchtesgaden/Untersalzberg, have been warned that I render
myself liable to punishment by giving a false affidavit. I hereby
depose that the following statement is true to the best of my
knowledge and belief, and was made to be submitted as evidence
to the United States Military Tribunal in Nuernberg.

Under State Secretary Luther usually avoided channeling sub-
missions to the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs via the State
Secretary of the Foreign Office, von Weizsaecker, which would
have been the correct procedure. Once, when this omission to
inform the State Secretary had unpleasant consequences, the
Minister’s office prevailed upon Ribbentrop to issue instructions
that Luther, too, should make his submissions available to the
State Secretary. However, Luther often took it upon himself
to evade this instruction by pointing out the delay which this
would cause and he frequently presented his submission directly
to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs as before simply adding
a note that the State Secretary had been informed. I repeatedly
found, upon inquiring of the State Secretary’s office or of the

* Franz von Sonnleithner testified as a defense witness. His testimony is recorded in the
mimeogrraphed transcript, 26 Augrust 1948, 18474—18499.

386

State Secretary himself, as to whether the State Secretary had
actually approved this or that of Luther’s submissions, that in
fact, Weizsaecker, contrary to Luther’s statements, had not been
informed. I know that Luther always adapted his official behavior
to Weizsaecker to the trend of his relationship with Ribbentrop
at the time and his own current plans.

Nuernberg, 7 January 1948

[Signed] Franz Sonnleithner

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE WITNESS
FABIAN VON SCHLABRENDORFF 1

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Dr. Becker (counsel for defendant von Weizsaecker) : Mr.
von Schlabrendorff, will you please, first of all, give your full
name for the record?

Witness von Schlabrendorff: My first name is Fabian; my
last name is von Schlabrendorff.

Q. Describe your professional career, Mr. von Schlabrendorff.

A. I attended secondary school in Detmold and after graduation
became a Referendar. Later I took the assessor examination
and became an assessor. Then I was licensed to practice law,
which I am still practicing today.

Q. What was your position during the war?

A. At the beginning of the war I was called up as a soldier.
First I was a noncommissioned officer in an infantry unit; then
I became an officer, a company commander, and in February
1941 I became a staff officer for special use [Ordonnanzoffizier z.
b. v.] in the operations department of the staff of the Army
Group Center.

Q. Mr. von Schlabrendorff, are you the author of the report
published as a book by the American citizen Graevenitz under
the title, “They Almost Killed Hitler”; 2 in England under the
title, “The Revolt Against Hitler”; in the German language edi-
tion under the title, “Officers Against Hitler [“Offiziere gegen
Hitler”] ?

A. Yes.

1 Complete testimony is recorded in the mimeographed transcript, 30 June 1948, pages 10526-
10551.

2 They Almost Killed Hitler (The McMillan Co., New York, 1947) is von Schlabrendorff’ s
personal account of the resistance movement within Hitler’s Germany prior to and during
World War II. The volume was edited by German-born Gero v. S. Gaevenitz, who came to
the United States in the twenties, stayed to become an American citizen, and served in World
War II as Assistant to Allen W. Dulles, OSS Mission Chief in Bern, Switzerland. From
Switzerland, Gaevenitz established and maintained contact with various anti-Nazi groups in
Germany and later participated in the negotiations which ended in the capitulation of German
forces in Italy.

387

Q. Is it correct that the American edition of this book has a
foreword by General Donovan, the last paragraph of which reads
as follows:

“This book, in addition to pointing a lesson to us Americans,
reminds us of the self-sacrifice of brave men who died on the
gallows under torture or in concentration camps because they
dared, against hopeless odds, to plot the downfall of a tyrant/’

A. Yes.

Q. Did you belong to the NSDAP or any of its affiliated organi-
zations?

A. No.

Q. When did your work against the NSDAP begin?

A. My work against the NSDAP began before 1933. I was
often a speaker at National Socialist election meetings where I
spoke against the National Socialists. After 1933, as before
1933, I wrote newspaper articles against the National Socialists,
until this was no longer feasible. Then, from Pomerania, I came
into a conservative resistance group under von Kleist-Schmitzin,
who was executed in connection with the events of 20 July 1944.
In the course of the years we came into contact with other re-
sistance groups. Because of the terror exercised by the National
Socialists these individual resistance groups grew in the course
of years into a resistance movement.

Q. Will you please tell us briefly what your connection was
with what we call “resistance movement” today?

A. In 1938 I made the acquaintance of Hans Oster, who was
at that time a colonel. Colonel Hans Oster was chief of the
Central Office of the counterintelligence, which was under the
leadership of Admiral Canaris. From 1938 on, one can speak
of a resistance movement in Germany as a conscious and de-
liberate collaboration to overthrow Hitler and national socialism.
Through acquaintance with Colonel Hans Oster I came into the
core of the resistance movement.

Q. Before the outbreak of war did you have your own con-
tacts abroad for the resistance movement?

A. Yes. Before the war the German resistance movement con-
sidered it important to have contact with countries outside Ger-
many. I had much contact with the English journalist Ian Col-
win who was stationed in Berlin. Through him I went to Eng-
land before the war. There I had conversations about the Ger-
man resistance movement with the later Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and the English conservative leader Lord Lloyd.

Q. In connection with your activity in the resistance movement,
did you learn of Mr. von Weizsaecker’s collaboration with the

388

resistance groups in the fall of 1938, as well as the steps which
he took in 1938 and 1939 through the Kordt brothers in London.

A. Not before the war. During the war I did.

Q. Mr. von Schlabrendorff, is it not astonishing that you learned
of such enterprises only during the war, some time after they
took place?

A. No, that is not astonishing, because the leaders of the
German resistance movement wanted to keep as many things as
possible secret among the members of the resistance groups it-
self, to preserve them as long as possible from Gestapo terror.

Q. Mr. von Schlabrendorff, from whom did you learn of these
measures during the war?

A. I learned of them by accident after I myself went to see
Baron Weizsaecker for personal reasons during the war and I
told Colonel Hans Oster and his closest associate Reichsgerichts-
rat Hans von Dohnanyi about this visit. Both men told me,
when I informed them of my visit and my impression of Baron
von Weizsaecker, “Don’t you know that this man is in close
political contact with us in the fight against Hitler and national
socialism?”

Q. I shall now hand you [Weizsaecker] defense document book
5. I don’t want to go into individual documents at this time —
I merely want to ask you to look at the index and I shall then
put to you a few questions about the most important persons
mentioned there.* Will you please tell us briefly what position
these persons held in the groups which formed the resistance
movement? And please start with Chief of the General Staff
Haider.

Dr. Kempner: We object against this line of questioning.
The witness is asked about the attitude of affiants. I think if
there is any discussion about what kind of persons the affiants
are, this should be brought out in cross-examination. But this
witness is not an expert on the affiants of the defense.

Judge Powers, Presiding: Well, I don’t understand the ques-
tion asked for their attitude particularly. The question asked
that they be identified and placed in the resistance movement.

Dr. Becker: Yes. May I make a comment on that? In these
documents are the affiants testifying about their own position

* Document book 5 of defendant von Weizsaecker was entitled “Resistance.” It contained
over thirty affidavits and several extracts from postwar books or reports concerning aspects
of the “resistance” movement or movements in Germany, and defendant von Weizsaecker’s
relations thereto. The “Index” to this document book gives a brief summary of what the
defense sought to prove by the documents in this document book. Two of the affidavits in-
cluded therein have been reproduced in Volume XII, section VI D, that is, an affidavit of Lord
Halifax, Document Weizsaecker 408, Weizsaecker Defense Exhibit 121, and an affidavit of
Papal Nuncio Raphael Forni, Document Weizsaecker 448, Weizsaecker Defense Exhibit 414.

389

with regard to Mr. von Weizsaecker, or about the position of
others?

Judge Powers, Presiding: Well, I’ve overruled the objection,
Doctor; so go ahead.

Dr. Becker: Then, will you please begin with Haider?

Judge Powers, Presiding: I think it would be better, perhaps,
rather than asking him to look at the affidavits, ask him about
the people whose names appear in the affidavits.

Dr. Becker : This is Exhibit 269 and Exhibit 270. 1

According to your own personal experience and knowledge,
what was Mr. Haider’s position in the resistance movement?

Witness von Schlabrendorff : I cannot tell you anything
about that from my own knowledge. I can tell you only what
I have heard from third parties — that is to say, from Colonel
Hans Oster whom I have already mentioned. From him I learned
that General Haider, Chief of the General Staff of the German
Army, had been considered an active member in the struggle
against Hitler and national socialism since 1938. He had been
working since 1938 toward an overthrow of Hitler by military
means. Later, according to Oster, there had been a split between
himself and Haider.

Q. May I ask you to go on and describe briefly the positions
of General Beck and Mr. Goerdeler in the resistance movement?
Their names are also mentioned in this book.

A. General Ludwig Beck was recognized by all groups of the
resistance movement as the head of this organization against
Hitler. He was the leader. He was, in a sense, the brains of
the German resistance movement. Lord Mayor Karl Goerdeler 2
was the motor or the heart of the German resistance movement
who did not allow any reverses to hamper his work. In contrast
to General Beck, he was a person about whom there sometimes
existed a difference of opinion. I can testify about these two
persons from my own knowledge, because I knew both of them.
During the war I was in constant contact with both of them.

Q. In the next question I shall mention three names — Admiral
Canaris, Colonel, later General, Oster, whom you have mentioned,
and Mr. von Dohnanyi.

A. I knew all three of these men personally. During the war
I was in regular contact with all three of them.

1 Weizsaecker Document 140, Weizsaecker Defense Exhibit 269 was an affidavit of Dr. Hasso
von Etzdorf; and Weizsaecker Document 145, Weizsaecker Defense Exhibit 270, an affidavit
of General Franz Haider. Both items not reproduced herein are contained in Weizsaecker
document book 5. Extracts from Haider’s testimony are reproduced in Volume XII, sections
VIE (Poland) and VI H (U.S.S.R.).

2 Former Lord Mayor of Leipzig. Goerdeler was tried before a People’s Court after the
attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July 1944, sentenced to death, and executed.

390

Admiral Canaris was the Chief of the German Counterintelli-
gence; he had a personal fanatical hatred of Hitler and the Na-
tional Socialists. He used his powerful position to place parts
of the German Counterintelligence in the service of the German
resistance movement.

Colonel Hans Oster, who was chief of the Central Office of
Counterintelligence, worked under Admiral Canaris for many
years, and he administered the organization of the resistance
movement like a chief of staff, until about the spring of 1943;
shortly thereafter, he was put in the officers’ reserve, and retired.

His first assistant was Reichsgerichtsrat Hans von Dohnanyi,
who, together with Oster and Canaris, had a very considerable
share in the regular organization work under Oster and Canaris
in the German resistance movement.

Q. Now, I should like to ask you about Ambassador von Has-
sell.*

A. I knew Ambassador von Hassell personally, too, and I had
conversations with him. He was one of the Referenten on foreign
policy of the German resistance movement.

Q. Do you know about something that’s been discussed fre-
quently in this trial — a certain tension later on between Weiz-
saecker and Hassell? And do you know anything about the
cause of the tension?

A. I learned of this tension only from the diary of Ambassa-
dor von Hassell, which was published after the war. I know
however that during the war members of the resistance move-
ment called Ambassador von Hassell a little too talkative and
for that reason there were sometimes minor controversies.

Q. Do you know anything about the young resistance group in
the Foreign Office? And I shall mention the following names
from this document book : von Haften, von Trott, Brueckelmeyer,
the Kordt brothers, Etzdorf, Kessel, and von Nostitz.

A. During the war I knew only one of these people personally,
Legation Councillor von Haften. Through him I heard that there
was a number of young people in the Foreign Office who could
be considered a strongpoint of the German resistance movement.

Q. Mr. von Schlabrendorff, why was this group important?

A. This group was important — and I might almost say de-
cisive — for us because every action of the resistance movement
could be undertaken only by considering the position with respect
to foreign policy — to judge the position correctly and to estab-
lish contact with foreign quarters was the duty of these men in
the German Foreign Office.

Von Hassell was tried and executed after the' attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July 1944.

391

Q. I should like to ask you about two men whose names I
mentioned here — von Schwerin-Schwanenfeld and Fritz von der
Schulenburg.

A. I knew both of them personally and I was in contact with
them during the war. Count Schwerin-Schwanenfeld was a sol-
dier at that time and had a military task in Berlin in the re-
sistance movement. The second person Count Fritz von der
Schulenburg, was also a soldier in the first part of the war.
Later he became a civilian and had a political post in Berlin.

Q. What was the role of these two in connection with the re-
sistance movement?

A. Schwerin-Schwanenfeld had a military assignment; he was
to go into action when Berlin was occupied according to the
plan. Count Fritz von der Schulenburg had a political assign-
ment, he was to have a leading position in the proposed domestic
administration.

Q. The last names which I want to ask you about are from
the Protestant camp: Pastor Schoenfeld and Mr. Gerstenmaier.

A. I know both of these men but I met them only after the
war.

Q. Are you not surprised that you met two such people — Mr.
Gerstenmaier, for instance, was tried by the People’s Court for
resistance activity — only after the war?

A. No. I am not surprised, since I personally concentrated on
the military aspects of the resistance movement and, besides, I
deliberately avoided becoming acquainted with others unneces-
sarily. The resultant danger was avoided by us.

Q. Was there also a Socialist resistance group and what con-
nection did it have with the groups you have mentioned?

A. There was a very important Socialist resistance movement
in Germany. There were outstanding names in it — Carl Mieren-
dorff, Haubach, Reichwein, Maas, Leuschner, Leber, and Jakob
Kaiser. These persons, with the unions backing them, were in
constant contact with the head of the resistance movement, Gen-
eral Beck. But these contacts were maintained with very special
liaison men. It was not possible to contact these circles directly.

Q. When did you meet Mr. von Weizsaecker?

A. I met Mr. von Weizsaecker during the war. I cannot give
you the day or the month now. It was between the Polish cam-
paign and the French campaign. I remember the time because
the reason why I went to see Mr. von Weizsaecker was the death
of one of his sons, who was in a regiment affiliated with my
division in the Polish campaign. That is why I went to see

392

Baron von Weizsaecker, to express my condolences to him and
his wife about the son who had fallen in the Polish campaign.

Q. Do you recall any details of this first conversation?

A. In this first conversation I approached Baron von Weiz-
saecker very carefully because I was not sure of his political at-
titude; but I had the definite and certain impression in this first
conversation that he was not a National Socialist, that he was
an opponent of national socialism.

Q. But your friends in the resistance movement had not pre-
viously informed you about Mr. von Weizsaecker?

A. No. No one had informed me beforehand about Baron von
Weizsaecker’s personal attitude.

Q. And afterwards you learned from Mr. Oster what you have
already mentioned?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you then, subsequently, talk to other leading resistance
men about Baron von Weizsaecker?

A. Yes. I talked to Admiral Canaris about him and also to
General Beck.

Q. How was Baron von Weizsaecker looked upon by the re-
sistance movement, according to these conversations?

A. All leading men of the German resistance movement who
talked to me about Baron von Weizsaecker made no secret of the
fact that he was a man who shared our views, whose difficult
duty it was to act as the National Socialist State Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and to work toward the same aims that we out-
side the government were working toward.

Q. Mr. von Schlabrendorff, do you remember from these con-
versations what these men expected of Mr. von Weizsaecker?

A. Yes. Dohnanyi especially and repeatedly told me that valu-
able information on foreign policy he had received from Baron
von Weizsaecker.

Q. Did you visit Mr. von Weizsaecker often after this?

A. Yes. On the basis of the political impression which I
gained at the first visit, I visited Baron von Weizsaecker when-
ever I was in Berlin. In contrast to the first visit, there was
always a political reason for my later visits.

Q. Can you give us this reason?

A. Yes. During this war, while I was in the army, I tried
to win over leading military men for the resistance movement.
I believe I can say, without exaggeration, that I fought for the
allegiance of several field marshals, especially Field Marshal
Fedor von Bock and Field Marshal von Kluge. Both of these
men had no doubts about the military position of the Third Reich.
What they did doubt was the position with respect to foreign

393

policy and the consequences of a coup d’etat against Hitler from
within. For this reason they wanted information and judgments
on the political situation from an official personage. This per-
sonage I saw as Baron von Weizsaecker; and for this reason I
went to see him frequently during the war.

Q. Can you remember any essential details of the information,
which you got from Baron von Weizsaecker?

A. Yes. I remember that Baron von Weizsaecker, in describ-
ing the political situation, again and again emphasized that peace
with Hitler was impossible for Germany. A prerequisite for
peace was the overthrow of this man.

Q. Is it correct, Mr. von Schlabrendorff, that Mr. von Weiz-
saecker in various interviews explained this attitude with various
examples from the foreign-political situation?

A. Yes, that’s right.

Q. Did Mr. von Weizsaecker ever talk to you about his rela-
tionship with Ribbentrop?

A. Yes. I myself recall that, not without curiosity, I asked
Baron Weizsaecker about his relationship with Ribbentrop. Baron
Weizsaecker told me that sometimes he did not see Mr. Ribben-
trop for weeks and had no contact with him and he made no
secret of the fact that he was strongly opposed to Ribbentrop.
He went so far as to extend his thesis, “no peace for Germany
with Hitler,” to include “no peace for Germany with Ribbentrop.”

Q. Did you have the impression, from your talks with Mr.
von Weizsaecker, that under the impressions of the great terri-
torial gains of the German armies his political convictions which
you have just described had been shaken?

A. On the contrary. I was always astonished when I came to
Berlin from the field and visited Baron Weizsaecker and heard
from him a clear and unvarnished judgment of the military situ-
ation, while many other persons who were not National Socialists
or who were anti-Nazis were deceived by the reports of successes
in the German communiques. I recall that, in contrast to the
judgment of the situation by high military officials, Baron Weiz-
saecker said in the days of the big successes in Russia “that
will come to an end before Christmas.”

Q. Did Baron Weizsaecker ask you for information in turn?

A. Yes. He frequently wanted to know military details and
he explained this wish by saying that the military information
which he got officially was rather inferior.

Q. How was your own resistance work shaping up at this
time?

A. My own resistance work was not much at the time. It
consisted in mailman service, if I may call it that, between the

394

resistance group in the army in the field and the resistance group
in the home army. It was necessary constantly to adjust these
two groups and their actions to one another.

Q. Were you and your friends of the resistance movement
aware at the time that Mr. von Weizsaecker was signing or
initialing documents of a National Socialist character?

A. Yes. We knew that from our own experience. There was
no one in Germany who could have evaded contact with national
socialism. It was only a question of degree. From our own daily
work and our insight into the work of the field marshals we
saw that high officials in the Third Reich were daily forced to
collaborate in work which either in form or in substance could
be called National Socialist.

Q. Were you and your friends surprised when you read in
the newspapers Mr. von Weizsaecker’s speech made at the recep-
tion for diplomats returning from South America? I shall leave
open the question of whether the newspapers reported this speech
correctly.

A. I do not remember this speech. I remember only the fact
that there was a speech reported in the newspapers at the time.
I also remember that this speech was discussed by my friends.
We agreed that such speeches were a mistake and a crime if one
was honestly working for the National Socialists, but that they
were necessary if one was working against the National Socialists
and was forced to hold a post under national socialism in order
to fight against national socialism.

I remember that my own later superior, during the war, was
forced to make a speech on the occasion of Hitler’s birthday
and tried to avoid making it. I told him he had to make this
speech. He had to make the speech which I was going to write
for him and I did write a speech for him which used stronger
expressions than Goebbels or Ley would have used, because we
considered it necessary, before taking any action against Hitler
and national socialism, to deceive Hitler and the National So-
cialists about our attitude and our power.

Q. Did you and your friends assume, for example, that Mr. von
Weizsaecker, with whose peace policy you were familiar, signed
various measures taken by the Foreign Office in connection with
aggressive actions?

A. I did not know that at the time but I imagined it and
thought that it must be so.

Q. Then you and your friends were able to understand Mr. von
Weizsaecker’s accepting membership and honorary rank in the
SS?

395

A. Membership and honorary rank in the SS were for us ex-
ternal things. For a person fighting against national socialism
and holding an important position for us, they seemed to us an
advantage.

Q. Yesterday I gave you prosecution document book 60-B to
read.* During your conversations in 1942 with Mr. von Weiz-
saecker did you suppose that Mr. von Weizsaecker would sign
or initial such documents as you find in this book?

A. I did not know that at the time but I imagined it. I knew
the work of many other persons in similar positions and above
all I knew that during the war a person in the Foreign Office
could make no decisions in these things. In most cases it was
just a matter of taking notice.

Q. Did not the leaders of the German resistance movement and
yourself believe that as an enemy of national socialism one should
keep aloof from such unclean things?

A. Fundamentally we did believe that. I, personally, because
of my temperament and my somewhat uncompromising basic
convictions, would not have signed or initialed such matters, but
that probably would have been wrong. Keeping in mind the goal,
the overthrow of Hitler, it was necessary in our opinion to do
such things, no matter how much they might weigh upon one's
conscience.

Q. Do you recall from your conversations with Mr. von Weiz-
saecker any statements indicating his attitude toward crimes
against humanity?

A. I remember one such conversation, which took place toward
the beginning of our acquaintance. I was describing to Baron
von Weizsaecker the atrocities in Poland and I recall the horror
which Baron Weizsaecker expressed about these atrocities com-
mitted by Germans against Poles. He added “I see the day and
the hour coming when these atrocities will avenge themselves
many fold on the Germans." I know that he added, “Believe
me, because of Hitler and the atrocities committed by him and
his followers, God will not change his laws of good and evil."

Q. Mr. von Schlabrendorff, during this time when you ’talked
to Mr. von Weizsaecker at intervals, did you have contact only
with your superiors in the field army or did you also have regular
contact with the other leaders of the resistance movement in
Berlin, and did you discuss these problems with them?

* This document book was entitled "Foreign Office Defendants — Count Five. War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity; Atrocities committed against civilian populations.” It con-
tained over 50 contemporaneous documents dealing with the treatment of Jews from Denmark,
Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France. Some of these documents are reproduced below in
section IX C 1.

396

A. I also had much contact with the civilian heads of the re-
sistance movement, especially Goerdeler. I myself arranged for
Goerdeler to travel from Berlin to Russia, to Smolensk, under
another name to talk to Field Marshal von Kluge.* In this way
we discussed the same problems with civilian personages.

Q. Did you learn whether the leading persons, especially in the
counterintelligence, received information not only from you but
directly from Weizsaecker?

A. I didn't quite understand your question. Would you re-
peat it?

Q. My question was this. Did you learn that the leading per-
sons of the resistance movement, especially those in counterintel-
ligence, received information from von Weizsaecker in the same
way as you did?

A. I know that specifically of Admiral Canaris.

Q. And the information wdiich Mr. Canaris received from Mr.
von Weizsaecker was the same information that you got?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you and Mr. von Weizsaecker agree that Hitler had
to be removed?

A. Baron Weizsaecker never left any doubt in my mind about
that.

Q. Now, in 1942 and 1943, what were the difficulties involved
in an assassination, according to your own experience?

A. The difficulties involved in an assassination in 1942, and
1943, were in part that the resistance movement had great doubts
about the expediency of an assassination. There were opponents
of Hitler within the resistance movement who were against an
assassination for religious reasons, for psychological reasons.
There were also great technical difficulties. Hitler was not living
like other people. He was always surrounded by all sorts of
protective measures to prevent an assassination. To break
through this protection and get to the man himself with any
chance of success was extremely difficult. Also, even a successful
attack was senseless unless political events at home and abroad
were such that the continuity of the government in Germany
could be maintained.

Q. By whom and how was this assassination to be carried out?

A. The resistance movement or various groups in the resistance
movement repeatedly planned assassinations of Hitler. These
plans were made most concrete when members of the High Com-
mand of the Army participated in the plans and saw a favorable
opportunity when a new uniform was to be shown. On this
occasion they thought Hitler could be blown up. We had to find

* Kluge committed suicide after the attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July 1944 and after the
Gestapo had received orders to have him arrested.

953402—62 26

397

a person who was willing to sacrifice himself in the showing
of this uniform. A Captain Axel von dem Busche offered him-
self. The plan was not carried out because this Captain Axel
von dem Busche was seriously wounded shortly thereafter. Also,
Hitler himself several times declined to attend the showing of
the new uniform.

Q. Mr. Schlabrendorff, how does it happen that the man you
just mentioned was apparently at the Eastern Front in action,
as I assume from the fact that he was wounded, fighting for the
German Army and at the same time planning an assassination
of Hitler?

A. The German resistance movement was not a profession to
which one could devote oneself exclusively. We were Germans.
We were in the middle of a war. We had to protect our country
against the enemy by force of arms.

Q. Subsequently you yourself undertook the assassination of
Hitler. Will you very briefly describe the essential points of this
plan?

A. The High Command of Army Group Center tried to lure
Hitler out of his headquarters. We succeeded in arranging a
sham conference of the army commanders within the Army Group
Center. We had prepared a package of English explosives and
when Hitler and his party were getting into the plane to leave
we put this package, camouflaged as cognac, into the hands of
the men with Hitler. The plane should have exploded over
Minsk. Because of the great cold in Russia and by accidents
such as frequently occur, the English detonator failed and the
plane arrived safely at headquarters. We had difficulty in get-
ting the package back but we managed it.

Q. Afterwards you were able to see, by examining the pack-
age, that it failed to blow up for technical reasons?

A. Since I had given the package to the man personally when
he was getting into the plane, I went after the package myself
and got it back from the man personally, opened it myself, ex-
amined the fuse myself, and discovered that it had functioned
at first, but at the end of the fuse the detonator had not exploded.

Q. Was this attempted assassination discovered?

A. I believe it was not.

Q. In what connection were you yourself arrested?

A. I was arrested after the attempted coup d’etat of 20 July
1944.

Q. Please give us a very brief description of your trial and the
judgment?

A. On 17 August 1944 I was arrested at the Eastern Front and
turned over to the Reich Security Main Office in Berlin. There

398

was an investigation by the Reich Security Main Office, in the
course of which I was repeatedly and severely tortured. I was
turned over to the judge of the People's Court who issued an
order for arrest without even seeing me. I was dishonorably
discharged from the German armed forces and I was tried for
treason. I had four trials before the People's Court. The first
two were dismissed because of objections of my defense. During
the third trial, on 3 February 1945, there was a big American
air raid on Berlin. The courthouse was hit and the president
of the People’s Court, Robert Freisler, was killed during my
trial, while I escaped with my life. At the time of the fourth
and last trial all the witnesses had been executed, and therefore
I was acquitted. After my acquittal I was again arrested by
the Reich Security Main Office and Heinrich Himmler condemned
me to death by shooting. I was to be shot at the concentration
camp Flossenbuerg, but before that could be done I was re-
leased by American troops.

* ♦ * ★ * * He

Q. Are you of the opinion that the interrelations of the persons
in the resistance movement were made clear in the proceedings?

A. I cannot answer that question with certainty.

Q. As you know, Mr. von Weizsaecker was assigned to the
Vatican in 1943. What was the reaction of your friends and
yourself to this step?

A. We who knew Baron Weizsaecker's convictions regretted
this change of post very much, as far as our struggle against
Hitler was concerned.

Q. Will you please explain very briefly what you have just
said?

A. Baron Weizsaecker in the post of State Secretary for For-
eign Affairs was an important support for the German resistance
movement. When the change in his post came we had lost this
support.

Q. The aims of the resistance movement then failed. From
your experience in the technique of resistance in Germany, can
you tell us anything about a man like Weizsaecker's remaining
in office?

A. Resistance, not in a democracy but in a dictatorship, is,
according to our experience, possible only when some members
of the resistance movement are in official posts because success
for a resistance movement in a dictatorship is possible only by
collaboration between those who attack the dictatorship from
outside and those who work secretly in important posts within
the dictatorship.

Q. And as long as you were personally acquainted with Mr.
von Weizsaecker, you considered him such a person?

399

A. Yes.

Q. Thank you. No further questions.

Judge Powers, Presiding: Are there any other defense counsel
who wish to examine the witness? If not, has the prosecution any
cross-examination ?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Dr. Kempner: Mr. von Schlabrendorff, you were a German
officer, were you not?

Witness von Schlabrendorff: Yes.

Q. When were you called up for active service?

A. As a soldier?

Q. Yes.

A. I can’t tell you the exact day. At the beginning of the
war in 1939.

Q. And you were in the army until when?

A. Until I was dishonorably discharged in October 1944.

Q. At what front were you?

A. I was in the West. Then after the end of the campaign
in the West I was transferred to the East, and I was at the
Eastern Front for 3 years.

Q. In the time from 1939 to 1943, how often did you come
to Berlin from the front and speak to Mr. von Weizsaecker —
twice, five times, ten times?

A. I estimate that I spoke to Baron Weizsaecker seven to
eight times but I was in Berlin much more often than that.

Q. You spoke to Baron Weizsaecker seven to eight times from
1939 to 1943?

A. Yes.

Q. Isn’t that a little too high? Aren’t you mistaken?

A. I was in Berlin much more often. It’s possible that the
figure I have given is too low.

Q. And in these seven to eight times you were in very close
contact with him, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q. You said before that it would be necessary in preparing
an assassination of Hitler to have things just right. Otherwise
there is no point in an assassination?

A. Yes.

Q. That is a military conclusion?

A. Yes.

Q. When, on 13 March 1943, you undertook to assassinate
Hitler — have I got the date right?

A. Yes. That is the date.

Q. How did you agree upon this assassination with your con-
fidant Mr. von Weizsaecker with respect to foreign policy?

100

A. There was no agreement with Baron Weizsaecker.

Q. Did you tell him about this planned assassination at all?

A. No. There was a reason for that. We told such serious
things beforehand only to persons directly affected.

Q. But he was your foreign policy support. You told us be-
fore that without coordination the government would not have
gone on. This is my question: Who were the foreign policy ex-
perts who were closer to you than Weizsaecker, to whom you
confided your plan of assassination?

A. I said before that my work in the resistance movement was
generally limited to military circles. As far as foreign policy
went, I talked essentially only to Oster, Dohnanyi, and Canaris.
When the attack of 13 March 1943 was discussed, the military
considerations were the defeat at Stalingrad, the approaching de-
feat in Africa, the resultant psychological effect on the soldiers
and on the people at home, also the fact that General Olbricht,
who was Chief in the General Army Office under the Commander
of the Replacement Army, said that after the assassination he
could seize power in Berlin. It was these people who had con-
sultants on foreign policy.

*******

Q. As expert for the resistance movement, you have given in-
formation about many persons here. I should like to know from
you whether the so-called “Sippenhaftung” was in effect then,
that relatives, children, grandmothers, aunts, of alleged resistance
people were arrested?

A. Yes. I believe that was in effect.

Q. Do you know whether the relatives of Mr. von Weizsaecker
were arrested or interrogated by the Gestapo at that time?

A. No. I do not know that.

Q. Do you know whether and when a contribution was made
to the resistance movement by von Kessel, Nostitz, or the Kordt
brothers ?

A. I don’t know that from my own observation. Later, after
the war —

Q. I am not interested in that. I just want to know what
you know from your own observation.

What relation, necessary for the resistance movement, was
there between the German Foreign Office and foreign circles that
Mr. von Weizsaecker, to your knowledge, established?

A. I heard from a third party, Reichsgerichtsrat Hans von
Dohnanyi —

Q. Did you know anything about it yourself? Did you see
anything yourself?

401

A. I did not observe anything myself, directly.

*******

Q. You said that the defense counsel of Mr. von Weizsaecker
gave you a document book 60-B?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he also happen to show you prosecution document books
59, 60-A, 61, 62, and 63 7 1

A. I can’t tell you exactly the numbers of the books.

Q. How many documents did you read showing Mr. von
Weizsaecker ’s participation in the deportation of Jews to the east,
with which he is charged by the prosecution, how many such
documents he signed? I am not talking about taking notice of
anything.

A. I read quite a number of such documents as you have just
described.

Q. How many other resistance fighters did you have in your
movement who signed such documents?

A. We had, for example, SS Lieutenant General Nebe. He
also collaborated in a number of such things. 2

Q. Do you know that Mr. Nebe had nothing whatever to do
with the mass murder of Jews in the East?

A. On the contrary, SS Lieutenant General Arthur Nebe was
SS and Police Leader of Army Group Center, which is where I
got to know him. I negotiated with him several times during
the war. I know that during this time he did everything possible
to prevent the murder of Jews and Russians or to reduce it to a
minimum. But he was not able to prevent it completely and he
was in a terrible conflict: Either to do it himself and reduce it
to a minimum, or to go away and leave it to others, who would
kill not one-tenth but 100 percent.

Q. As an expert on the resistance movement, I shall now ask
you in conclusion, how many Jews is it permissible to murder if
one’s final goal is to do away with Hitler — how many million?

A. I would say nobody.

Dr. Kempner: Thank you.

Dr. Becker: I have no further questions.

1 The prosecution document books referred to contain numerous further documents concern-
ing the treatment of Jews in various countries. Most of these documents are contemporaneous
documents, some of which are reproduced earlier in section IX B 1.

2 Nebe played an active part in the extermination program in the occupied east. On 20
July 1944, while in Berlin, he joined a group of police officers who believed Hitler had been
assassinated and who indicated a desire to join the government which was to succeed Hitler.
Nebe was arrested and executed.

402

3. TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANTS SCHWERIN VON KRO-
SIGK, LAMMERS, VON WEIZSAECKER, BERGER, AND
VEESENMAYER

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT
SCHWERIN VON KROSIGK*

DIRECT EXAMINATION

*******

Dr. Fritsch (counsel for defendant Schwerin von Krosigk) :
Witness, I think I interrupted you and we can now discuss the
point you were just proceeding to discuss, that is, November
1938, the so-called spontaneous uprising of the people against
the Jews. Before that took place, even if only very shortly there-
tofore, did you receive notification of that “Crystal Day” [Crystal
Week] ?

Defendant Schwerin von Krosigk: No. I received no in-
formation whatsoever. These abominable incidents came as a
complete surprise to me. Even now I am still of the opinion
that the murder of Legation Counsellor vom Rath by a Jew was
only the exterior cause; the real motives are to be found at far
greater depth than that. The real motives were based on the
increasing radicalization of certain Party circles and they were
due to the attitude maintained by these specific circles, to the
effect that in this sphere the governmental administration was
sabotaging the will of the Nazi Party by dilatory methods. That
must have been the reason for the Party enacting the Nuernberg
Laws. And now, again, that was the same reason for Goebbels
inciting the masses to revolutionary methods. The result of this
incitement of the public spirit was this abominable “Crystal
Week” [Kristallwoche] . At the time when this occurred, and
ever since, I have always considered this to be a disgrace on the
character of the German people. At the time involved, I imme-
diately called up Goering and Goebbels in order to put an end
to these abominable excesses.

*******

(Recess)

Q. We were just discussing the persecution of the Jews. I had
asked you a question which I think you did not answer.

After these excesses had taken place who took things in hand?
A. The business was started by Goebbels. Then, Goering took
matters in hand. He invited the Ministries to a conference on
12 November; that is the well-known meeting.

* Further extracts from the' testimony of defendant Schwerin von Krosigk are reproduced in
sections VI B and VI E, Volume XII, and in section X G, below.

403

Q. We now come to Prosecution Exhibit 1441, in document
book 59, Document 1816-PS. 1 These are the stenographic min-
utes of the conference on 12 November 1938, under Goering’s
chairmanship. You were present, were you not?

A. Yes.

Q. How many people attended the conference?

A. That’s very difficult to estimate. I think it would be nearer
100 than 50.

Q. And Goering invited the participants?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, a quite general question. Do the contents of the
documents submitted, dealing with this question, in the main
coincide with your memory of what took place?

A. Yes. In general, apart from the fact that, as the docu-
ments show, some parts are missing.

Q. Was this a conference, perhaps, with the idea of getting
matters running again in an orderly way or what happened?

A. Goering had some ordinances before him which were al-
ready prepared. One of these was the ordinance concerning the
imposition of a fine amounting to 1 billion marks. 2 He said that
Hitler had ordered that. You can hardly call it a real conference.
Goering did most of the talking. He would call now upon one
man and then upon another to make suggestions about measures
which might perhaps still be taken. The main part of the con-
ference, as the minutes show, was concerned with the question
of compensation by the insurance companies.

Q. According to the minutes you, too, were called up, as you
call it. Please look at these parts of the minutes, first of all,
page 58 of the English. Perhaps we might take all these parts
together. Then, look at page 70 of the English and then page
78 of the English. What struck me when I read these minutes
was the brief and somewhat negative nature of your answers ;
and I think you confirmed that. Was there a special reason for
that?

A. I suppose that I need hardly explain that the whole at-
mosphere was utterly repulsive to me, as was the tone of what
was said. In addition I was still very much influenced by what
had just happened; so I wanted to keep out of it as much as
possible, since I myself could do nothing about it. With reference
to the first remark on page 58 of the English, I suppose that I
need not say anything. In fact, I do not know anything about
the extent of the damage. As for the second remark on page
70 of the English, I wanted to express my misgivings about

1 Reproduced above in section IX B 1.

2 Document 1412-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 2102, reproduced above in this section.

404

taking over Jewish securities in exchange for an entry in the
debit account [Schuldbucheintragung]. On page 78 of the Eng-
lish I once again emphasized these misgivings. Of course, I could
not permit securities to be thrown on the market from the Jewish
side, thus spoiling the market for the Reich loan. It would not
have been in the interest of the Jews either; and that is why,
if such a fine had to be imposed at all, it was necessary, tem-
porarily at least, to put a ban on the sale of securities. With
reference to the last remark also on page 78, there I was referring
to a suggestion made by Heydrich. That was the suggestion to
encourage the emigration of Jews. This was along the same
lines as the negotiations which I have mentioned, which had
been started by Schacht.

Q. You said that Goering had the ordinances lying before him.
Did these include the decree concerning the Jewish fine?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there any discussion on the subject or did Goering
just announce it?

A. No one talked to me about it beforehand ever. There is
something I would like to add. Before the “Crystal Week” no-
body ever suggested to me that the property of Jews should in
any way be put at the disposal of the Reich. The fact that I
myself never made such a suggestion is, I suppose, something I
need hardly emphasize.

Q. Didn’t you yourself feel that this was a very dirty trick?
First this whole business was staged and then the injured party
was to pay.

A. Yes, certainly. I think that hardly requires discussion. At
the beginning of my examination I said that I fought very hard
with myself with the feeling of my duty to remain in office against
the relief of getting rid of this burden. This battle was never as
hard as it was at that moment. But I have already explained
why I did remain and I don’t want to go into it again now.

Q. Well, then Goering announced this decree about the Jewish
fine. I am now having book 57-B given to you.

Judge Powers, Presiding: Counsel, I dislike to interrupt. I
take it you are aware that count four of the indictment has been
stricken.* This document relates to the period involved. If
material at all, it’s only to show the attitude of the defendant. I
hope you won’t spend too much time on it.

Dr. Fritsch: No, it’s only from that point of view that I
wanted to discuss it.

* The order of the Tribunal dismissing count four of the indictment is reproduced above
iu section VIII F.

405

Dr. Fritsch : Have you got [Document 1412-PS, Prosecution]
Exhibit 2102 before you? It’s page 99 of the English. Article
2 entrusts the Minister of Finance with the issuing of implementa-
tion regulations. You were not asked beforehand about that
assignment?

Defendant Schwerin von Krosigk : No.

Q. Did you do anything in order to get rid of the assignment?

A. No. In this situation that would have been quite useless.
What had to matter to me was only to execute these regulations
in a way which as far as possible, avoided hardships and took
into consideration both humane and economic considerations.

* * * * * * *

Q. With reference to the problem of the treatment of the
Jews I have one more question. These matters have been re-
peatedly discussed here. I would only like to hear your per-
sonal attitude. What did you know about the so-called Final
Solution [Endloesung] of the Jewish Question?

A. I cannot remember ever having heard the term at all be-
fore the collapse. At any rate I was not aware of any physical
extermination as a solution of the Jewish question.

Q. The prosecution naturally says that many people in Ger-
many knew it and asks why you, as a minister, did not know it.
Is it possible for you to explain that?

A. Of course it could not remain hidden from me that in war-
time Jews were evacuated from Germany. All the less since
the property they left behind them was transferred to my finan-
cial authority for administration and evaluation. But as far
as a plan, the execution of such a plan went, that this evacuation
was to lead to extermination, that is something of which I never
heard anything at all. When I asked I was always told that
these measures were equivalent to the internment of enemy na-
tionals in wartime for security reasons.

Q. At that time were you ever given the name of a place
where they were taken?

A. The East was mentioned quite generally. I only heard one
name. That was Theresienstadt. That was given to me as a
place which had been evacuated by other inhabitants and made
available for the settlement of German Jews.

Q. I would like here to refer to an affidavit, Krosigk Docu-
ment 222, which I will submit as Krosigk Defense Exhibit 45,*
in our document book 1. That is a statement by Attorney Eckart
Koenig who once went to see you and who now confirms how
pleased you were about the fact that Dr. Grabower, the present

* Not reproduced herein.

406

Finance President of Nuernberg, was taken to Theresienstadt.
Koenig says that he noticed that you had no idea what was
really up. However I would like you to explain how it is pos-
sible for a man in your position to have known nothing of all
these things.

A. I know how difficult it must be to understand for people
who did not experience the conditions at that time. It was one
of the most important methods of government that Hitler em-
ployed; to use his secrecy apparatus, to restrict everybody, up
to the highest positions, to the knowledge of such matters as
belonged to their spheres.

*******

Q. Let us now refer to two further prosecution exhibits to be
found in this same document book 75, specifically Document NG-
4097, Prosecution Exhibit 2450, and Document NG-4094, Prose-
cution Exhibit 2451,* pages 167 and 169 of the English, re-
spectively. This is an exchange of correspondence between two
officials on the staff of your Ministry, that is, Gossel and Patzer,
in which they discuss assets found in the Warsaw ghetto.

Did you have anything to do with this matter and, if so, what
are you able to tell us about it?

A. Of course, I did not know this exchange of correspondence.
All I remember is that on one occasion in connection with some
report or other one of the Referenten mentioned that large
treasures had allegedly been captured in the Warsaw ghetto and
he tied this up with the question as to whether the SS had
enriched themselves or whether these items had been turned
over to the Reich; and the Referent also mentioned on that oc-
casion that nothing was known officially of this matter. Pre-
sumably he had made inquiries with the respective departments,
inquiring as to whether these items had been captured under the
laws of warfare and whether they had been turned in to the
Reich. I don't know any further details concerning this matter.
All I know is that subsequently I was told that no Warsaw
property had been turned in to the Reich and that it was im-
possible to verify whether the notices reported to me by my
Referent were perhaps based on false information.

Q. You really had no reason to pursue any such matters in
detail, did you?

A. No, certainly not. Of course, if you permit me to say,
the Reich Ministry of Finance was a rather passive institution,
and people had to call upon us and ask us to intervene but it
may be that one or the other Referenten might possibly have

* Both of these exhibits are reproduced in section IX B 1.

407

been too zealous in the carrying out of his duty and, as a result,
he may have made inquiries as to whether it wasn’t possible that
certain property which should have been officially turned in may
have been retained in the hands of the wrong people.

Q. We have another very typical case in evidence which pre-
sumably refers to a matter that was called to the attention of
the Reich Ministry of Finance. I am referring to prosecution
document book 75, which contains Exhibit 2449, on page 163 of
the English, which is Document NG-4096.* I just mentioned
the name of “Account Heiliger” [“Konto Heiliger”], which is
a cover name for this account. Do you know the importance of
this account?

A.* No. I don’t know how many accounts the Reich Main
Finance Office may have had in their books. In any case, I am
sure there must have been thousands of such accounts. Now,
as far as this “Heiliger” account is concerned, I never heard
of it before this trial took place, nor did I know this letter of
the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office. It wasn’t
submitted to me, which can be seen clearly beyond all doubt
from the photostat in evidence. The same applies to the con-
tents of the communication. The Referent did not report the
contents to me. What I knew was that certain treasures were
in the hands of the Reich Main Office, which had been captured
by the Wehrmacht and turned in to the Reich Main Finance
Office. It is necessary for me, once again, to emphasize the fact
that the Reich Main Finance Office was an agency of the entire
Reich, and all the Ministries made use of the Reich Main Finance
Office. Now, what individual accounts may have been maintained
there and what amounts were paid into any such accounts was a
thing which the individual departments handled within their
jurisdiction, say, for example, the Reich Minister of the Interior
had, let me assume it just for this once, illegally acquired assets
and paid them into an account with the Reich Main Finance
Office, in which event there was nothing I could do to change
that. I wasn’t even notified about that with a single word. This
resulted from the over-all structure of organization of the entire
Reich administration.

Q. In the prosecution document that we have just now dis-
cussed, the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office refers
to a discussion they had with the Deputy of the Reich Ministry
of Finance. In connection with such a merely technical pro-
cedure, why was it necessary at all to call in conferences?

A. I don’t know the answer to that either. Normally it wouldn’t
have been necessary but, furthermore, this seems to be wrong

* Reproduced in section IX B 1.

408

because, as can be seen by Patzer’s letter to Gossel, it says
specifically that this statement is based on an error of fact.
Patzer, in any case, says that he did not take part in any such
conference.

Q. This last question refers to the same prosecution exhibit,
English pages 167 and 168, where you will find this Patzer
statement that you just referred to. Do I understand you cor-
rectly to say that this Patzer-Gossel correspondence, to all prac-
tical intents, refers to a settlement of procedure in regard to
the expenses involved in connection with assets turned into the
Reich Main Finance Office by any of the Reich Ministries or
Departments?

A. Yes. That is correct. That's the very thing.

*******

Q. Let us now discuss Prosecution Exhibit 2452 in prosecu-
tion document book 75, page 170 of the English, Document Num-
ber NG-4905.* This is a circular letter issued by Geheimrat
Schlueter and signed by him, he being a member on the staff of
your ministry. He notifies the senior finance presidents that
the deportation of Jews from the Reich area was proposed to
take place to a city located in the eastern territories and the
law concerning public enemies was to form the basis of this
deportation operation. Did this circular letter of Schlueter come
to your knowledge?

A. No. I don't think that I previously knew this circular
letter but I do know that as far as the technical handling of the
property was concerned which deported Jews left behind them,
this matter was reported to me by Schlueter. He reported to
me at the time that the Regierungspraesidenten would hold juris-
diction to pass the necessary confiscation orders, and these offi-
cials were agencies of the Reich Ministry of the Interior. It
was mandatory for the Jews prior to their deportation to submit
registration lists of their property to the Gestapo, and these prop-
erty registration lists were passed on to the Finance Administra-
tion and the latter was responsible for the administration of this
property as well as its utilization. Schlueter reported to me,
saying that in conformity with my general directives, it had been
ordered that a special file was to be drawn up for each individual
case and an account index card was to be set up covering each
individual case which was to show the incoming as well as the
outgoing items in detail, so that at any time it should be possible
to have a proper survey concerning the actual status of the
property involved. At that time I again emphasized to Schlueter

* Reproduced in part earlier in this section.

409

how necessary it was to maintain these property indices up to
date and to store them in safe locations.

*******

Q. Count Schwerin, you cosigned the 13th decree pursuant to
the Citizenship Law. That is Prosecution Exhibit 2456 in book
75 on page 189 of the English, Document 1422-PS. 1 I am hav-
ing this document passed to you.

(The witness is handed the document.)

This decree provides that punishable acts committed by Jews
are to be prosecuted by the police and that after the death of a
Jew his property is forfeited to the Reich. In accordance, first
of all, with what you have been saying, I am starting from the
assumption that this decree was submitted to you because of the
possible forfeiture of property into the hands of the Reich, is
that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have no misgivings about signing this decree on
account of its other contents?

A. The other contents were actually no business of mine, but
if we are to go into the question of misgivings at all, I can say
the following: I remember quite clearly that at that time this
decree was submitted to me with the statement that, on the
basis of a Hitler order, matters had already been handled for
the last 9 months in the manner provided in the ordinance, that
is, the prosecution of punishable offenses by the Jews by the
police instead of by the courts, and it was quite hopeless to at-
tempt to undertake anything directed against this Fuehrer order
and against this regulation of procedure. For me, however, the
following consideration also played a part. In the Jewish ques-
tion as in a number of other questions, as I have repeatedly
mentioned, the main thing seemed to me to gain time. I was
convinced that the official promulgation would guarantee greater
protection under the law than if the police, as heretofore, handled
the matter more or less anonymously. Nothing is more detri-
mental to an agency than acting in the dark. With respect to
the task imposed on me under this decree of taking over prop-
erty, everything had been done in order to register such property
accurately, as I have already described.

Q. I would like here to refer to an excerpt from the judgment
in the Justice Case, which was tried before a Military Tribunal
here in Nuernberg. This is [Krosigk] Defense Exhibit 74 in
book 2, [Krosigk] Document 160. 2 This describes the actual

1 Reproduced in section IX B 1.

2 This extract from the judgment in the Justice Case is not reproduced herein. The com-
plete judgment is reproduced in Volume III, this series.

410

practice such as was customary long before the decree was is-
sued. Now, before we leave this subject, I would like to come
back once again to your personal attitude in these matters. You
had mentioned that the Crystal Week was the most terrible thing
for you. You have already mentioned your over-all plan of alle-
viating the hardships of a few people as much as possible and
said that this in the main was why, at your friends’ advice, you
did not resign. Did you achieve this goal?

A. Of course, I unfortunately could not achieve in full the
goal which I had in mind. I have already described the measures
I undertook in the execution of laws and decrees so far as my
Ministry was concerned with them, in order to carry out the
alleviation policy I pursued. The second thing that I still could
do, and that is what I always tried to do, was to help in individual
cases. I have already mentioned that although I was not success-
ful in all such cases I, at any rate, never turned a deaf ear to
any single request addressed to me. This also applied particularly
to these Jewish cases. I considered it one of the most important
parts of the functions of a Minister at that time, particularly
because there no longer existed any parliament before which
complaints could be aired. It was specially this part of my
ministerial work which strengthened me in the feeling that I
considered it a necessity to remain in office. If I had not been
there, the applicants wouldn’t even have dared to hand in a re-
quest and if they had done so, none the less, it would have been
thrown into the wastepaper basket. To furnish only some idea
of the kind of requests made to me, I have already discussed the
requests submitted concerning the remaining in office of officials
who were related to Jews, other requests concerned hardships
resulting from the collection of the Jewish atonement fine, other
hardships arose out of the 11th supplement to the Reich Citizen-
ship Law, further requests were concerned with the possibilities
of emigration. Then it was always a matter of obtaining the
necessary foreign currency from the Ministry of Economics.
Finally, I received requests to prevent the evacuation which
threatened. Up to the outbreak of war, I tried to make possible
the emigration of the largest possible number of Jews. During
the, last years, on the other hand, I was trying to protect as
many Jews as possible from threatening evacuation. Inevitably
as a protective measure this involved playing for time. From
this point of view, one must explain and assess many measures
of that time.

*******

Q. Count Schwerin, 3V2 years have elapsed since the collapse.
You have had many experiences in that time and have found out

411

many things that you did know before 1945. You have reflected
on your position in the 12 years of Hitler's rule. What is your
own opinion now of that period? And of your behavior during
that period?

A. I served the Hitler government initially because I held it
to be my duty as a civil servant. This was under the only govern-
ment that political conditions at that time made possible. I felt
I should not desert work and my administration. Later, because
only from such a position was I able to prevent injustice so far
as my power extended and preserve valuable institutions and
help those who were afflicted and finally because I considered it a
manifestation of lack of character to desert the sinking ship, I
remained. Personal ambition played no role in my decision to do
so. From today's point of view and in the full knowledge of
matters now which were not then known to me, my behavior
might, at that time, be regarded as politically erroneous. Po-
litically erroneous primarily for this reason — because under dic-
tatorship, whether dictatorship by one person or by a party, all
decent respectable work and all honest effort must finally be
brought under the service of the dictatorship. That is the tragic
lesson we have learned during the past 12 years — a lesson that
not only I have learned, but others. But my decisions must be
evaluated from the status at that time and any considerations
that bore with that time. And from that point of view, if I
were once again faced with the same decision, I should again act
as my duty commands in the same way as I did then. It was
perfectly clear to me that this decision would bring me into inner
conflicts and in such a position it is dreadfully difficult always
to do the correct thing. Nor do I assert myself that I was free
of err. Out of deep conviction I take a part in the Declaration
of the Evangelical Churches of Germany made at Stuttgart which
confesses the weakness of Christians. But from there to crim-
inality is a long way. I did not consciously and deliberately take
part in any crime. On the contrary, so far as my powers ex-
tended, I combatted that and endeavored, in my own doing, and
in my office, to maintain the principles of right and morality.
Three more sentences, if the Tribunal will permit. Consequently,
after the capitulation I considered it the most basic duty of all
men who had occupied leading positions to tell the whole and pure
truth so that the crimes committed under the Hitler government
might be named by name and not beautified, but also to throw
their weight in favor of a just evaluation of these men who had
acted not out of ambition or opportunism, but from a decent
sense of duty and during this regime had conducted a quiet but
stubborn fight for the good. Consequently, I also held it to be

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412

my duty, in view of the problem of national socialism, as well
as the problem of communism, to emphasize that such radical
tendencies are unpaid bills which are presented to the leading
classes. If these bills are not paid in time, then the creditors
will see to it that they are reimbursed one way or the other. That
was the case in national socialism. God grant that not again will
unpaid bills bring incalculable misery upon the world.

* * * * * * *

CROSS-EX AMIN A TION

*******

Mr. Hardy: * * * What do you know about the Warsaw
ghetto?

Witness Schwerin von Krosigk : Officially I know only what
I have already testified to during my direct examination, that on
one occasion Referenten of mine spoke about the question as to
whether assets and property from the Warsaw ghetto had or
had not been delivered to the Reich Main Finance Office. Later
there were rumors to the effect that this was not the case.

Q. Well, did you supply the funds or make available the funds
for the demolition of the Warsaw ghetto?

A. I know — I can't tell you the exact year now — that funds
were requested for hygienic reasons, as it was said then, to
undertake rebuilding there in the Warsaw ghetto.

Q. Well, to refresh your recollection, I wish to show you Docu-
ment NG-5561, which I mark for identification as Prosecution
Exhibit 3916.*

Judge Christianson, Presiding: Document NG-5561 will be
given identification number 3916.

Mr. Hardy: Now, on the first page of that photostat, your
initial appears at the bottom, doesn't it?

Witness Schwerin von Krosigk: Yes.

Q. And you propose there that you will supply or make avail-
able the necessary installments for the demolition of the Warsaw
ghetto, but that you weren't quite able to authorize the entire
expenditure at that time.

A. Yes. This corresponds to what I said, namely, that funds —
and here we find the year 1944 — were requested for the demoli-
tion of the ghetto.

Q. Well now, if you will look at page 3 of the original, the
last note, addressed to you as Reich Finance Minister, we find
in the last paragraph that the moveable property in Jewish hands
was realized and the proceeds paid in favor of the Reich Finance
Minister. Is that true? Were they actually paid to you?

* Reproduced above in this section.

963402—62 27

413

A. I cannot say. I never saw this letter before. With the
best will in the world I cannot answer that question.

Q. Well, did the proceeds — ignoring the letter for the moment
— did the proceeds of the Jewish property confiscated from the
Warsaw ghetto go to the Reich Finance Ministry?

A. I have already told you, I cannot tell you, I don’t know.
What was reported to me was that none of these funds reached
the Reich Main Finance Office.

He * sfc * $ * *

EXTRACTS FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT LAMMERS 1
DIRECT EXAMINATION

H! He * Hs He He He

Dr. Seidl (counsel for defendant Lammers) : On 20 January
1942 a conference took place with Heydrich at Berlin-Wannsee.
The alleged minutes of this conference were submitted by the
prosecution in book 76. It is in the same document I mentioned
just now, that is, Document NG-2586-G, Prosecution Exhibit
1452. 2 Were these records submitted to you? Did you read
them or hear of them in any other way?

Defendant Lammers: These weren’t records. They’re just
one-sided minutes, compiled in the RSHA. If, which I doubt,
these minutes were really sent out to everybody who attended
the meeting, which included my Ministerial Councillor Kritzinger,
I must still deny that they were ever submitted to me or that
I ever read them. These minutes are something I would have
remembered. I don’t think that they ever reached the Reich
Chancellery and I have quite a number of reasons for supposing
that. On the other hand, it is not impossible that Kritzinger
reported to me about this conference, but that was a